aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/arch/x86/kernel
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c16
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/msi.c16
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c200
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c56
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-inject.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c95
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c16
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/process.c28
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/process.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/time.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S7
19 files changed, 338 insertions, 139 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
index 48ab5fdd1044..ee33f0951322 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
@@ -1915,7 +1915,7 @@ void __init init_apic_mappings(void)
unsigned int new_apicid;
if (apic_validate_deadline_timer())
- pr_debug("TSC deadline timer available\n");
+ pr_info("TSC deadline timer available\n");
if (x2apic_mode) {
boot_cpu_physical_apicid = read_apic_id();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
index 2271adbc3c42..be226cdd08d3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
@@ -2160,6 +2160,7 @@ static inline void __init check_timer(void)
legacy_pic->init(0);
legacy_pic->make_irq(0);
apic_write(APIC_LVT0, APIC_DM_EXTINT);
+ legacy_pic->unmask(0);
unlock_ExtINT_logic();
@@ -2233,12 +2234,12 @@ static int mp_irqdomain_create(int ioapic)
ip->irqdomain = irq_domain_create_linear(fn, hwirqs, cfg->ops,
(void *)(long)ioapic);
- /* Release fw handle if it was allocated above */
- if (!cfg->dev)
- irq_domain_free_fwnode(fn);
-
- if (!ip->irqdomain)
+ if (!ip->irqdomain) {
+ /* Release fw handle if it was allocated above */
+ if (!cfg->dev)
+ irq_domain_free_fwnode(fn);
return -ENOMEM;
+ }
ip->irqdomain->parent = parent;
@@ -2252,8 +2253,13 @@ static int mp_irqdomain_create(int ioapic)
static void ioapic_destroy_irqdomain(int idx)
{
+ struct ioapic_domain_cfg *cfg = &ioapics[idx].irqdomain_cfg;
+ struct fwnode_handle *fn = ioapics[idx].irqdomain->fwnode;
+
if (ioapics[idx].irqdomain) {
irq_domain_remove(ioapics[idx].irqdomain);
+ if (!cfg->dev)
+ irq_domain_free_fwnode(fn);
ioapics[idx].irqdomain = NULL;
}
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/msi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/msi.c
index f10e7f93b0e2..8c102d62b859 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/msi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/msi.c
@@ -149,10 +149,11 @@ void __init arch_init_msi_domain(struct irq_domain *parent)
msi_default_domain =
pci_msi_create_irq_domain(fn, &pci_msi_domain_info,
parent);
- irq_domain_free_fwnode(fn);
}
- if (!msi_default_domain)
+ if (!msi_default_domain) {
+ irq_domain_free_fwnode(fn);
pr_warn("failed to initialize irqdomain for MSI/MSI-x.\n");
+ }
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IRQ_REMAP
@@ -185,7 +186,8 @@ struct irq_domain *arch_create_remap_msi_irq_domain(struct irq_domain *parent,
if (!fn)
return NULL;
d = pci_msi_create_irq_domain(fn, &pci_msi_ir_domain_info, parent);
- irq_domain_free_fwnode(fn);
+ if (!d)
+ irq_domain_free_fwnode(fn);
return d;
}
#endif
@@ -248,7 +250,8 @@ static struct irq_domain *dmar_get_irq_domain(void)
if (fn) {
dmar_domain = msi_create_irq_domain(fn, &dmar_msi_domain_info,
x86_vector_domain);
- irq_domain_free_fwnode(fn);
+ if (!dmar_domain)
+ irq_domain_free_fwnode(fn);
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&dmar_lock);
@@ -373,7 +376,10 @@ struct irq_domain *hpet_create_irq_domain(int hpet_id)
}
d = msi_create_irq_domain(fn, domain_info, parent);
- irq_domain_free_fwnode(fn);
+ if (!d) {
+ irq_domain_free_fwnode(fn);
+ kfree(domain_info);
+ }
return d;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
index b958082c74a7..637cf4dfccc9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
@@ -368,6 +368,10 @@ static int x86_vector_alloc_irqs(struct irq_domain *domain, unsigned int virq,
irq_data->chip = &lapic_controller;
irq_data->chip_data = data;
irq_data->hwirq = virq + i;
+
+ /* Don't invoke affinity setter on deactivated interrupts */
+ irqd_set_affinity_on_activate(irq_data);
+
err = assign_irq_vector_policy(virq + i, node, data, info,
irq_data);
if (err) {
@@ -457,7 +461,6 @@ int __init arch_early_irq_init(void)
x86_vector_domain = irq_domain_create_tree(fn, &x86_vector_domain_ops,
NULL);
BUG_ON(x86_vector_domain == NULL);
- irq_domain_free_fwnode(fn);
irq_set_default_host(x86_vector_domain);
arch_init_msi_domain(x86_vector_domain);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 7896a34f53b5..245184152892 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
-/* Control conditional STIPB in switch_to() */
+/* Control conditional STIBP in switch_to() */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
/* Control conditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
@@ -108,6 +109,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
l1tf_select_mitigation();
mds_select_mitigation();
taa_select_mitigation();
+ srbds_select_mitigation();
/*
* As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS
@@ -391,6 +393,97 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SRBDS: " fmt
+
+enum srbds_mitigations {
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
+};
+
+static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
+static const char * const srbds_strings[] = {
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode",
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode",
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF] = "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status",
+};
+
+static bool srbds_off;
+
+void update_srbds_msr(void)
+{
+ u64 mcu_ctrl;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+ return;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ return;
+
+ if (srbds_mitigation == SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED)
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+
+ switch (srbds_mitigation) {
+ case SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ case SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF:
+ mcu_ctrl |= RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
+ break;
+ case SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+ mcu_ctrl &= ~RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+}
+
+static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting
+ * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled.
+ */
+ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
+ else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
+ else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+ else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || srbds_off)
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+ update_srbds_msr();
+ pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+ return 0;
+
+ srbds_off = !strcmp(str, "off");
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt
enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
@@ -488,7 +581,9 @@ early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
-static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user __ro_after_init =
+static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init =
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
+static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init =
SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
@@ -540,10 +635,11 @@ enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
};
static const char * const spectre_v2_user_strings[] = {
- [SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE] = "User space: Vulnerable",
- [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP protection",
- [SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via prctl",
- [SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via seccomp and prctl",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE] = "User space: Vulnerable",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP protection",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP always-on protection",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via prctl",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via seccomp and prctl",
};
static const struct {
@@ -655,23 +751,36 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n",
static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb) ?
"always-on" : "conditional");
+
+ spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode;
}
- /* If enhanced IBRS is enabled no STIPB required */
- if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+ /*
+ * If enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
+ * required.
+ */
+ if (!smt_possible || spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
return;
/*
- * If SMT is not possible or STIBP is not available clear the STIPB
- * mode.
+ * At this point, an STIBP mode other than "off" has been set.
+ * If STIBP support is not being forced, check if STIBP always-on
+ * is preferred.
*/
- if (!smt_possible || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+ if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON))
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
+
+ /*
+ * If STIBP is not available, clear the STIBP mode.
+ */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
+
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp = mode;
+
set_mode:
- spectre_v2_user = mode;
- /* Only print the STIBP mode when SMT possible */
- if (smt_possible)
- pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_user_strings[mode]);
+ pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_user_strings[mode]);
}
static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
@@ -902,10 +1011,11 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
{
mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
- switch (spectre_v2_user) {
+ switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED:
update_stibp_strict();
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
@@ -1134,13 +1244,19 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
{
switch (ctrl) {
case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
- if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
+ if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
return 0;
/*
* Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
- * mode.
+ * mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled
+ * by a previous prctl call.
+
*/
- if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT)
+ if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ||
+ task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
return -EPERM;
task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
task_update_spec_tif(task);
@@ -1151,9 +1267,12 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
* Indirect branch speculation is always allowed when
* mitigation is force disabled.
*/
- if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
+ if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
return -EPERM;
- if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT)
+ if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
return 0;
task_set_spec_ib_disable(task);
if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE)
@@ -1184,7 +1303,8 @@ void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task)
{
if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
ssb_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
- if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP)
+ if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP)
ib_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
}
#endif
@@ -1213,21 +1333,24 @@ static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
- switch (spectre_v2_user) {
- case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
+ if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
- case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
- case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
+ else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+ return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
+ spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP) {
if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
if (task_spec_ib_disable(task))
return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
- case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
- return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
- default:
+ } else
return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
- }
}
int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
@@ -1466,11 +1589,13 @@ static char *stibp_state(void)
if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
return "";
- switch (spectre_v2_user) {
+ switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
return ", STIBP: disabled";
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
return ", STIBP: forced";
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED:
+ return ", STIBP: always-on";
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
if (static_key_enabled(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
@@ -1491,6 +1616,11 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void)
return "";
}
+static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
+}
+
static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf, unsigned int bug)
{
@@ -1532,6 +1662,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT:
return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf);
+ case X86_BUG_SRBDS:
+ return srbds_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -1578,4 +1711,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 7b4141889919..64066a2497e4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -854,6 +854,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
else if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PAE) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PSE36))
c->x86_phys_bits = 36;
#endif
+ c->x86_cache_bits = c->x86_phys_bits;
if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000000a)
c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x8000000a);
@@ -894,7 +895,6 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
}
#endif
- c->x86_cache_bits = c->x86_phys_bits;
}
#define NO_SPECULATION BIT(0)
@@ -964,9 +964,30 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
{}
};
-static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues) \
+ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \
+ INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
+ X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
+
+#define SRBDS BIT(0)
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_ULT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_GT3E, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_GT3E, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD), SRBDS),
+ {}
+};
+
+static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
{
- const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
+ const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
}
@@ -986,29 +1007,32 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
- if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
- if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
}
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
/*
@@ -1026,7 +1050,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
- if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
+ /*
+ * SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed
+ * in the vulnerability blacklist.
+ */
+ if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) &&
+ cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1035,7 +1068,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
- if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
@@ -1451,6 +1484,7 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
mtrr_ap_init();
validate_apic_and_package_id(c);
x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
+ update_srbds_msr();
}
static __init int setup_noclflush(char *arg)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
index db10a63687d3..432058e5e44b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ extern int detect_ht_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu);
extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
+extern void update_srbds_msr(void);
extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
index 3fed38812eea..751e59057466 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
@@ -34,13 +34,18 @@ const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match)
const struct x86_cpu_id *m;
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
- for (m = match; m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->feature; m++) {
+ for (m = match;
+ m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->steppings | m->feature;
+ m++) {
if (m->vendor != X86_VENDOR_ANY && c->x86_vendor != m->vendor)
continue;
if (m->family != X86_FAMILY_ANY && c->x86 != m->family)
continue;
if (m->model != X86_MODEL_ANY && c->x86_model != m->model)
continue;
+ if (m->steppings != X86_STEPPING_ANY &&
+ !(BIT(c->x86_stepping) & m->steppings))
+ continue;
if (m->feature != X86_FEATURE_ANY && !cpu_has(c, m->feature))
continue;
return m;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-inject.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-inject.c
index e57b59762f9f..94aa91b09c28 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-inject.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-inject.c
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ static void do_inject(void)
*/
if (inj_type == DFR_INT_INJ) {
i_mce.status |= MCI_STATUS_DEFERRED;
- i_mce.status |= (i_mce.status & ~MCI_STATUS_UC);
+ i_mce.status &= ~MCI_STATUS_UC;
}
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index 87a57b7642d3..601a5da1d196 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -907,8 +907,6 @@ const void *get_xsave_field_ptr(int xsave_state)
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
-#define NR_VALID_PKRU_BITS (CONFIG_NR_PROTECTION_KEYS * 2)
-#define PKRU_VALID_MASK (NR_VALID_PKRU_BITS - 1)
/*
* This will go out and modify PKRU register to set the access
* rights for @pkey to @init_val.
@@ -927,6 +925,13 @@ int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * This code should only be called with valid 'pkey'
+ * values originating from in-kernel users. Complain
+ * if a bad value is observed.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(pkey >= arch_max_pkey());
+
/* Set the bits we need in PKRU: */
if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS)
new_pkru_bits |= PKRU_AD_BIT;
@@ -964,18 +969,31 @@ static inline bool xfeatures_mxcsr_quirk(u64 xfeatures)
return true;
}
-/*
- * This is similar to user_regset_copyout(), but will not add offset to
- * the source data pointer or increment pos, count, kbuf, and ubuf.
- */
-static inline void
-__copy_xstate_to_kernel(void *kbuf, const void *data,
- unsigned int offset, unsigned int size, unsigned int size_total)
+static void fill_gap(unsigned to, void **kbuf, unsigned *pos, unsigned *count)
{
- if (offset < size_total) {
- unsigned int copy = min(size, size_total - offset);
+ if (*pos < to) {
+ unsigned size = to - *pos;
+
+ if (size > *count)
+ size = *count;
+ memcpy(*kbuf, (void *)&init_fpstate.xsave + *pos, size);
+ *kbuf += size;
+ *pos += size;
+ *count -= size;
+ }
+}
- memcpy(kbuf + offset, data, copy);
+static void copy_part(unsigned offset, unsigned size, void *from,
+ void **kbuf, unsigned *pos, unsigned *count)
+{
+ fill_gap(offset, kbuf, pos, count);
+ if (size > *count)
+ size = *count;
+ if (size) {
+ memcpy(*kbuf, from, size);
+ *kbuf += size;
+ *pos += size;
+ *count -= size;
}
}
@@ -988,8 +1006,9 @@ __copy_xstate_to_kernel(void *kbuf, const void *data,
*/
int copy_xstate_to_kernel(void *kbuf, struct xregs_state *xsave, unsigned int offset_start, unsigned int size_total)
{
- unsigned int offset, size;
struct xstate_header header;
+ const unsigned off_mxcsr = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, mxcsr);
+ unsigned count = size_total;
int i;
/*
@@ -1005,46 +1024,42 @@ int copy_xstate_to_kernel(void *kbuf, struct xregs_state *xsave, unsigned int of
header.xfeatures = xsave->header.xfeatures;
header.xfeatures &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR;
+ if (header.xfeatures & XFEATURE_MASK_FP)
+ copy_part(0, off_mxcsr,
+ &xsave->i387, &kbuf, &offset_start, &count);
+ if (header.xfeatures & (XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM))
+ copy_part(off_mxcsr, MXCSR_AND_FLAGS_SIZE,
+ &xsave->i387.mxcsr, &kbuf, &offset_start, &count);
+ if (header.xfeatures & XFEATURE_MASK_FP)
+ copy_part(offsetof(struct fxregs_state, st_space), 128,
+ &xsave->i387.st_space, &kbuf, &offset_start, &count);
+ if (header.xfeatures & XFEATURE_MASK_SSE)
+ copy_part(xstate_offsets[XFEATURE_SSE], 256,
+ &xsave->i387.xmm_space, &kbuf, &offset_start, &count);
+ /*
+ * Fill xsave->i387.sw_reserved value for ptrace frame:
+ */
+ copy_part(offsetof(struct fxregs_state, sw_reserved), 48,
+ xstate_fx_sw_bytes, &kbuf, &offset_start, &count);
/*
* Copy xregs_state->header:
*/
- offset = offsetof(struct xregs_state, header);
- size = sizeof(header);
-
- __copy_xstate_to_kernel(kbuf, &header, offset, size, size_total);
+ copy_part(offsetof(struct xregs_state, header), sizeof(header),
+ &header, &kbuf, &offset_start, &count);
- for (i = 0; i < XFEATURE_MAX; i++) {
+ for (i = FIRST_EXTENDED_XFEATURE; i < XFEATURE_MAX; i++) {
/*
* Copy only in-use xstates:
*/
if ((header.xfeatures >> i) & 1) {
void *src = __raw_xsave_addr(xsave, 1 << i);
- offset = xstate_offsets[i];
- size = xstate_sizes[i];
-
- /* The next component has to fit fully into the output buffer: */
- if (offset + size > size_total)
- break;
-
- __copy_xstate_to_kernel(kbuf, src, offset, size, size_total);
+ copy_part(xstate_offsets[i], xstate_sizes[i],
+ src, &kbuf, &offset_start, &count);
}
}
-
- if (xfeatures_mxcsr_quirk(header.xfeatures)) {
- offset = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, mxcsr);
- size = MXCSR_AND_FLAGS_SIZE;
- __copy_xstate_to_kernel(kbuf, &xsave->i387.mxcsr, offset, size, size_total);
- }
-
- /*
- * Fill xsave->i387.sw_reserved value for ptrace frame:
- */
- offset = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, sw_reserved);
- size = sizeof(xstate_fx_sw_bytes);
-
- __copy_xstate_to_kernel(kbuf, xstate_fx_sw_bytes, offset, size, size_total);
+ fill_gap(size_total, &kbuf, &offset_start, &count);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c b/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c
index 02abc134367f..f7833ae4e3f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ spurious_8259A_irq:
* lets ACK and report it. [once per IRQ]
*/
if (!(spurious_irq_mask & irqmask)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG
+ printk_deferred(KERN_DEBUG
"spurious 8259A interrupt: IRQ%d.\n", irq);
spurious_irq_mask |= irqmask;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
index 9d7bb8de2917..02665ffef050 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
@@ -744,16 +744,11 @@ asm(
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(kretprobe_trampoline);
STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(kretprobe_trampoline);
-static struct kprobe kretprobe_kprobe = {
- .addr = (void *)kretprobe_trampoline,
-};
-
/*
* Called from kretprobe_trampoline
*/
__visible __used void *trampoline_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb;
struct kretprobe_instance *ri = NULL;
struct hlist_head *head, empty_rp;
struct hlist_node *tmp;
@@ -763,16 +758,12 @@ __visible __used void *trampoline_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
void *frame_pointer;
bool skipped = false;
- preempt_disable();
-
/*
* Set a dummy kprobe for avoiding kretprobe recursion.
* Since kretprobe never run in kprobe handler, kprobe must not
* be running at this point.
*/
- kcb = get_kprobe_ctlblk();
- __this_cpu_write(current_kprobe, &kretprobe_kprobe);
- kcb->kprobe_status = KPROBE_HIT_ACTIVE;
+ kprobe_busy_begin();
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&empty_rp);
kretprobe_hash_lock(current, &head, &flags);
@@ -851,7 +842,7 @@ __visible __used void *trampoline_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
__this_cpu_write(current_kprobe, &ri->rp->kp);
ri->ret_addr = correct_ret_addr;
ri->rp->handler(ri, regs);
- __this_cpu_write(current_kprobe, &kretprobe_kprobe);
+ __this_cpu_write(current_kprobe, &kprobe_busy);
}
recycle_rp_inst(ri, &empty_rp);
@@ -867,8 +858,7 @@ __visible __used void *trampoline_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
kretprobe_hash_unlock(current, &flags);
- __this_cpu_write(current_kprobe, NULL);
- preempt_enable();
+ kprobe_busy_end();
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(ri, tmp, &empty_rp, hlist) {
hlist_del(&ri->hlist);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index d2ef967bfafb..a07b09f68e7e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -414,28 +414,20 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp,
u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
bool updmsr = false;
- /*
- * If TIF_SSBD is different, select the proper mitigation
- * method. Note that if SSBD mitigation is disabled or permanentely
- * enabled this branch can't be taken because nothing can set
- * TIF_SSBD.
- */
- if (tif_diff & _TIF_SSBD) {
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD)) {
+ /* Handle change of TIF_SSBD depending on the mitigation method. */
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD)) {
+ if (tif_diff & _TIF_SSBD)
amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn);
- } else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) {
+ } else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) {
+ if (tif_diff & _TIF_SSBD)
amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn);
- } else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
- static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
- msr |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
- updmsr = true;
- }
+ } else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
+ static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+ updmsr |= !!(tif_diff & _TIF_SSBD);
+ msr |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
}
- /*
- * Only evaluate TIF_SPEC_IB if conditional STIBP is enabled,
- * otherwise avoid the MSR write.
- */
+ /* Only evaluate TIF_SPEC_IB if conditional STIBP is enabled. */
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) &&
static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) {
updmsr |= !!(tif_diff & _TIF_SPEC_IB);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.h b/arch/x86/kernel/process.h
index 898e97cf6629..320ab978fb1f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.h
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ static inline void switch_to_extra(struct task_struct *prev,
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
/*
* Avoid __switch_to_xtra() invocation when conditional
- * STIPB is disabled and the only different bit is
+ * STIBP is disabled and the only different bit is
* TIF_SPEC_IB. For CONFIG_SMP=n TIF_SPEC_IB is not
* in the TIF_WORK_CTXSW masks.
*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
index 734549492a18..dc4d27000aa3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ static unsigned long task_seg_base(struct task_struct *task,
*/
mutex_lock(&task->mm->context.lock);
ldt = task->mm->context.ldt;
- if (unlikely(idx >= ldt->nr_entries))
+ if (unlikely(!ldt || idx >= ldt->nr_entries))
base = 0;
else
base = get_desc_base(ldt->entries + idx);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
index c663d5fcff2e..b7663a1f89ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -197,6 +197,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id reboot_dmi_table[] __initconst = {
DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "MacBook5"),
},
},
+ { /* Handle problems with rebooting on Apple MacBook6,1 */
+ .callback = set_pci_reboot,
+ .ident = "Apple MacBook6,1",
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Apple Inc."),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "MacBook6,1"),
+ },
+ },
{ /* Handle problems with rebooting on Apple MacBookPro5 */
.callback = set_pci_reboot,
.ident = "Apple MacBookPro5",
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/time.c b/arch/x86/kernel/time.c
index ab0176ae985b..12f90f17f4f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/time.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/time.c
@@ -24,10 +24,6 @@
#include <asm/hpet.h>
#include <asm/time.h>
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-__visible volatile unsigned long jiffies __cacheline_aligned_in_smp = INITIAL_JIFFIES;
-#endif
-
unsigned long profile_pc(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long pc = instruction_pointer(regs);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
index a9a55e76a43f..a5e2ce931f69 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
@@ -346,8 +346,11 @@ bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_state *state)
/*
* Find the orc_entry associated with the text address.
*
- * Decrement call return addresses by one so they work for sibling
- * calls and calls to noreturn functions.
+ * For a call frame (as opposed to a signal frame), state->ip points to
+ * the instruction after the call. That instruction's stack layout
+ * could be different from the call instruction's layout, for example
+ * if the call was to a noreturn function. So get the ORC data for the
+ * call instruction itself.
*/
orc = orc_find(state->signal ? state->ip : state->ip - 1);
if (!orc || orc->sp_reg == ORC_REG_UNDEFINED)
@@ -550,6 +553,7 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state *state, struct task_struct *task,
state->sp = task->thread.sp;
state->bp = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(frame->bp);
state->ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(frame->ret_addr);
+ state->signal = (void *)state->ip == ret_from_fork;
}
if (get_stack_info((unsigned long *)state->sp, state->task,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 2384a2ae5ec3..d3dc8bc6b3ad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -36,13 +36,13 @@ OUTPUT_FORMAT(CONFIG_OUTPUT_FORMAT, CONFIG_OUTPUT_FORMAT, CONFIG_OUTPUT_FORMAT)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
OUTPUT_ARCH(i386)
ENTRY(phys_startup_32)
-jiffies = jiffies_64;
#else
OUTPUT_ARCH(i386:x86-64)
ENTRY(phys_startup_64)
-jiffies_64 = jiffies;
#endif
+jiffies = jiffies_64;
+
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
/*
* On 64-bit, align RODATA to 2MB so we retain large page mappings for
@@ -352,7 +352,8 @@ SECTIONS
.bss : AT(ADDR(.bss) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
__bss_start = .;
*(.bss..page_aligned)
- *(.bss)
+ . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+ *(BSS_MAIN)
. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
__bss_stop = .;
}
generated by cgit 1.2.3-korg (git 2.39.0) at 2024-04-28 09:42:37 +0000