| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
|
|
commit eb8ef2a3c50092bb018077c047b8dba1ce0e78e3 upstream.
Both vlan_dev_change_flags() and vlan_dev_set_egress_priority()
can return an error. vlan_changelink() should not ignore them.
Fixes: 07b5b17e157b ("[VLAN]: Use rtnl_link API")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 9bbd917e0bec9aebdbd0c8dbc966caec15eb33e9 upstream.
There are few cases where the ndo_uninit() handler might be not
called if an error happens while device is initialized.
Since vlan_newlink() calls vlan_changelink() before
trying to register the netdevice, we need to make sure
vlan_dev_uninit() has been called at least once,
or we might leak allocated memory.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888122a206c0 (size 32):
comm "syz-executor511", pid 7124, jiffies 4294950399 (age 32.240s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 61 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ......as........
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<000000000eb3bb85>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:43 [inline]
[<000000000eb3bb85>] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:586 [inline]
[<000000000eb3bb85>] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3320 [inline]
[<000000000eb3bb85>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x145/0x2c0 mm/slab.c:3549
[<000000007b99f620>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:556 [inline]
[<000000007b99f620>] vlan_dev_set_egress_priority+0xcc/0x150 net/8021q/vlan_dev.c:194
[<000000007b0cb745>] vlan_changelink+0xd6/0x140 net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c:126
[<0000000065aba83a>] vlan_newlink+0x135/0x200 net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c:181
[<00000000fb5dd7a2>] __rtnl_newlink+0x89a/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3305
[<00000000ae4273a1>] rtnl_newlink+0x4e/0x80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3363
[<00000000decab39f>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x178/0x4b0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5424
[<00000000accba4ee>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x61/0x170 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
[<00000000319fe20f>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5442
[<00000000d51938dc>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
[<00000000d51938dc>] netlink_unicast+0x223/0x310 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
[<00000000e539ac79>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c0/0x570 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
[<000000006250c27e>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:639 [inline]
[<000000006250c27e>] sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x70 net/socket.c:659
[<00000000e2a156d1>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x2d0/0x300 net/socket.c:2330
[<000000008c87466e>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x8a/0xd0 net/socket.c:2384
[<00000000110e3054>] __sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xf0 net/socket.c:2417
[<00000000d71077c8>] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2426 [inline]
[<00000000d71077c8>] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2424 [inline]
[<00000000d71077c8>] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 net/socket.c:2424
Fixe: 07b5b17e157b ("[VLAN]: Use rtnl_link API")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 240ce7f6428ff5188b9eedc066e1e4d645b8635f upstream.
When a child Qdisc is removed from one of the PRIO Qdisc's bands, it is
replaced unconditionally by a NOOP qdisc. As a result, any traffic hitting
that band gets dropped. That is incorrect--no Qdisc was explicitly added
when PRIO was created, and after removal, none should have to be added
either.
Fix PRIO by first attempting to create a default Qdisc and only falling
back to noop when that fails. This pattern of attempting to create an
invisible FIFO, using NOOP only as a fallback, is also seen in other
Qdiscs.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit c9655008e7845bcfdaac10a1ed8554ec167aea88 upstream.
When we receive a D-SACK, where the sequence number satisfies:
undo_marker <= start_seq < end_seq <= prior_snd_una
we consider this is a valid D-SACK and tcp_is_sackblock_valid()
returns true, then this D-SACK is discarded as "old stuff",
but the variable first_sack_index is not marked as negative
in tcp_sacktag_write_queue().
If this D-SACK also carries a SACK that needs to be processed
(for example, the previous SACK segment was lost), this SACK
will be treated as a D-SACK in the following processing of
tcp_sacktag_write_queue(), which will eventually lead to
incorrect updates of undo_retrans and reordering.
Fixes: fd6dad616d4f ("[TCP]: Earlier SACK block verification & simplify access to them")
Signed-off-by: Pengcheng Yang <yangpc@wangsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit be7a7729207797476b6666f046d765bdf9630407 upstream.
This patch is to fix a memleak caused by no place to free cmd->obj.chunk
for the unprocessed SCTP_CMD_REPLY. This issue occurs when failing to
process a cmd while there're still SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmds on the cmd seq
with an allocated chunk in cmd->obj.chunk.
So fix it by freeing cmd->obj.chunk for each SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd left on
the cmd seq when any cmd returns error. While at it, also remove 'nomem'
label.
Reported-by: syzbot+107c4aff5f392bf1517f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 68aab823c223646fab311f8a6581994facee66a0 upstream.
The variables 'window_interval' is u64 and do_div()
truncates it to 32 bits, which means it can test
non-zero and be truncated to zero for division.
The unit of window_interval is nanoseconds,
so its lower 32-bit is relatively easy to exceed.
Fix this issue by using div64_u64() instead.
Fixes: 7298de9cd725 ("sch_cake: Add ingress mode")
Signed-off-by: Wen Yang <wenyang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
Cc: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: cake@lists.bufferbloat.net
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit d9e15a2733067c9328fb56d98fe8e574fa19ec31 upstream.
As diagnosed by Florian :
If TCA_FQ_QUANTUM is set to 0x80000000, fq_deueue()
can loop forever in :
if (f->credit <= 0) {
f->credit += q->quantum;
goto begin;
}
... because f->credit is either 0 or -2147483648.
Let's limit TCA_FQ_QUANTUM to no more than 1 << 20 :
This max value should limit risks of breaking user setups
while fixing this bug.
Fixes: afe4fd062416 ("pkt_sched: fq: Fair Queue packet scheduler")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Diagnosed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Reported-by: syzbot+dc9071cc5a85950bdfce@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit af1c0e4e00f3cc76cb136ebf2e2c04e8b6446285 upstream.
When a frame with NULL DSAP is received, llc_station_rcv is called.
In turn, llc_stat_ev_rx_null_dsap_xid_c is called to check if it is a NULL
XID frame. The return statement of llc_stat_ev_rx_null_dsap_xid_c returns 1
when the incoming frame is not a NULL XID frame and 0 otherwise. Hence, a
NULL XID response is returned unexpectedly, e.g. when the incoming frame is
a NULL TEST command.
To fix the error, simply remove the conditional operator.
A similar error in llc_stat_ev_rx_null_dsap_test_c is also fixed.
Signed-off-by: Chan Shu Tak, Alex <alexchan@task.com.hk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 6fc232db9e8cd50b9b83534de9cd91ace711b2d7 upstream.
In rfkill_register, the struct rfkill pointer is first derefernced
and then checked for NULL. This patch removes the BUG_ON and returns
an error to the caller in case rfkill is NULL.
Signed-off-by: Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191215153409.21696-1-pakki001@umn.edu
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 5133498f4ad1123a5ffd4c08df6431dab882cc32 upstream.
Redirecting a packet from ingress to egress by using bpf_redirect
breaks if the egress interface has an fq qdisc installed. This is the same
problem as fixed in 'commit 8203e2d844d3 ("net: clear skb->tstamp in forwarding paths")
Clear skb->tstamp when redirecting into the egress path.
Fixes: 80b14dee2bea ("net: Add a new socket option for a future transmit time.")
Fixes: fb420d5d91c1 ("tcp/fq: move back to CLOCK_MONOTONIC")
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191213180817.2510-1-lmb@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 56cb31e185adb61f930743a9b70e700a43625386 upstream.
If wdev->wext.keys was initialized it didn't get reset to NULL on
unregister (and it doesn't get set in cfg80211_init_wdev either), but
wdev is reused if unregister was triggered through
cfg80211_switch_netns.
The next unregister (for whatever reason) will try to free
wdev->wext.keys again.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bühler <source@stbuehler.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191126100543.782023-1-stefan.buehler@tik.uni-stuttgart.de
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 753ffad3d6243303994227854d951ff5c70fa9e0 upstream.
Fix overwriting of the qos_ctrl.tid field for encrypted frames injected on
a monitor interface. While qos_ctrl.tid is not encrypted, it's used as an
input into the encryption algorithm so it's protected, and thus cannot be
modified after encryption. For injected frames, the encryption may already
have been done in userspace, so we cannot change any fields.
Before passing the frame to the driver, the qos_ctrl.tid field is updated
from skb->priority. Prior to dbd50a851c50 skb->priority was updated in
ieee80211_select_queue_80211(), but this function is no longer always
called.
Update skb->priority in ieee80211_monitor_start_xmit() so that the value
is stored, and when later code 'modifies' the TID it really sets it to
the same value as before, preserving the encryption.
Fixes: dbd50a851c50 ("mac80211: only allocate one queue when using iTXQs")
Signed-off-by: Fredrik Olofsson <fredrik.olofsson@anyfinetworks.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191119133451.14711-1-fredrik.olofsson@anyfinetworks.com
[rewrite commit message based on our discussion]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 0d2c96af797ba149e559c5875c0151384ab6dd14 upstream.
Userspace might bogusly sent NFT_DATA_VERDICT in several netlink
attributes that assume NFT_DATA_VALUE. Moreover, make sure that error
path invokes nft_data_release() to decrement the reference count on the
chain object.
Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Fixes: 0f3cd9b36977 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add range expression")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit bffc124b6fe37d0ae9b428d104efb426403bb5c9 upstream.
Only NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY and NFTA_SET_ELEM_FLAGS make sense for elements
whose NFT_SET_ELEM_INTERVAL_END flag is set on.
Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
sets
commit db3b665dd77b34e34df00e17d7b299c98fcfb2c5 upstream.
The existing rbtree implementation might store consecutive elements
where the closing element and the opening element might overlap, eg.
[ a, a+1) [ a+1, a+2)
This patch removes the optimization for non-anonymous sets in the exact
matching case, where it is assumed to stop searching in case that the
closing element is found. Instead, invalidate candidate interval and
keep looking further in the tree.
The lookup/get operation might return false, while there is an element
in the rbtree. Moreover, the get operation returns true as if a+2 would
be in the tree. This happens with named sets after several set updates.
The existing lookup optimization (that only works for the anonymous
sets) might not reach the opening [ a+1,... element if the closing
...,a+1) is found in first place when walking over the rbtree. Hence,
walking the full tree in that case is needed.
This patch fixes the lookup and get operations.
Fixes: e701001e7cbe ("netfilter: nft_rbtree: allow adjacent intervals with dynamic updates")
Fixes: ba0e4d9917b4 ("netfilter: nf_tables: get set elements via netlink")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 18a110b022a5c02e7dc9f6109d0bd93e58ac6ebb upstream.
Curtis Taylor and Jon Maxwell reported and debugged a crash on 3.10
based kernel.
Crash occurs in ctnetlink_conntrack_events because net->nfnl socket is
NULL. The nfnl socket was set to NULL by netns destruction running on
another cpu.
The exiting network namespace calls the relevant destructors in the
following order:
1. ctnetlink_net_exit_batch
This nulls out the event callback pointer in struct netns.
2. nfnetlink_net_exit_batch
This nulls net->nfnl socket and frees it.
3. nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list
This removes all remaining conntrack entries.
This is order is correct. The only explanation for the crash so ar is:
cpu1: conntrack is dying, eviction occurs:
-> nf_ct_delete()
-> nf_conntrack_event_report \
-> nf_conntrack_eventmask_report
-> notify->fcn() (== ctnetlink_conntrack_events).
cpu1: a. fetches rcu protected pointer to obtain ctnetlink event callback.
b. gets interrupted.
cpu2: runs netns exit handlers:
a runs ctnetlink destructor, event cb pointer set to NULL.
b runs nfnetlink destructor, nfnl socket is closed and set to NULL.
cpu1: c. resumes and trips over NULL net->nfnl.
Problem appears to be that ctnetlink_net_exit_batch only prevents future
callers of nf_conntrack_eventmask_report() from obtaining the callback.
It doesn't wait of other cpus that might have already obtained the
callbacks address.
I don't see anything in upstream kernels that would prevent similar
crash: We need to wait for all cpus to have exited the event callback.
Fixes: 9592a5c01e79dbc59eb56fa ("netfilter: ctnetlink: netns support")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 92a35678ec075100ce666a2fb6969151affb0e5d upstream.
hsr nodes are protected by RCU and there is no write side lock.
But node insertions and deletions could be being operated concurrently.
So write side locking is needed.
Test commands:
ip netns add nst
ip link add veth0 type veth peer name veth1
ip link add veth2 type veth peer name veth3
ip link set veth1 netns nst
ip link set veth3 netns nst
ip link set veth0 up
ip link set veth2 up
ip link add hsr0 type hsr slave1 veth0 slave2 veth2
ip a a 192.168.100.1/24 dev hsr0
ip link set hsr0 up
ip netns exec nst ip link set veth1 up
ip netns exec nst ip link set veth3 up
ip netns exec nst ip link add hsr1 type hsr slave1 veth1 slave2 veth3
ip netns exec nst ip a a 192.168.100.2/24 dev hsr1
ip netns exec nst ip link set hsr1 up
for i in {0..9}
do
for j in {0..9}
do
for k in {0..9}
do
for l in {0..9}
do
arping 192.168.100.2 -I hsr0 -s 00:01:3$i:4$j:5$k:6$l -c1 &
done
done
done
done
Splat looks like:
[ 236.066091][ T3286] list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffff8880a5940300), but was ffff8880a5940d0.
[ 236.069617][ T3286] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 236.070545][ T3286] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:25!
[ 236.071391][ T3286] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI
[ 236.072343][ T3286] CPU: 0 PID: 3286 Comm: arping Tainted: G W 5.5.0-rc1+ #209
[ 236.073463][ T3286] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 236.074695][ T3286] RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x74/0xd0
[ 236.075499][ T3286] Code: 48 39 da 75 27 48 39 f5 74 36 48 39 dd 74 31 48 83 c4 08 b8 01 00 00 00 5b 5d c3 48 b
[ 236.078277][ T3286] RSP: 0018:ffff8880aaa97648 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 236.086991][ T3286] RAX: 0000000000000075 RBX: ffff8880d4624c20 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 236.088000][ T3286] RDX: 0000000000000075 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffed1015552ebf
[ 236.098897][ T3286] RBP: ffff88809b53d200 R08: ffffed101b3c04f9 R09: ffffed101b3c04f9
[ 236.099960][ T3286] R10: 00000000308769a1 R11: ffffed101b3c04f8 R12: ffff8880d4624c28
[ 236.100974][ T3286] R13: ffff8880d4624c20 R14: 0000000040310100 R15: ffff8880ce17ee02
[ 236.138967][ T3286] FS: 00007f23479fa680(0000) GS:ffff8880d9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 236.144852][ T3286] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 236.145720][ T3286] CR2: 00007f4a14bab210 CR3: 00000000a61c6001 CR4: 00000000000606f0
[ 236.146776][ T3286] Call Trace:
[ 236.147222][ T3286] hsr_add_node+0x314/0x490 [hsr]
[ 236.153633][ T3286] hsr_forward_skb+0x2b6/0x1bc0 [hsr]
[ 236.154362][ T3286] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x90/0xc0
[ 236.155091][ T3286] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xa0/0xa0
[ 236.156607][ T3286] hsr_dev_xmit+0x70/0xd0 [hsr]
[ 236.157254][ T3286] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x160/0x740
[ 236.157941][ T3286] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1961/0x2e10
[ 236.158565][ T3286] ? netdev_core_pick_tx+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ ... ]
Reported-by: syzbot+3924327f9ad5f4d2b343@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: f421436a591d ("net/hsr: Add support for the High-availability Seamless Redundancy protocol (HSRv0)")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 1d19e2d53e8ed9e4c98fc95e0067492cda7288b0 upstream.
hsr_dev_finalize() is called to create new hsr interface.
There are some wrong error handling codes.
1. wrong checking return value of debugfs_create_{dir/file}.
These function doesn't return NULL. If error occurs in there,
it returns error pointer.
So, it should check error pointer instead of NULL.
2. It doesn't unregister interface if it fails to setup hsr interface.
If it fails to initialize hsr interface after register_netdevice(),
it should call unregister_netdevice().
3. Ignore failure of creation of debugfs
If creating of debugfs dir and file is failed, creating hsr interface
will be failed. But debugfs doesn't affect actual logic of hsr module.
So, ignoring this is more correct and this behavior is more general.
Fixes: c5a759117210 ("net/hsr: Use list_head (and rcu) instead of array for slave devices.")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 84bb59d773853bc2dda2ac1ef8474c40eb33a3c6 upstream.
When hsr module is being removed, debugfs_remove() is called to remove
both debugfs directory and file.
When module is being removed, module state is changed to
MODULE_STATE_GOING then exit() is called.
At this moment, module couldn't be held so try_module_get()
will be failed.
debugfs's open() callback tries to hold the module if .owner is existing.
If it fails, warning message is printed.
CPU0 CPU1
delete_module()
try_stop_module()
hsr_exit() open() <-- WARNING
debugfs_remove()
In order to avoid the warning message, this patch makes hsr module does
not set .owner. Unsetting .owner is safe because these are protected by
inode_lock().
Test commands:
#SHELL1
ip link add dummy0 type dummy
ip link add dummy1 type dummy
while :
do
ip link add hsr0 type hsr slave1 dummy0 slave2 dummy1
modprobe -rv hsr
done
#SHELL2
while :
do
cat /sys/kernel/debug/hsr0/node_table
done
Splat looks like:
[ 101.223783][ T1271] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 101.230309][ T1271] debugfs file owner did not clean up at exit: node_table
[ 101.230380][ T1271] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1271 at fs/debugfs/file.c:309 full_proxy_open+0x10f/0x650
[ 101.233153][ T1271] Modules linked in: hsr(-) dummy veth openvswitch nsh nf_conncount nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_d]
[ 101.237112][ T1271] CPU: 3 PID: 1271 Comm: cat Tainted: G W 5.5.0-rc1+ #204
[ 101.238270][ T1271] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 101.240379][ T1271] RIP: 0010:full_proxy_open+0x10f/0x650
[ 101.241166][ T1271] Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 c1 04 00 00 49 8b 3c 24 e8 04 86 7e ff 84 c0 75 2d 4c 8
[ 101.251985][ T1271] RSP: 0018:ffff8880ca22fa38 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 101.273355][ T1271] RAX: dffffc0000000008 RBX: ffff8880cc6e6200 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 101.274466][ T1271] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffff8880c4dd5c14
[ 101.275581][ T1271] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: fffffbfff2922f5d R09: 0000000000000000
[ 101.276733][ T1271] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffc0551bc0
[ 101.277853][ T1271] R13: ffff8880c4059a48 R14: ffff8880be50a5e0 R15: ffffffff941adaa0
[ 101.278956][ T1271] FS: 00007f8871cda540(0000) GS:ffff8880da800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 101.280216][ T1271] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 101.282832][ T1271] CR2: 00007f88717cfd10 CR3: 00000000b9440005 CR4: 00000000000606e0
[ 101.283974][ T1271] Call Trace:
[ 101.285328][ T1271] do_dentry_open+0x63c/0xf50
[ 101.286077][ T1271] ? open_proxy_open+0x270/0x270
[ 101.288271][ T1271] ? __x64_sys_fchdir+0x180/0x180
[ 101.288987][ T1271] ? inode_permission+0x65/0x390
[ 101.289682][ T1271] path_openat+0x701/0x2810
[ 101.290294][ T1271] ? path_lookupat+0x880/0x880
[ 101.290957][ T1271] ? check_chain_key+0x236/0x5d0
[ 101.291676][ T1271] ? __lock_acquire+0xdfe/0x3de0
[ 101.292358][ T1271] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
[ 101.292962][ T1271] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x170
[ 101.293644][ T1271] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1d0
[ 101.305616][ T1271] do_filp_open+0x17a/0x270
[ 101.306061][ T1271] ? may_open_dev+0xc0/0xc0
[ ... ]
Fixes: fc4ecaeebd26 ("net: hsr: add debugfs support for display node list")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 7c68fa2bddda6d942bd387c9ba5b4300737fd991 upstream.
sk->sk_pacing_shift can be read and written without lock
synchronization. This patch adds annotations to
document this fact and avoid future syzbot complains.
This might also avoid unexpected false sharing
in sk_pacing_shift_update(), as the compiler
could remove the conditional check and always
write over sk->sk_pacing_shift :
if (sk->sk_pacing_shift != val)
sk->sk_pacing_shift = val;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit c305c6ae79e2ce20c22660ceda94f0d86d639a82 upstream.
KCSAN reported a data-race [1]
While we can use READ_ONCE() on the read sides,
we need to make sure hh->hh_len is written last.
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in eth_header_cache / neigh_resolve_output
write to 0xffff8880b9dedcb8 of 4 bytes by task 29760 on cpu 0:
eth_header_cache+0xa9/0xd0 net/ethernet/eth.c:247
neigh_hh_init net/core/neighbour.c:1463 [inline]
neigh_resolve_output net/core/neighbour.c:1480 [inline]
neigh_resolve_output+0x415/0x470 net/core/neighbour.c:1470
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:511 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0x7a2/0xec0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:116
__ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:142 [inline]
__ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:127
ip6_finish_output+0x41/0x160 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:152
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline]
ip6_output+0xf2/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:175
dst_output include/net/dst.h:436 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline]
ndisc_send_skb+0x459/0x5f0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:505
ndisc_send_ns+0x207/0x430 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:647
rt6_probe_deferred+0x98/0xf0 net/ipv6/route.c:615
process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
read to 0xffff8880b9dedcb8 of 4 bytes by task 29572 on cpu 1:
neigh_resolve_output net/core/neighbour.c:1479 [inline]
neigh_resolve_output+0x113/0x470 net/core/neighbour.c:1470
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:511 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0x7a2/0xec0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:116
__ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:142 [inline]
__ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:127
ip6_finish_output+0x41/0x160 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:152
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline]
ip6_output+0xf2/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:175
dst_output include/net/dst.h:436 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline]
ndisc_send_skb+0x459/0x5f0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:505
ndisc_send_ns+0x207/0x430 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:647
rt6_probe_deferred+0x98/0xf0 net/ipv6/route.c:615
process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 29572 Comm: kworker/1:4 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc6+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events rt6_probe_deferred
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit d088337c38a5cd8f0230fbf2d514ff7672f9d0d3 upstream.
In the implementation of hci_connect_le_scan() when conn is added via
hci_conn_add(), if hci_explicit_conn_params_set() fails the allocated
memory for conn is leaked. Use hci_conn_del() to release it.
Fixes: f75113a26008 ("Bluetooth: add hci_connect_le_scan")
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit df66499a1fab340c167250a5743931dc50d5f0fa upstream.
We used to take a lock in amp_physical_cfm() but then we moved it to
the caller function. Unfortunately the unlock on this error path was
overlooked so it leads to a double unlock.
Fixes: a514b17fab51 ("Bluetooth: Refactor locking in amp_physical_cfm")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 1148f9adbe71415836a18a36c1b4ece999ab0973 upstream.
proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted() has been firstly introduced
in commit 2e4a30983b0f ("bpf: restrict access to core bpf sysctls")
under CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT. Then, this ifdef has been removed in
ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv
allocations"), because a new sysctl, bpf_jit_limit, made use of it.
Finally, this parameter has become long instead of integer with
fdadd04931c2 ("bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64K")
and thus, a new proc_dolongvec_minmax_bpf_restricted() has been
added.
With this last change, we got back to that
proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted() is used only under
CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT, but the corresponding ifdef has not been
brought back.
So, in configurations like CONFIG_BPF_JIT=y && CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT=n
since v4.20 we have:
CC net/core/sysctl_net_core.o
net/core/sysctl_net_core.c:292:1: warning: ‘proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted’ defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
292 | proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Suppress this by guarding it with CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT again.
Fixes: fdadd04931c2 ("bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64K")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@dlink.ru>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191218091821.7080-1-alobakin@dlink.ru
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 0b9173f4688dfa7c5d723426be1d979c24ce3d51 upstream.
Bridge packets that are forwarded have skb->dst == NULL and get
dropped by the check introduced by
b60a77386b1d4868f72f6353d35dabe5fbe981f2 (net: make skb_dst_force
return true when dst is refcounted).
To fix this we check skb_dst() before skb_dst_force(), so we don't
drop skb packet with dst == NULL. This holds also for skb at the
PRE_ROUTING hook so we remove the second check.
Fixes: b60a77386b1d ("net: make skb_dst_force return true when dst is refcounted")
Signed-off-by: Marco Oliverio <marco.oliverio@tanaza.com>
Signed-off-by: Rocco Folino <rocco.folino@tanaza.com>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 90b2be27bb0e56483f335cc10fb59ec66882b949 upstream.
KCSAN reported the following race [1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __dev_queue_xmit / net_tx_action
read to 0xffff8880ba403508 of 1 bytes by task 21814 on cpu 1:
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3389 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x9db/0x1b40 net/core/dev.c:3761
dev_queue_xmit+0x21/0x30 net/core/dev.c:3825
neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:500 [inline]
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:509 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0x873/0xec0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:116
__ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:142 [inline]
__ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:127
ip6_finish_output+0x41/0x160 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:152
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline]
ip6_output+0xf2/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:175
dst_output include/net/dst.h:436 [inline]
ip6_local_out+0x74/0x90 net/ipv6/output_core.c:179
ip6_send_skb+0x53/0x110 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1795
udp_v6_send_skb.isra.0+0x3ec/0xa70 net/ipv6/udp.c:1173
udpv6_sendmsg+0x1906/0x1c20 net/ipv6/udp.c:1471
inet6_sendmsg+0x6d/0x90 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:576
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0x9f/0xc0 net/socket.c:657
___sys_sendmsg+0x2b7/0x5d0 net/socket.c:2311
__sys_sendmmsg+0x123/0x350 net/socket.c:2413
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x64/0x80 net/socket.c:2439
do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x370 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
write to 0xffff8880ba403508 of 1 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0:
qdisc_run_begin include/net/sch_generic.h:160 [inline]
qdisc_run include/net/pkt_sched.h:120 [inline]
net_tx_action+0x2b1/0x6c0 net/core/dev.c:4551
__do_softirq+0x115/0x33f kernel/softirq.c:292
do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1082
do_softirq.part.0+0x6b/0x80 kernel/softirq.c:337
do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:329 [inline]
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x76/0x80 kernel/softirq.c:189
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:32 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:688 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0x7bb/0xec0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:117
__ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:142 [inline]
__ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:127
ip6_finish_output+0x41/0x160 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:152
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline]
ip6_output+0xf2/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:175
dst_output include/net/dst.h:436 [inline]
ip6_local_out+0x74/0x90 net/ipv6/output_core.c:179
ip6_send_skb+0x53/0x110 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1795
udp_v6_send_skb.isra.0+0x3ec/0xa70 net/ipv6/udp.c:1173
udpv6_sendmsg+0x1906/0x1c20 net/ipv6/udp.c:1471
inet6_sendmsg+0x6d/0x90 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:576
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0x9f/0xc0 net/socket.c:657
___sys_sendmsg+0x2b7/0x5d0 net/socket.c:2311
__sys_sendmmsg+0x123/0x350 net/socket.c:2413
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x64/0x80 net/socket.c:2439
do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x370 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 21817 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc6+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Fixes: d518d2ed8640 ("net/sched: fix race between deactivation and dequeue for NOLOCK qdisc")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 5fcaf6982d1167f1cd9b264704f6d1ef4c505d54 upstream.
I was investigating a crash in our Virtuozzo7 kernel which happened in
in svcauth_unix_set_client. I found out that we access m_client field
in ip_map structure, which was received from sunrpc_cache_lookup (we
have a bit older kernel, now the code is in sunrpc_cache_add_entry), and
these field looks uninitialized (m_client == 0x74 don't look like a
pointer) but in the cache_head in flags we see 0x1 which is CACHE_VALID.
It looks like the problem appeared from our previous fix to sunrpc (1):
commit 4ecd55ea0742 ("sunrpc: fix cache_head leak due to queued
request")
And we've also found a patch already fixing our patch (2):
commit d58431eacb22 ("sunrpc: don't mark uninitialised items as VALID.")
Though the crash is eliminated, I think the core of the problem is not
completely fixed:
Neil in the patch (2) makes cache_head CACHE_NEGATIVE, before
cache_fresh_locked which was added in (1) to fix crash. These way
cache_is_valid won't say the cache is valid anymore and in
svcauth_unix_set_client the function cache_check will return error
instead of 0, and we don't count entry as initialized.
But it looks like we need to remove cache_fresh_locked completely in
sunrpc_cache_lookup:
In (1) we've only wanted to make cache_fresh_unlocked->cache_dequeue so
that cache_requests with no readers also release corresponding
cache_head, to fix their leak. We with Vasily were not sure if
cache_fresh_locked and cache_fresh_unlocked should be used in pair or
not, so we've guessed to use them in pair.
Now we see that we don't want the CACHE_VALID bit set here by
cache_fresh_locked, as "valid" means "initialized" and there is no
initialization in sunrpc_cache_add_entry. Both expiry_time and
last_refresh are not used in cache_fresh_unlocked code-path and also not
required for the initial fix.
So to conclude cache_fresh_locked was called by mistake, and we can just
safely remove it instead of crutching it with CACHE_NEGATIVE. It looks
ideologically better for me. Hope I don't miss something here.
Here is our crash backtrace:
[13108726.326291] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000074
[13108726.326365] IP: [<ffffffffc01f79eb>] svcauth_unix_set_client+0x2ab/0x520 [sunrpc]
[13108726.326448] PGD 0
[13108726.326468] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[13108726.326497] Modules linked in: nbd isofs xfs loop kpatch_cumulative_81_0_r1(O) xt_physdev nfnetlink_queue bluetooth rfkill ip6table_nat nf_nat_ipv6 ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_wlc ip_vs_sh nf_conntrack_netlink ip_vs_sed ip_vs_pe_sip nf_conntrack_sip ip_vs_nq ip_vs_lc ip_vs_lblcr ip_vs_lblc ip_vs_ftp ip_vs_dh nf_nat_ftp nf_conntrack_ftp iptable_raw xt_recent nf_log_ipv6 xt_hl ip6t_rt nf_log_ipv4 nf_log_common xt_LOG xt_limit xt_TCPMSS xt_tcpmss vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel xt_statistic xt_NFLOG nfnetlink_log dummy xt_mark xt_REDIRECT nf_nat_redirect raw_diag udp_diag tcp_diag inet_diag netlink_diag af_packet_diag unix_diag rpcsec_gss_krb5 xt_addrtype ip6t_rpfilter ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 ebtable_nat ebtable_broute nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 ip6table_mangle ip6table_raw nfsv4
[13108726.327173] dns_resolver cls_u32 binfmt_misc arptable_filter arp_tables ip6table_filter ip6_tables devlink fuse_kio_pcs ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 xt_nat iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 xt_comment nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_wdog_tmo xt_multiport bonding xt_set xt_conntrack iptable_filter iptable_mangle kpatch(O) ebtable_filter ebt_among ebtables ip_set_hash_ip ip_set nfnetlink vfat fat skx_edac intel_powerclamp coretemp intel_rapl iosf_mbi kvm_intel kvm irqbypass fuse pcspkr ses enclosure joydev sg mei_me hpwdt hpilo lpc_ich mei ipmi_si shpchp ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler xt_ipvs acpi_power_meter ip_vs_rr nfsv3 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache nf_nat cls_fw sch_htb sch_cbq sch_sfq ip_vs em_u32 nf_conntrack tun br_netfilter veth overlay ip6_vzprivnet ip6_vznetstat ip_vznetstat
[13108726.327817] ip_vzprivnet vziolimit vzevent vzlist vzstat vznetstat vznetdev vzmon vzdev bridge pio_kaio pio_nfs pio_direct pfmt_raw pfmt_ploop1 ploop ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper scsi_transport_iscsi 8021q syscopyarea sysfillrect garp sysimgblt fb_sys_fops mrp stp ttm llc bnx2x crct10dif_pclmul crct10dif_common crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel drm dm_multipath ghash_clmulni_intel uas aesni_intel lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper cryptd tg3 smartpqi scsi_transport_sas mdio libcrc32c i2c_core usb_storage ptp pps_core wmi sunrpc dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: kpatch_cumulative_82_0_r1]
[13108726.328403] CPU: 35 PID: 63742 Comm: nfsd ve: 51332 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W O ------------ 3.10.0-862.20.2.vz7.73.29 #1 73.29
[13108726.328491] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10/ProLiant DL360 Gen10, BIOS U32 10/02/2018
[13108726.328554] task: ffffa0a6a41b1160 ti: ffffa0c2a74bc000 task.ti: ffffa0c2a74bc000
[13108726.328610] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffc01f79eb>] [<ffffffffc01f79eb>] svcauth_unix_set_client+0x2ab/0x520 [sunrpc]
[13108726.328706] RSP: 0018:ffffa0c2a74bfd80 EFLAGS: 00010246
[13108726.328750] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffa0a6183ae000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[13108726.328811] RDX: 0000000000000074 RSI: 0000000000000286 RDI: ffffa0c2a74bfcf0
[13108726.328864] RBP: ffffa0c2a74bfe00 R08: ffffa0bab8c22960 R09: 0000000000000001
[13108726.328916] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffa0a32aa7f000
[13108726.328969] R13: ffffa0a6183afac0 R14: ffffa0c233d88d00 R15: ffffa0c2a74bfdb4
[13108726.329022] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa0e17f9c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[13108726.329081] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[13108726.332311] CR2: 0000000000000074 CR3: 00000026a1b28000 CR4: 00000000007607e0
[13108726.334606] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[13108726.336754] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[13108726.338908] PKRU: 00000000
[13108726.341047] Call Trace:
[13108726.343074] [<ffffffff8a2c78b4>] ? groups_alloc+0x34/0x110
[13108726.344837] [<ffffffffc01f5eb4>] svc_set_client+0x24/0x30 [sunrpc]
[13108726.346631] [<ffffffffc01f2ac1>] svc_process_common+0x241/0x710 [sunrpc]
[13108726.348332] [<ffffffffc01f3093>] svc_process+0x103/0x190 [sunrpc]
[13108726.350016] [<ffffffffc07d605f>] nfsd+0xdf/0x150 [nfsd]
[13108726.351735] [<ffffffffc07d5f80>] ? nfsd_destroy+0x80/0x80 [nfsd]
[13108726.353459] [<ffffffff8a2bf741>] kthread+0xd1/0xe0
[13108726.355195] [<ffffffff8a2bf670>] ? create_kthread+0x60/0x60
[13108726.356896] [<ffffffff8a9556dd>] ret_from_fork_nospec_begin+0x7/0x21
[13108726.358577] [<ffffffff8a2bf670>] ? create_kthread+0x60/0x60
[13108726.360240] Code: 4c 8b 45 98 0f 8e 2e 01 00 00 83 f8 fe 0f 84 76 fe ff ff 85 c0 0f 85 2b 01 00 00 49 8b 50 40 b8 01 00 00 00 48 89 93 d0 1a 00 00 <f0> 0f c1 02 83 c0 01 83 f8 01 0f 8e 53 02 00 00 49 8b 44 24 38
[13108726.363769] RIP [<ffffffffc01f79eb>] svcauth_unix_set_client+0x2ab/0x520 [sunrpc]
[13108726.365530] RSP <ffffa0c2a74bfd80>
[13108726.367179] CR2: 0000000000000074
Fixes: d58431eacb22 ("sunrpc: don't mark uninitialised items as VALID.")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 8cb4ec44de42b99b92399b4d1daf3dc430ed0186 upstream.
On Big Endian architectures, u16 port value was extracted from the wrong
parts of u32 sreg_port, just like commit 10596608c4d62 ("netfilter:
nf_tables: fix mismatch in big-endian system") describes.
Fixes: 4ed8eb6570a49 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Add native tproxy support")
Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Máté Eckl <ecklm94@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit a5a7daa52edb5197a3b696afee13ef174dc2e993 upstream.
Reading tp->recvmsg_inq after socket lock is released
raises a KCSAN warning [1]
Replace has_tss & has_cmsg by cmsg_flags and make
sure to not read tp->recvmsg_inq a second time.
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in tcp_chrono_stop / tcp_recvmsg
write to 0xffff888126adef24 of 2 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0:
tcp_chrono_set net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2309 [inline]
tcp_chrono_stop+0x14c/0x280 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2338
tcp_clean_rtx_queue net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3165 [inline]
tcp_ack+0x274f/0x3170 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3688
tcp_rcv_established+0x37e/0xf50 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5696
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x381/0x4e0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1561
tcp_v4_rcv+0x19dc/0x1bb0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1942
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x4d/0x420 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:204
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x110/0x140 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:231
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:299 [inline]
ip_local_deliver+0x133/0x210 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:252
dst_input include/net/dst.h:442 [inline]
ip_rcv_finish+0x121/0x160 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:413
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:299 [inline]
ip_rcv+0x18f/0x1a0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:523
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xa7/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:5010
__netif_receive_skb+0x37/0xf0 net/core/dev.c:5124
netif_receive_skb_internal+0x59/0x190 net/core/dev.c:5214
napi_skb_finish net/core/dev.c:5677 [inline]
napi_gro_receive+0x28f/0x330 net/core/dev.c:5710
read to 0xffff888126adef25 of 1 bytes by task 7275 on cpu 1:
tcp_recvmsg+0x77b/0x1a30 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2187
inet_recvmsg+0xbb/0x250 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:838
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:871 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:889 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x92/0xb0 net/socket.c:885
sock_read_iter+0x15f/0x1e0 net/socket.c:967
call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:1889 [inline]
new_sync_read+0x389/0x4f0 fs/read_write.c:414
__vfs_read+0xb1/0xc0 fs/read_write.c:427
vfs_read fs/read_write.c:461 [inline]
vfs_read+0x143/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:446
ksys_read+0xd5/0x1b0 fs/read_write.c:587
__do_sys_read fs/read_write.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_read fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
__x64_sys_read+0x4c/0x60 fs/read_write.c:595
do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x370 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 7275 Comm: sshd Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Fixes: b75eba76d3d7 ("tcp: send in-queue bytes in cmsg upon read")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit ebfcd8955c0b52eb793bcbc9e71140e3d0cdb228 upstream.
The socket read/write helpers only look at the file O_NONBLOCK. not
the iocb IOCB_NOWAIT flag. This breaks users like preadv2/pwritev2
and io_uring that rely on not having the file itself marked nonblocking,
but rather the iocb itself.
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
This is the 5.2.34 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Sat 07 Mar 2020 07:25:00 PM EST
# gpg: using RSA key EBCE84042C07D1D6
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
|
|
commit 2beb6d2901a3f73106485d560c49981144aeacb1 upstream.
In commit 4b1373de73a3 ("net: ipv6: addr: perform strict checks also for
doit handlers") we add strict check for inet6_rtm_getaddr(). But we did
the invalid header values check before checking if NETLINK_F_STRICT_CHK
is set. This may break backwards compatibility if user already set the
ifm->ifa_prefixlen, ifm->ifa_flags, ifm->ifa_scope in their netlink code.
I didn't move the nlmsg_len check because I thought it's a valid check.
Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 4b1373de73a3 ("net: ipv6: addr: perform strict checks also for doit handlers")
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 8dbd76e79a16b45b2ccb01d2f2e08dbf64e71e40 upstream.
Michal Kubecek and Firo Yang did a very nice analysis of crashes
happening in __inet_lookup_established().
Since a TCP socket can go from TCP_ESTABLISH to TCP_LISTEN
(via a close()/socket()/listen() cycle) without a RCU grace period,
I should not have changed listeners linkage in their hash table.
They must use the nulls protocol (Documentation/RCU/rculist_nulls.txt),
so that a lookup can detect a socket in a hash list was moved in
another one.
Since we added code in commit d296ba60d8e2 ("soreuseport: Resolve
merge conflict for v4/v6 ordering fix"), we have to add
hlist_nulls_add_tail_rcu() helper.
Fixes: 3b24d854cb35 ("tcp/dccp: do not touch listener sk_refcnt under synflood")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Firo Yang <firo.yang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20191120083919.GH27852@unicorn.suse.cz/
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 1f85e6267caca44b30c54711652b0726fadbb131 upstream.
Backport of commit fdfc5c8594c2 ("tcp: remove empty skb from
write queue in error cases") in linux-4.14 stable triggered
various bugs. One of them has been fixed in commit ba2ddb43f270
("tcp: Don't dequeue SYN/FIN-segments from write-queue"), but
we still have crashes in some occasions.
Root-cause is that when tcp_sendmsg() has allocated a fresh
skb and could not append a fragment before being blocked
in sk_stream_wait_memory(), tcp_write_xmit() might be called
and decide to send this fresh and empty skb.
Sending an empty packet is not only silly, it might have caused
many issues we had in the past with tp->packets_out being
out of sync.
Fixes: c65f7f00c587 ("[TCP]: Simplify SKB data portion allocation with NETIF_F_SG.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 4d42df46d6372ece4cb4279870b46c2ea7304a47 upstream.
When do IPv6 tunnel PMTU update and calls __ip6_rt_update_pmtu() in the end,
we should not call dst_confirm_neigh() as there is no two-way communication.
v5: No change.
v4: No change.
v3: Do not remove dst_confirm_neigh, but add a new bool parameter in
dst_ops.update_pmtu to control whether we should do neighbor confirm.
Also split the big patch to small ones for each area.
v2: Remove dst_confirm_neigh in __ip6_rt_update_pmtu.
Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 8247a79efa2f28b44329f363272550c1738377de upstream.
When do IPv6 tunnel PMTU update and calls __ip6_rt_update_pmtu() in the end,
we should not call dst_confirm_neigh() as there is no two-way communication.
Although vti and vti6 are immune to this problem because they are IFF_NOARP
interfaces, as Guillaume pointed. There is still no sense to confirm neighbour
here.
v5: Update commit description.
v4: No change.
v3: Do not remove dst_confirm_neigh, but add a new bool parameter in
dst_ops.update_pmtu to control whether we should do neighbor confirm.
Also split the big patch to small ones for each area.
v2: Remove dst_confirm_neigh in __ip6_rt_update_pmtu.
Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 7a1592bcb15d71400a98632727791d1e68ea0ee8 upstream.
When do tunnel PMTU update and calls __ip6_rt_update_pmtu() in the end,
we should not call dst_confirm_neigh() as there is no two-way communication.
v5: No Change.
v4: Update commit description
v3: Do not remove dst_confirm_neigh, but add a new bool parameter in
dst_ops.update_pmtu to control whether we should do neighbor confirm.
Also split the big patch to small ones for each area.
v2: Remove dst_confirm_neigh in __ip6_rt_update_pmtu.
Fixes: 0dec879f636f ("net: use dst_confirm_neigh for UDP, RAW, ICMP, L2TP")
Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 675d76ad0ad5bf41c9a129772ef0aba8f57ea9a7 upstream.
When we do ipv6 gre pmtu update, we will also do neigh confirm currently.
This will cause the neigh cache be refreshed and set to REACHABLE before
xmit.
But if the remote mac address changed, e.g. device is deleted and recreated,
we will not able to notice this and still use the old mac address as the neigh
cache is REACHABLE.
Fix this by disable neigh confirm when do pmtu update
v5: No change.
v4: No change.
v3: Do not remove dst_confirm_neigh, but add a new bool parameter in
dst_ops.update_pmtu to control whether we should do neighbor confirm.
Also split the big patch to small ones for each area.
v2: Remove dst_confirm_neigh in __ip6_rt_update_pmtu.
Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit bd085ef678b2cc8c38c105673dfe8ff8f5ec0c57 upstream.
The MTU update code is supposed to be invoked in response to real
networking events that update the PMTU. In IPv6 PMTU update function
__ip6_rt_update_pmtu() we called dst_confirm_neigh() to update neighbor
confirmed time.
But for tunnel code, it will call pmtu before xmit, like:
- tnl_update_pmtu()
- skb_dst_update_pmtu()
- ip6_rt_update_pmtu()
- __ip6_rt_update_pmtu()
- dst_confirm_neigh()
If the tunnel remote dst mac address changed and we still do the neigh
confirm, we will not be able to update neigh cache and ping6 remote
will failed.
So for this ip_tunnel_xmit() case, _EVEN_ if the MTU is changed, we
should not be invoking dst_confirm_neigh() as we have no evidence
of successful two-way communication at this point.
On the other hand it is also important to keep the neigh reachability fresh
for TCP flows, so we cannot remove this dst_confirm_neigh() call.
To fix the issue, we have to add a new bool parameter for dst_ops.update_pmtu
to choose whether we should do neigh update or not. I will add the parameter
in this patch and set all the callers to true to comply with the previous
way, and fix the tunnel code one by one on later patches.
v5: No change.
v4: No change.
v3: Do not remove dst_confirm_neigh, but add a new bool parameter in
dst_ops.update_pmtu to control whether we should do neighbor confirm.
Also split the big patch to small ones for each area.
v2: Remove dst_confirm_neigh in __ip6_rt_update_pmtu.
Suggested-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit feed8a4fc9d46c3126fb9fcae0e9248270c6321a upstream.
When the size of the receive buffer for a socket is close to 2^31 when
computing if we have enough space in the buffer to copy a packet from
the queue to the buffer we might hit an integer overflow.
When an user set net.core.rmem_default to a value close to 2^31 UDP
packets are dropped because of this overflow. This can be visible, for
instance, with failure to resolve hostnames.
This can be fixed by casting sk_rcvbuf (which is an int) to unsigned
int, similarly to how it is done in TCP.
Signed-off-by: Antonio Messina <amessina@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 2bec445f9bf35e52e395b971df48d3e1e5dc704a upstream.
Latest commit 853697504de0 ("tcp: Fix highest_sack and highest_sack_seq")
apparently allowed syzbot to trigger various crashes in TCP stack [1]
I believe this commit only made things easier for syzbot to find
its way into triggering use-after-frees. But really the bugs
could lead to bad TCP behavior or even plain crashes even for
non malicious peers.
I have audited all calls to tcp_rtx_queue_unlink() and
tcp_rtx_queue_unlink_and_free() and made sure tp->highest_sack would be updated
if we are removing from rtx queue the skb that tp->highest_sack points to.
These updates were missing in three locations :
1) tcp_clean_rtx_queue() [This one seems quite serious,
I have no idea why this was not caught earlier]
2) tcp_rtx_queue_purge() [Probably not a big deal for normal operations]
3) tcp_send_synack() [Probably not a big deal for normal operations]
[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_highest_sack_seq include/net/tcp.h:1864 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_highest_sack_seq include/net/tcp.h:1856 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_check_sack_reordering+0x33c/0x3a0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:891
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880a488d068 by task ksoftirqd/1/16
CPU: 1 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
__kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:134
tcp_highest_sack_seq include/net/tcp.h:1864 [inline]
tcp_highest_sack_seq include/net/tcp.h:1856 [inline]
tcp_check_sack_reordering+0x33c/0x3a0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:891
tcp_try_undo_partial net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:2730 [inline]
tcp_fastretrans_alert+0xf74/0x23f0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:2847
tcp_ack+0x2577/0x5bf0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3710
tcp_rcv_established+0x6dd/0x1e90 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5706
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x619/0x8d0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1619
tcp_v4_rcv+0x307f/0x3b40 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2001
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x5a/0x880 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:204
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x23b/0x380 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:231
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [inline]
ip_local_deliver+0x1e9/0x520 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:252
dst_input include/net/dst.h:442 [inline]
ip_rcv_finish+0x1db/0x2f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:428
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [inline]
ip_rcv+0xe8/0x3f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:538
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x113/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:5148
__netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1d0 net/core/dev.c:5262
process_backlog+0x206/0x750 net/core/dev.c:6093
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6530 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x508/0x1120 net/core/dev.c:6598
__do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292
run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:603 [inline]
run_ksoftirqd+0x8e/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:595
smpboot_thread_fn+0x6a3/0xa40 kernel/smpboot.c:165
kthread+0x361/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
Allocated by task 10091:
save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:513 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:486
kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:521
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:584 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slab.c:3263 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x138/0x740 mm/slab.c:3575
__alloc_skb+0xd5/0x5e0 net/core/skbuff.c:198
alloc_skb_fclone include/linux/skbuff.h:1099 [inline]
sk_stream_alloc_skb net/ipv4/tcp.c:875 [inline]
sk_stream_alloc_skb+0x113/0xc90 net/ipv4/tcp.c:852
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0xcf9/0x3470 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1282
tcp_sendmsg+0x30/0x50 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1432
inet_sendmsg+0x9e/0xe0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:807
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672
__sys_sendto+0x262/0x380 net/socket.c:1998
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2010 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2006 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2006
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 10095:
save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:335 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:474
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:483
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x320 mm/slab.c:3694
kfree_skbmem+0x178/0x1c0 net/core/skbuff.c:645
__kfree_skb+0x1e/0x30 net/core/skbuff.c:681
sk_eat_skb include/net/sock.h:2453 [inline]
tcp_recvmsg+0x1252/0x2930 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2166
inet_recvmsg+0x136/0x610 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:838
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:886 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:904 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0xce/0x110 net/socket.c:900
__sys_recvfrom+0x1ff/0x350 net/socket.c:2055
__do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2073 [inline]
__se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2069 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2069
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880a488d040
which belongs to the cache skbuff_fclone_cache of size 456
The buggy address is located 40 bytes inside of
456-byte region [ffff8880a488d040, ffff8880a488d208)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0002922340 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88821b057000 index:0x0
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea00022a5788 ffffea0002624a48 ffff88821b057000
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff8880a488d040 0000000100000006 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8880a488cf00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8880a488cf80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8880a488d000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8880a488d080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880a488d100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 853697504de0 ("tcp: Fix highest_sack and highest_sack_seq")
Fixes: 50895b9de1d3 ("tcp: highest_sack fix")
Fixes: 737ff314563c ("tcp: use sequence distance to detect reordering")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Cambda Zhu <cambda@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 853697504de043ff0bfd815bd3a64de1dce73dc7 upstream.
>From commit 50895b9de1d3 ("tcp: highest_sack fix"), the logic about
setting tp->highest_sack to the head of the send queue was removed.
Of course the logic is error prone, but it is logical. Before we
remove the pointer to the highest sack skb and use the seq instead,
we need to set tp->highest_sack to NULL when there is no skb after
the last sack, and then replace NULL with the real skb when new skb
inserted into the rtx queue, because the NULL means the highest sack
seq is tp->snd_nxt. If tp->highest_sack is NULL and new data sent,
the next ACK with sack option will increase tp->reordering unexpectedly.
This patch sets tp->highest_sack to the tail of the rtx queue if
it's NULL and new data is sent. The patch keeps the rule that the
highest_sack can only be maintained by sack processing, except for
this only case.
Fixes: 50895b9de1d3 ("tcp: highest_sack fix")
Signed-off-by: Cambda Zhu <cambda@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit bb3d0b8bf5be61ab1d6f472c43cbf34de17e796b upstream.
If fq_classify() recycles a struct fq_flow because
a socket structure has been reallocated, we do not
set sk->sk_pacing_status immediately, but later if the
flow becomes detached.
This means that any flow requiring pacing (BBR, or SO_MAX_PACING_RATE)
might fallback to TCP internal pacing, which requires a per-socket
high resolution timer, and therefore more cpu cycles.
Fixes: 218af599fa63 ("tcp: internal implementation for pacing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 70cf3dc7313207816255b9acb0dffb19dae78144 upstream.
There's no skb_pull performed when a mirred action is set at egress of a
mac device, with a target device/action that expects skb->data to point
at the network header.
As a result, either the target device is errornously given an skb with
data pointing to the mac (egress case), or the net stack receives the
skb with data pointing to the mac (ingress case).
E.g:
# tc qdisc add dev eth9 root handle 1: prio
# tc filter add dev eth9 parent 1: prio 9 protocol ip handle 9 basic \
action mirred egress redirect dev tun0
(tun0 is a tun device. result: tun0 errornously gets the eth header
instead of the iph)
Revise the push/pull logic of tcf_mirred_act() to not rely on the
skb_at_tc_ingress() vs tcf_mirred_act_wants_ingress() comparison, as it
does not cover all "pull" cases.
Instead, calculate whether the required action on the target device
requires the data to point at the network header, and compare this to
whether skb->data points to network header - and make the push/pull
adjustments as necessary.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Shmulik Ladkani <sladkani@proofpoint.com>
Tested-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit bbab7ef235031f6733b5429ae7877bfa22339712 upstream.
This code reads two global variables without protection
of a lock. We need READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() pairs to
avoid load/store-tearing and better document the intent.
KCSAN reported :
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in icmp_global_allow / icmp_global_allow
read to 0xffffffff861a8014 of 4 bytes by task 11201 on cpu 0:
icmp_global_allow+0x36/0x1b0 net/ipv4/icmp.c:254
icmpv6_global_allow net/ipv6/icmp.c:184 [inline]
icmpv6_global_allow net/ipv6/icmp.c:179 [inline]
icmp6_send+0x493/0x1140 net/ipv6/icmp.c:514
icmpv6_send+0x71/0xb0 net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c:43
ip6_link_failure+0x43/0x180 net/ipv6/route.c:2640
dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:419 [inline]
vti_xmit net/ipv4/ip_vti.c:243 [inline]
vti_tunnel_xmit+0x27f/0xa50 net/ipv4/ip_vti.c:279
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4420 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4434 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3280 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0xef/0x430 net/core/dev.c:3296
__dev_queue_xmit+0x14c9/0x1b60 net/core/dev.c:3873
dev_queue_xmit+0x21/0x30 net/core/dev.c:3906
neigh_direct_output+0x1f/0x30 net/core/neighbour.c:1530
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:511 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0x7a6/0xec0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:116
__ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:142 [inline]
__ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:127
ip6_finish_output+0x41/0x160 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:152
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline]
ip6_output+0xf2/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:175
dst_output include/net/dst.h:436 [inline]
ip6_local_out+0x74/0x90 net/ipv6/output_core.c:179
write to 0xffffffff861a8014 of 4 bytes by task 11183 on cpu 1:
icmp_global_allow+0x174/0x1b0 net/ipv4/icmp.c:272
icmpv6_global_allow net/ipv6/icmp.c:184 [inline]
icmpv6_global_allow net/ipv6/icmp.c:179 [inline]
icmp6_send+0x493/0x1140 net/ipv6/icmp.c:514
icmpv6_send+0x71/0xb0 net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c:43
ip6_link_failure+0x43/0x180 net/ipv6/route.c:2640
dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:419 [inline]
vti_xmit net/ipv4/ip_vti.c:243 [inline]
vti_tunnel_xmit+0x27f/0xa50 net/ipv4/ip_vti.c:279
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4420 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4434 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3280 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0xef/0x430 net/core/dev.c:3296
__dev_queue_xmit+0x14c9/0x1b60 net/core/dev.c:3873
dev_queue_xmit+0x21/0x30 net/core/dev.c:3906
neigh_direct_output+0x1f/0x30 net/core/neighbour.c:1530
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:511 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0x7a6/0xec0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:116
__ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:142 [inline]
__ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:127
ip6_finish_output+0x41/0x160 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:152
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline]
ip6_output+0xf2/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:175
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 11183 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Fixes: 4cdf507d5452 ("icmp: add a global rate limitation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 71685eb4ce80ae9c49eff82ca4dd15acab215de9 upstream.
We need to explicitely forbid read/store tearing in inet_peer_gc()
and inet_putpeer().
The following syzbot report reminds us about inet_putpeer()
running without a lock held.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in inet_putpeer / inet_putpeer
write to 0xffff888121fb2ed0 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0:
inet_putpeer+0x37/0xa0 net/ipv4/inetpeer.c:240
ip4_frag_free+0x3d/0x50 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:102
inet_frag_destroy_rcu+0x58/0x80 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:228
__rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:222 [inline]
rcu_do_batch+0x256/0x5b0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2157
rcu_core+0x369/0x4d0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2377
rcu_core_si+0x12/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2386
__do_softirq+0x115/0x33f kernel/softirq.c:292
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:373 [inline]
irq_exit+0xbb/0xe0 kernel/softirq.c:413
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline]
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0xe6/0x280 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1137
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:830
native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c:71
arch_cpu_idle+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:571
default_idle_call+0x1e/0x40 kernel/sched/idle.c:94
cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline]
do_idle+0x1af/0x280 kernel/sched/idle.c:263
write to 0xffff888121fb2ed0 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 1:
inet_putpeer+0x37/0xa0 net/ipv4/inetpeer.c:240
ip4_frag_free+0x3d/0x50 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:102
inet_frag_destroy_rcu+0x58/0x80 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:228
__rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:222 [inline]
rcu_do_batch+0x256/0x5b0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2157
rcu_core+0x369/0x4d0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2377
rcu_core_si+0x12/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2386
__do_softirq+0x115/0x33f kernel/softirq.c:292
run_ksoftirqd+0x46/0x60 kernel/softirq.c:603
smpboot_thread_fn+0x37d/0x4a0 kernel/smpboot.c:165
kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Fixes: 4b9d9be839fd ("inetpeer: remove unused list")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 5604285839aaedfb23ebe297799c6e558939334d upstream.
syzbot is kind enough to remind us we need to call skb_may_pull()
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in br_nf_forward_arp+0xe61/0x1230 net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c:665
CPU: 1 PID: 11631 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc8-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1c9/0x220 lib/dump_stack.c:118
kmsan_report+0x128/0x220 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:108
__msan_warning+0x64/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:245
br_nf_forward_arp+0xe61/0x1230 net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c:665
nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:135 [inline]
nf_hook_slow+0x18b/0x3f0 net/netfilter/core.c:512
nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:260 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]
__br_forward+0x78f/0xe30 net/bridge/br_forward.c:109
br_flood+0xef0/0xfe0 net/bridge/br_forward.c:234
br_handle_frame_finish+0x1a77/0x1c20 net/bridge/br_input.c:162
nf_hook_bridge_pre net/bridge/br_input.c:245 [inline]
br_handle_frame+0xfb6/0x1eb0 net/bridge/br_input.c:348
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x20b9/0x51a0 net/core/dev.c:4830
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:4927 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb net/core/dev.c:5043 [inline]
process_backlog+0x610/0x13c0 net/core/dev.c:5874
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6311 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x7a6/0x1aa0 net/core/dev.c:6379
__do_softirq+0x4a1/0x83a kernel/softirq.c:293
do_softirq_own_stack+0x49/0x80 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1091
</IRQ>
do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:338 [inline]
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x184/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:190
local_bh_enable+0x36/0x40 include/linux/bottom_half.h:32
rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:688 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x38e8/0x4200 net/core/dev.c:3819
dev_queue_xmit+0x4b/0x60 net/core/dev.c:3825
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2959 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x8234/0x9100 net/packet/af_packet.c:2984
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:657 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0xc44/0xc70 net/socket.c:1952
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1964 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:1960
__x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:1960
do_syscall_64+0xb6/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45a679
Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f0a3c9e5c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 000000000045a679
RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: 0000000020000200 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 00000000200000c0 R09: 0000000000000014
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f0a3c9e66d4
R13: 00000000004c8ec1 R14: 00000000004dfe28 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:149 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x5c/0x110 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:132
kmsan_slab_alloc+0x97/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:86
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2773 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe27/0x11a0 mm/slub.c:4381
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:141 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x306/0xa10 net/core/skbuff.c:209
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1049 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0x18c/0xa80 net/core/skbuff.c:5662
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xafd/0x10a0 net/core/sock.c:2244
packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2807 [inline]
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2902 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x63a6/0x9100 net/packet/af_packet.c:2984
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:657 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0xc44/0xc70 net/socket.c:1952
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1964 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:1960
__x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:1960
do_syscall_64+0xb6/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: c4e70a87d975 ("netfilter: bridge: rename br_netfilter.c to br_netfilter_hooks.c")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 86434744fedf0cfe07a9eee3f4632c0e25c1d136 upstream.
FASTOPEN setsockopt() or sendmsg() may switch the SMC socket to fallback
mode. Once fallback mode is active, the native TCP socket functions are
called. Nevertheless there is a small race window, when FASTOPEN
setsockopt/sendmsg runs in parallel to a connect(), and switch the
socket into fallback mode before connect() takes the sock lock.
Make sure the SMC-specific connect setup is omitted in this case.
This way a syzbot-reported refcount problem is fixed, triggered by
different threads running non-blocking connect() and FASTOPEN_KEY
setsockopt.
Reported-by: syzbot+96d3f9ff6a86d37e44c8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 6d6dd528d5af ("net/smc: fix refcount non-blocking connect() -part 2")
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit e608f631f0ba5f1fc5ee2e260a3a35d13107cbfe upstream.
syzbot reported following splat:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in size_entry_mwt net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2063 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in compat_copy_entries+0x128b/0x1380 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2155
Read of size 4 at addr ffffc900004461f4 by task syz-executor267/7937
CPU: 1 PID: 7937 Comm: syz-executor267 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
size_entry_mwt net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2063 [inline]
compat_copy_entries+0x128b/0x1380 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2155
compat_do_replace+0x344/0x720 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2249
compat_do_ebt_set_ctl+0x22f/0x27e net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2333
[..]
Because padding isn't considered during computation of ->buf_user_offset,
"total" is decremented by fewer bytes than it should.
Therefore, the first part of
if (*total < sizeof(*entry) || entry->next_offset < sizeof(*entry))
will pass, -- it should not have. This causes oob access:
entry->next_offset is past the vmalloced size.
Reject padding and check that computed user offset (sum of ebt_entry
structure plus all individual matches/watchers/targets) is same
value that userspace gave us as the offset of the next entry.
Reported-by: syzbot+f68108fed972453a0ad4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 81e675c227ec ("netfilter: ebtables: add CONFIG_COMPAT support")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
Bruce Ashfield
Eric Dumazet
Petr Machata
Pengcheng Yang
Xin Long
Wen Yang
Chan Shu Tak, Alex
Aditya Pakki
Lorenz Bauer
Stefan Bühler
Fredrik Olofsson
Pablo Neira Ayuso
Florian Westphal
Taehee Yoo
Navid Emamdoost
Dan Carpenter
Alexander Lobakin
Marco Oliverio
Pavel Tikhomirov
Phil Sutter
Jens Axboe
Hangbin Liu
Antonio Messina
Cambda Zhu
Shmulik Ladkani
Ursula Braun