AgeCommit message (Collapse)Author
2021-09-15Linux 5.4.146v5.4.146Greg Kroah-Hartman
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210913131047.974309396@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com> Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudip.mukherjee@codethink.co.uk> Tested-by: Hulk Robot <hulkrobot@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15clk: kirkwood: Fix a clocking boot regressionLinus Walleij
commit aaedb9e00e5400220a8871180d23a83e67f29f63 upstream. Since a few kernel releases the Pogoplug 4 has crashed like this during boot: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000002 (...) [<c04116ec>] (strlen) from [<c00ead80>] (kstrdup+0x1c/0x4c) [<c00ead80>] (kstrdup) from [<c04591d8>] (__clk_register+0x44/0x37c) [<c04591d8>] (__clk_register) from [<c04595ec>] (clk_hw_register+0x20/0x44) [<c04595ec>] (clk_hw_register) from [<c045bfa8>] (__clk_hw_register_mux+0x198/0x1e4) [<c045bfa8>] (__clk_hw_register_mux) from [<c045c050>] (clk_register_mux_table+0x5c/0x6c) [<c045c050>] (clk_register_mux_table) from [<c0acf3e0>] (kirkwood_clk_muxing_setup.constprop.0+0x13c/0x1ac) [<c0acf3e0>] (kirkwood_clk_muxing_setup.constprop.0) from [<c0aceae0>] (of_clk_init+0x12c/0x214) [<c0aceae0>] (of_clk_init) from [<c0ab576c>] (time_init+0x20/0x2c) [<c0ab576c>] (time_init) from [<c0ab3d18>] (start_kernel+0x3dc/0x56c) [<c0ab3d18>] (start_kernel) from [<00000000>] (0x0) Code: e3130020 1afffffb e12fff1e c08a1078 (e5d03000) This is because the "powersave" mux clock 0 was provided in an unterminated array, which is required by the loop in the driver: /* Count, allocate, and register clock muxes */ for (n = 0; desc[n].name;) n++; Here n will go out of bounds and then call clk_register_mux() on random memory contents after the mux clock. Fix this by terminating the array with a blank entry. Fixes: 105299381d87 ("cpufreq: kirkwood: use the powersave multiplexer") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Cc: Chris Packham <chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz> Cc: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@bootlin.com> Cc: Sebastian Hesselbarth <sebastian.hesselbarth@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210814235514.403426-1-linus.walleij@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15backlight: pwm_bl: Improve bootloader/kernel device handoverDaniel Thompson
commit 79fad92f2e596f5a8dd085788a24f540263ef887 upstream. Currently there are (at least) two problems in the way pwm_bl starts managing the enable_gpio pin. Both occur when the backlight is initially off and the driver finds the pin not already in output mode and, as a result, unconditionally switches it to output-mode and asserts the signal. Problem 1: This could cause the backlight to flicker since, at this stage in driver initialisation, we have no idea what the PWM and regulator are doing (an unconfigured PWM could easily "rest" at 100% duty cycle). Problem 2: This will cause us not to correctly honour the post_pwm_on_delay (which also risks flickers). Fix this by moving the code to configure the GPIO output mode until after we have examines the handover state. That allows us to initialize enable_gpio to off if the backlight is currently off and on if the backlight is on. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Acked-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de> Tested-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15fbmem: don't allow too huge resolutionsTetsuo Handa
commit 8c28051cdcbe9dfcec6bd0a4709d67a09df6edae upstream. syzbot is reporting page fault at vga16fb_fillrect() [1], for vga16fb_check_var() is failing to detect multiplication overflow. if (vxres * vyres > maxmem) { vyres = maxmem / vxres; if (vyres < yres) return -ENOMEM; } Since no module would accept too huge resolutions where multiplication overflow happens, let's reject in the common path. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=04168c8063cfdde1db5e [1] Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+04168c8063cfdde1db5e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Debugged-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/185175d6-227a-7b55-433d-b070929b262c@i-love.sakura.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15IMA: remove the dependency on CRYPTO_MD5THOBY Simon
commit 8510505d55e194d3f6c9644c9f9d12c4f6b0395a upstream. MD5 is a weak digest algorithm that shouldn't be used for cryptographic operation. It hinders the efficiency of a patch set that aims to limit the digests allowed for the extended file attribute namely security.ima. MD5 is no longer a requirement for IMA, nor should it be used there. The sole place where we still use the MD5 algorithm inside IMA is setting the ima_hash algorithm to MD5, if the user supplies 'ima_hash=md5' parameter on the command line. With commit ab60368ab6a4 ("ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithm"), setting "ima_hash=md5" fails gracefully when CRYPTO_MD5 is not set: ima: Can not allocate md5 (reason: -2) ima: Allocating md5 failed, going to use default hash algorithm sha256 Remove the CRYPTO_MD5 dependency for IMA. Signed-off-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr> Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> [zohar@linux.ibm.com: include commit number in patch description for stable.] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.17 Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15IMA: remove -Wmissing-prototypes warningAustin Kim
commit a32ad90426a9c8eb3915eed26e08ce133bd9e0da upstream. With W=1 build, the compiler throws warning message as below: security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c:24:12: warning: no previous prototype for ‘ima_mok_init’ [-Wmissing-prototypes] __init int ima_mok_init(void) Silence the warning by adding static keyword to ima_mok_init(). Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austin.kim@lge.com> Fixes: 41c89b64d718 ("IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15fuse: flush extending writesMiklos Szeredi
commit 59bda8ecee2ffc6a602b7bf2b9e43ca669cdbdcd upstream. Callers of fuse_writeback_range() assume that the file is ready for modification by the server in the supplied byte range after the call returns. If there's a write that extends the file beyond the end of the supplied range, then the file needs to be extended to at least the end of the range, but currently that's not done. There are at least two cases where this can cause problems: - copy_file_range() will return short count if the file is not extended up to end of the source range. - FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE | FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE will not extend the file, hence the region may not be fully allocated. Fix by flushing writes from the start of the range up to the end of the file. This could be optimized if the writes are non-extending, etc, but it's probably not worth the trouble. Fixes: a2bc92362941 ("fuse: fix copy_file_range() in the writeback case") Fixes: 6b1bdb56b17c ("fuse: allow fallocate(FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE)") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.2 Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15fuse: truncate pagecache on atomic_o_truncMiklos Szeredi
commit 76224355db7570cbe6b6f75c8929a1558828dd55 upstream. fuse_finish_open() will be called with FUSE_NOWRITE in case of atomic O_TRUNC. This can deadlock with fuse_wait_on_page_writeback() in fuse_launder_page() triggered by invalidate_inode_pages2(). Fix by replacing invalidate_inode_pages2() in fuse_finish_open() with a truncate_pagecache() call. This makes sense regardless of FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE or fc->writeback cache, so do it unconditionally. Reported-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com> Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+bea44a5189836d956894@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: e4648309b85a ("fuse: truncate pending writes on O_TRUNC") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15KVM: nVMX: Unconditionally clear nested.pi_pending on nested VM-EnterSean Christopherson
commit f7782bb8d818d8f47c26b22079db10599922787a upstream. Clear nested.pi_pending on nested VM-Enter even if L2 will run without posted interrupts enabled. If nested.pi_pending is left set from a previous L2, vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() will pick up the stale flag and exit to userspace with an "internal emulation error" due the new L2 not having a valid nested.pi_desc. Arguably, vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() should first check for posted interrupts being enabled, but it's also completely reasonable that KVM wouldn't screw up a fundamental flag. Not to mention that the mere existence of nested.pi_pending is a long-standing bug as KVM shouldn't move the posted interrupt out of the IRR until it's actually processed, e.g. KVM effectively drops an interrupt when it performs a nested VM-Exit with a "pending" posted interrupt. Fixing the mess is a future problem. Prior to vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() interpreting a null PI descriptor as an error, this was a benign bug as the null PI descriptor effectively served as a check on PI not being enabled. Even then, the new flow did not become problematic until KVM started checking the result of kvm_check_nested_events(). Fixes: 705699a13994 ("KVM: nVMX: Enable nested posted interrupt processing") Fixes: 966eefb89657 ("KVM: nVMX: Disable vmcs02 posted interrupts if vmcs12 PID isn't mappable") Fixes: 47d3530f86c0 ("KVM: x86: Exit to userspace when kvm_check_nested_events fails") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210810144526.2662272-1-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15KVM: x86: Update vCPU's hv_clock before back to guest when tsc_offset is ↵Zelin Deng
adjusted commit d9130a2dfdd4b21736c91b818f87dbc0ccd1e757 upstream. When MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST is written by guest due to TSC ADJUST feature especially there's a big tsc warp (like a new vCPU is hot-added into VM which has been up for a long time), tsc_offset is added by a large value then go back to guest. This causes system time jump as tsc_timestamp is not adjusted in the meantime and pvclock monotonic character. To fix this, just notify kvm to update vCPU's guest time before back to guest. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Zelin Deng <zelin.deng@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <1619576521-81399-2-git-send-email-zelin.deng@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15KVM: s390: index kvm->arch.idle_mask by vcpu_idxHalil Pasic
commit a3e03bc1368c1bc16e19b001fc96dc7430573cc8 upstream. While in practice vcpu->vcpu_idx == vcpu->vcp_id is often true, it may not always be, and we must not rely on this. Reason is that KVM decides the vcpu_idx, userspace decides the vcpu_id, thus the two might not match. Currently kvm->arch.idle_mask is indexed by vcpu_id, which implies that code like for_each_set_bit(vcpu_id, kvm->arch.idle_mask, online_vcpus) { vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(kvm, vcpu_id); do_stuff(vcpu); } is not legit. Reason is that kvm_get_vcpu expects an vcpu_idx, not an vcpu_id. The trouble is, we do actually use kvm->arch.idle_mask like this. To fix this problem we have two options. Either use kvm_get_vcpu_by_id(vcpu_id), which would loop to find the right vcpu_id, or switch to indexing via vcpu_idx. The latter is preferable for obvious reasons. Let us make switch from indexing kvm->arch.idle_mask by vcpu_id to indexing it by vcpu_idx. To keep gisa_int.kicked_mask indexed by the same index as idle_mask lets make the same change for it as well. Fixes: 1ee0bc559dc3 ("KVM: s390: get rid of local_int array") Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Bornträger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.15+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210827125429.1912577-1-pasic@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15x86/resctrl: Fix a maybe-uninitialized build warning treated as errorBabu Moger
commit 527f721478bce3f49b513a733bacd19d6f34b08c upstream. The recent commit 064855a69003 ("x86/resctrl: Fix default monitoring groups reporting") caused a RHEL build failure with an uninitialized variable warning treated as an error because it removed the default case snippet. The RHEL Makefile uses '-Werror=maybe-uninitialized' to force possibly uninitialized variable warnings to be treated as errors. This is also reported by smatch via the 0day robot. The error from the RHEL build is: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c: In function ‘__mon_event_count’: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c:261:12: error: ‘m’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized] m->chunks += chunks; ^~ The upstream Makefile does not build using '-Werror=maybe-uninitialized'. So, the problem is not seen there. Fix the problem by putting back the default case snippet. [ bp: note that there's nothing wrong with the code and other compilers do not trigger this warning - this is being done just so the RHEL compiler is happy. ] Fixes: 064855a69003 ("x86/resctrl: Fix default monitoring groups reporting") Reported-by: Terry Bowman <Terry.Bowman@amd.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/162949631908.23903.17090272726012848523.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15perf/x86/amd/ibs: Extend PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_EXCLUDE to IBS OpKim Phillips
commit f11dd0d80555cdc8eaf5cfc9e19c9e198217f9f1 upstream. Commit: 2ff40250691e ("perf/core, arch/x86: Use PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_EXCLUDE for exclusion incapable PMUs") neglected to do so. Fixes: 2ff40250691e ("perf/core, arch/x86: Use PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_EXCLUDE for exclusion incapable PMUs") Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210817221048.88063-2-kim.phillips@amd.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15tty: Fix data race between tiocsti() and flush_to_ldisc()Nguyen Dinh Phi
commit bb2853a6a421a052268eee00fd5d3f6b3504b2b1 upstream. The ops->receive_buf() may be accessed concurrently from these two functions. If the driver flushes data to the line discipline receive_buf() method while tiocsti() is waiting for the ops->receive_buf() to finish its work, the data race will happen. For example: tty_ioctl |tty_ldisc_receive_buf ->tioctsi | ->tty_port_default_receive_buf | ->tty_ldisc_receive_buf ->hci_uart_tty_receive | ->hci_uart_tty_receive ->h4_recv | ->h4_recv In this case, the h4 receive buffer will be overwritten by the latecomer, and we will lost the data. Hence, change tioctsi() function to use the exclusive lock interface from tty_buffer to avoid the data race. Reported-by: syzbot+97388eb9d31b997fe1d0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Nguyen Dinh Phi <phind.uet@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210823000641.2082292-1-phind.uet@gmail.com Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15time: Handle negative seconds correctly in timespec64_to_ns()Lukas Hannen
commit 39ff83f2f6cc5cc1458dfcea9697f96338210beb upstream. timespec64_ns() prevents multiplication overflows by comparing the seconds value of the timespec to KTIME_SEC_MAX. If the value is greater or equal it returns KTIME_MAX. But that check casts the signed seconds value to unsigned which makes the comparision true for all negative values and therefore return wrongly KTIME_MAX. Negative second values are perfectly valid and required in some places, e.g. ptp_clock_adjtime(). Remove the cast and add a check for the negative boundary which is required to prevent undefined behaviour due to multiplication underflow. Fixes: cb47755725da ("time: Prevent undefined behaviour in timespec64_to_ns()")' Signed-off-by: Lukas Hannen <lukas.hannen@opensource.tttech-industrial.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/AM6PR01MB541637BD6F336B8FFB72AF80EEC69@AM6PR01MB5416.eurprd01.prod.exchangelabs.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15bpf: Fix pointer arithmetic mask tightening under state pruningDaniel Borkmann
commit e042aa532c84d18ff13291d00620502ce7a38dda upstream. In 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask") we narrowed the offset mask for unprivileged pointer arithmetic in order to mitigate a corner case where in the speculative domain it is possible to advance, for example, the map value pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of- bounds in order to leak kernel memory via side-channel to user space. The verifier's state pruning for scalars leaves one corner case open where in the first verification path R_x holds an unknown scalar with an aux->alu_limit of e.g. 7, and in a second verification path that same register R_x, here denoted as R_x', holds an unknown scalar which has tighter bounds and would thus satisfy range_within(R_x, R_x') as well as tnum_in(R_x, R_x') for state pruning, yielding an aux->alu_limit of 3: Given the second path fits the register constraints for pruning, the final generated mask from aux->alu_limit will remain at 7. While technically not wrong for the non-speculative domain, it would however be possible to craft similar cases where the mask would be too wide as in 7fedb63a8307. One way to fix it is to detect the presence of unknown scalar map pointer arithmetic and force a deeper search on unknown scalars to ensure that we do not run into a masking mismatch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [OP: adjusted context in include/linux/bpf_verifier.h for 5.4] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15bpf: verifier: Allocate idmap scratch in verifier envLorenz Bauer
commit c9e73e3d2b1eb1ea7ff068e05007eec3bd8ef1c9 upstream. func_states_equal makes a very short lived allocation for idmap, probably because it's too large to fit on the stack. However the function is called quite often, leading to a lot of alloc / free churn. Replace the temporary allocation with dedicated scratch space in struct bpf_verifier_env. Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210429134656.122225-4-lmb@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [OP: adjusted context for 5.4] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigationDaniel Borkmann
commit 2039f26f3aca5b0e419b98f65dd36481337b86ee upstream. Spectre v4 gadgets make use of memory disambiguation, which is a set of techniques that execute memory access instructions, that is, loads and stores, out of program order; Intel's optimization manual, section A load instruction micro-op may depend on a preceding store. Many microarchitectures block loads until all preceding store addresses are known. The memory disambiguator predicts which loads will not depend on any previous stores. When the disambiguator predicts that a load does not have such a dependency, the load takes its data from the L1 data cache. Eventually, the prediction is verified. If an actual conflict is detected, the load and all succeeding instructions are re-executed. af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") tried to mitigate this attack by sanitizing the memory locations through preemptive "fast" (low latency) stores of zero prior to the actual "slow" (high latency) store of a pointer value such that upon dependency misprediction the CPU then speculatively executes the load of the pointer value and retrieves the zero value instead of the attacker controlled scalar value previously stored at that location, meaning, subsequent access in the speculative domain is then redirected to the "zero page". The sanitized preemptive store of zero prior to the actual "slow" store is done through a simple ST instruction based on r10 (frame pointer) with relative offset to the stack location that the verifier has been tracking on the original used register for STX, which does not have to be r10. Thus, there are no memory dependencies for this store, since it's only using r10 and immediate constant of zero; hence af86ca4e3088 /assumed/ a low latency operation. However, a recent attack demonstrated that this mitigation is not sufficient since the preemptive store of zero could also be turned into a "slow" store and is thus bypassed as well: [...] // r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar) // r7 = pointer to map value 31: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2 // r9 will remain "fast" register, r10 will become "slow" register below 32: (bf) r9 = r10 // JIT maps BPF reg to x86 reg: // r9 -> r15 (callee saved) // r10 -> rbp // train store forward prediction to break dependency link between both r9 // and r10 by evicting them from the predictor's LRU table. 33: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24576) 34: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0 35: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24580) 36: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0 37: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24584) 38: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0 39: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24588) 40: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0 [...] 543: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596) 544: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0 // prepare call to bpf_ringbuf_output() helper. the latter will cause rbp // to spill to stack memory while r13/r14/r15 (all callee saved regs) remain // in hardware registers. rbp becomes slow due to push/pop latency. below is // disasm of bpf_ringbuf_output() helper for better visual context: // // ffffffff8117ee20: 41 54 push r12 // ffffffff8117ee22: 55 push rbp // ffffffff8117ee23: 53 push rbx // ffffffff8117ee24: 48 f7 c1 fc ff ff ff test rcx,0xfffffffffffffffc // ffffffff8117ee2b: 0f 85 af 00 00 00 jne ffffffff8117eee0 <-- jump taken // [...] // ffffffff8117eee0: 49 c7 c4 ea ff ff ff mov r12,0xffffffffffffffea // ffffffff8117eee7: 5b pop rbx // ffffffff8117eee8: 5d pop rbp // ffffffff8117eee9: 4c 89 e0 mov rax,r12 // ffffffff8117eeec: 41 5c pop r12 // ffffffff8117eeee: c3 ret 545: (18) r1 = map[id:4] 547: (bf) r2 = r7 548: (b7) r3 = 0 549: (b7) r4 = 4 550: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_output#194288 // instruction 551 inserted by verifier \ 551: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here // storing map value pointer r7 at fp-16 | since value of r10 is "slow". 552: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 / // following "fast" read to the same memory location, but due to dependency // misprediction it will speculatively execute before insn 551/552 completes. 553: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r9 -16) // in speculative domain contains attacker controlled r2. in non-speculative // domain this contains r7, and thus accesses r7 +0 below. 554: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) // leak r3 As can be seen, the current speculative store bypass mitigation which the verifier inserts at line 551 is insufficient since /both/, the write of the zero sanitation as well as the map value pointer are a high latency instruction due to prior memory access via push/pop of r10 (rbp) in contrast to the low latency read in line 553 as r9 (r15) which stays in hardware registers. Thus, architecturally, fp-16 is r7, however, microarchitecturally, fp-16 can still be r2. Initial thoughts to address this issue was to track spilled pointer loads from stack and enforce their load via LDX through r10 as well so that /both/ the preemptive store of zero /as well as/ the load use the /same/ register such that a dependency is created between the store and load. However, this option is not sufficient either since it can be bypassed as well under speculation. An updated attack with pointer spill/fills now _all_ based on r10 would look as follows: [...] // r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar) // r7 = pointer to map value [...] // longer store forward prediction training sequence than before. 2062: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25588) 2063: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30708) = r0 2064: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25592) 2065: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30712) = r0 2066: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596) 2067: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0 // store the speculative load address (scalar) this time after the store // forward prediction training. 2068: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2 // preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores. 2069: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0 2070: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0 2071: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0 2072: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0 2073: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29712) = r0 2074: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29716) = r0 2075: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29720) = r0 2076: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29724) = r0 2077: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29728) = r0 2078: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29732) = r0 2079: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29736) = r0 2080: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29740) = r0 2081: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29744) = r0 2082: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29748) = r0 2083: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29752) = r0 2084: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29756) = r0 2085: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29760) = r0 2086: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29764) = r0 2087: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29768) = r0 2088: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29772) = r0 2089: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29776) = r0 2090: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29780) = r0 2091: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29784) = r0 2092: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29788) = r0 2093: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29792) = r0 2094: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0 2095: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0 2096: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0 2097: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0 2098: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0 // overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; same as before, also including the // sanitation store with 0 from the current mitigation by the verifier. 2099: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here 2100: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 | since store unit is still busy. // load from stack intended to bypass stores. 2101: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 2102: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) // leak r3 [...] Looking at the CPU microarchitecture, the scheduler might issue loads (such as seen in line 2101) before stores (line 2099,2100) because the load execution units become available while the store execution unit is still busy with the sequence of dummy stores (line 2069-2098). And so the load may use the prior stored scalar from r2 at address r10 -16 for speculation. The updated attack may work less reliable on CPU microarchitectures where loads and stores share execution resources. This concludes that the sanitizing with zero stores from af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") is insufficient. Moreover, the detection of stack reuse from af86ca4e3088 where previously data (STACK_MISC) has been written to a given stack slot where a pointer value is now to be stored does not have sufficient coverage as precondition for the mitigation either; for several reasons outlined as follows: 1) Stack content from prior program runs could still be preserved and is therefore not "random", best example is to split a speculative store bypass attack between tail calls, program A would prepare and store the oob address at a given stack slot and then tail call into program B which does the "slow" store of a pointer to the stack with subsequent "fast" read. From program B PoV such stack slot type is STACK_INVALID, and therefore also must be subject to mitigation. 2) The STACK_SPILL must not be coupled to register_is_const(&stack->spilled_ptr) condition, for example, the previous content of that memory location could also be a pointer to map or map value. Without the fix, a speculative store bypass is not mitigated in such precondition and can then lead to a type confusion in the speculative domain leaking kernel memory near these pointer types. While brainstorming on various alternative mitigation possibilities, we also stumbled upon a retrospective from Chrome developers [0]: [...] For variant 4, we implemented a mitigation to zero the unused memory of the heap prior to allocation, which cost about 1% when done concurrently and 4% for scavenging. Variant 4 defeats everything we could think of. We explored more mitigations for variant 4 but the threat proved to be more pervasive and dangerous than we anticipated. For example, stack slots used by the register allocator in the optimizing compiler could be subject to type confusion, leading to pointer crafting. Mitigating type confusion for stack slots alone would have required a complete redesign of the backend of the optimizing compiler, perhaps man years of work, without a guarantee of completeness. [...] >From BPF side, the problem space is reduced, however, options are rather limited. One idea that has been explored was to xor-obfuscate pointer spills to the BPF stack: [...] // preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores. [...] 2106: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0 2107: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0 2108: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0 2109: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0 2110: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0 // overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; xored with random 'secret' value // of 943576462 before store ... 2111: (b4) w11 = 943576462 2112: (af) r11 ^= r7 2113: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r11 2114: (79) r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 2115: (b4) w2 = 943576462 2116: (af) r2 ^= r11 // ... and restored with the same 'secret' value with the help of AX reg. 2117: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) [...] While the above would not prevent speculation, it would make data leakage infeasible by directing it to random locations. In order to be effective and prevent type confusion under speculation, such random secret would have to be regenerated for each store. The additional complexity involved for a tracking mechanism that prevents jumps such that restoring spilled pointers would not get corrupted is not worth the gain for unprivileged. Hence, the fix in here eventually opted for emitting a non-public BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC instruction which the x86 JIT translates into a lfence opcode. Inserting the latter in between the store and load instruction is one of the mitigations options [1]. The x86 instruction manual notes: [...] An LFENCE that follows an instruction that stores to memory might complete before the data being stored have become globally visible. [...] The latter meaning that the preceding store instruction finished execution and the store is at minimum guaranteed to be in the CPU's store queue, but it's not guaranteed to be in that CPU's L1 cache at that point (globally visible). The latter would only be guaranteed via sfence. So the load which is guaranteed to execute after the lfence for that local CPU would have to rely on store-to-load forwarding. [2], in section 2.3 on store buffers says: [...] For every store operation that is added to the ROB, an entry is allocated in the store buffer. This entry requires both the virtual and physical address of the target. Only if there is no free entry in the store buffer, the frontend stalls until there is an empty slot available in the store buffer again. Otherwise, the CPU can immediately continue adding subsequent instructions to the ROB and execute them out of order. On Intel CPUs, the store buffer has up to 56 entries. [...] One small upside on the fix is that it lifts constraints from af86ca4e3088 where the sanitize_stack_off relative to r10 must be the same when coming from different paths. The BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC gets emitted after a BPF_STX or BPF_ST instruction. This happens either when we store a pointer or data value to the BPF stack for the first time, or upon later pointer spills. The former needs to be enforced since otherwise stale stack data could be leaked under speculation as outlined earlier. For non-x86 JITs the BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC mapping is currently optimized away, but others could emit a speculation barrier as well if necessary. For real-world unprivileged programs e.g. generated by LLVM, pointer spill/fill is only generated upon register pressure and LLVM only tries to do that for pointers which are not used often. The program main impact will be the initial BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC sanitation for the STACK_INVALID case when the first write to a stack slot occurs e.g. upon map lookup. In future we might refine ways to mitigate the latter cost. [0] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.05178.pdf [1] https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2018/05/21/analysis-and-mitigation-of-speculative-store-bypass-cve-2018-3639/ [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.05725.pdf Fixes: af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") Fixes: f7cf25b2026d ("bpf: track spill/fill of constants") Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> [OP: - apply check_stack_write_fixed_off() changes in check_stack_write() - replace env->bypass_spec_v4 -> env->allow_ptr_leaks] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction for mitigating Spectre v4Daniel Borkmann
commit f5e81d1117501546b7be050c5fbafa6efd2c722c upstream. In case of JITs, each of the JIT backends compiles the BPF nospec instruction /either/ to a machine instruction which emits a speculation barrier /or/ to /no/ machine instruction in case the underlying architecture is not affected by Speculative Store Bypass or has different mitigations in place already. This covers both x86 and (implicitly) arm64: In case of x86, we use 'lfence' instruction for mitigation. In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation as controlled via the ssbd kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled, it works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any additional instructions here (hence only comment in arm64 JIT). Other archs can follow as needed. The BPF nospec instruction is specifically targeting Spectre v4 since i) we don't use a serialization barrier for the Spectre v1 case, and ii) mitigation instructions for v1 and v4 might be different on some archs. The BPF nospec is required for a future commit, where the BPF verifier does annotate intermediate BPF programs with speculation barriers. Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> [OP: - adjusted context for 5.4 - apply riscv changes to /arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp.c] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15ipv4: fix endianness issue in inet_rtm_getroute_build_skb()Eric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 92548b0ee220e000d81c27ac9a80e0ede895a881 ] The UDP length field should be in network order. This removes the following sparse error: net/ipv4/route.c:3173:27: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) net/ipv4/route.c:3173:27: expected restricted __be16 [usertype] len net/ipv4/route.c:3173:27: got unsigned long Fixes: 404eb77ea766 ("ipv4: support sport, dport and ip_proto in RTM_GETROUTE") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@nvidia.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15octeontx2-af: Fix loop in free and unmap counterSubbaraya Sundeep
[ Upstream commit 6537e96d743b89294b397b4865c6c061abae31b0 ] When the given counter does not belong to the entry then code ends up in infinite loop because the loop cursor, entry is not getting updated further. This patch fixes that by updating entry for every iteration. Fixes: a958dd59f9ce ("octeontx2-af: Map or unmap NPC MCAM entry and counter") Signed-off-by: Subbaraya Sundeep <sbhatta@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Sunil Goutham <sgoutham@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15net: qualcomm: fix QCA7000 checksum handlingStefan Wahren
[ Upstream commit 429205da6c834447a57279af128bdd56ccd5225e ] Based on tests the QCA7000 doesn't support checksum offloading. So assume ip_summed is CHECKSUM_NONE and let the kernel take care of the checksum handling. This fixes data transfer issues in noisy environments. Reported-by: Michael Heimpold <michael.heimpold@in-tech.com> Fixes: 291ab06ecf67 ("net: qualcomm: new Ethernet over SPI driver for QCA7000") Signed-off-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15net: sched: Fix qdisc_rate_table refcount leak when get tcf_block failedXiyu Yang
[ Upstream commit c66070125837900163b81a03063ddd657a7e9bfb ] The reference counting issue happens in one exception handling path of cbq_change_class(). When failing to get tcf_block, the function forgets to decrease the refcount of "rtab" increased by qdisc_put_rtab(), causing a refcount leak. Fix this issue by jumping to "failure" label when get tcf_block failed. Fixes: 6529eaba33f0 ("net: sched: introduce tcf block infractructure") Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang <xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1630252681-71588-1-git-send-email-xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15ipv4: make exception cache less predictibleEric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 67d6d681e15b578c1725bad8ad079e05d1c48a8e ] Even after commit 6457378fe796 ("ipv4: use siphash instead of Jenkins in fnhe_hashfun()"), an attacker can still use brute force to learn some secrets from a victim linux host. One way to defeat these attacks is to make the max depth of the hash table bucket a random value. Before this patch, each bucket of the hash table used to store exceptions could contain 6 items under attack. After the patch, each bucket would contains a random number of items, between 6 and 10. The attacker can no longer infer secrets. This is slightly increasing memory size used by the hash table, by 50% in average, we do not expect this to be a problem. This patch is more complex than the prior one (IPv6 equivalent), because IPv4 was reusing the oldest entry. Since we need to be able to evict more than one entry per update_or_create_fnhe() call, I had to replace fnhe_oldest() with fnhe_remove_oldest(). Also note that we will queue extra kfree_rcu() calls under stress, which hopefully wont be a too big issue. Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Keyu Man <kman001@ucr.edu> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Tested-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15ipv6: make exception cache less predictibleEric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit a00df2caffed3883c341d5685f830434312e4a43 ] Even after commit 4785305c05b2 ("ipv6: use siphash in rt6_exception_hash()"), an attacker can still use brute force to learn some secrets from a victim linux host. One way to defeat these attacks is to make the max depth of the hash table bucket a random value. Before this patch, each bucket of the hash table used to store exceptions could contain 6 items under attack. After the patch, each bucket would contains a random number of items, between 6 and 10. The attacker can no longer infer secrets. This is slightly increasing memory size used by the hash table, we do not expect this to be a problem. Following patch is dealing with the same issue in IPv4. Fixes: 35732d01fe31 ("ipv6: introduce a hash table to store dst cache") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Keyu Man <kman001@ucr.edu> Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15brcmfmac: pcie: fix oops on failure to resume and reprobeAhmad Fatoum
[ Upstream commit d745ca4f2c4ae9f1bd8cf7d8ac6e22d739bffd19 ] When resuming from suspend, brcmf_pcie_pm_leave_D3 will first attempt a hot resume and then fall back to removing the PCI device and then reprobing. If this probe fails, the kernel will oops, because brcmf_err, which is called to report the failure will dereference the stale bus pointer. Open code and use the default bus-less brcmf_err to avoid this. Fixes: 8602e62441ab ("brcmfmac: pass bus to the __brcmf_err() in pcie.c") Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210817063521.22450-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15bcma: Fix memory leak for internally-handled coresZenghui Yu
[ Upstream commit b63aed3ff195130fef12e0af590f4838cf0201d8 ] kmemleak reported that dev_name() of internally-handled cores were leaked on driver unbinding. Let's use device_initialize() to take refcounts for them and put_device() to properly free the related stuff. While looking at it, there's another potential issue for those which should be *registered* into driver core. If device_register() failed, we put device once and freed bcma_device structures. In bcma_unregister_cores(), they're treated as unregistered and we hit both UAF and double-free. That smells not good and has also been fixed now. Fixes: ab54bc8460b5 ("bcma: fill core details for every device") Signed-off-by: Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210727025232.663-2-yuzenghui@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15ath6kl: wmi: fix an error code in ath6kl_wmi_sync_point()Dan Carpenter
[ Upstream commit fd6729ec534cffbbeb3917761e6d1fe6a412d3fe ] This error path is unlikely because of it checked for NULL and returned -ENOMEM earlier in the function. But it should return an error code here as well if we ever do hit it because of a race condition or something. Fixes: bdcd81707973 ("Add ath6kl cleaned up driver") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210813113438.GB30697@kili Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15ASoC: wcd9335: Disable irq on slave ports in the remove functionChristophe JAILLET
[ Upstream commit d3efd26af2e044ff2b48d38bb871630282d77e60 ] The probe calls 'wcd9335_setup_irqs()' to enable interrupts on all slave ports. This must be undone in the remove function. Add a 'wcd9335_teardown_irqs()' function that undoes 'wcd9335_setup_irqs()' function, and call it from the remove function. Fixes: 20aedafdf492 ("ASoC: wcd9335: add support to wcd9335 codec") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Message-Id: <8f761244d79bd4c098af8a482be9121d3a486d1b.1629091028.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15ASoC: wcd9335: Fix a memory leak in the error handling path of the probe ↵Christophe JAILLET
function [ Upstream commit fc6fc81caa63900cef9ebb8b2e365c3ed5a9effb ] If 'wcd9335_setup_irqs()' fails, me must release the memory allocated in 'wcd_clsh_ctrl_alloc()', as already done in the remove function. Add an error handling path and the missing 'wcd_clsh_ctrl_free()' call. Fixes: 20aedafdf492 ("ASoC: wcd9335: add support to wcd9335 codec") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Message-Id: <6dc12372f09fabb70bf05941dbe6a1382dc93e43.1629091028.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15ASoC: wcd9335: Fix a double irq free in the remove functionChristophe JAILLET
[ Upstream commit 7a6a723e98aa45f393e6add18f7309dfffa1b0e2 ] There is no point in calling 'free_irq()' explicitly for 'WCD9335_IRQ_SLIMBUS' in the remove function. The irqs are requested in 'wcd9335_setup_irqs()' using a resource managed function (i.e. 'devm_request_threaded_irq()'). 'wcd9335_setup_irqs()' requests all what is defined in the 'wcd9335_irqs' structure. This structure has only one entry for 'WCD9335_IRQ_SLIMBUS'. So 'devm_request...irq()' + explicit 'free_irq()' would lead to a double free. Remove the unneeded 'free_irq()' from the remove function. Fixes: 20aedafdf492 ("ASoC: wcd9335: add support to wcd9335 codec") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Message-Id: <0614d63bc00edd7e81dd367504128f3d84f72efa.1629091028.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15tty: serial: fsl_lpuart: fix the wrong mapbase valueAndy Duan
[ Upstream commit d5c38948448abc2bb6b36dbf85a554bf4748885e ] Register offset needs to be applied on mapbase also. dma_tx/rx_request use the physical address of UARTDATA. Register offset is currently only applied to membase (the corresponding virtual addr) but not on mapbase. Fixes: 24b1e5f0e83c ("tty: serial: lpuart: add imx7ulp support") Reviewed-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Adriana Reus <adriana.reus@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Sherry Sun <sherry.sun@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210819021033.32606-1-sherry.sun@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15usb: bdc: Fix an error handling path in 'bdc_probe()' when no suitable DMA ↵Christophe JAILLET
config is available [ Upstream commit d2f42e09393c774ab79088d8e3afcc62b3328fc9 ] If no suitable DMA configuration is available, a previous 'bdc_phy_init()' call must be undone by a corresponding 'bdc_phy_exit()' call. Branch to the existing error handling path instead of returning directly. Fixes: cc29d4f67757 ("usb: bdc: Add support for USB phy") Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0c5910979f39225d5d8fe68c9ab1c147c68ddee1.1629314734.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15usb: ehci-orion: Handle errors of clk_prepare_enable() in probeEvgeny Novikov
[ Upstream commit 4720f1bf4ee4a784d9ece05420ba33c9222a3004 ] ehci_orion_drv_probe() did not account for possible errors of clk_prepare_enable() that in particular could cause invocation of clk_disable_unprepare() on clocks that were not prepared/enabled yet, e.g. in remove or on handling errors of usb_add_hcd() in probe. Though, there were several patches fixing different issues with clocks in this driver, they did not solve this problem. Add handling of errors of clk_prepare_enable() in ehci_orion_drv_probe() to avoid calls of clk_disable_unprepare() without previous successful invocation of clk_prepare_enable(). Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 8c869edaee07 ("ARM: Orion: EHCI: Add support for enabling clocks") Co-developed-by: Kirill Shilimanov <kirill.shilimanov@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Evgeny Novikov <novikov@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Kirill Shilimanov <kirill.shilimanov@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210825170902.11234-1-novikov@ispras.ru Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15i2c: mt65xx: fix IRQ checkSergey Shtylyov
[ Upstream commit 58fb7c643d346e2364404554f531cfa6a1a3917c ] Iff platform_get_irq() returns 0, the driver's probe() method will return 0 early (as if the method's call was successful). Let's consider IRQ0 valid for simplicity -- devm_request_irq() can always override that decision... Fixes: ce38815d39ea ("I2C: mediatek: Add driver for MediaTek I2C controller") Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omprussia.ru> Reviewed-by: Qii Wang <qii.wang@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15CIFS: Fix a potencially linear read overflowLen Baker
[ Upstream commit f980d055a0f858d73d9467bb0b570721bbfcdfb8 ] strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first. This read may exceed the destination size limit. This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated. Also, the strnlen() call does not avoid the read overflow in the strlcpy function when a not NUL-terminated string is passed. So, replace this block by a call to kstrndup() that avoids this type of overflow and does the same. Fixes: 066ce6899484d ("cifs: rename cifs_strlcpy_to_host and make it use new functions") Signed-off-by: Len Baker <len.baker@gmx.com> Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15bpf: Fix possible out of bound write in narrow load handlingAndrey Ignatov
[ Upstream commit d7af7e497f0308bc97809cc48b58e8e0f13887e1 ] Fix a verifier bug found by smatch static checker in [0]. This problem has never been seen in prod to my best knowledge. Fixing it still seems to be a good idea since it's hard to say for sure whether it's possible or not to have a scenario where a combination of convert_ctx_access() and a narrow load would lead to an out of bound write. When narrow load is handled, one or two new instructions are added to insn_buf array, but before it was only checked that cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) And it's safe to add a new instruction to insn_buf[cnt++] only once. The second try will lead to out of bound write. And this is what can happen if `shift` is set. Fix it by making sure that if the BPF_RSH instruction has to be added in addition to BPF_AND then there is enough space for two more instructions in insn_buf. The full report [0] is below: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:12304 convert_ctx_accesses() warn: offset 'cnt' incremented past end of array kernel/bpf/verifier.c:12311 convert_ctx_accesses() warn: offset 'cnt' incremented past end of array kernel/bpf/verifier.c 12282 12283 insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1); 12284 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code; 12285 } 12286 12287 target_size = 0; 12288 cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog, 12289 &target_size); 12290 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) || ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Bounds check. 12291 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { 12292 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 12293 return -EINVAL; 12294 } 12295 12296 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) { 12297 u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset( 12298 off, size, size_default) * 8; 12299 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) { 12300 if (shift) 12301 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH, ^^^^^ increment beyond end of array 12302 insn->dst_reg, 12303 shift); --> 12304 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, ^^^^^ out of bounds write 12305 (1 << size * 8) - 1); 12306 } else { 12307 if (shift) 12308 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, 12309 insn->dst_reg, 12310 shift); 12311 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Same. 12312 (1ULL << size * 8) - 1); 12313 } 12314 } 12315 12316 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 12317 if (!new_prog) 12318 return -ENOMEM; 12319 12320 delta += cnt - 1; 12321 12322 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */ 12323 env->prog = new_prog; 12324 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 12325 } 12326 12327 return 0; 12328 } [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210817050843.GA21456@kili/ v1->v2: - clarify that problem was only seen by static checker but not in prod; Fixes: 46f53a65d2de ("bpf: Allow narrow loads with offset > 0") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210820163935.1902398-1-rdna@fb.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15mmc: moxart: Fix issue with uninitialized dma_slave_configTony Lindgren
[ Upstream commit ee5165354d498e5bceb0b386e480ac84c5f8c28c ] Depending on the DMA driver being used, the struct dma_slave_config may need to be initialized to zero for the unused data. For example, we have three DMA drivers using src_port_window_size and dst_port_window_size. If these are left uninitialized, it can cause DMA failures. For moxart, this is probably not currently an issue but is still good to fix though. Fixes: 1b66e94e6b99 ("mmc: moxart: Add MOXA ART SD/MMC driver") Cc: Jonas Jensen <jonas.jensen@gmail.com> Cc: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210810081644.19353-3-tony@atomide.com Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15mmc: dw_mmc: Fix issue with uninitialized dma_slave_configTony Lindgren
[ Upstream commit c3ff0189d3bc9c03845fe37472c140f0fefd0c79 ] Depending on the DMA driver being used, the struct dma_slave_config may need to be initialized to zero for the unused data. For example, we have three DMA drivers using src_port_window_size and dst_port_window_size. If these are left uninitialized, it can cause DMA failures. For dw_mmc, this is probably not currently an issue but is still good to fix though. Fixes: 3fc7eaef44db ("mmc: dw_mmc: Add external dma interface support") Cc: Shawn Lin <shawn.lin@rock-chips.com> Cc: Jaehoon Chung <jh80.chung@samsung.com> Cc: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@gmail.com> Cc: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210810081644.19353-2-tony@atomide.com Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Fix module resource and format selectionCezary Rojewski
[ Upstream commit e8b374b649afe756c2470e0e6668022e90bf8518 ] Module configuration may differ between its instances depending on resources required and input and output audio format. Available parameters to select from are stored in module resource and interface (format) lists. These come from topology, together with description of each of pipe's modules. Ignoring index value provided by topology and relying always on 0th entry leads to unexpected module behavior due to under/overbudged resources assigned or impropper format selection. Fix by taking entry at index specified by topology. Fixes: f6fa56e22559 ("ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Parse and update module config structure") Signed-off-by: Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@intel.com> Tested-by: Lukasz Majczak <lma@semihalf.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210818075742.1515155-5-cezary.rojewski@intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Leave data as is when invoking TLV IPCsCezary Rojewski
[ Upstream commit 126b3422adc80f29d2129db7f61e0113a8a526c6 ] Advancing pointer initially fixed issue for some users but caused regression for others. Leave data as it to make it easier for end users to adjust their topology files if needed. Fixes: a8cd7066f042 ("ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Strip T and L from TLV IPCs") Signed-off-by: Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@intel.com> Tested-by: Lukasz Majczak <lma@semihalf.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210818075742.1515155-3-cezary.rojewski@intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15rsi: fix an error code in rsi_probe()Dan Carpenter
[ Upstream commit 9adcdf6758d7c4c9bdaf22d78eb9fcae260ed113 ] Return -ENODEV instead of success for unsupported devices. Fixes: 54fdb318c111 ("rsi: add new device model for 9116") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210816183947.GA2119@kili Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15rsi: fix error code in rsi_load_9116_firmware()Dan Carpenter
[ Upstream commit d0f8430332a16c7baa80ce2886339182c5d85f37 ] This code returns success if the kmemdup() fails, but obviously it should return -ENOMEM instead. Fixes: e5a1ecc97e5f ("rsi: add firmware loading for 9116 device") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210805103746.GA26417@kili Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15i2c: s3c2410: fix IRQ checkSergey Shtylyov
[ Upstream commit d6840a5e370b7ea4fde16ce2caf431bcc87f9a75 ] Iff platform_get_irq() returns 0, the driver's probe() method will return 0 early (as if the method's call was successful). Let's consider IRQ0 valid for simplicity -- devm_request_irq() can always override that decision... Fixes: e0d1ec97853f ("i2c-s3c2410: Change IRQ to be plain integer.") Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15i2c: iop3xx: fix deferred probingSergey Shtylyov
[ Upstream commit a1299505162ad00def3573260c2c68b9c8e8d697 ] When adding the code to handle platform_get_irq*() errors in the commit 489447380a29 ("handle errors returned by platform_get_irq*()"), the actual error code was enforced to be -ENXIO in the driver for some strange reason. This didn't matter much until the deferred probing was introduced -- which requires an actual error code to be propagated upstream from the failure site. While fixing this, also stop overriding the errors from request_irq() to -EIO (done since the pre-git era). Fixes: 489447380a29 ("[PATCH] handle errors returned by platform_get_irq*()") Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15Bluetooth: add timeout sanity check to hci_inquiryPavel Skripkin
[ Upstream commit f41a4b2b5eb7872109723dab8ae1603bdd9d9ec1 ] Syzbot hit "task hung" bug in hci_req_sync(). The problem was in unreasonable huge inquiry timeout passed from userspace. Fix it by adding sanity check for timeout value to hci_inquiry(). Since hci_inquiry() is the only user of hci_req_sync() with user controlled timeout value, it makes sense to check timeout value in hci_inquiry() and don't touch hci_req_sync(). Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+be2baed593ea56c6a84c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15mm/swap: consider max pages in iomap_swapfile_add_extentXu Yu
[ Upstream commit 36ca7943ac18aebf8aad4c50829eb2ea5ec847df ] When the max pages (last_page in the swap header + 1) is smaller than the total pages (inode size) of the swapfile, iomap_swapfile_activate overwrites sis->max with total pages. However, frontswap_map is a swap page state bitmap allocated using the initial sis->max page count read from the swap header. If swapfile activation increases sis->max, it's possible for the frontswap code to walk off the end of the bitmap, thereby corrupting kernel memory. [djwong: modify the description a bit; the original paragraph reads: "However, frontswap_map is allocated using max pages. When test and clear the sis offset, which is larger than max pages, of frontswap_map in __frontswap_invalidate_page(), neighbors of frontswap_map may be overwritten, i.e., slab is polluted." Note also that this bug resulted in a behavioral change: activating a swap file that was formatted and later extended results in all pages being activated, not the number of pages recorded in the swap header.] This fixes the issue by considering the limitation of max pages of swap info in iomap_swapfile_add_extent(). To reproduce the case, compile kernel with slub RED ZONE, then run test: $ sudo stress-ng -a 1 -x softlockup,resources -t 72h --metrics --times \ --verify -v -Y /root/tmpdir/stress-ng/stress-statistic-12.yaml \ --log-file /root/tmpdir/stress-ng/stress-logfile-12.txt \ --temp-path /root/tmpdir/stress-ng/ We'll get the error log as below: [ 1151.015141] ============================================================================= [ 1151.016489] BUG kmalloc-16 (Not tainted): Right Redzone overwritten [ 1151.017486] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 1151.017486] [ 1151.018997] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 1151.019873] INFO: 0x0000000084e43932-0x0000000098d17cae @offset=7392. First byte 0x0 instead of 0xcc [ 1151.021303] INFO: Allocated in __do_sys_swapon+0xcf6/0x1170 age=43417 cpu=9 pid=3816 [ 1151.022538] __slab_alloc+0xe/0x20 [ 1151.023069] __kmalloc_node+0xfd/0x4b0 [ 1151.023704] __do_sys_swapon+0xcf6/0x1170 [ 1151.024346] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [ 1151.024925] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 1151.025749] INFO: Freed in put_cred_rcu+0xa1/0xc0 age=43424 cpu=3 pid=2041 [ 1151.026889] kfree+0x276/0x2b0 [ 1151.027405] put_cred_rcu+0xa1/0xc0 [ 1151.027949] rcu_do_batch+0x17d/0x410 [ 1151.028566] rcu_core+0x14e/0x2b0 [ 1151.029084] __do_softirq+0x101/0x29e [ 1151.029645] asm_call_irq_on_stack+0x12/0x20 [ 1151.030381] do_softirq_own_stack+0x37/0x40 [ 1151.031037] do_softirq.part.15+0x2b/0x30 [ 1151.031710] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x4b/0x50 [ 1151.032412] copy_fpstate_to_sigframe+0x111/0x360 [ 1151.033197] __setup_rt_frame+0xce/0x480 [ 1151.033809] arch_do_signal+0x1a3/0x250 [ 1151.034463] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xcf/0x110 [ 1151.035242] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x190 [ 1151.035970] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 1151.036795] INFO: Slab 0x000000003b9de4dc objects=44 used=9 fp=0x00000000539e349e flags=0xfffffc0010201 [ 1151.038323] INFO: Object 0x000000004855ba01 @offset=7376 fp=0x0000000000000000 [ 1151.038323] [ 1151.039683] Redzone 000000008d0afd3d: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ................ [ 1151.041180] Object 000000004855ba01: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 1151.042714] Redzone 0000000084e43932: 00 00 00 c0 cc cc cc cc ........ [ 1151.044120] Padding 000000000864c042: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ [ 1151.045615] CPU: 5 PID: 3816 Comm: stress-ng Tainted: G B 5.10.50+ #7 [ 1151.046846] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 1151.048633] Call Trace: [ 1151.049072] dump_stack+0x57/0x6a [ 1151.049585] check_bytes_and_report+0xed/0x110 [ 1151.050320] check_object+0x1eb/0x290 [ 1151.050924] ? __x64_sys_swapoff+0x39a/0x540 [ 1151.051646] free_debug_processing+0x151/0x350 [ 1151.052333] __slab_free+0x21a/0x3a0 [ 1151.052938] ? _cond_resched+0x2d/0x40 [ 1151.053529] ? __vunmap+0x1de/0x220 [ 1151.054139] ? __x64_sys_swapoff+0x39a/0x540 [ 1151.054796] ? kfree+0x276/0x2b0 [ 1151.055307] kfree+0x276/0x2b0 [ 1151.055832] __x64_sys_swapoff+0x39a/0x540 [ 1151.056466] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [ 1151.057084] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 1151.057866] RIP: 0033:0x150340b0ffb7 [ 1151.058481] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x150340b0ff8d. [ 1151.059537] RSP: 002b:00007fff7f4ee238 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a8 [ 1151.060768] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff7f4ee66c RCX: 0000150340b0ffb7 [ 1151.061904] RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000018094 RDI: 00007fff7f4ee860 [ 1151.063033] RBP: 00007fff7f4ef980 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000150340a672bd [ 1151.064135] R10: 00007fff7f4edca0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000018094 [ 1151.065253] R13: 0000000000000005 R14: 000000000160d930 R15: 00007fff7f4ee66c [ 1151.066413] FIX kmalloc-16: Restoring 0x0000000084e43932-0x0000000098d17cae=0xcc [ 1151.066413] [ 1151.067890] FIX kmalloc-16: Object at 0x000000004855ba01 not freed Fixes: 67482129cdab ("iomap: add a swapfile activation function") Fixes: a45c0eccc564 ("iomap: move the swapfile code into a separate file") Signed-off-by: Gang Deng <gavin.dg@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Xu Yu <xuyu@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15usb: gadget: mv_u3d: request_irq() after initializing UDCNadezda Lutovinova
[ Upstream commit 2af0c5ffadaf9d13eca28409d4238b4e672942d3 ] If IRQ occurs between calling request_irq() and mv_u3d_eps_init(), then null pointer dereference occurs since u3d->eps[] wasn't initialized yet but used in mv_u3d_nuke(). The patch puts registration of the interrupt handler after initializing of neccesery data. Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 90fccb529d24 ("usb: gadget: Gadget directory cleanup - group UDC drivers") Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Nadezda Lutovinova <lutovinova@ispras.ru> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210818141247.4794-1-lutovinova@ispras.ru Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15nfsd4: Fix forced-expiry lockingJ. Bruce Fields
[ Upstream commit f7104cc1a9159cd0d3e8526cb638ae0301de4b61 ] This should use the network-namespace-wide client_lock, not the per-client cl_lock. You shouldn't see any bugs unless you're actually using the forced-expiry interface introduced by 89c905beccbb. Fixes: 89c905beccbb "nfsd: allow forced expiration of NFSv4 clients" Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15lockd: Fix invalid lockowner cast after vfs_test_lockBenjamin Coddington
[ Upstream commit cd2d644ddba183ec7b451b7c20d5c7cc06fcf0d7 ] After calling vfs_test_lock() the pointer to a conflicting lock can be returned, and that lock is not guarunteed to be owned by nlm. In that case, we cannot cast it to struct nlm_lockowner. Instead return the pid of that conflicting lock. Fixes: 646d73e91b42 ("lockd: Show pid of lockd for remote locks") Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>