diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
71 files changed, 986 insertions, 427 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index be4403a8e1b4..9fd2e3c2494a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ config X86 select ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_DATA select ARCH_DISCARD_MEMBLOCK select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE if ACPI + select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE @@ -2437,6 +2438,25 @@ config ARCH_ENABLE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCK def_bool y depends on X86_64 || X86_PAE +config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION + bool "Force GDS Mitigation" + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL + default n + help + Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows + unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in + vector registers. + + This option is equivalent to setting gather_data_sampling=force on the + command line. The microcode mitigation is used if present, otherwise + AVX is disabled as a mitigation. On affected systems that are missing + the microcode any userspace code that unconditionally uses AVX will + break with this option set. + + Setting this option on systems not vulnerable to GDS has no effect. + + If in doubt, say N. + config ARCH_ENABLE_HUGEPAGE_MIGRATION def_bool y depends on X86_64 && HUGETLB_PAGE && MIGRATION diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/bioscall.S b/arch/x86/boot/bioscall.S index d401b4a262b0..a860390852ff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/bioscall.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/bioscall.S @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ intcall: movw %dx, %si movw %sp, %di movw $11, %cx - rep; movsd + rep; movsl /* Pop full state from the stack */ popal @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ intcall: jz 4f movw %sp, %si movw $11, %cx - rep; movsd + rep; movsl 4: addw $44, %sp /* Restore state and return */ diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/boot.h b/arch/x86/boot/boot.h index ef5a9cc66fb8..a4c5fb92b1cb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/boot.h +++ b/arch/x86/boot/boot.h @@ -114,66 +114,78 @@ typedef unsigned int addr_t; static inline u8 rdfs8(addr_t addr) { + u8 *ptr = (u8 *)absolute_pointer(addr); u8 v; - asm volatile("movb %%fs:%1,%0" : "=q" (v) : "m" (*(u8 *)addr)); + asm volatile("movb %%fs:%1,%0" : "=q" (v) : "m" (*ptr)); return v; } static inline u16 rdfs16(addr_t addr) { + u16 *ptr = (u16 *)absolute_pointer(addr); u16 v; - asm volatile("movw %%fs:%1,%0" : "=r" (v) : "m" (*(u16 *)addr)); + asm volatile("movw %%fs:%1,%0" : "=r" (v) : "m" (*ptr)); return v; } static inline u32 rdfs32(addr_t addr) { + u32 *ptr = (u32 *)absolute_pointer(addr); u32 v; - asm volatile("movl %%fs:%1,%0" : "=r" (v) : "m" (*(u32 *)addr)); + asm volatile("movl %%fs:%1,%0" : "=r" (v) : "m" (*ptr)); return v; } static inline void wrfs8(u8 v, addr_t addr) { - asm volatile("movb %1,%%fs:%0" : "+m" (*(u8 *)addr) : "qi" (v)); + u8 *ptr = (u8 *)absolute_pointer(addr); + asm volatile("movb %1,%%fs:%0" : "+m" (*ptr) : "qi" (v)); } static inline void wrfs16(u16 v, addr_t addr) { - asm volatile("movw %1,%%fs:%0" : "+m" (*(u16 *)addr) : "ri" (v)); + u16 *ptr = (u16 *)absolute_pointer(addr); + asm volatile("movw %1,%%fs:%0" : "+m" (*ptr) : "ri" (v)); } static inline void wrfs32(u32 v, addr_t addr) { - asm volatile("movl %1,%%fs:%0" : "+m" (*(u32 *)addr) : "ri" (v)); + u32 *ptr = (u32 *)absolute_pointer(addr); + asm volatile("movl %1,%%fs:%0" : "+m" (*ptr) : "ri" (v)); } static inline u8 rdgs8(addr_t addr) { + u8 *ptr = (u8 *)absolute_pointer(addr); u8 v; - asm volatile("movb %%gs:%1,%0" : "=q" (v) : "m" (*(u8 *)addr)); + asm volatile("movb %%gs:%1,%0" : "=q" (v) : "m" (*ptr)); return v; } static inline u16 rdgs16(addr_t addr) { + u16 *ptr = (u16 *)absolute_pointer(addr); u16 v; - asm volatile("movw %%gs:%1,%0" : "=r" (v) : "m" (*(u16 *)addr)); + asm volatile("movw %%gs:%1,%0" : "=r" (v) : "m" (*ptr)); return v; } static inline u32 rdgs32(addr_t addr) { + u32 *ptr = (u32 *)absolute_pointer(addr); u32 v; - asm volatile("movl %%gs:%1,%0" : "=r" (v) : "m" (*(u32 *)addr)); + asm volatile("movl %%gs:%1,%0" : "=r" (v) : "m" (*ptr)); return v; } static inline void wrgs8(u8 v, addr_t addr) { - asm volatile("movb %1,%%gs:%0" : "+m" (*(u8 *)addr) : "qi" (v)); + u8 *ptr = (u8 *)absolute_pointer(addr); + asm volatile("movb %1,%%gs:%0" : "+m" (*ptr) : "qi" (v)); } static inline void wrgs16(u16 v, addr_t addr) { - asm volatile("movw %1,%%gs:%0" : "+m" (*(u16 *)addr) : "ri" (v)); + u16 *ptr = (u16 *)absolute_pointer(addr); + asm volatile("movw %1,%%gs:%0" : "+m" (*ptr) : "ri" (v)); } static inline void wrgs32(u32 v, addr_t addr) { - asm volatile("movl %1,%%gs:%0" : "+m" (*(u32 *)addr) : "ri" (v)); + u32 *ptr = (u32 *)absolute_pointer(addr); + asm volatile("movl %1,%%gs:%0" : "+m" (*ptr) : "ri" (v)); } /* Note: these only return true/false, not a signed return value! */ diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/main.c b/arch/x86/boot/main.c index 9bcea386db65..98b4ff1c51f3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/main.c @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static void copy_boot_params(void) u16 cl_offset; }; const struct old_cmdline * const oldcmd = - (const struct old_cmdline *)OLD_CL_ADDRESS; + absolute_pointer(OLD_CL_ADDRESS); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof boot_params != 4096); memcpy(&boot_params.hdr, &hdr, sizeof hdr); diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S index 78b308f2f2ea..e6c258bf9511 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -1500,13 +1500,13 @@ ENTRY(async_page_fault) END(async_page_fault) #endif -ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit) +ENTRY(rewind_stack_and_make_dead) /* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */ xorl %ebp, %ebp movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %esi leal -TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-PTREGS_SIZE(%esi), %esp - call do_exit + call make_task_dead 1: jmp 1b -END(rewind_stack_do_exit) +END(rewind_stack_and_make_dead) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index bb2e1818408e..bf08de4232e3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -1759,10 +1759,10 @@ END(nmi) ENTRY(ignore_sysret) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY mov $-ENOSYS, %eax - sysret + sysretl END(ignore_sysret) -ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit) +ENTRY(rewind_stack_and_make_dead) UNWIND_HINT_FUNC /* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */ xorl %ebp, %ebp @@ -1771,5 +1771,5 @@ ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit) leaq -PTREGS_SIZE(%rax), %rsp UNWIND_HINT_REGS - call do_exit -END(rewind_stack_do_exit) + call make_task_dead +END(rewind_stack_and_make_dead) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c index a1c31bb23170..a3cd828359f8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c @@ -228,8 +228,8 @@ static unsigned long vdso_addr(unsigned long start, unsigned len) /* Round the lowest possible end address up to a PMD boundary. */ end = (start + len + PMD_SIZE - 1) & PMD_MASK; - if (end >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) - end = TASK_SIZE_MAX; + if (end >= DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW) + end = DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW; end -= len; if (end > start) { diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c index 2bf1170f7afd..34da6d27d839 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c @@ -2699,6 +2699,7 @@ static bool hswep_has_limit_sbox(unsigned int device) return false; pci_read_config_dword(dev, HSWEP_PCU_CAPID4_OFFET, &capid4); + pci_dev_put(dev); if (!hswep_get_chop(capid4)) return true; diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c index 3ebd77770f98..4cfda3cfae7f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c +++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c @@ -298,6 +298,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) set_personality_ia32(false); setup_new_exec(bprm); + install_exec_creds(bprm); regs->cs = __USER32_CS; regs->r8 = regs->r9 = regs->r10 = regs->r11 = regs->r12 = @@ -314,8 +315,6 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (retval < 0) return retval; - install_exec_creds(bprm); - if (N_MAGIC(ex) == OMAGIC) { unsigned long text_addr, map_size; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h index 542509b53e0f..dd8ff1ca2aef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h @@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ #include <asm/processor.h> -extern void check_bugs(void); - #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL) void check_mpx_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); #else diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index bd4374f56651..5cf8dca571cf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -409,5 +409,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */ #define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(27) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */ #define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */ +#define X86_BUG_GDS X86_BUG(29) /* CPU is affected by Gather Data Sampling */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h index 4d90f4b64437..49decc8339b3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ extern int dump_fpu(struct pt_regs *ptregs, struct user_i387_struct *fpstate); extern void fpu__init_cpu(void); extern void fpu__init_system_xstate(void); extern void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void); -extern void fpu__init_system(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); +extern void fpu__init_system(void); extern void fpu__init_check_bugs(void); extern void fpu__resume_cpu(void); extern u64 fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/i8259.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/i8259.h index 89789e8c80f6..e16574c16e93 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/i8259.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/i8259.h @@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ struct legacy_pic { void (*make_irq)(unsigned int irq); }; +void legacy_pic_pcat_compat(void); + extern struct legacy_pic *legacy_pic; extern struct legacy_pic null_legacy_pic; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h index 1f2f52a34086..ccf07426a84d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h @@ -74,6 +74,11 @@ #define INTEL_FAM6_LAKEFIELD 0x8A #define INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE 0x97 #define INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE_L 0x9A +#define INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE_N 0xBE + +#define INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE 0xB7 +#define INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE_P 0xBA +#define INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE_S 0xBF /* "Small Core" Processors (Atom) */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h index 616f8e637bc3..b51ac6eed904 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h @@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; static inline int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; } +static inline void mem_encrypt_init(void) { } + #define __bss_decrypted #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h index 91a06cef50c1..b675db12a8ab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include <asm/cpu.h> #include <linux/earlycpio.h> #include <linux/initrd.h> +#include <asm/microcode_amd.h> struct ucode_patch { struct list_head plist; @@ -130,7 +131,7 @@ static inline unsigned int x86_cpuid_family(void) int __init microcode_init(void); extern void __init load_ucode_bsp(void); extern void load_ucode_ap(void); -void reload_early_microcode(void); +void reload_early_microcode(unsigned int cpu); extern bool get_builtin_firmware(struct cpio_data *cd, const char *name); extern bool initrd_gone; void microcode_bsp_resume(void); @@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ void microcode_bsp_resume(void); static inline int __init microcode_init(void) { return 0; }; static inline void __init load_ucode_bsp(void) { } static inline void load_ucode_ap(void) { } -static inline void reload_early_microcode(void) { } +static inline void reload_early_microcode(unsigned int cpu) { } static inline void microcode_bsp_resume(void) { } static inline bool get_builtin_firmware(struct cpio_data *cd, const char *name) { return false; } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h index 5c524d4f71cd..403a8e76b310 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h @@ -47,12 +47,14 @@ struct microcode_amd { extern void __init load_ucode_amd_bsp(unsigned int family); extern void load_ucode_amd_ap(unsigned int family); extern int __init save_microcode_in_initrd_amd(unsigned int family); -void reload_ucode_amd(void); +void reload_ucode_amd(unsigned int cpu); +extern void amd_check_microcode(void); #else static inline void __init load_ucode_amd_bsp(unsigned int family) {} static inline void load_ucode_amd_ap(unsigned int family) {} static inline int __init save_microcode_in_initrd_amd(unsigned int family) { return -EINVAL; } -void reload_ucode_amd(void) {} +static inline void reload_ucode_amd(unsigned int cpu) {} +static inline void amd_check_microcode(void) {} #endif #endif /* _ASM_X86_MICROCODE_AMD_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 0bd07699dba3..4be36bfb2477 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ #define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior */ #define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT) +/* A mask for bits which the kernel toggles when controlling mitigations */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK (SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD \ + | SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S) + #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ #define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ @@ -134,6 +138,15 @@ * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier * Return Stack Buffer Predictions. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL BIT(25) /* + * CPU is vulnerable to Gather + * Data Sampling (GDS) and + * has controls for mitigation. + */ +#define ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO BIT(26) /* + * CPU is not vulnerable to Gather + * Data Sampling (GDS). + */ #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* @@ -152,6 +165,8 @@ #define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123 #define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0) #define FB_CLEAR_DIS BIT(3) /* CPU Fill buffer clear disable */ +#define GDS_MITG_DIS BIT(4) /* Disable GDS mitigation */ +#define GDS_MITG_LOCKED BIT(5) /* GDS mitigation locked */ #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175 @@ -399,10 +414,12 @@ #define MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS 0xc0010141 #define MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG 0xc0011020 #define MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG 0xc0011022 +#define MSR_AMD64_TW_CFG 0xc0011023 #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG 0xc0011029 #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT 1 #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT) +#define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_ZEN2_FP_BACKUP_FIX_BIT 9 #define MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2 0xc001102a #define MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHCTL 0xc0011030 @@ -430,6 +447,10 @@ #define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f +/* Zen4 */ +#define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG 0xc001102e +#define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_SHARED_BTB_FIX_BIT 5 + /* Fam 17h MSRs */ #define MSR_F17H_IRPERF 0xc00000e9 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/numa.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/numa.h index bbfde3d2662f..4bcd9d0c7bee 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/numa.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/numa.h @@ -11,13 +11,6 @@ #define NR_NODE_MEMBLKS (MAX_NUMNODES*2) -/* - * Too small node sizes may confuse the VM badly. Usually they - * result from BIOS bugs. So dont recognize nodes as standalone - * NUMA entities that have less than this amount of RAM listed: - */ -#define NODE_MIN_SIZE (4*1024*1024) - extern int numa_off; /* diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index cc4bb218f1c6..f3049d55c522 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -1001,4 +1001,6 @@ enum taa_mitigations { TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED, }; +extern bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void); + #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h index a671a1145906..9177b4354c3f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ void __noreturn machine_real_restart(unsigned int type); #define MRR_BIOS 0 #define MRR_APM 1 +void cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(void); + typedef void (*nmi_shootdown_cb)(int, struct pt_regs*); void nmi_shootdown_cpus(nmi_shootdown_cb callback); void run_crash_ipi_callback(struct pt_regs *regs); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h index ae13bc974416..c5ed79159975 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h @@ -91,27 +91,16 @@ extern unsigned long _brk_end; void *extend_brk(size_t size, size_t align); /* - * Reserve space in the brk section. The name must be unique within - * the file, and somewhat descriptive. The size is in bytes. Must be - * used at file scope. + * Reserve space in the .brk section, which is a block of memory from which the + * caller is allowed to allocate very early (before even memblock is available) + * by calling extend_brk(). All allocated memory will be eventually converted + * to memblock. Any leftover unallocated memory will be freed. * - * (This uses a temp function to wrap the asm so we can pass it the - * size parameter; otherwise we wouldn't be able to. We can't use a - * "section" attribute on a normal variable because it always ends up - * being @progbits, which ends up allocating space in the vmlinux - * executable.) + * The size is in bytes. */ -#define RESERVE_BRK(name,sz) \ - static void __section(.discard.text) __used notrace \ - __brk_reservation_fn_##name##__(void) { \ - asm volatile ( \ - ".pushsection .brk_reservation,\"aw\",@nobits;" \ - ".brk." #name ":" \ - " 1:.skip %c0;" \ - " .size .brk." #name ", . - 1b;" \ - " .popsection" \ - : : "i" (sz)); \ - } +#define RESERVE_BRK(name, size) \ + __section(.bss..brk) __aligned(1) __used \ + static char __brk_##name[size] /* Helper for reserving space for arrays of things */ #define RESERVE_BRK_ARRAY(type, name, entries) \ @@ -129,12 +118,19 @@ asmlinkage void __init x86_64_start_reservations(char *real_mode_data); #endif /* __i386__ */ #endif /* _SETUP */ -#else -#define RESERVE_BRK(name,sz) \ - .pushsection .brk_reservation,"aw",@nobits; \ -.brk.name: \ -1: .skip sz; \ - .size .brk.name,.-1b; \ + +#else /* __ASSEMBLY */ + +.macro __RESERVE_BRK name, size + .pushsection .bss..brk, "aw" +GLOBAL(__brk_\name) + .skip \size +END(__brk_\name) .popsection +.endm + +#define RESERVE_BRK(name, size) __RESERVE_BRK name, size + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + #endif /* _ASM_X86_SETUP_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/virtext.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/virtext.h index 0116b2ee9e64..62810550024d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/virtext.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/virtext.h @@ -89,12 +89,6 @@ static inline int cpu_has_svm(const char **msg) return 0; } - if (boot_cpu_data.extended_cpuid_level < SVM_CPUID_FUNC) { - if (msg) - *msg = "can't execute cpuid_8000000a"; - return 0; - } - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SVM)) { if (msg) *msg = "svm not available"; @@ -114,7 +108,21 @@ static inline void cpu_svm_disable(void) wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, 0); rdmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer); - wrmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer & ~EFER_SVME); + if (efer & EFER_SVME) { + /* + * Force GIF=1 prior to disabling SVM to ensure INIT and NMI + * aren't blocked, e.g. if a fatal error occurred between CLGI + * and STGI. Note, STGI may #UD if SVM is disabled from NMI + * context between reading EFER and executing STGI. In that + * case, GIF must already be set, otherwise the NMI would have + * been blocked, so just eat the fault. + */ + asm_volatile_goto("1: stgi\n\t" + _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault]) + ::: "memory" : fault); +fault: + wrmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer & ~EFER_SVME); + } } /** Makes sure SVM is disabled, if it is supported on the CPU diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c index 8b1aa1206d98..2f0fa294d617 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c @@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ static int __init acpi_parse_madt(struct acpi_table_header *table) madt->address); } + if (madt->flags & ACPI_MADT_PCAT_COMPAT) + legacy_pic_pcat_compat(); + default_acpi_madt_oem_check(madt->header.oem_id, madt->header.oem_table_id); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index 918a23704c0c..33882d5ab25d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -366,6 +366,17 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, u8 insnbuf[MAX_PATCH_LEN]; DPRINTK("alt table %px, -> %px", start, end); + + /* + * In the case CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y, KASAN_SHADOW_START is defined using + * cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LA57) and is therefore patched here. + * During the process, KASAN becomes confused seeing partial LA57 + * conversion and triggers a false-positive out-of-bound report. + * + * Disable KASAN until the patching is complete. + */ + kasan_disable_current(); + /* * The scan order should be from start to end. A later scanned * alternative code can overwrite previously scanned alternative code. @@ -426,6 +437,8 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, text_poke_early(instr, insnbuf, insnbuf_sz); } + + kasan_enable_current(); } #ifdef CONFIG_SMP @@ -677,8 +690,8 @@ void *__init_or_module text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode, } else { local_irq_save(flags); memcpy(addr, opcode, len); - local_irq_restore(flags); sync_core(); + local_irq_restore(flags); /* * Could also do a CLFLUSH here to speed up CPU recovery; but diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c index 926939978c1c..9318fe7d850e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c @@ -403,10 +403,9 @@ static unsigned int reserve_eilvt_offset(int offset, unsigned int new) if (vector && !eilvt_entry_is_changeable(vector, new)) /* may not change if vectors are different */ return rsvd; - rsvd = atomic_cmpxchg(&eilvt_offsets[offset], rsvd, new); - } while (rsvd != new); + } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg(&eilvt_offsets[offset], &rsvd, new)); - rsvd &= ~APIC_EILVT_MASKED; + rsvd = new & ~APIC_EILVT_MASKED; if (rsvd && rsvd != vector) pr_info("LVT offset %d assigned for vector 0x%02x\n", offset, rsvd); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c index 677508baf95a..af59aa9c5523 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c @@ -2449,17 +2449,21 @@ static int io_apic_get_redir_entries(int ioapic) unsigned int arch_dynirq_lower_bound(unsigned int from) { + unsigned int ret; + /* * dmar_alloc_hwirq() may be called before setup_IO_APIC(), so use * gsi_top if ioapic_dynirq_base hasn't been initialized yet. */ - if (!ioapic_initialized) - return gsi_top; + ret = ioapic_dynirq_base ? : gsi_top; + /* - * For DT enabled machines ioapic_dynirq_base is irrelevant and not - * updated. So simply return @from if ioapic_dynirq_base == 0. + * For DT enabled machines ioapic_dynirq_base is irrelevant and + * always 0. gsi_top can be 0 if there is no IO/APIC registered. + * 0 is an invalid interrupt number for dynamic allocations. Return + * @from instead. */ - return ioapic_dynirq_base ? : from; + return ret ? : from; } #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_phys.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_phys.c index 8e70c2ba21b3..fb17767552ef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_phys.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_phys.c @@ -102,7 +102,10 @@ static void init_x2apic_ldr(void) static int x2apic_phys_probe(void) { - if (x2apic_mode && (x2apic_phys || x2apic_fadt_phys())) + if (!x2apic_mode) + return 0; + + if (x2apic_phys || x2apic_fadt_phys()) return 1; return apic == &apic_x2apic_phys; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apm_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apm_32.c index f7151cd03cb0..3d7a8049f637 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apm_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apm_32.c @@ -247,12 +247,6 @@ extern int (*console_blank_hook)(int); #endif /* - * The apm_bios device is one of the misc char devices. - * This is its minor number. - */ -#define APM_MINOR_DEV 134 - -/* * Various options can be changed at boot time as follows: * (We allow underscores for compatibility with the modules code) * apm=on/off enable/disable APM diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index e017f64e09d6..84667781c41d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -23,11 +23,6 @@ #include "cpu.h" -static const int amd_erratum_383[]; -static const int amd_erratum_400[]; -static const int amd_erratum_1054[]; -static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, const int *erratum); - /* * nodes_per_socket: Stores the number of nodes per socket. * Refer to Fam15h Models 00-0fh BKDG - CPUID Fn8000_001E_ECX @@ -35,6 +30,83 @@ static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, const int *erratum); */ static u32 nodes_per_socket = 1; +/* + * AMD errata checking + * + * Errata are defined as arrays of ints using the AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM() or + * AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM() macros. The latter is intended for newer errata that + * have an OSVW id assigned, which it takes as first argument. Both take a + * variable number of family-specific model-stepping ranges created by + * AMD_MODEL_RANGE(). + * + * Example: + * + * const int amd_erratum_319[] = + * AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0x2, 0x1, 0x4, 0x2), + * AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0x8, 0x0, 0x8, 0x0), + * AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0x9, 0x0, 0x9, 0x0)); + */ + +#define AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(...) { -1, __VA_ARGS__, 0 } +#define AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM(osvw_id, ...) { osvw_id, __VA_ARGS__, 0 } +#define AMD_MODEL_RANGE(f, m_start, s_start, m_end, s_end) \ + ((f << 24) | (m_start << 16) | (s_start << 12) | (m_end << 4) | (s_end)) +#define AMD_MODEL_RANGE_FAMILY(range) (((range) >> 24) & 0xff) +#define AMD_MODEL_RANGE_START(range) (((range) >> 12) & 0xfff) +#define AMD_MODEL_RANGE_END(range) ((range) & 0xfff) + +static const int amd_erratum_400[] = + AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM(1, AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0xf, 0x41, 0x2, 0xff, 0xf), + AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0x2, 0x1, 0xff, 0xf)); + +static const int amd_erratum_383[] = + AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM(3, AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0, 0, 0xff, 0xf)); + +/* #1054: Instructions Retired Performance Counter May Be Inaccurate */ +static const int amd_erratum_1054[] = + AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0, 0, 0x2f, 0xf)); + +static const int amd_zenbleed[] = + AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x30, 0x0, 0x4f, 0xf), + AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x60, 0x0, 0x7f, 0xf), + AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x90, 0x0, 0x91, 0xf), + AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0xa0, 0x0, 0xaf, 0xf)); + +static const int amd_erratum_1485[] = + AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x19, 0x10, 0x0, 0x1f, 0xf), + AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x19, 0x60, 0x0, 0xaf, 0xf)); + +static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, const int *erratum) +{ + int osvw_id = *erratum++; + u32 range; + u32 ms; + + if (osvw_id >= 0 && osvw_id < 65536 && + cpu_has(cpu, X86_FEATURE_OSVW)) { + u64 osvw_len; + + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH, osvw_len); + if (osvw_id < osvw_len) { + u64 osvw_bits; + + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS + (osvw_id >> 6), + osvw_bits); + return osvw_bits & (1ULL << (osvw_id & 0x3f)); + } + } + + /* OSVW unavailable or ID unknown, match family-model-stepping range */ + ms = (cpu->x86_model << 4) | cpu->x86_stepping; + while ((range = *erratum++)) + if ((cpu->x86 == AMD_MODEL_RANGE_FAMILY(range)) && + (ms >= AMD_MODEL_RANGE_START(range)) && + (ms <= AMD_MODEL_RANGE_END(range))) + return true; + + return false; +} + static inline int rdmsrl_amd_safe(unsigned msr, unsigned long long *p) { u32 gprs[8] = { 0 }; @@ -199,6 +271,15 @@ static void init_amd_k6(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) return; } #endif + /* + * Work around Erratum 1386. The XSAVES instruction malfunctions in + * certain circumstances on Zen1/2 uarch, and not all parts have had + * updated microcode at the time of writing (March 2023). + * + * Affected parts all have no supervisor XSAVE states, meaning that + * the XSAVEC instruction (which works fine) is equivalent. + */ + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES); } static void init_amd_k7(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) @@ -900,6 +981,47 @@ static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } } +static bool cpu_has_zenbleed_microcode(void) +{ + u32 good_rev = 0; + + switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) { + case 0x30 ... 0x3f: good_rev = 0x0830107a; break; + case 0x60 ... 0x67: good_rev = 0x0860010b; break; + case 0x68 ... 0x6f: good_rev = 0x08608105; break; + case 0x70 ... 0x7f: good_rev = 0x08701032; break; + case 0xa0 ... 0xaf: good_rev = 0x08a00008; break; + + default: + return false; + break; + } + + if (boot_cpu_data.microcode < good_rev) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static void zenbleed_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + if (!cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_zenbleed)) + return; + + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) + return; + + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AVX)) + return; + + if (!cpu_has_zenbleed_microcode()) { + pr_notice_once("Zenbleed: please update your microcode for the most optimal fix\n"); + msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_ZEN2_FP_BACKUP_FIX_BIT); + } else { + msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_ZEN2_FP_BACKUP_FIX_BIT); + } +} + static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { early_init_amd(c); @@ -1002,6 +1124,12 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) msr_set_bit(MSR_K7_HWCR, MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT); check_null_seg_clears_base(c); + + zenbleed_check(c); + + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && + cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_1485)) + msr_set_bit(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_SHARED_BTB_FIX_BIT); } #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 @@ -1097,73 +1225,6 @@ static const struct cpu_dev amd_cpu_dev = { cpu_dev_register(amd_cpu_dev); -/* - * AMD errata checking - * - * Errata are defined as arrays of ints using the AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM() or - * AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM() macros. The latter is intended for newer errata that - * have an OSVW id assigned, which it takes as first argument. Both take a - * variable number of family-specific model-stepping ranges created by - * AMD_MODEL_RANGE(). - * - * Example: - * - * const int amd_erratum_319[] = - * AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0x2, 0x1, 0x4, 0x2), - * AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0x8, 0x0, 0x8, 0x0), - * AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0x9, 0x0, 0x9, 0x0)); - */ - -#define AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(...) { -1, __VA_ARGS__, 0 } -#define AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM(osvw_id, ...) { osvw_id, __VA_ARGS__, 0 } -#define AMD_MODEL_RANGE(f, m_start, s_start, m_end, s_end) \ - ((f << 24) | (m_start << 16) | (s_start << 12) | (m_end << 4) | (s_end)) -#define AMD_MODEL_RANGE_FAMILY(range) (((range) >> 24) & 0xff) -#define AMD_MODEL_RANGE_START(range) (((range) >> 12) & 0xfff) -#define AMD_MODEL_RANGE_END(range) ((range) & 0xfff) - -static const int amd_erratum_400[] = - AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM(1, AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0xf, 0x41, 0x2, 0xff, 0xf), - AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0x2, 0x1, 0xff, 0xf)); - -static const int amd_erratum_383[] = - AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM(3, AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0, 0, 0xff, 0xf)); - -/* #1054: Instructions Retired Performance Counter May Be Inaccurate */ -static const int amd_erratum_1054[] = - AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0, 0, 0x2f, 0xf)); - -static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, const int *erratum) -{ - int osvw_id = *erratum++; - u32 range; - u32 ms; - - if (osvw_id >= 0 && osvw_id < 65536 && - cpu_has(cpu, X86_FEATURE_OSVW)) { - u64 osvw_len; - - rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH, osvw_len); - if (osvw_id < osvw_len) { - u64 osvw_bits; - - rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS + (osvw_id >> 6), - osvw_bits); - return osvw_bits & (1ULL << (osvw_id & 0x3f)); - } - } - - /* OSVW unavailable or ID unknown, match family-model-stepping range */ - ms = (cpu->x86_model << 4) | cpu->x86_stepping; - while ((range = *erratum++)) - if ((cpu->x86 == AMD_MODEL_RANGE_FAMILY(range)) && - (ms >= AMD_MODEL_RANGE_START(range)) && - (ms <= AMD_MODEL_RANGE_END(range))) - return true; - - return false; -} - void set_dr_addr_mask(unsigned long mask, int dr) { if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BPEXT)) @@ -1182,3 +1243,18 @@ void set_dr_addr_mask(unsigned long mask, int dr) break; } } + +static void zenbleed_check_cpu(void *unused) +{ + struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(smp_processor_id()); + + zenbleed_check(c); +} + +void amd_check_microcode(void) +{ + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) + return; + + on_each_cpu(zenbleed_check_cpu, NULL, 1); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index f1f57acca139..6e1acbdd27a5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ * - Andrew D. Balsa (code cleanup). */ #include <linux/init.h> -#include <linux/utsname.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/nospec.h> @@ -25,9 +24,7 @@ #include <asm/msr.h> #include <asm/vmx.h> #include <asm/paravirt.h> -#include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> -#include <asm/set_memory.h> #include <asm/intel-family.h> #include <asm/e820/api.h> #include <asm/hypervisor.h> @@ -47,6 +44,7 @@ static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void); static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void); static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void); /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; @@ -115,29 +113,24 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear); DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear); -void __init check_bugs(void) +void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void) { - identify_boot_cpu(); - - /* - * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the - * core code know. - */ - cpu_smt_check_topology(); - - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) { - pr_info("CPU: "); - print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data); - } - /* * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family. */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) { rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + /* + * Previously running kernel (kexec), may have some controls + * turned ON. Clear them and let the mitigations setup below + * rediscover them based on configuration. + */ + x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK; + } + /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); @@ -157,39 +150,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) l1tf_select_mitigation(); md_clear_select_mitigation(); srbds_select_mitigation(); - - arch_smt_update(); - -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 - /* - * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP. - * - * - i386 is no longer supported. - * - In order to run on anything without a TSC, we need to be - * compiled for a i486. - */ - if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4) - panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features"); - - init_utsname()->machine[1] = - '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86); - alternative_instructions(); - - fpu__init_check_bugs(); -#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ - alternative_instructions(); - - /* - * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages - * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping - * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs. - * - * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems - * very little benefit for that case. - */ - if (!direct_gbpages) - set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1); -#endif + gds_select_mitigation(); } /* @@ -641,6 +602,149 @@ static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str) early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline); #undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "GDS: " fmt + +enum gds_mitigations { + GDS_MITIGATION_OFF, + GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED, + GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE, + GDS_MITIGATION_FULL, + GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED, + GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR, +}; + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION) +static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE; +#else +static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL; +#endif + +static const char * const gds_strings[] = { + [GDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable", + [GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode", + [GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE] = "Mitigation: AVX disabled, no microcode", + [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode", + [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED] = "Mitigation: Microcode (locked)", + [GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status", +}; + +bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void) +{ + return (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL || + gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gds_ucode_mitigated); + +void update_gds_msr(void) +{ + u64 mcu_ctrl_after; + u64 mcu_ctrl; + + switch (gds_mitigation) { + case GDS_MITIGATION_OFF: + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); + mcu_ctrl |= GDS_MITG_DIS; + break; + case GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED: + /* + * The LOCKED state comes from the boot CPU. APs might not have + * the same state. Make sure the mitigation is enabled on all + * CPUs. + */ + case GDS_MITIGATION_FULL: + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); + mcu_ctrl &= ~GDS_MITG_DIS; + break; + case GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE: + case GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED: + case GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR: + return; + }; + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); + + /* + * Check to make sure that the WRMSR value was not ignored. Writes to + * GDS_MITG_DIS will be ignored if this processor is locked but the boot + * processor was not. + */ + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl_after); + WARN_ON_ONCE(mcu_ctrl != mcu_ctrl_after); +} + +static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void) +{ + u64 mcu_ctrl; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS)) + return; + + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) { + gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR; + goto out; + } + + if (cpu_mitigations_off()) + gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF; + /* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */ + + /* No microcode */ + if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) { + if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) { + /* + * This only needs to be done on the boot CPU so do it + * here rather than in update_gds_msr() + */ + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX); + pr_warn("Microcode update needed! Disabling AVX as mitigation.\n"); + } else { + gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; + } + goto out; + } + + /* Microcode has mitigation, use it */ + if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) + gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); + if (mcu_ctrl & GDS_MITG_LOCKED) { + if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_OFF) + pr_warn("Mitigation locked. Disable failed.\n"); + + /* + * The mitigation is selected from the boot CPU. All other CPUs + * _should_ have the same state. If the boot CPU isn't locked + * but others are then update_gds_msr() will WARN() of the state + * mismatch. If the boot CPU is locked update_gds_msr() will + * ensure the other CPUs have the mitigation enabled. + */ + gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED; + } + + update_gds_msr(); +out: + pr_info("%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]); +} + +static int __init gds_parse_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS)) + return 0; + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) + gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF; + else if (!strcmp(str, "force")) + gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE; + + return 0; +} +early_param("gather_data_sampling", gds_parse_cmdline); + +#undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt enum spectre_v1_mitigation { @@ -975,14 +1079,18 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO; } -static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) { - return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS || - mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || + return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE; } +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +{ + return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS; +} + static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) { @@ -1045,12 +1153,19 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) } /* - * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, - * STIBP is not required. + * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP + * is not required. + * + * Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target + * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which + * implicitly enables cross-thread protections. However, in legacy IBRS + * mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return + * to userspace. This disables the implicit cross-thread protection, + * so allow for STIBP to be selected in that case. */ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || !smt_possible || - spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return; /* @@ -1778,6 +1893,8 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE) task_set_spec_ib_force_disable(task); task_update_spec_tif(task); + if (task == current) + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); break; default: return -ERANGE; @@ -2100,7 +2217,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf) static char *stibp_state(void) { - if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return ""; switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) { @@ -2175,6 +2292,11 @@ static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); } +static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]); +} + static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf, unsigned int bug) { @@ -2224,6 +2346,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr case X86_BUG_RETBLEED: return retbleed_show_state(buf); + case X86_BUG_GDS: + return gds_show_state(buf); + default: break; } @@ -2288,4 +2413,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, cha { return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED); } + +ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_GDS); +} #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 55293e5dcbff..d315e928b95c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -13,14 +13,20 @@ #include <linux/sched/mm.h> #include <linux/sched/clock.h> #include <linux/sched/task.h> +#include <linux/sched/smt.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kprobes.h> #include <linux/kgdb.h> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> #include <linux/smp.h> +#include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/syscore_ops.h> #include <asm/stackprotector.h> +#include <linux/utsname.h> + +#include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/perf_event.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> #include <asm/archrandom.h> @@ -56,6 +62,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC #include <asm/uv/uv.h> #endif +#include <asm/set_memory.h> #include "cpu.h" @@ -1040,6 +1047,12 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { #define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2) /* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */ #define RETBLEED BIT(3) +/* CPU is affected by SMT (cross-thread) return predictions */ +#define SMT_RSB BIT(4) +/* CPU is affected by SRSO */ +#define SRSO BIT(5) +/* CPU is affected by GDS */ +#define GDS BIT(6) static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), @@ -1052,18 +1065,20 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_MOBILE,X86_STEPPING_ANY, RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_XEON_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_XEON_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), @@ -1186,6 +1201,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB); + /* + * Check if CPU is vulnerable to GDS. If running in a virtual machine on + * an affected processor, the VMM may have disabled the use of GATHER by + * disabling AVX2. The only way to do this in HW is to clear XCR0[2], + * which means that AVX will be disabled. + */ + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, GDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) && + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; @@ -1271,8 +1296,6 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) cpu_set_bug_bits(c); - fpu__init_system(c); - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 /* * Regardless of whether PCID is enumerated, the SDM says @@ -1661,6 +1684,8 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) validate_apic_and_package_id(c); x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(); update_srbds_msr(); + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS)) + update_gds_msr(); } static __init int setup_noclflush(char *arg) @@ -1978,8 +2003,6 @@ void cpu_init(void) clear_all_debug_regs(); dbg_restore_debug_regs(); - fpu__init_cpu(); - if (is_uv_system()) uv_cpu_init(); @@ -2043,8 +2066,6 @@ void cpu_init(void) clear_all_debug_regs(); dbg_restore_debug_regs(); - fpu__init_cpu(); - load_fixmap_gdt(cpu); } #endif @@ -2077,6 +2098,8 @@ void microcode_check(void) perf_check_microcode(); + amd_check_microcode(); + /* Reload CPUID max function as it might've changed. */ info.cpuid_level = cpuid_eax(0); @@ -2095,3 +2118,69 @@ void microcode_check(void) pr_warn("x86/CPU: CPU features have changed after loading microcode, but might not take effect.\n"); pr_warn("x86/CPU: Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n"); } + +void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) +{ + identify_boot_cpu(); + + /* + * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the + * core code know. + */ + cpu_smt_check_topology(); + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) { + pr_info("CPU: "); + print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data); + } + + cpu_select_mitigations(); + + arch_smt_update(); + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) { + /* + * Check whether this is a real i386 which is not longer + * supported and fixup the utsname. + */ + if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4) + panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features"); + + init_utsname()->machine[1] = + '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86); + } + + /* + * Must be before alternatives because it might set or clear + * feature bits. + */ + fpu__init_system(); + fpu__init_cpu(); + + alternative_instructions(); + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) { + /* + * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages + * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping + * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs. + * + * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems + * very little benefit for that case. + */ + if (!direct_gbpages) + set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1); + } else { + fpu__init_check_bugs(); + } + + /* + * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA + * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will + * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will + * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It + * must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64 + * hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted. + */ + mem_encrypt_init(); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h index 4eb9bf68b122..ca1b8bf380a2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h @@ -79,9 +79,11 @@ extern void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void check_null_seg_clears_base(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu); +void cpu_select_mitigations(void); extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void); extern void update_srbds_msr(void); +extern void update_gds_msr(void); extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_rdtgroup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_rdtgroup.c index f406e3b85bdb..1125f752f126 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_rdtgroup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_rdtgroup.c @@ -585,8 +585,10 @@ static int __rdtgroup_move_task(struct task_struct *tsk, /* * Ensure the task's closid and rmid are written before determining if * the task is current that will decide if it will be interrupted. + * This pairs with the full barrier between the rq->curr update and + * resctrl_sched_in() during context switch. */ - barrier(); + smp_mb(); /* * By now, the task's closid and rmid are set. If the task is current @@ -2140,19 +2142,23 @@ static void rdt_move_group_tasks(struct rdtgroup *from, struct rdtgroup *to, t->closid = to->closid; t->rmid = to->mon.rmid; -#ifdef CONFIG_SMP /* - * This is safe on x86 w/o barriers as the ordering - * of writing to task_cpu() and t->on_cpu is - * reverse to the reading here. The detection is - * inaccurate as tasks might move or schedule - * before the smp function call takes place. In - * such a case the function call is pointless, but + * Order the closid/rmid stores above before the loads + * in task_curr(). This pairs with the full barrier + * between the rq->curr update and resctrl_sched_in() + * during context switch. + */ + smp_mb(); + + /* + * If the task is on a CPU, set the CPU in the mask. + * The detection is inaccurate as tasks might move or + * schedule before the smp function call takes place. + * In such a case the function call is pointless, but * there is no other side effect. */ - if (mask && t->on_cpu) + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) && mask && task_curr(t)) cpumask_set_cpu(task_cpu(t), mask); -#endif } } read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c index 8396c77e9323..5698e04803b5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c @@ -54,7 +54,9 @@ struct cont_desc { }; static u32 ucode_new_rev; -static u8 amd_ucode_patch[PATCH_MAX_SIZE]; + +/* One blob per node. */ +static u8 amd_ucode_patch[MAX_NUMNODES][PATCH_MAX_SIZE]; /* * Microcode patch container file is prepended to the initrd in cpio @@ -210,7 +212,7 @@ apply_microcode_early_amd(u32 cpuid_1_eax, void *ucode, size_t size, bool save_p patch = (u8 (*)[PATCH_MAX_SIZE])__pa_nodebug(&amd_ucode_patch); #else new_rev = &ucode_new_rev; - patch = &amd_ucode_patch; + patch = &amd_ucode_patch[0]; #endif desc.cpuid_1_eax = cpuid_1_eax; @@ -329,8 +331,7 @@ void load_ucode_amd_ap(unsigned int cpuid_1_eax) apply_microcode_early_amd(cpuid_1_eax, cp.data, cp.size, false); } -static enum ucode_state -load_microcode_amd(bool save, u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size); +static enum ucode_state load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size); int __init save_microcode_in_initrd_amd(unsigned int cpuid_1_eax) { @@ -348,19 +349,19 @@ int __init save_microcode_in_initrd_amd(unsigned int cpuid_1_eax) if (!desc.mc) return -EINVAL; - ret = load_microcode_amd(true, x86_family(cpuid_1_eax), desc.data, desc.size); + ret = load_microcode_amd(x86_family(cpuid_1_eax), desc.data, desc.size); if (ret > UCODE_UPDATED) return -EINVAL; return 0; } -void reload_ucode_amd(void) +void reload_ucode_amd(unsigned int cpu) { - struct microcode_amd *mc; u32 rev, dummy; + struct microcode_amd *mc; - mc = (struct microcode_amd *)amd_ucode_patch; + mc = (struct microcode_amd *)amd_ucode_patch[cpu_to_node(cpu)]; rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, rev, dummy); @@ -531,7 +532,7 @@ static enum ucode_state apply_microcode_amd(int cpu) rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, rev, dummy); /* need to apply patch? */ - if (rev >= mc_amd->hdr.patch_id) { + if (rev > mc_amd->hdr.patch_id) { ret = UCODE_OK; goto out; } @@ -698,9 +699,10 @@ static enum ucode_state __load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data, return UCODE_OK; } -static enum ucode_state -load_microcode_amd(bool save, u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size) +static enum ucode_state load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size) { + struct cpuinfo_x86 *c; + unsigned int nid, cpu; struct ucode_patch *p; enum ucode_state ret; @@ -713,22 +715,22 @@ load_microcode_amd(bool save, u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size) return ret; } - p = find_patch(0); - if (!p) { - return ret; - } else { - if (boot_cpu_data.microcode >= p->patch_id) - return ret; + for_each_node(nid) { + cpu = cpumask_first(cpumask_of_node(nid)); + c = &cpu_data(cpu); - ret = UCODE_NEW; - } + p = find_patch(cpu); + if (!p) + continue; - /* save BSP's matching patch for early load */ - if (!save) - return ret; + if (c->microcode >= p->patch_id) + continue; - memset(amd_ucode_patch, 0, PATCH_MAX_SIZE); - memcpy(amd_ucode_patch, p->data, min_t(u32, ksize(p->data), PATCH_MAX_SIZE)); + ret = UCODE_NEW; + + memset(&amd_ucode_patch[nid], 0, PATCH_MAX_SIZE); + memcpy(&amd_ucode_patch[nid], p->data, min_t(u32, ksize(p->data), PATCH_MAX_SIZE)); + } return ret; } @@ -754,12 +756,11 @@ static enum ucode_state request_microcode_amd(int cpu, struct device *device, { char fw_name[36] = "amd-ucode/microcode_amd.bin"; struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu); - bool bsp = c->cpu_index == boot_cpu_data.cpu_index; enum ucode_state ret = UCODE_NFOUND; const struct firmware *fw; /* reload ucode container only on the boot cpu */ - if (!refresh_fw || !bsp) + if (!refresh_fw) return UCODE_OK; if (c->x86 >= 0x15) @@ -776,7 +777,7 @@ static enum ucode_state request_microcode_amd(int cpu, struct device *device, goto fw_release; } - ret = load_microcode_amd(bsp, c->x86, fw->data, fw->size); + ret = load_microcode_amd(c->x86, fw->data, fw->size); fw_release: release_firmware(fw); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c index 985ef98c8ba2..963b989710f9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c @@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ struct cpio_data find_microcode_in_initrd(const char *path, bool use_pa) #endif } -void reload_early_microcode(void) +void reload_early_microcode(unsigned int cpu) { int vendor, family; @@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ void reload_early_microcode(void) break; case X86_VENDOR_AMD: if (family >= 0x10) - reload_ucode_amd(); + reload_ucode_amd(cpu); break; default: break; @@ -783,7 +783,7 @@ void microcode_bsp_resume(void) if (uci->valid && uci->mc) microcode_ops->apply_microcode(cpu); else if (!uci->mc) - reload_early_microcode(); + reload_early_microcode(cpu); } static struct syscore_ops mc_syscore_ops = { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c index 3aa0e5a45303..31ad79a0c6f3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c @@ -662,7 +662,6 @@ void load_ucode_intel_ap(void) else iup = &intel_ucode_patch; -reget: if (!*iup) { patch = __load_ucode_intel(&uci); if (!patch) @@ -673,12 +672,7 @@ reget: uci.mc = *iup; - if (apply_microcode_early(&uci, true)) { - /* Mixed-silicon system? Try to refetch the proper patch: */ - *iup = NULL; - - goto reget; - } + apply_microcode_early(&uci, true); } static struct microcode_intel *find_patch(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c index 71ca064e3794..31fe56a90cbf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ int detect_extended_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * initial apic id, which also represents 32-bit extended x2apic id. */ c->initial_apicid = edx; - smp_num_siblings = LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx); + smp_num_siblings = max_t(int, smp_num_siblings, LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx)); #endif return 0; } @@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ int detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * Populate HT related information from sub-leaf level 0. */ cpuid_count(0xb, SMT_LEVEL, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); - core_level_siblings = smp_num_siblings = LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx); + core_level_siblings = LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx); + smp_num_siblings = max_t(int, smp_num_siblings, LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx)); core_plus_mask_width = ht_mask_width = BITS_SHIFT_NEXT_LEVEL(eax); sub_index = 1; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c index 91b3483e5085..e40bb50c5c4f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ #include <linux/kdebug.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> #include <asm/reboot.h> -#include <asm/virtext.h> #include <asm/intel_pt.h> /* Used while preparing memory map entries for second kernel */ @@ -86,15 +85,6 @@ static void kdump_nmi_callback(int cpu, struct pt_regs *regs) */ cpu_crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss(); - /* Disable VMX or SVM if needed. - * - * We need to disable virtualization on all CPUs. - * Having VMX or SVM enabled on any CPU may break rebooting - * after the kdump kernel has finished its task. - */ - cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); - cpu_emergency_svm_disable(); - /* * Disable Intel PT to stop its logging */ @@ -153,12 +143,7 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs) */ cpu_crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss(); - /* Booting kdump kernel with VMX or SVM enabled won't work, - * because (among other limitations) we can't disable paging - * with the virt flags. - */ - cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); - cpu_emergency_svm_disable(); + cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(); /* * Disable Intel PT to stop its logging diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c index 2b5886401e5f..7e698c45760c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c @@ -171,7 +171,6 @@ void show_trace_log_lvl(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs, printk("%sCall Trace:\n", log_lvl); unwind_start(&state, task, regs, stack); - stack = stack ? : get_stack_pointer(task, regs); regs = unwind_get_entry_regs(&state, &partial); /* @@ -190,9 +189,13 @@ void show_trace_log_lvl(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs, * - hardirq stack * - entry stack */ - for ( ; stack; stack = PTR_ALIGN(stack_info.next_sp, sizeof(long))) { + for (stack = stack ?: get_stack_pointer(task, regs); + stack; + stack = stack_info.next_sp) { const char *stack_name; + stack = PTR_ALIGN(stack, sizeof(long)); + if (get_stack_info(stack, task, &stack_info, &visit_mask)) { /* * We weren't on a valid stack. It's possible that @@ -326,7 +329,7 @@ unsigned long oops_begin(void) } NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_begin); -void __noreturn rewind_stack_do_exit(int signr); +void __noreturn rewind_stack_and_make_dead(int signr); void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr) { @@ -361,7 +364,7 @@ void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr) * reuse the task stack and that existing poisons are invalid. */ kasan_unpoison_task_stack(current); - rewind_stack_do_exit(signr); + rewind_stack_and_make_dead(signr); } NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_end); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c index 9692ccc583bb..644372a10c89 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ void fpu__init_cpu(void) fpu__init_cpu_xstate(); } -static bool fpu__probe_without_cpuid(void) +static bool __init fpu__probe_without_cpuid(void) { unsigned long cr0; u16 fsw, fcw; @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static bool fpu__probe_without_cpuid(void) return fsw == 0 && (fcw & 0x103f) == 0x003f; } -static void fpu__init_system_early_generic(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +static void __init fpu__init_system_early_generic(void) { if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CPUID) && !test_bit(X86_FEATURE_FPU, (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared)) { @@ -297,10 +297,10 @@ static void __init fpu__init_parse_early_param(void) * Called on the boot CPU once per system bootup, to set up the initial * FPU state that is later cloned into all processes: */ -void __init fpu__init_system(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +void __init fpu__init_system(void) { fpu__init_parse_early_param(); - fpu__init_system_early_generic(c); + fpu__init_system_early_generic(); /* * The FPU has to be operational for some of the diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c index 7d372db8bee1..e33b732ad337 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c @@ -811,6 +811,14 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void) fpu__init_prepare_fx_sw_frame(); setup_init_fpu_buf(); setup_xstate_comp(); + + /* + * CPU capabilities initialization runs before FPU init. So + * X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE is not set. Now that XSAVE is completely + * functional, set the feature bit so depending code works. + */ + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE); + print_xstate_offset_size(); pr_info("x86/fpu: Enabled xstate features 0x%llx, context size is %d bytes, using '%s' format.\n", diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c b/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c index fe522691ac71..82753622f489 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ */ static void init_8259A(int auto_eoi); +static bool pcat_compat __ro_after_init; static int i8259A_auto_eoi; DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(i8259A_lock); @@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ static void make_8259A_irq(unsigned int irq) disable_irq_nosync(irq); io_apic_irqs &= ~(1<<irq); irq_set_chip_and_handler(irq, &i8259A_chip, handle_level_irq); + irq_set_status_flags(irq, IRQ_LEVEL); enable_irq(irq); lapic_assign_legacy_vector(irq, true); } @@ -300,15 +302,32 @@ static void unmask_8259A(void) static int probe_8259A(void) { + unsigned char new_val, probe_val = ~(1 << PIC_CASCADE_IR); unsigned long flags; - unsigned char probe_val = ~(1 << PIC_CASCADE_IR); - unsigned char new_val; + + /* + * If MADT has the PCAT_COMPAT flag set, then do not bother probing + * for the PIC. Some BIOSes leave the PIC uninitialized and probing + * fails. + * + * Right now this causes problems as quite some code depends on + * nr_legacy_irqs() > 0 or has_legacy_pic() == true. This is silly + * when the system has an IO/APIC because then PIC is not required + * at all, except for really old machines where the timer interrupt + * must be routed through the PIC. So just pretend that the PIC is + * there and let legacy_pic->init() initialize it for nothing. + * + * Alternatively this could just try to initialize the PIC and + * repeat the probe, but for cases where there is no PIC that's + * just pointless. + */ + if (pcat_compat) + return nr_legacy_irqs(); + /* - * Check to see if we have a PIC. - * Mask all except the cascade and read - * back the value we just wrote. If we don't - * have a PIC, we will read 0xff as opposed to the - * value we wrote. + * Check to see if we have a PIC. Mask all except the cascade and + * read back the value we just wrote. If we don't have a PIC, we + * will read 0xff as opposed to the value we wrote. */ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&i8259A_lock, flags); @@ -430,5 +449,9 @@ static int __init i8259A_init_ops(void) return 0; } - device_initcall(i8259A_init_ops); + +void __init legacy_pic_pcat_compat(void) +{ + pcat_compat = true; +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c index a0693b71cfc1..f2c215e1f64c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c @@ -72,8 +72,10 @@ void __init init_ISA_irqs(void) legacy_pic->init(0); - for (i = 0; i < nr_legacy_irqs(); i++) + for (i = 0; i < nr_legacy_irqs(); i++) { irq_set_chip_and_handler(i, chip, handle_level_irq); + irq_set_status_flags(i, IRQ_LEVEL); + } } void __init init_IRQ(void) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c index 544bd41a514c..36b5a493e5b4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c @@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ unsigned long __recover_optprobed_insn(kprobe_opcode_t *buf, unsigned long addr) /* This function only handles jump-optimized kprobe */ if (kp && kprobe_optimized(kp)) { op = container_of(kp, struct optimized_kprobe, kp); - /* If op->list is not empty, op is under optimizing */ - if (list_empty(&op->list)) + /* If op is optimized or under unoptimizing */ + if (list_empty(&op->list) || optprobe_queued_unopt(op)) goto found; } } @@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ int arch_check_optimized_kprobe(struct optimized_kprobe *op) for (i = 1; i < op->optinsn.size; i++) { p = get_kprobe(op->kp.addr + i); - if (p && !kprobe_disabled(p)) + if (p && !kprobe_disarmed(p)) return -EEXIST; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/quirks.c b/arch/x86/kernel/quirks.c index 736348ead421..2ecf1dcc86b2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/quirks.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/quirks.c @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static void ich_force_hpet_resume(void) static void ich_force_enable_hpet(struct pci_dev *dev) { u32 val; - u32 uninitialized_var(rcba); + u32 rcba; int err = 0; if (hpet_address || force_hpet_address) @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static void hpet_print_force_info(void) static void old_ich_force_hpet_resume(void) { u32 val; - u32 uninitialized_var(gen_cntl); + u32 gen_cntl; if (!force_hpet_address || !cached_dev) return; @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static void old_ich_force_hpet_resume(void) static void old_ich_force_enable_hpet(struct pci_dev *dev) { u32 val; - u32 uninitialized_var(gen_cntl); + u32 gen_cntl; if (hpet_address || force_hpet_address) return; @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static void vt8237_force_hpet_resume(void) static void vt8237_force_enable_hpet(struct pci_dev *dev) { - u32 uninitialized_var(val); + u32 val; if (hpet_address || force_hpet_address) return; @@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static void nvidia_force_hpet_resume(void) static void nvidia_force_enable_hpet(struct pci_dev *dev) { - u32 uninitialized_var(val); + u32 val; if (hpet_address || force_hpet_address) return; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c index b0f3a996df15..444b8a691c14 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c @@ -536,33 +536,29 @@ static inline void kb_wait(void) } } -static void vmxoff_nmi(int cpu, struct pt_regs *regs) -{ - cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); -} +static inline void nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart(void); -/* Use NMIs as IPIs to tell all CPUs to disable virtualization */ -static void emergency_vmx_disable_all(void) +static void emergency_reboot_disable_virtualization(void) { /* Just make sure we won't change CPUs while doing this */ local_irq_disable(); /* - * Disable VMX on all CPUs before rebooting, otherwise we risk hanging - * the machine, because the CPU blocks INIT when it's in VMX root. + * Disable virtualization on all CPUs before rebooting to avoid hanging + * the system, as VMX and SVM block INIT when running in the host. * * We can't take any locks and we may be on an inconsistent state, so - * use NMIs as IPIs to tell the other CPUs to exit VMX root and halt. + * use NMIs as IPIs to tell the other CPUs to disable VMX/SVM and halt. * - * Do the NMI shootdown even if VMX if off on _this_ CPU, as that - * doesn't prevent a different CPU from being in VMX root operation. + * Do the NMI shootdown even if virtualization is off on _this_ CPU, as + * other CPUs may have virtualization enabled. */ - if (cpu_has_vmx()) { - /* Safely force _this_ CPU out of VMX root operation. */ - __cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); + if (cpu_has_vmx() || cpu_has_svm(NULL)) { + /* Safely force _this_ CPU out of VMX/SVM operation. */ + cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(); - /* Halt and exit VMX root operation on the other CPUs. */ - nmi_shootdown_cpus(vmxoff_nmi); + /* Disable VMX/SVM and halt on other CPUs. */ + nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart(); } } @@ -599,7 +595,7 @@ static void native_machine_emergency_restart(void) unsigned short mode; if (reboot_emergency) - emergency_vmx_disable_all(); + emergency_reboot_disable_virtualization(); tboot_shutdown(TB_SHUTDOWN_REBOOT); @@ -804,6 +800,17 @@ void machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs) /* This is the CPU performing the emergency shutdown work. */ int crashing_cpu = -1; +/* + * Disable virtualization, i.e. VMX or SVM, to ensure INIT is recognized during + * reboot. VMX blocks INIT if the CPU is post-VMXON, and SVM blocks INIT if + * GIF=0, i.e. if the crash occurred between CLGI and STGI. + */ +void cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(void) +{ + cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); + cpu_emergency_svm_disable(); +} + #if defined(CONFIG_SMP) static nmi_shootdown_cb shootdown_callback; @@ -826,7 +833,14 @@ static int crash_nmi_callback(unsigned int val, struct pt_regs *regs) return NMI_HANDLED; local_irq_disable(); - shootdown_callback(cpu, regs); + if (shootdown_callback) + shootdown_callback(cpu, regs); + + /* + * Prepare the CPU for reboot _after_ invoking the callback so that the + * callback can safely use virtualization instructions, e.g. VMCLEAR. + */ + cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(); atomic_dec(&waiting_for_crash_ipi); /* Assume hlt works */ @@ -842,18 +856,32 @@ static void smp_send_nmi_allbutself(void) apic->send_IPI_allbutself(NMI_VECTOR); } -/* - * Halt all other CPUs, calling the specified function on each of them +/** + * nmi_shootdown_cpus - Stop other CPUs via NMI + * @callback: Optional callback to be invoked from the NMI handler + * + * The NMI handler on the remote CPUs invokes @callback, if not + * NULL, first and then disables virtualization to ensure that + * INIT is recognized during reboot. * - * This function can be used to halt all other CPUs on crash - * or emergency reboot time. The function passed as parameter - * will be called inside a NMI handler on all CPUs. + * nmi_shootdown_cpus() can only be invoked once. After the first + * invocation all other CPUs are stuck in crash_nmi_callback() and + * cannot respond to a second NMI. */ void nmi_shootdown_cpus(nmi_shootdown_cb callback) { unsigned long msecs; + local_irq_disable(); + /* + * Avoid certain doom if a shootdown already occurred; re-registering + * the NMI handler will cause list corruption, modifying the callback + * will do who knows what, etc... + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crash_ipi_issued)) + return; + /* Make a note of crashing cpu. Will be used in NMI callback. */ crashing_cpu = safe_smp_processor_id(); @@ -881,7 +909,17 @@ void nmi_shootdown_cpus(nmi_shootdown_cb callback) msecs--; } - /* Leave the nmi callback set */ + /* + * Leave the nmi callback set, shootdown is a one-time thing. Clearing + * the callback could result in a NULL pointer dereference if a CPU + * (finally) responds after the timeout expires. + */ +} + +static inline void nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart(void) +{ + if (!crash_ipi_issued) + nmi_shootdown_cpus(NULL); } /* @@ -911,6 +949,8 @@ void nmi_shootdown_cpus(nmi_shootdown_cb callback) /* No other CPUs to shoot down */ } +static inline void nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart(void) { } + void run_crash_ipi_callback(struct pt_regs *regs) { } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smp.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smp.c index b2b87b91f336..c94ed0b37bcd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/smp.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smp.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ #include <asm/mce.h> #include <asm/trace/irq_vectors.h> #include <asm/kexec.h> -#include <asm/virtext.h> +#include <asm/reboot.h> /* * Some notes on x86 processor bugs affecting SMP operation: @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static int smp_stop_nmi_callback(unsigned int val, struct pt_regs *regs) if (raw_smp_processor_id() == atomic_read(&stopping_cpu)) return NMI_HANDLED; - cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); + cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(); stop_this_cpu(NULL); return NMI_HANDLED; @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static int smp_stop_nmi_callback(unsigned int val, struct pt_regs *regs) asmlinkage __visible void smp_reboot_interrupt(void) { ipi_entering_ack_irq(); - cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); + cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(); stop_this_cpu(NULL); irq_exit(); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c index 8783d065f927..2e4f6a1ebca5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c @@ -96,6 +96,17 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(cpumask_var_t, cpu_llc_shared_map); DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct cpuinfo_x86, cpu_info); EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_info); +struct mwait_cpu_dead { + unsigned int control; + unsigned int status; +}; + +/* + * Cache line aligned data for mwait_play_dead(). Separate on purpose so + * that it's unlikely to be touched by other CPUs. + */ +static DEFINE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(struct mwait_cpu_dead, mwait_cpu_dead); + /* Logical package management. We might want to allocate that dynamically */ unsigned int __max_logical_packages __read_mostly; EXPORT_SYMBOL(__max_logical_packages); @@ -231,6 +242,7 @@ static void notrace start_secondary(void *unused) #endif load_current_idt(); cpu_init(); + fpu__init_cpu(); x86_cpuinit.early_percpu_clock_init(); preempt_disable(); smp_callin(); @@ -1594,10 +1606,10 @@ static bool wakeup_cpu0(void) */ static inline void mwait_play_dead(void) { + struct mwait_cpu_dead *md = this_cpu_ptr(&mwait_cpu_dead); unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; unsigned int highest_cstate = 0; unsigned int highest_subcstate = 0; - void *mwait_ptr; int i; if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) @@ -1631,13 +1643,6 @@ static inline void mwait_play_dead(void) (highest_subcstate - 1); } - /* - * This should be a memory location in a cache line which is - * unlikely to be touched by other processors. The actual - * content is immaterial as it is not actually modified in any way. - */ - mwait_ptr = ¤t_thread_info()->flags; - wbinvd(); while (1) { @@ -1649,9 +1654,9 @@ static inline void mwait_play_dead(void) * case where we return around the loop. */ mb(); - clflush(mwait_ptr); + clflush(md); mb(); - __monitor(mwait_ptr, 0, 0); + __monitor(md, 0, 0); mb(); __mwait(eax, 0); /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sysfb_efi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sysfb_efi.c index 897da526e40e..5bc0fedb3342 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sysfb_efi.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sysfb_efi.c @@ -265,6 +265,22 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id efifb_dmi_swap_width_height[] __initconst = { "Lenovo ideapad D330-10IGM"), }, }, + { + /* Lenovo IdeaPad Duet 3 10IGL5 with 1200x1920 portrait screen */ + .matches = { + DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"), + DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, + "IdeaPad Duet 3 10IGL5"), + }, + }, + { + /* Lenovo Yoga Book X91F / X91L */ + .matches = { + DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"), + /* Non exact match to match F + L versions */ + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Lenovo YB1-X91"), + }, + }, {}, }; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c index ae9e806a11de..3b87bca027b4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c @@ -735,8 +735,9 @@ static int branch_setup_xol_ops(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct insn *insn) switch (opc1) { case 0xeb: /* jmp 8 */ case 0xe9: /* jmp 32 */ - case 0x90: /* prefix* + nop; same as jmp with .offs = 0 */ break; + case 0x90: /* prefix* + nop; same as jmp with .offs = 0 */ + goto setup; case 0xe8: /* call relative */ branch_clear_offset(auprobe, insn); @@ -765,6 +766,7 @@ static int branch_setup_xol_ops(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct insn *insn) return -ENOTSUPP; } +setup: auprobe->branch.opc1 = opc1; auprobe->branch.ilen = insn->length; auprobe->branch.offs = insn->immediate.value; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index 34c0652ca8b4..20d09355c9e0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ SECTIONS .brk : AT(ADDR(.brk) - LOAD_OFFSET) { __brk_base = .; . += 64 * 1024; /* 64k alignment slop space */ - *(.brk_reservation) /* areas brk users have reserved */ + *(.bss..brk) /* areas brk users have reserved */ __brk_limit = .; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile index dc4f2fdf5e57..13fd54de5449 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ kvm-y += x86.o mmu.o emulate.o i8259.o irq.o lapic.o \ i8254.o ioapic.o irq_comm.o cpuid.o pmu.o mtrr.o \ hyperv.o page_track.o debugfs.o -kvm-intel-y += vmx.o pmu_intel.o +kvm-intel-y += vmx/vmx.o vmx/pmu_intel.o kvm-amd-y += svm.o pmu_amd.o obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c index 027941e3df68..256b00f456e6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c @@ -2201,13 +2201,17 @@ int kvm_apic_local_deliver(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int lvt_type) { u32 reg = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, lvt_type); int vector, mode, trig_mode; + int r; if (kvm_apic_hw_enabled(apic) && !(reg & APIC_LVT_MASKED)) { vector = reg & APIC_VECTOR_MASK; mode = reg & APIC_MODE_MASK; trig_mode = reg & APIC_LVT_LEVEL_TRIGGER; - return __apic_accept_irq(apic, mode, vector, 1, trig_mode, - NULL); + + r = __apic_accept_irq(apic, mode, vector, 1, trig_mode, NULL); + if (r && lvt_type == APIC_LVTPC) + kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_LVTPC, reg | APIC_LVT_MASKED); + return r; } return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu_intel.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c index 611f9e60f815..611f9e60f815 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu_intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 9bb696d7300c..55e52064c4ec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -2062,6 +2062,12 @@ static inline bool nested_cpu_has_shadow_vmcs(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS); } +static inline bool nested_cpu_has_save_preemption_timer(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) +{ + return vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & + VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER; +} + static inline bool is_nmi(u32 intr_info) { return (intr_info & (INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK)) @@ -4734,9 +4740,6 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf) } } - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, host_xss); - return 0; } @@ -5518,18 +5521,15 @@ static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights(struct kvm_segment *var) { u32 ar; - if (var->unusable || !var->present) - ar = 1 << 16; - else { - ar = var->type & 15; - ar |= (var->s & 1) << 4; - ar |= (var->dpl & 3) << 5; - ar |= (var->present & 1) << 7; - ar |= (var->avl & 1) << 12; - ar |= (var->l & 1) << 13; - ar |= (var->db & 1) << 14; - ar |= (var->g & 1) << 15; - } + ar = var->type & 15; + ar |= (var->s & 1) << 4; + ar |= (var->dpl & 3) << 5; + ar |= (var->present & 1) << 7; + ar |= (var->avl & 1) << 12; + ar |= (var->l & 1) << 13; + ar |= (var->db & 1) << 14; + ar |= (var->g & 1) << 15; + ar |= (var->unusable || !var->present) << 16; return ar; } @@ -7951,6 +7951,9 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) WARN_ONCE(host_bndcfgs, "KVM: BNDCFGS in host will be lost"); } + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, host_xss); + if (!cpu_has_vmx_vpid() || !cpu_has_vmx_invvpid() || !(cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_single() || cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_global())) enable_vpid = 0; @@ -12609,6 +12612,10 @@ static int check_vmentry_prereqs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) if (nested_vmx_check_msr_switch_controls(vcpu, vmcs12)) return VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD; + if (!nested_cpu_has_preemption_timer(vmcs12) && + nested_cpu_has_save_preemption_timer(vmcs12)) + return VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD; + if (nested_vmx_check_pml_controls(vcpu, vmcs12)) return VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD; @@ -12745,7 +12752,7 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_vmcs_link_ptr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, static int check_vmentry_postreqs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, u32 *exit_qual) { - bool ia32e; + bool ia32e = !!(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE); *exit_qual = ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT; @@ -12758,6 +12765,13 @@ static int check_vmentry_postreqs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, return 1; } + if ((vmcs12->guest_cr0 & (X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE)) == X86_CR0_PG) + return 1; + + if ((ia32e && !(vmcs12->guest_cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)) || + (ia32e && !(vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))) + return 1; + /* * If the load IA32_EFER VM-entry control is 1, the following checks * are performed on the field for the IA32_EFER MSR: @@ -12769,7 +12783,6 @@ static int check_vmentry_postreqs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, */ if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending && (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)) { - ia32e = (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) != 0; if (!kvm_valid_efer(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_ia32_efer) || ia32e != !!(vmcs12->guest_ia32_efer & EFER_LMA) || ((vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) && @@ -13865,6 +13878,21 @@ static int vmx_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, /* FIXME: produce nested vmexit and return X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED. */ break; + case x86_intercept_pause: + /* + * PAUSE is a single-byte NOP with a REPE prefix, i.e. collides + * with vanilla NOPs in the emulator. Apply the interception + * check only to actual PAUSE instructions. Don't check + * PAUSE-loop-exiting, software can't expect a given PAUSE to + * exit, i.e. KVM is within its rights to allow L2 to execute + * the PAUSE. + */ + if ((info->rep_prefix != REPE_PREFIX) || + !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING)) + return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; + + break; + /* TODO: check more intercepts... */ default: break; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx_evmcs.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_evmcs.h index 210a884090ad..210a884090ad 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx_evmcs.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_evmcs.h diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx_shadow_fields.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_shadow_fields.h index cd0c75f6d037..cd0c75f6d037 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx_shadow_fields.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_shadow_fields.h diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 8fe615df8e5b..0548ae57826f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1224,6 +1224,9 @@ u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void) /* Guests don't need to know "Fill buffer clear control" exists */ data &= ~ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL; + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS) || gds_ucode_mitigated()) + data |= ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO; + return data; } @@ -2457,6 +2460,7 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) case MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LOADER: case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2: case MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG: + case MSR_AMD64_TW_CFG: case MSR_F15H_EX_CFG: break; @@ -2760,6 +2764,7 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2: case MSR_IA32_PERF_CTL: case MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG: + case MSR_AMD64_TW_CFG: case MSR_F15H_EX_CFG: msr_info->data = 0; break; @@ -3637,12 +3642,11 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, { unsigned long val; + memset(dbgregs, 0, sizeof(*dbgregs)); memcpy(dbgregs->db, vcpu->arch.db, sizeof(vcpu->arch.db)); kvm_get_dr(vcpu, 6, &val); dbgregs->dr6 = val; dbgregs->dr7 = vcpu->arch.dr7; - dbgregs->flags = 0; - memset(&dbgregs->reserved, 0, sizeof(dbgregs->reserved)); } static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/iomap_copy_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/iomap_copy_64.S index 33147fef3452..f1024b51cfee 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/iomap_copy_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/iomap_copy_64.S @@ -22,6 +22,6 @@ */ ENTRY(__iowrite32_copy) movl %edx,%ecx - rep movsd + rep movsl ret ENDPROC(__iowrite32_copy) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/misc.c b/arch/x86/lib/misc.c index a018ec4fba53..c97be9a1430a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/misc.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/misc.c @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ */ int num_digits(int val) { - int m = 10; + long long m = 10; int d = 1; if (val < 0) { diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c index b1dba0987565..2c84c5595cf4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include <linux/kmemleak.h> #include <asm/set_memory.h> +#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #include <asm/e820/api.h> #include <asm/init.h> #include <asm/page.h> @@ -207,6 +208,24 @@ static void __init probe_page_size_mask(void) } } +#define INTEL_MATCH(_model) { .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, \ + .family = 6, \ + .model = _model, \ + } +/* + * INVLPG may not properly flush Global entries + * on these CPUs when PCIDs are enabled. + */ +static const struct x86_cpu_id invlpg_miss_ids[] = { + INTEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE ), + INTEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE_L ), + INTEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE_N ), + INTEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE ), + INTEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE_P), + INTEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE_S), + {} +}; + static void setup_pcid(void) { if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) @@ -215,6 +234,12 @@ static void setup_pcid(void) if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID)) return; + if (x86_match_cpu(invlpg_miss_ids)) { + pr_info("Incomplete global flushes, disabling PCID"); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID); + return; + } + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE)) { /* * This can't be cr4_set_bits_and_update_boot() -- the diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c index 650d5a6cafc7..832c899b7b73 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c @@ -563,7 +563,8 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32)); - cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + if (cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < 0) + return; if (!strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer))) sme_me_mask = me_mask; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/numa.c b/arch/x86/mm/numa.c index b4ff063a4371..a830d49341ec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/numa.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/numa.c @@ -585,13 +585,6 @@ static int __init numa_register_memblks(struct numa_meminfo *mi) if (start >= end) continue; - /* - * Don't confuse VM with a node that doesn't have the - * minimum amount of memory: - */ - if (end && (end - start) < NODE_MIN_SIZE) - continue; - alloc_node_data(nid); } diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c b/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c index 76959a7d88c8..94291e0ddcb7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c +++ b/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include <linux/dmi.h> #include <linux/pci.h> #include <linux/vgaarb.h> +#include <asm/amd_nb.h> #include <asm/hpet.h> #include <asm/pci_x86.h> @@ -824,3 +825,23 @@ static void rs690_fix_64bit_dma(struct pci_dev *pdev) DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_ATI, 0x7910, rs690_fix_64bit_dma); #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_NB + +#define AMD_15B8_RCC_DEV2_EPF0_STRAP2 0x10136008 +#define AMD_15B8_RCC_DEV2_EPF0_STRAP2_NO_SOFT_RESET_DEV2_F0_MASK 0x00000080L + +static void quirk_clear_strap_no_soft_reset_dev2_f0(struct pci_dev *dev) +{ + u32 data; + + if (!amd_smn_read(0, AMD_15B8_RCC_DEV2_EPF0_STRAP2, &data)) { + data &= ~AMD_15B8_RCC_DEV2_EPF0_STRAP2_NO_SOFT_RESET_DEV2_F0_MASK; + if (amd_smn_write(0, AMD_15B8_RCC_DEV2_EPF0_STRAP2, data)) + pci_err(dev, "Failed to write data 0x%x\n", data); + } else { + pci_err(dev, "Failed to read data\n"); + } +} +DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, 0x15b8, quirk_clear_strap_no_soft_reset_dev2_f0); +#endif diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile index 2cfa0caef133..00f104e341e5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile @@ -12,6 +12,11 @@ $(obj)/string.o: $(srctree)/arch/x86/boot/compressed/string.c FORCE $(obj)/sha256.o: $(srctree)/lib/sha256.c FORCE $(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c) +# When profile-guided optimization is enabled, llvm emits two different +# overlapping text sections, which is not supported by kexec. Remove profile +# optimization flags. +KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out -fprofile-sample-use=% -fprofile-use=%,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) + LDFLAGS_purgatory.ro := -e purgatory_start -r --no-undefined -nostdlib -z nodefaultlib targets += purgatory.ro @@ -25,7 +30,7 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n # make up the standalone purgatory.ro PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE := -mcmodel=kernel -PURGATORY_CFLAGS := -mcmodel=large -ffreestanding -fno-zero-initialized-in-bss +PURGATORY_CFLAGS := -mcmodel=large -ffreestanding -fno-zero-initialized-in-bss -g0 PURGATORY_CFLAGS += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING # Default KBUILD_CFLAGS can have -pg option set when FTRACE is enabled. That @@ -56,6 +61,9 @@ CFLAGS_sha256.o += $(PURGATORY_CFLAGS) CFLAGS_REMOVE_string.o += $(PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE) CFLAGS_string.o += $(PURGATORY_CFLAGS) +AFLAGS_REMOVE_setup-x86_$(BITS).o += -g -Wa,-gdwarf-2 +AFLAGS_REMOVE_entry64.o += -g -Wa,-gdwarf-2 + $(obj)/purgatory.ro: $(PURGATORY_OBJS) FORCE $(call if_changed,ld) diff --git a/arch/x86/um/vdso/um_vdso.c b/arch/x86/um/vdso/um_vdso.c index 7c441b59d375..be99ff25c503 100644 --- a/arch/x86/um/vdso/um_vdso.c +++ b/arch/x86/um/vdso/um_vdso.c @@ -20,8 +20,10 @@ int __vdso_clock_gettime(clockid_t clock, struct timespec *ts) { long ret; - asm("syscall" : "=a" (ret) : - "0" (__NR_clock_gettime), "D" (clock), "S" (ts) : "memory"); + asm("syscall" + : "=a" (ret) + : "0" (__NR_clock_gettime), "D" (clock), "S" (ts) + : "rcx", "r11", "memory"); return ret; } @@ -32,8 +34,10 @@ int __vdso_gettimeofday(struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tz) { long ret; - asm("syscall" : "=a" (ret) : - "0" (__NR_gettimeofday), "D" (tv), "S" (tz) : "memory"); + asm("syscall" + : "=a" (ret) + : "0" (__NR_gettimeofday), "D" (tv), "S" (tz) + : "rcx", "r11", "memory"); return ret; } diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/smp.c b/arch/x86/xen/smp.c index 7a43b2ae19f1..a1cc855c539c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/smp.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp.c @@ -32,30 +32,30 @@ static irqreturn_t xen_reschedule_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) void xen_smp_intr_free(unsigned int cpu) { + kfree(per_cpu(xen_resched_irq, cpu).name); + per_cpu(xen_resched_irq, cpu).name = NULL; if (per_cpu(xen_resched_irq, cpu).irq >= 0) { unbind_from_irqhandler(per_cpu(xen_resched_irq, cpu).irq, NULL); per_cpu(xen_resched_irq, cpu).irq = -1; - kfree(per_cpu(xen_resched_irq, cpu).name); - per_cpu(xen_resched_irq, cpu).name = NULL; } + kfree(per_cpu(xen_callfunc_irq, cpu).name); + per_cpu(xen_callfunc_irq, cpu).name = NULL; if (per_cpu(xen_callfunc_irq, cpu).irq >= 0) { unbind_from_irqhandler(per_cpu(xen_callfunc_irq, cpu).irq, NULL); per_cpu(xen_callfunc_irq, cpu).irq = -1; - kfree(per_cpu(xen_callfunc_irq, cpu).name); - per_cpu(xen_callfunc_irq, cpu).name = NULL; } + kfree(per_cpu(xen_debug_irq, cpu).name); + per_cpu(xen_debug_irq, cpu).name = NULL; if (per_cpu(xen_debug_irq, cpu).irq >= 0) { unbind_from_irqhandler(per_cpu(xen_debug_irq, cpu).irq, NULL); per_cpu(xen_debug_irq, cpu).irq = -1; - kfree(per_cpu(xen_debug_irq, cpu).name); - per_cpu(xen_debug_irq, cpu).name = NULL; } + kfree(per_cpu(xen_callfuncsingle_irq, cpu).name); + per_cpu(xen_callfuncsingle_irq, cpu).name = NULL; if (per_cpu(xen_callfuncsingle_irq, cpu).irq >= 0) { unbind_from_irqhandler(per_cpu(xen_callfuncsingle_irq, cpu).irq, NULL); per_cpu(xen_callfuncsingle_irq, cpu).irq = -1; - kfree(per_cpu(xen_callfuncsingle_irq, cpu).name); - per_cpu(xen_callfuncsingle_irq, cpu).name = NULL; } } @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ int xen_smp_intr_init(unsigned int cpu) char *resched_name, *callfunc_name, *debug_name; resched_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "resched%d", cpu); + per_cpu(xen_resched_irq, cpu).name = resched_name; rc = bind_ipi_to_irqhandler(XEN_RESCHEDULE_VECTOR, cpu, xen_reschedule_interrupt, @@ -74,9 +75,9 @@ int xen_smp_intr_init(unsigned int cpu) if (rc < 0) goto fail; per_cpu(xen_resched_irq, cpu).irq = rc; - per_cpu(xen_resched_irq, cpu).name = resched_name; callfunc_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "callfunc%d", cpu); + per_cpu(xen_callfunc_irq, cpu).name = callfunc_name; rc = bind_ipi_to_irqhandler(XEN_CALL_FUNCTION_VECTOR, cpu, xen_call_function_interrupt, @@ -86,18 +87,21 @@ int xen_smp_intr_init(unsigned int cpu) if (rc < 0) goto fail; per_cpu(xen_callfunc_irq, cpu).irq = rc; - per_cpu(xen_callfunc_irq, cpu).name = callfunc_name; - debug_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "debug%d", cpu); - rc = bind_virq_to_irqhandler(VIRQ_DEBUG, cpu, xen_debug_interrupt, - IRQF_PERCPU | IRQF_NOBALANCING, - debug_name, NULL); - if (rc < 0) - goto fail; - per_cpu(xen_debug_irq, cpu).irq = rc; - per_cpu(xen_debug_irq, cpu).name = debug_name; + if (!xen_fifo_events) { + debug_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "debug%d", cpu); + per_cpu(xen_debug_irq, cpu).name = debug_name; + rc = bind_virq_to_irqhandler(VIRQ_DEBUG, cpu, + xen_debug_interrupt, + IRQF_PERCPU | IRQF_NOBALANCING, + debug_name, NULL); + if (rc < 0) + goto fail; + per_cpu(xen_debug_irq, cpu).irq = rc; + } callfunc_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "callfuncsingle%d", cpu); + per_cpu(xen_callfuncsingle_irq, cpu).name = callfunc_name; rc = bind_ipi_to_irqhandler(XEN_CALL_FUNCTION_SINGLE_VECTOR, cpu, xen_call_function_single_interrupt, @@ -107,7 +111,6 @@ int xen_smp_intr_init(unsigned int cpu) if (rc < 0) goto fail; per_cpu(xen_callfuncsingle_irq, cpu).irq = rc; - per_cpu(xen_callfuncsingle_irq, cpu).name = callfunc_name; return 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c index e8248e8a04ca..66f83562d329 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include <asm/desc.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> +#include <asm/fpu/internal.h> #include <xen/interface/xen.h> #include <xen/interface/vcpu.h> @@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ static void cpu_bringup(void) int cpu; cpu_init(); + fpu__init_cpu(); touch_softlockup_watchdog(); preempt_disable(); @@ -94,18 +96,18 @@ asmlinkage __visible void cpu_bringup_and_idle(void) void xen_smp_intr_free_pv(unsigned int cpu) { + kfree(per_cpu(xen_irq_work, cpu).name); + per_cpu(xen_irq_work, cpu).name = NULL; if (per_cpu(xen_irq_work, cpu).irq >= 0) { unbind_from_irqhandler(per_cpu(xen_irq_work, cpu).irq, NULL); per_cpu(xen_irq_work, cpu).irq = -1; - kfree(per_cpu(xen_irq_work, cpu).name); - per_cpu(xen_irq_work, cpu).name = NULL; } + kfree(per_cpu(xen_pmu_irq, cpu).name); + per_cpu(xen_pmu_irq, cpu).name = NULL; if (per_cpu(xen_pmu_irq, cpu).irq >= 0) { unbind_from_irqhandler(per_cpu(xen_pmu_irq, cpu).irq, NULL); per_cpu(xen_pmu_irq, cpu).irq = -1; - kfree(per_cpu(xen_pmu_irq, cpu).name); - per_cpu(xen_pmu_irq, cpu).name = NULL; } } @@ -115,6 +117,7 @@ int xen_smp_intr_init_pv(unsigned int cpu) char *callfunc_name, *pmu_name; callfunc_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "irqwork%d", cpu); + per_cpu(xen_irq_work, cpu).name = callfunc_name; rc = bind_ipi_to_irqhandler(XEN_IRQ_WORK_VECTOR, cpu, xen_irq_work_interrupt, @@ -124,10 +127,10 @@ int xen_smp_intr_init_pv(unsigned int cpu) if (rc < 0) goto fail; per_cpu(xen_irq_work, cpu).irq = rc; - per_cpu(xen_irq_work, cpu).name = callfunc_name; if (is_xen_pmu) { pmu_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "pmu%d", cpu); + per_cpu(xen_pmu_irq, cpu).name = pmu_name; rc = bind_virq_to_irqhandler(VIRQ_XENPMU, cpu, xen_pmu_irq_handler, IRQF_PERCPU|IRQF_NOBALANCING, @@ -135,7 +138,6 @@ int xen_smp_intr_init_pv(unsigned int cpu) if (rc < 0) goto fail; per_cpu(xen_pmu_irq, cpu).irq = rc; - per_cpu(xen_pmu_irq, cpu).name = pmu_name; } return 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c b/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c index 6fffb86a32ad..e6cf1b430fd0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ void xen_init_lock_cpu(int cpu) cpu, per_cpu(lock_kicker_irq, cpu)); name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "spinlock%d", cpu); + per_cpu(irq_name, cpu) = name; irq = bind_ipi_to_irqhandler(XEN_SPIN_UNLOCK_VECTOR, cpu, dummy_handler, @@ -93,7 +94,6 @@ void xen_init_lock_cpu(int cpu) if (irq >= 0) { disable_irq(irq); /* make sure it's never delivered */ per_cpu(lock_kicker_irq, cpu) = irq; - per_cpu(irq_name, cpu) = name; } printk("cpu %d spinlock event irq %d\n", cpu, irq); @@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ void xen_uninit_lock_cpu(int cpu) if (!xen_pvspin) return; + kfree(per_cpu(irq_name, cpu)); + per_cpu(irq_name, cpu) = NULL; /* * When booting the kernel with 'mitigations=auto,nosmt', the secondary * CPUs are not activated, and lock_kicker_irq is not initialized. @@ -116,8 +118,6 @@ void xen_uninit_lock_cpu(int cpu) unbind_from_irqhandler(irq, NULL); per_cpu(lock_kicker_irq, cpu) = -1; - kfree(per_cpu(irq_name, cpu)); - per_cpu(irq_name, cpu) = NULL; } PV_CALLEE_SAVE_REGS_THUNK(xen_vcpu_stolen); diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h index 2f111f47ba98..9faec8543237 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ extern struct start_info *xen_start_info; extern struct shared_info xen_dummy_shared_info; extern struct shared_info *HYPERVISOR_shared_info; +extern bool xen_fifo_events; + void xen_setup_mfn_list_list(void); void xen_build_mfn_list_list(void); void xen_setup_machphys_mapping(void); |