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-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0003-CVE-2021-42574.patch142
1 files changed, 142 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0003-CVE-2021-42574.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0003-CVE-2021-42574.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2995a6fc61
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+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0003-CVE-2021-42574.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+From 1a7f2c0774129750fdf73e9f1b78f0ce983c9ab3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Malcolm <dmalcolm@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2021 09:54:32 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] libcpp: escape non-ASCII source bytes in -Wbidi-chars=
+ [PR103026]
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This flags rich_locations associated with -Wbidi-chars= so that
+non-ASCII bytes will be escaped when printing the source lines
+(using the diagnostics support I added in
+r12-4825-gbd5e882cf6e0def3dd1bc106075d59a303fe0d1e).
+
+In particular, this ensures that the printed source lines will
+be pure ASCII, and thus the visual ordering of the characters
+will be the same as the logical ordering.
+
+Before:
+
+ Wbidi-chars-1.c: In function âmainâ:
+ Wbidi-chars-1.c:6:43: warning: unpaired UTF-8 bidirectional control character detected [-Wbidi-chars=]
+ 6 | /*â® } â¦if (isAdmin)⩠⦠begin admins only */
+ | ^
+ Wbidi-chars-1.c:9:28: warning: unpaired UTF-8 bidirectional control character detected [-Wbidi-chars=]
+ 9 | /* end admins only â® { â¦*/
+ | ^
+
+ Wbidi-chars-11.c:6:15: warning: UTF-8 vs UCN mismatch when closing a context by "U+202C (POP DIRECTIONAL FORMATTING)" [-Wbidi-chars=]
+ 6 | int LRE_âª_PDF_\u202c;
+ | ^
+ Wbidi-chars-11.c:8:19: warning: UTF-8 vs UCN mismatch when closing a context by "U+202C (POP DIRECTIONAL FORMATTING)" [-Wbidi-chars=]
+ 8 | int LRE_\u202a_PDF_â¬_;
+ | ^
+ Wbidi-chars-11.c:10:28: warning: UTF-8 vs UCN mismatch when closing a context by "U+202C (POP DIRECTIONAL FORMATTING)" [-Wbidi-chars=]
+ 10 | const char *s1 = "LRE_âª_PDF_\u202c";
+ | ^
+ Wbidi-chars-11.c:12:33: warning: UTF-8 vs UCN mismatch when closing a context by "U+202C (POP DIRECTIONAL FORMATTING)" [-Wbidi-chars=]
+ 12 | const char *s2 = "LRE_\u202a_PDF_â¬";
+ | ^
+
+After:
+
+ Wbidi-chars-1.c: In function âmainâ:
+ Wbidi-chars-1.c:6:43: warning: unpaired UTF-8 bidirectional control character detected [-Wbidi-chars=]
+ 6 | /*<U+202E> } <U+2066>if (isAdmin)<U+2069> <U+2066> begin admins only */
+ | ^
+ Wbidi-chars-1.c:9:28: warning: unpaired UTF-8 bidirectional control character detected [-Wbidi-chars=]
+ 9 | /* end admins only <U+202E> { <U+2066>*/
+ | ^
+
+ Wbidi-chars-11.c:6:15: warning: UTF-8 vs UCN mismatch when closing a context by "U+202C (POP DIRECTIONAL FORMATTING)" [-Wbidi-chars=]
+ 6 | int LRE_<U+202A>_PDF_\u202c;
+ | ^
+ Wbidi-chars-11.c:8:19: warning: UTF-8 vs UCN mismatch when closing a context by "U+202C (POP DIRECTIONAL FORMATTING)" [-Wbidi-chars=]
+ 8 | int LRE_\u202a_PDF_<U+202C>_;
+ | ^
+ Wbidi-chars-11.c:10:28: warning: UTF-8 vs UCN mismatch when closing a context by "U+202C (POP DIRECTIONAL FORMATTING)" [-Wbidi-chars=]
+ 10 | const char *s1 = "LRE_<U+202A>_PDF_\u202c";
+ | ^
+ Wbidi-chars-11.c:12:33: warning: UTF-8 vs UCN mismatch when closing a context by "U+202C (POP DIRECTIONAL FORMATTING)" [-Wbidi-chars=]
+ 12 | const char *s2 = "LRE_\u202a_PDF_<U+202C>";
+ | ^
+
+libcpp/ChangeLog:
+ PR preprocessor/103026
+ * lex.c (maybe_warn_bidi_on_close): Use a rich_location
+ and call set_escape_on_output (true) on it.
+ (maybe_warn_bidi_on_char): Likewise.
+
+Signed-off-by: David Malcolm <dmalcolm@redhat.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2021-42574
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gcc.gnu.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=gcc.git;h=1a7f2c0774129750fdf73e9f1b78f0ce983c9ab3]
+Signed-off-by: Pgowda <pgowda.cve@gmail.com>
+
+---
+ libcpp/lex.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libcpp/lex.c b/libcpp/lex.c
+index 8188e33b07d..2421d6c0f40 100644
+--- a/libcpp/lex.c
++++ b/libcpp/lex.c
+@@ -1427,9 +1427,11 @@ maybe_warn_bidi_on_close (cpp_reader *pfile, const uchar *p)
+ const location_t loc
+ = linemap_position_for_column (pfile->line_table,
+ CPP_BUF_COLUMN (pfile->buffer, p));
+- cpp_warning_with_line (pfile, CPP_W_BIDIRECTIONAL, loc, 0,
+- "unpaired UTF-8 bidirectional control character "
+- "detected");
++ rich_location rich_loc (pfile->line_table, loc);
++ rich_loc.set_escape_on_output (true);
++ cpp_warning_at (pfile, CPP_W_BIDIRECTIONAL, &rich_loc,
++ "unpaired UTF-8 bidirectional control character "
++ "detected");
+ }
+ /* We're done with this context. */
+ bidi::on_close ();
+@@ -1454,6 +1456,9 @@ maybe_warn_bidi_on_char (cpp_reader *pfile, const uchar *p, bidi::kind kind,
+ const location_t loc
+ = linemap_position_for_column (pfile->line_table,
+ CPP_BUF_COLUMN (pfile->buffer, p));
++ rich_location rich_loc (pfile->line_table, loc);
++ rich_loc.set_escape_on_output (true);
++
+ /* It seems excessive to warn about a PDI/PDF that is closing
+ an opened context because we've already warned about the
+ opening character. Except warn when we have a UCN x UTF-8
+@@ -1462,20 +1467,20 @@ maybe_warn_bidi_on_char (cpp_reader *pfile, const uchar *p, bidi::kind kind,
+ {
+ if (warn_bidi == bidirectional_unpaired
+ && bidi::current_ctx_ucn_p () != ucn_p)
+- cpp_warning_with_line (pfile, CPP_W_BIDIRECTIONAL, loc, 0,
+- "UTF-8 vs UCN mismatch when closing "
+- "a context by \"%s\"", bidi::to_str (kind));
++ cpp_warning_at (pfile, CPP_W_BIDIRECTIONAL, &rich_loc,
++ "UTF-8 vs UCN mismatch when closing "
++ "a context by \"%s\"", bidi::to_str (kind));
+ }
+ else if (warn_bidi == bidirectional_any)
+ {
+ if (kind == bidi::kind::PDF || kind == bidi::kind::PDI)
+- cpp_warning_with_line (pfile, CPP_W_BIDIRECTIONAL, loc, 0,
+- "\"%s\" is closing an unopened context",
+- bidi::to_str (kind));
++ cpp_warning_at (pfile, CPP_W_BIDIRECTIONAL, &rich_loc,
++ "\"%s\" is closing an unopened context",
++ bidi::to_str (kind));
+ else
+- cpp_warning_with_line (pfile, CPP_W_BIDIRECTIONAL, loc, 0,
+- "found problematic Unicode character \"%s\"",
+- bidi::to_str (kind));
++ cpp_warning_at (pfile, CPP_W_BIDIRECTIONAL, &rich_loc,
++ "found problematic Unicode character \"%s\"",
++ bidi::to_str (kind));
+ }
+ }
+ /* We're done with this context. */
+--
+2.27.0
+
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