| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
commit 86d32f9a7c54ad74f4514d7fef7c847883207291 upstream.
If seq_file .next function does not change position index,
read after some lseek can generate unexpected output:
$ dd if=/proc/keys bs=1 # full usual output
0f6bfdf5 I--Q--- 2 perm 3f010000 1000 1000 user 4af2f79ab8848d0a: 740
1fb91b32 I--Q--- 3 perm 1f3f0000 1000 65534 keyring _uid.1000: 2
27589480 I--Q--- 1 perm 0b0b0000 0 0 user invocation_id: 16
2f33ab67 I--Q--- 152 perm 3f030000 0 0 keyring _ses: 2
33f1d8fa I--Q--- 4 perm 3f030000 1000 1000 keyring _ses: 1
3d427fda I--Q--- 2 perm 3f010000 1000 1000 user 69ec44aec7678e5a: 740
3ead4096 I--Q--- 1 perm 1f3f0000 1000 65534 keyring _uid_ses.1000: 1
521+0 records in
521+0 records out
521 bytes copied, 0,00123769 s, 421 kB/s
But a read after lseek in middle of last line results in the partial
last line and then a repeat of the final line:
$ dd if=/proc/keys bs=500 skip=1
dd: /proc/keys: cannot skip to specified offset
g _uid_ses.1000: 1
3ead4096 I--Q--- 1 perm 1f3f0000 1000 65534 keyring _uid_ses.1000: 1
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
97 bytes copied, 0,000135035 s, 718 kB/s
and a read after lseek beyond end of file results in the last line being
shown:
$ dd if=/proc/keys bs=1000 skip=1 # read after lseek beyond end of file
dd: /proc/keys: cannot skip to specified offset
3ead4096 I--Q--- 1 perm 1f3f0000 1000 65534 keyring _uid_ses.1000: 1
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
76 bytes copied, 0,000119981 s, 633 kB/s
See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283
Fixes: 1f4aace60b0e ("fs/seq_file.c: simplify seq_file iteration code ...")
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 2e356101e72ab1361821b3af024d64877d9a798d upstream.
Currently, when we add a new user key, the calltrace as below:
add_key()
key_create_or_update()
key_alloc()
__key_instantiate_and_link
generic_key_instantiate
key_payload_reserve
......
Since commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly"),
we can reach max bytes/keys in key_alloc, but we forget to remove this
limit when we reserver space for payload in key_payload_reserve. So we
can only reach max keys but not max bytes when having delta between plen
and type->def_datalen. Remove this limit when instantiating the key, so we
can keep consistent with key_alloc.
Also, fix the similar problem in keyctl_chown_key().
Fixes: 0b77f5bfb45c ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys")
Fixes: a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0.x
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 030b995ad9ece9fa2d218af4429c1c78c2342096 ]
In AVC update we don't call avc_node_kill() when avc_xperms_populate()
fails, resulting in the avc->avc_cache.active_nodes counter having a
false value. In last patch this changes was missed , so correcting it.
Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Jaihind Yadav <jaihindyadav@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar Siddojigari <rsiddoji@codeaurora.org>
[PM: merge fuzz, minor description cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit d8db60cb23e49a92cf8cada3297395c7fa50fdf8 ]
Fix avc_insert() to call avc_node_kill() if we've already allocated
an AVC node and the code fails to insert the node in the cache.
Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Reported-by: rsiddoji@codeaurora.org
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 0188d5c025ca8fe756ba3193bd7d150139af5a88 ]
commit bda0be7ad994 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
passed down the rcu flag to the SELinux AVC, but failed to adjust the
test in slow_avc_audit() to also return -ECHILD on LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY.
Previously, we only returned -ECHILD if generating an audit record with
LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE since this was only relevant from inode_permission.
Move the handling of MAY_NOT_BLOCK to avc_audit() and its inlined
equivalent in selinux_inode_permission() immediately after we determine
that audit is required, and always fall back to ref-walk in this case.
Fixes: bda0be7ad994 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
Reported-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit a8772fad0172aeae339144598b809fd8d4823331 upstream.
syzbot is reporting that there is a race at tomoyo_stat_update() [1].
Although it is acceptable to fail to track exact number of times policy
was updated, convert to atomic_t because this is not a hot path.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a4d7b973972eeed410596e6604580e0133b0fc04
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+efea72d4a0a1d03596cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 7c1857bdbdf1e4c541e45eab477ee23ed4333ea4 ]
Set the timestamp on new keys rather than leaving it unset.
Fixes: 31d5a79d7f3d ("KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 1f8266ff58840d698a1e96d2274189de1bdf7969 ]
As a comment above begin_current_label_crit_section() explains,
begin_current_label_crit_section() must run in sleepable context because
when label_is_stale() is true, aa_replace_current_label() runs, which uses
prepare_creds(), which can sleep.
Until now, the ptrace access check (which runs with a task lock held)
violated this rule.
Also add a might_sleep() assertion to begin_current_label_crit_section(),
because asserts are less likely to be ignored than comments.
Fixes: b2d09ae449ced ("apparmor: move ptrace checks to using labels")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 5f997580e8b12b9f585e34cc16304925d26ce49e ]
The netperf benchmark shows a 5.73% reduction in throughput for
small (64 byte) transfers by unconfined tasks.
DEFINE_AUDIT_SK() in aa_label_sk_perm() should not be performed
unconditionally, rather only when the label is confined.
netperf-tcp
56974a6fc^ 56974a6fc
Min 64 563.48 ( 0.00%) 531.17 ( -5.73%)
Min 128 1056.92 ( 0.00%) 999.44 ( -5.44%)
Min 256 1945.95 ( 0.00%) 1867.97 ( -4.01%)
Min 1024 6761.40 ( 0.00%) 6364.23 ( -5.87%)
Min 2048 11110.53 ( 0.00%) 10606.20 ( -4.54%)
Min 3312 13692.67 ( 0.00%) 13158.41 ( -3.90%)
Min 4096 14926.29 ( 0.00%) 14457.46 ( -3.14%)
Min 8192 18399.34 ( 0.00%) 18091.65 ( -1.67%)
Min 16384 21384.13 ( 0.00%) 21158.05 ( -1.06%)
Hmean 64 564.96 ( 0.00%) 534.38 ( -5.41%)
Hmean 128 1064.42 ( 0.00%) 1010.12 ( -5.10%)
Hmean 256 1965.85 ( 0.00%) 1879.16 ( -4.41%)
Hmean 1024 6839.77 ( 0.00%) 6478.70 ( -5.28%)
Hmean 2048 11154.80 ( 0.00%) 10671.13 ( -4.34%)
Hmean 3312 13838.12 ( 0.00%) 13249.01 ( -4.26%)
Hmean 4096 15009.99 ( 0.00%) 14561.36 ( -2.99%)
Hmean 8192 18975.57 ( 0.00%) 18326.54 ( -3.42%)
Hmean 16384 21440.44 ( 0.00%) 21324.59 ( -0.54%)
Stddev 64 1.24 ( 0.00%) 2.85 (-130.64%)
Stddev 128 4.51 ( 0.00%) 6.53 ( -44.84%)
Stddev 256 11.67 ( 0.00%) 8.50 ( 27.16%)
Stddev 1024 48.33 ( 0.00%) 75.07 ( -55.34%)
Stddev 2048 54.82 ( 0.00%) 65.16 ( -18.86%)
Stddev 3312 153.57 ( 0.00%) 56.29 ( 63.35%)
Stddev 4096 100.25 ( 0.00%) 88.50 ( 11.72%)
Stddev 8192 358.13 ( 0.00%) 169.99 ( 52.54%)
Stddev 16384 43.99 ( 0.00%) 141.82 (-222.39%)
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
Fixes: 56974a6fcfef ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket
mediation")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit c1a85a00ea66cb6f0bd0f14e47c28c2b0999799f ]
This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the
security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is
used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for
the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag
passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether
security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by
the proposed SafeSetID LSM).
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 8c62ed27a12c00e3db1c9f04bc0f272bdbb06734 upstream.
aa_xattrs_match() is unfortunately calling vfs_getxattr_alloc() from a
context protected by an rcu_read_lock. This can not be done as
vfs_getxattr_alloc() may sleep regardles of the gfp_t value being
passed to it.
Fix this by breaking the rcu_read_lock on the policy search when the
xattr match feature is requested and restarting the search if a policy
changes occur.
Fixes: 8e51f9087f40 ("apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and value")
Reported-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 00e0590dbaec6f1bcaa36a85467d7e3497ced522 ]
The sanity check in macro update_for_len checks to see if len
is less than zero, however, len is a size_t so it can never be
less than zero, so this sanity check is a no-op. Fix this by
making len a ssize_t so the comparison will work and add ulen
that is a size_t copy of len so that the min() macro won't
throw warnings about comparing different types.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Macro compares unsigned to 0")
Fixes: f1bd904175e8 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 201218e4d3dfa1346e30997f48725acce3f26d01 ]
Although the apparmorfs dentries are always dropped from the dentry cache
when the usage count drops to zero, there is no guarantee that this will
happen in aafs_remove(), as another thread might still be using it. In
this scenario, this means that the dentry will temporarily continue to
appear in the results of lookups, even after the call to aafs_remove().
In the case of removal of a profile - it also causes simple_rmdir()
on the profile directory to fail, as the directory won't be empty until
the usage counts of all child dentries have decreased to zero. This
results in the dentry for the profile directory leaking and appearing
empty in the file system tree forever.
Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 4ece3125f21b1d42b84896c5646dbf0e878464e1 ]
integrity_kernel_read() can fail in which case we forward to call
ahash_request_free() on a currently running request. We have to wait
for its completion before we can free the request.
This was observed by interrupting a "find / -type f -xdev -print0 | xargs -0
cat 1>/dev/null" with ctrl-c on an IMA enabled filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit f5e1040196dbfe14c77ce3dfe3b7b08d2d961e88 ]
integrity_kernel_read() returns the number of bytes read. If this is
a short read then this positive value is returned from
ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(). Currently this is only indirectly called from
ima_calc_file_hash() and this function only tests for the return value
being zero or nonzero and also doesn't forward the return value.
Nevertheless there's no point in returning a positive value as an error,
so translate a short read into -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit e5bfad3d7acc5702f32aafeb388362994f4d7bd0 upstream.
inode_smack::smk_lock is taken during smack_d_instantiate(), which is
called during a filesystem transaction when creating a file on ext4.
Therefore to avoid a deadlock, all code that takes this lock must use
GFP_NOFS, to prevent memory reclaim from waiting for the filesystem
transaction to complete.
Reported-by: syzbot+0eefc1e06a77d327a056@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 3675f052b43ba51b99b85b073c7070e083f3e6fb upstream.
There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds():
If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be
acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other
->unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that
something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it):
- task A: create task B with fork()
- task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS
- task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some
conditions
- task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library
- task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH
- task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute
- task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which
destroys the ptrace relationship)
Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in
bprm->unsafe, we reject the execve().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5663884caab1 ("Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
[ Upstream commit 3f4287e7d98a2954f20bf96c567fdffcd2b63eb9 ]
In smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(), there is an if statement
on line 3920 to check whether skb is NULL:
if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
This check indicates skb can be NULL in some cases.
But on lines 3931 and 3932, skb is used:
ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur when skb is NULL.
To fix these possible bugs, an if statement is added to check skb.
These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit d41a3effbb53b1bcea41e328d16a4d046a508381 ]
If a request_key authentication token key gets revoked, there's a window in
which request_key_auth_describe() can see it with a NULL payload - but it
makes no check for this and something like the following oops may occur:
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000038
Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000004ddf30
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
...
NIP [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x90/0xd0
LR [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0
Call Trace:
[...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 (unreliable)
[...] proc_keys_show+0x308/0x4c0
[...] seq_read+0x3d0/0x540
[...] proc_reg_read+0x90/0x110
[...] __vfs_read+0x3c/0x70
[...] vfs_read+0xb4/0x1b0
[...] ksys_read+0x7c/0x130
[...] system_call+0x5c/0x70
Fix this by checking for a NULL pointer when describing such a key.
Also make the read routine check for a NULL pointer to be on the safe side.
[DH: Modified to not take already-held rcu lock and modified to also check
in the read routine]
Fixes: 04c567d9313e ("[PATCH] Keys: Fix race between two instantiators of a key")
Reported-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 156e42996bd84eccb6acf319f19ce0cb140d00e3 ]
Each function that manipulates the aa_ext struct should reset it's "pos"
member on failure. This ensures that, on failure, no changes are made to
the state of the aa_ext struct.
There are paths were elements are optional and the error path is
used to indicate the optional element is not present. This means
instead of just aborting on error the unpack stream can become
unsynchronized on optional elements, if using one of the affected
functions.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 736ec752d95e ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy")
Signed-off-by: Mike Salvatore <mike.salvatore@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 45385237f65aeee73641f1ef737d7273905a233f upstream.
Since roles_init() adds some entries to the role hash table, we need to
destroy also its keys/values on error, otherwise we get a memory leak in
the error path.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+fee3a14d4cdf92646287@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 464c258aa45b09f16aa0f05847ed8895873262d9 ]
When sid == 0 (we are resetting keycreate_sid to the default value), we
should skip the KEY__CREATE check.
Before this patch, doing a zero-sized write to /proc/self/keycreate
would check if the current task can create unlabeled keys (which would
usually fail with -EACCESS and generate an AVC). Now it skips the check
and correctly sets the task's keycreate_sid to 0.
Bug report: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1719067
Tested using the reproducer from the report above.
Fixes: 4eb582cf1fbd ("[PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keys")
Reported-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kir@sacred.ru>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 8404d7a674c49278607d19726e0acc0cae299357 upstream.
A packed AppArmor policy contains null-terminated tag strings that are read
by unpack_nameX(). However, unpack_nameX() uses string functions on them
without ensuring that they are actually null-terminated, potentially
leading to out-of-bounds accesses.
Make sure that the tag string is null-terminated before passing it to
strcmp().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 736ec752d95e ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 23375b13f98c5464c2b4d15f983cc062940f1f4e upstream.
While commit 11c236b89d7c2 ("apparmor: add a default null dfa") ensure
every profile has a policy.dfa it does not resize the policy.start[]
to have entries for every possible start value. Which means
PROFILE_MEDIATES is not safe to use on untrusted input. Unforunately
commit b9590ad4c4f2 ("apparmor: remove POLICY_MEDIATES_SAFE") did not
take into account the start value usage.
The input string in profile_query_cb() is user controlled and is not
properly checked to be within the limited start[] entries, even worse
it can't be as userspace policy is allowed to make us of entries types
the kernel does not know about. This mean usespace can currently cause
the kernel to access memory up to 240 entries beyond the start array
bounds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b9590ad4c4f2 ("apparmor: remove POLICY_MEDIATES_SAFE")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 221be106d75c1b511973301542f47d6000d0b63e upstream.
This patch prevents memory access beyond the evm_tfm array by checking the
validity of the index (hash algorithm) passed to init_desc(). The hash
algorithm can be arbitrarily set if the security.ima xattr type is not
EVM_XATTR_HMAC.
Fixes: 5feeb61183dde ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 8cdc23a3d9ec0944000ad43bad588e36afdc38cd upstream.
Show the '^' character when a policy rule has flag IMA_INMASK.
Fixes: 80eae209d63ac ("IMA: allow reading back the current IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 98bbbb76f2edcfb8fb2b8f4b3ccc7b6e99d64bd8 ]
clang correctly points out a code path that would lead
to an uninitialized variable use:
security/selinux/netlabel.c:310:6: error: variable 'addr' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is false
[-Werror,-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
security/selinux/netlabel.c:322:40: note: uninitialized use occurs here
rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, addr, &secattr);
^~~~
security/selinux/netlabel.c:310:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always true
if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
security/selinux/netlabel.c:291:23: note: initialize the variable 'addr' to silence this warning
struct sockaddr *addr;
^
= NULL
This is probably harmless since we should not see ipv6 packets
of CONFIG_IPV6 is disabled, but it's better to rearrange the code
so this cannot happen.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
[PM: removed old patchwork link, fixed checkpatch.pl style errors]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit f51dcd0f621caac5380ce90fbbeafc32ce4517ae ]
symlink body shouldn't be freed without an RCU delay. Switch apparmorfs
to ->destroy_inode() and use of call_rcu(); free both the inode and symlink
body in the callback.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 46c874419652bbefdfed17420fd6e88d8a31d9ec ]
symlink body shouldn't be freed without an RCU delay. Switch securityfs
to ->destroy_inode() and use of call_rcu(); free both the inode and symlink
body in the callback.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit c7e0d6cca86581092cbbf2cd868b3601495554cf ]
calling connect(AF_UNSPEC) on an already connected TCP socket is an
established way to disconnect() such socket. After commit 68741a8adab9
("selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure") it no longer works
and, in the above scenario connect() fails with EAFNOSUPPORT.
Fix the above falling back to the generic/old code when the address family
is not AF_INET{4,6}, but leave the SCTP code path untouched, as it has
specific constraints.
Fixes: 68741a8adab9 ("selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure")
Reported-by: Tom Deseyn <tdeseyn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit a83d6ddaebe541570291205cb538e35ad4ff94f9 upstream.
In the SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT case we never want to allow relabeling
files/directories, so we should never set the SBLABEL_MNT flag. The
'special handling' in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() is only intended for when
the behavior is set to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS.
While there, make the logic in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() more explicit
and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to make sure that introducing a new
SECURITY_FS_USE_* forces a review of the logic.
Fixes: d5f3a5f6e7e7 ("selinux: add security in-core xattr support for pstore and debugfs")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 3a28cff3bd4bf43f02be0c4e7933aebf3dc8197e upstream.
commit 0dc1ba24f7fff6 ("SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe")
results in no audit messages at all if in permissive mode because the
cache is updated during the rcu walk and thus no denial occurs on
the subsequent ref walk. Fix this by not updating the cache when
performing a non-blocking permission check. This only affects search
and symlink read checks during rcu walk.
Fixes: 0dc1ba24f7fff6 ("SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe")
Reported-by: BMK <bmktuwien@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit dfbd199a7cfe3e3cd8531e1353cdbd7175bfbc5e upstream.
When compiling genheaders and mdp from a newer host kernel, the
following error happens:
In file included from scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c:18:
./security/selinux/include/classmap.h:238:2: error: #error New
address family defined, please update secclass_map. #error New
address family defined, please update secclass_map. ^~~~~
make[3]: *** [scripts/Makefile.host:107:
scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders] Error 1 make[2]: ***
[scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux/genheaders] Error 2
make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux] Error 2
make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
Instead of relying on the host definition, include linux/socket.h in
classmap.h to have PF_MAX.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <paulo@paulo.ac>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: manually merge in mdp.c, subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 0fcc4c8c044e117ac126ab6df4138ea9a67fa2a9 upstream.
When dev_exception_add() returns an error (due to a failed memory
allocation), make sure that we move the RCU preemption count back to where
it was before we were called. We dropped the RCU read lock inside the loop
body, so we can't just "break".
sparse complains about this, too:
$ make -s C=2 security/device_cgroup.o
./include/linux/rcupdate.h:647:9: warning: context imbalance in
'propagate_exception' - unexpected unlock
Fixes: d591fb56618f ("device_cgroup: simplify cgroup tree walk in propagate_exception()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 53e0c2aa9a59a48e3798ef193d573ade85aa80f5 ]
Ignore all selinux_inode_notifysecctx() calls on mounts with SBLABEL_MNT
flag unset. This is achived by returning -EOPNOTSUPP for this case in
selinux_inode_setsecurtity() (because that function should not be called
in such case anyway) and translating this error to 0 in
selinux_inode_notifysecctx().
This fixes behavior of kernfs-based filesystems when mounted with the
'context=' option. Before this patch, if a node's context had been
explicitly set to a non-default value and later the filesystem has been
remounted with the 'context=' option, then this node would show up as
having the manually-set context and not the mount-specified one.
Steps to reproduce:
# mount -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
# chcon unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/cgroup.stat
# ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
-r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
# umount /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
# mount -o context=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
Result before:
# ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
-r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
Result after:
# ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 3815a245b50124f0865415dcb606a034e97494d4 upstream.
In the case when we're reusing a superblock, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts()
fails to set set_kern_flags, with the result that
nfs_clone_sb_security() incorrectly clears NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL.
The result is that if you mount the same NFS filesystem twice, NFS
security labels are turned off, even if they would work fine if you
mounted the filesystem only once.
("fixes" may be not exactly the right tag, it may be more like
"fixed-other-cases-but-missed-this-one".)
Cc: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b4d3452b8b4 "security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts..."
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 292c997a1970f8d1e1dfa354ed770a22f7b5a434 upstream.
As does in __sctp_connect(), when checking addrs in a while loop, after
get the addr len according to sa_family, it's necessary to do the check
walk_size + af->sockaddr_len > addrs_size to make sure it won't access
an out-of-bounds addr.
The same thing is needed in selinux_sctp_bind_connect(), otherwise an
out-of-bounds issue can be triggered:
[14548.772313] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in selinux_sctp_bind_connect+0x1aa/0x1f0
[14548.927083] Call Trace:
[14548.938072] dump_stack+0x9a/0xe9
[14548.953015] print_address_description+0x65/0x22e
[14548.996524] kasan_report.cold.6+0x92/0x1a6
[14549.015335] selinux_sctp_bind_connect+0x1aa/0x1f0
[14549.036947] security_sctp_bind_connect+0x58/0x90
[14549.058142] __sctp_setsockopt_connectx+0x5a/0x150 [sctp]
[14549.081650] sctp_setsockopt.part.24+0x1322/0x3ce0 [sctp]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d452930fd3b9 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
Reported-by: Chunyu Hu <chuhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 822ad64d7e46a8e2c8b8a796738d7b657cbb146d ]
In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if
a key type driver overrides the ->request_key hook and the userspace side
manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal
construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned.
Fix this by the following changes:
(1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead.
(2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the
payload available outside of security/keys/.
(3) The ->request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons
record and operation name.
Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the
keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked.
Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit ae3b564179bfd06f32d051b9e5d72ce4b2a07c37 ]
Several u->addr and u->path users are not holding any locks in
common with unix_bind(). unix_state_lock() is useless for those
purposes.
u->addr is assign-once and *(u->addr) is fully set up by the time
we set u->addr (all under unix_table_lock). u->path is also
set in the same critical area, also before setting u->addr, and
any unix_sock with ->path filled will have non-NULL ->addr.
So setting ->addr with smp_store_release() is all we need for those
"lockless" users - just have them fetch ->addr with smp_load_acquire()
and don't even bother looking at ->path if they see NULL ->addr.
Users of ->addr and ->path fall into several classes now:
1) ones that do smp_load_acquire(u->addr) and access *(u->addr)
and u->path only if smp_load_acquire() has returned non-NULL.
2) places holding unix_table_lock. These are guaranteed that
*(u->addr) is seen fully initialized. If unix_sock is in one of the
"bound" chains, so's ->path.
3) unix_sock_destructor() using ->addr is safe. All places
that set u->addr are guaranteed to have seen all stores *(u->addr)
while holding a reference to u and unix_sock_destructor() is called
when (atomic) refcount hits zero.
4) unix_release_sock() using ->path is safe. unix_bind()
is serialized wrt unix_release() (normally - by struct file
refcount), and for the instances that had ->path set by unix_bind()
unix_release_sock() comes from unix_release(), so they are fine.
Instances that had it set in unix_stream_connect() either end up
attached to a socket (in unix_accept()), in which case the call
chain to unix_release_sock() and serialization are the same as in
the previous case, or they never get accept'ed and unix_release_sock()
is called when the listener is shut down and its queue gets purged.
In that case the listener's queue lock provides the barriers needed -
unix_stream_connect() shoves our unix_sock into listener's queue
under that lock right after having set ->path and eventual
unix_release_sock() caller picks them from that queue under the
same lock right before calling unix_release_sock().
5) unix_find_other() use of ->path is pointless, but safe -
it happens with successful lookup by (abstract) name, so ->path.dentry
is guaranteed to be NULL there.
earlier-variant-reviewed-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit d6d478aee003e19ef90321176552a8ad2929a47f ]
aa_label_merge() can return NULL for memory allocations failures
make sure to handle and set the correct error in this case.
Reported-by: Peng Hao <peng.hao2@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit ede0fa98a900e657d1fcd80b50920efc896c1a4c upstream.
syzbot hit the 'BUG_ON(index_key->desc_len == 0);' in __key_link_begin()
called from construct_alloc_key() during sys_request_key(), because the
length of the key description was never calculated.
The problem is that we rely on ->desc_len being initialized by
search_process_keyrings(), specifically by search_nested_keyrings().
But, if the process isn't subscribed to any keyrings that never happens.
Fix it by always initializing keyring_index_key::desc_len as soon as the
description is set, like we already do in some places.
The following program reproduces the BUG_ON() when it's run as root and
no session keyring has been installed. If it doesn't work, try removing
pam_keyinit.so from /etc/pam.d/login and rebooting.
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(void)
{
int id = add_key("keyring", "syz", NULL, 0, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
keyctl_setperm(id, KEY_OTH_WRITE);
setreuid(5000, 5000);
request_key("user", "desc", "", id);
}
Reported-by: syzbot+ec24e95ea483de0a24da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit a08bf91ce28ed3ae7b6fef35d843fef8dc8c2cd9 upstream.
If the sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys' is set to some number n, then
actually users can only add up to 'n - 1' keys. Likewise for
'kernel.keys.maxbytes' and the root_* versions of these sysctls. But
these sysctls are apparently supposed to be *maximums*, as per their
names and all documentation I could find -- the keyrings(7) man page,
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst, and all the mentions of EDQUOT
meaning that the key quota was *exceeded* (as opposed to reached).
Thus, fix the code to allow reaching the quotas exactly.
Fixes: 0b77f5bfb45c ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 5b841bfab695e3b8ae793172a9ff7990f99cc3e2 ]
Function smack_key_permission() only issues smack requests for the
following operations:
- KEY_NEED_READ (issues MAY_READ)
- KEY_NEED_WRITE (issues MAY_WRITE)
- KEY_NEED_LINK (issues MAY_WRITE)
- KEY_NEED_SETATTR (issues MAY_WRITE)
A blank smack request is issued in all other cases, resulting in
smack access being granted if there is any rule defined between
subject and object, or denied with -EACCES otherwise.
Request MAY_READ access for KEY_NEED_SEARCH and KEY_NEED_VIEW.
Fix the logic in the unlikely case when both MAY_READ and
MAY_WRITE are needed. Validate access permission field for valid
contents.
Signed-off-by: Zoran Markovic <zmarkovic@sierrawireless.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 2cbdcb882f97a45f7475c67ac6257bbc16277dfe ]
If a superblock has the MS_SUBMOUNT flag set, we should always allow
mounting it. These mounts are done automatically by the kernel either as
part of mounting some parent mount (e.g. debugfs always mounts tracefs
under "tracing" for compatibility) or they are mounted automatically as
needed on subdirectory accesses (e.g. NFS crossmnt mounts). Since such
automounts are either an implicit consequence of the parent mount (which
is already checked) or they can happen during regular accesses (where it
doesn't make sense to check against the current task's context), the
mount permission check should be skipped for them.
Without this patch, attempts to access contents of an automounted
directory can cause unexpected SELinux denials.
In the current kernel tree, the MS_SUBMOUNT flag is set only via
vfs_submount(), which is called only from the following places:
- AFS, when automounting special "symlinks" referencing other cells
- CIFS, when automounting "referrals"
- NFS, when automounting subtrees
- debugfs, when automounting tracefs
In all cases the submounts are meant to be transparent to the user and
it makes sense that if mounting the master is allowed, then so should be
the automounts. Note that CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability checking is already
skipped for (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT) in:
- sget_userns() in fs/super.c:
if (!(flags & (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) &&
!(type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_MOUNT) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
- sget() in fs/super.c:
/* Ensure the requestor has permissions over the target filesystem */
if (!(flags & (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) && !ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
Verified internally on patched RHEL 7.6 with a reproducer using
NFS+httpd and selinux-tesuite.
Fixes: 93faccbbfa95 ("fs: Better permission checking for submounts")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 5b0e7310a2a33c06edc7eb81ffc521af9b2c5610 upstream.
levdatum->level can be NULL if we encounter an error while loading
the policy during sens_read prior to initializing it. Make sure
sens_destroy handles that case correctly.
Reported-by: syzbot+6664500f0f18f07a5c0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit a5795fd38ee8194451ba3f281f075301a3696ce2 upstream.
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Check that the cred security blob has been set before trying
to clean it up. There is a case during credential initialization
that could result in this.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+69ca07954461f189e808@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 9474f4e7cd71a633fa1ef93b7daefd44bbdfd482 upstream.
It's possible that a pid has died before we take the rcu lock, in which
case we can't walk the ancestry list as it may be detached. Instead, check
for death first before doing the walk.
Reported-by: syzbot+a9ac39bf55329e206219@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 2d514487faf1 ("security: Yama LSM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 5df275cd4cf51c86d49009f1397132f284ba515e upstream.
Do the LE conversions before doing the Infiniband-related range checks.
The incorrect checks are otherwise causing a failure to load any policy
with an ibendportcon rule on BE systems. This can be reproduced by
running (on e.g. ppc64):
cat >my_module.cil <<EOF
(type test_ibendport_t)
(roletype object_r test_ibendport_t)
(ibendportcon mlx4_0 1 (system_u object_r test_ibendport_t ((s0) (s0))))
EOF
semodule -i my_module.cil
Also, fix loading/storing the 64-bit subnet prefix for OCON_IBPKEY to
use a correctly aligned buffer.
Finally, do not use the 'nodebuf' (u32) buffer where 'buf' (__le32)
should be used instead.
Tested internally on a ppc64 machine with a RHEL 7 kernel with this
patch applied.
Cc: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Cc: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.13+
Fixes: a806f7a1616f ("selinux: Create policydb version for Infiniband support")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 598e1a42e9626213565d3b22ea948ce78556512a upstream.
Commit 32a4f5ecd738 ("net: sched: introduce chain object to uapi")
added new RTM_* definitions without properly updating SELinux, this
patch adds the necessary SELinux support.
While there was a BUILD_BUG_ON() in the SELinux code to protect from
exactly this case, it was bypassed in the broken commit. In order to
hopefully prevent this from happening in the future, add additional
comments which provide some instructions on how to resolve the
BUILD_BUG_ON() failures.
Fixes: 32a4f5ecd738 ("net: sched: introduce chain object to uapi")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.19
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 4458bba09788e70e8fb39ad003f087cd9dfbd6ac upstream.
syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
this case.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+ac488b9811036cea7ea0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Vasily Averin
Yang Xu
Jaihind Yadav
Paul Moore
Stephen Smalley
Tetsuo Handa
David Howells
Jann Horn
Tony Jones
Micah Morton
John Johansen
Colin Ian King
Chris Coulson
Sascha Hauer
Eric Biggers
Jia-Ju Bai
Hillf Danton
Mike Salvatore
Ondrej Mosnacek
Roberto Sassu
Arnd Bergmann
Al Viro
Paolo Abeni
Paulo Alcantara
J. Bruce Fields
Xin Long
Zoran Markovic
James Morris
Kees Cook