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2024-05-28Merge tag 'v5.15.160' into v5.15/standard/basev5.15/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
This is the 5.15.160 stable release # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmZR86kACgkQONu9yGCS # aT5cShAAn2f/JkJG8I/YWCPH8Sr+vTd8iCAFdJWTtOx8F4zoATTByPSsI6ZUYIvW # wfvf/dLtgQjY+/iebKvihzl4+VYdKLnnDv6xJF/gisynFPi4rU3xXKkRV4MVYp38 # MkyC26Vy6YsX5xa564TAYLm6/BARg3I6V327qcGRhPJDcEkhQ3+Rw1xtVkDfnc+N # XTfv4JO7F96+CWj3Md9IbUTubDr/QMTrMY9Nw223XeCO+jLiT8VKdrvoJ4hXkzJz # mW1YAqEDglh6vyKPpOiBkqPV28fXoj7dQB5Jxqlj0lJc2dpIIHNZTVHw9LAcNlQb # JGMmhIa65T0PxEM2VfUKvJStjg7usOxag8b52/gJgQvy0VinhaUF37YowElLvLWT # xdDPl9WgTtBfSDnfoxjRfBQ4OThInJQ7hIVsEqvGXjJi2jd94X/PKxDAaARFSNSw # ACONRhpGppiJX373qQ29u7aB0BoQyF1ObztyZCoVbSqRhCry5uqC+X1CMOjeO6P7 # rgeAM3/k4mWSFNcIFawpE36CwyV3kJ57Pif8CfgxS5NtqzaRvvAFKQTj0XS4CpUP # BDcclQFVOAS473EPSdRq7Oen1n6Qi0YhSlQKuiRxn19ZqShXjiomKdNf2QJurSdk # REJOq5M/CGHgYoRAe3S3Ifv7Yeh58dYr5acZK2k1U6YEpHh3/Ts= # =Untg # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Sat 25 May 2024 10:20:25 AM EDT # gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2024-05-28Merge tag 'v5.15.159' into v5.15/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
This is the 5.15.159 stable release # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmZHKJEACgkQONu9yGCS # aT4P7hAAtyLRjDLvniHloNewAg7dfha+oNKrIzvMr8B/fLNOwdzK99iKuj0LqG9S # RT+rm8r5XwJdSbOnscLP7+FAzEPqSJUxXMse8spJ+5pjgb9hZ3x0Eu8v4edKlpl2 # Sv/uXmCfyChGCTTUkfJrh/E81Sp0g8OO0LTuw2cxCGM9Hu2C8CsvGGTxhcutEcDT # 1aUQnBBiWkd7OiAMTVLJjHalK42kLETNzgjTAV19vsIGU6GjhJdgRHyvrJp3wKr/ # yFfPsCpJ+sZ/7K8uWQWFk34emgAUVERqb+t3tyv43VpPxQdAuERqYnKaX7d1UXE8 # MHGXUqn/0SnKXmM8H/cWc348UueeCn/bgoSJqD2Jrp7qLbo42ucIaqJzOFSQ/bCO # Tmlf5YmfGRToifaTkKSgAm15L2wwm2euEKfQu5zQ/MuuPV7BT1tf/YXoNcOJ8eHr # Md+BlTx/xYWJ6UQz0YNW+srPihUDFZvMk0cFPaFIQBgcfqGb1EpO5lztcgjGtP1M # Ft6ynkmRPoGcXknkeRKy7rm7pkodWdpO5cSAn53tqIo1aDUGSlfum8H+GwInu0oF # Fi+P/iThDpqmoBziwnxnKMCk4wjTrk5iCqem8FJ0zfDaGmDYhmUR1tIzYaxtWURq # BwLQCf0vqCOCMDx0rzJMQkvn8i+ikRoBWHunz8MsgwLOss4Muy0= # =HryS # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Fri 17 May 2024 05:51:13 AM EDT # gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2024-05-25netlink: annotate data-races around sk->sk_errEric Dumazet
commit d0f95894fda7d4f895b29c1097f92d7fee278cb2 upstream. syzbot caught another data-race in netlink when setting sk->sk_err. Annotate all of them for good measure. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in netlink_recvmsg / netlink_recvmsg write to 0xffff8881613bb220 of 4 bytes by task 28147 on cpu 0: netlink_recvmsg+0x448/0x780 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1994 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1027 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1049 [inline] __sys_recvfrom+0x1f4/0x2e0 net/socket.c:2229 __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2247 [inline] __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2243 [inline] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x78/0x90 net/socket.c:2243 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd write to 0xffff8881613bb220 of 4 bytes by task 28146 on cpu 1: netlink_recvmsg+0x448/0x780 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1994 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1027 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1049 [inline] __sys_recvfrom+0x1f4/0x2e0 net/socket.c:2229 __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2247 [inline] __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2243 [inline] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x78/0x90 net/socket.c:2243 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000016 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 28146 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-syzkaller-00055-g9ed22ae6be81 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/06/2023 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231003183455.3410550-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: yenchia.chen <yenchia.chen@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-25netlink: annotate lockless accesses to nlk->max_recvmsg_lenEric Dumazet
commit a1865f2e7d10dde00d35a2122b38d2e469ae67ed upstream. syzbot reported a data-race in data-race in netlink_recvmsg() [1] Indeed, netlink_recvmsg() can be run concurrently, and netlink_dump() also needs protection. [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in netlink_recvmsg / netlink_recvmsg read to 0xffff888141840b38 of 8 bytes by task 23057 on cpu 0: netlink_recvmsg+0xea/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1038 [inline] __sys_recvfrom+0x1ee/0x2e0 net/socket.c:2194 __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2212 [inline] __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2208 [inline] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x78/0x90 net/socket.c:2208 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd write to 0xffff888141840b38 of 8 bytes by task 23037 on cpu 1: netlink_recvmsg+0x114/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1989 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1038 [inline] ____sys_recvmsg+0x156/0x310 net/socket.c:2720 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2762 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x2e5/0x710 net/socket.c:2856 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2935 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2958 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2951 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:2951 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000001000 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 23037 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc4-syzkaller-00195-g5a57b48fdfcb #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/02/2023 Fixes: 9063e21fb026 ("netlink: autosize skb lengthes") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230403214643.768555-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: yenchia.chen <yenchia.chen@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-25net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requestsJakub Kicinski
commit 8590541473188741055d27b955db0777569438e3 upstream. Since we're setting the CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG flag on our requests to the crypto API, crypto_aead_{encrypt,decrypt} can return -EBUSY instead of -EINPROGRESS in valid situations. For example, when the cryptd queue for AESNI is full (easy to trigger with an artificially low cryptd.cryptd_max_cpu_qlen), requests will be enqueued to the backlog but still processed. In that case, the async callback will also be called twice: first with err == -EINPROGRESS, which it seems we can just ignore, then with err == 0. Compared to Sabrina's original patch this version uses the new tls_*crypt_async_wait() helpers and converts the EBUSY to EINPROGRESS to avoid having to modify all the error handling paths. The handling is identical. Fixes: a54667f6728c ("tls: Add support for encryption using async offload accelerator") Fixes: 94524d8fc965 ("net/tls: Add support for async decryption of tls records") Co-developed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/9681d1febfec295449a62300938ed2ae66983f28.1694018970.git.sd@queasysnail.net/ Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [v5.15: fixed contextual merge-conflicts in tls_decrypt_done and tls_encrypt_done] Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.15 Signed-off-by: Shaoying Xu <shaoyi@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-25tls: fix race between async notify and socket closeJakub Kicinski
commit aec7961916f3f9e88766e2688992da6980f11b8d upstream. The submitting thread (one which called recvmsg/sendmsg) may exit as soon as the async crypto handler calls complete() so any code past that point risks touching already freed data. Try to avoid the locking and extra flags altogether. Have the main thread hold an extra reference, this way we can depend solely on the atomic ref counter for synchronization. Don't futz with reiniting the completion, either, we are now tightly controlling when completion fires. Reported-by: valis <sec@valis.email> Fixes: 0cada33241d9 ("net/tls: fix race condition causing kernel panic") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [v5.15: fixed contextual conflicts in struct tls_sw_context_rx and func init_ctx_rx; replaced DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE with BUILD_BUG_ON_INVALID since they're equivalent when DEBUG_NET is not defined] Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.15 Signed-off-by: Shaoying Xu <shaoyi@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-25net: tls: factor out tls_*crypt_async_wait()Jakub Kicinski
commit c57ca512f3b68ddcd62bda9cc24a8f5584ab01b1 upstream. Factor out waiting for async encrypt and decrypt to finish. There are already multiple copies and a subsequent fix will need more. No functional changes. Note that crypto_wait_req() returns wait->err Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Stable-dep-of: aec7961916f3 ("tls: fix race between async notify and socket close") [v5.15: removed changes in tls_sw_splice_eof and adjusted waiting factor out for async descrypt in tls_sw_recvmsg] Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.15 Signed-off-by: Shaoying Xu <shaoyi@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-25tls: extract context alloc/initialization out of tls_set_sw_offloadSabrina Dubroca
commit 615580cbc99af0da2d1c7226fab43a3d5003eb97 upstream. Simplify tls_set_sw_offload a bit. Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Stable-dep-of: aec7961916f3 ("tls: fix race between async notify and socket close") [v5.15: fixed contextual conflicts from unavailable init_waitqueue_head and skb_queue_head_init calls in tls_set_sw_offload and init_ctx_rx] Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.15 Signed-off-by: Shaoying Xu <shaoyi@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-25tls: rx: simplify async waitJakub Kicinski
commit 37943f047bfb88ba4dfc7a522563f57c86d088a0 upstream. Since we are protected from async completions by decrypt_compl_lock we can drop the async_notify and reinit the completion before we start waiting. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Stable-dep-of: aec7961916f3 ("tls: fix race between async notify and socket close") Signed-off-by: Shaoying Xu <shaoyi@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-25nfsd: don't allow nfsd threads to be signalled.NeilBrown
commit 3903902401451b1cd9d797a8c79769eb26ac7fe5 upstream. The original implementation of nfsd used signals to stop threads during shutdown. In Linux 2.3.46pre5 nfsd gained the ability to shutdown threads internally it if was asked to run "0" threads. After this user-space transitioned to using "rpc.nfsd 0" to stop nfsd and sending signals to threads was no longer an important part of the API. In commit 3ebdbe5203a8 ("SUNRPC: discard svo_setup and rename svc_set_num_threads_sync()") (v5.17-rc1~75^2~41) we finally removed the use of signals for stopping threads, using kthread_stop() instead. This patch makes the "obvious" next step and removes the ability to signal nfsd threads - or any svc threads. nfsd stops allowing signals and we don't check for their delivery any more. This will allow for some simplification in later patches. A change worth noting is in nfsd4_ssc_setup_dul(). There was previously a signal_pending() check which would only succeed when the thread was being shut down. It should really have tested kthread_should_stop() as well. Now it just does the latter, not the former. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-17net: fix out-of-bounds access in ops_initThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
commit a26ff37e624d12e28077e5b24d2b264f62764ad6 upstream. net_alloc_generic is called by net_alloc, which is called without any locking. It reads max_gen_ptrs, which is changed under pernet_ops_rwsem. It is read twice, first to allocate an array, then to set s.len, which is later used to limit the bounds of the array access. It is possible that the array is allocated and another thread is registering a new pernet ops, increments max_gen_ptrs, which is then used to set s.len with a larger than allocated length for the variable array. Fix it by reading max_gen_ptrs only once in net_alloc_generic. If max_gen_ptrs is later incremented, it will be caught in net_assign_generic. Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com> Fixes: 073862ba5d24 ("netns: fix net_alloc_generic()") Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502132006.3430840-1-cascardo@igalia.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-17tipc: fix UAF in error pathPaolo Abeni
commit 080cbb890286cd794f1ee788bbc5463e2deb7c2b upstream. Sam Page (sam4k) working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative reported a UAF in the tipc_buf_append() error path: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88804d2a7c80 by task poc/8034 CPU: 1 PID: 8034 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.8.2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack linux/lib/dump_stack.c:88 dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 linux/lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description linux/mm/kasan/report.c:377 print_report+0xc4/0x620 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:601 kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183 skb_release_data+0x5af/0x880 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1026 skb_release_all linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1094 __kfree_skb linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1108 kfree_skb_reason+0x12d/0x210 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1144 kfree_skb linux/./include/linux/skbuff.h:1244 tipc_buf_append+0x425/0xb50 linux/net/tipc/msg.c:186 tipc_link_input+0x224/0x7c0 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1324 tipc_link_rcv+0x76e/0x2d70 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1824 tipc_rcv+0x45f/0x10f0 linux/net/tipc/node.c:2159 tipc_udp_recv+0x73b/0x8f0 linux/net/tipc/udp_media.c:390 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xad2/0x1850 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2108 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x131/0xb00 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2186 udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x165/0x3b0 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2346 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x2594/0x3400 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2422 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x30c/0x4e0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2e4/0x520 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308 ip_local_deliver+0x18e/0x1f0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254 dst_input linux/./include/net/dst.h:461 ip_rcv_finish linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308 ip_rcv+0x2c5/0x5d0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x199/0x1e0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5534 __netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1c0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5648 process_backlog+0x101/0x6b0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5976 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xba/0x550 linux/net/core/dev.c:6576 napi_poll linux/net/core/dev.c:6645 net_rx_action+0x95a/0xe90 linux/net/core/dev.c:6781 __do_softirq+0x21f/0x8e7 linux/kernel/softirq.c:553 do_softirq linux/kernel/softirq.c:454 do_softirq+0xb2/0xf0 linux/kernel/softirq.c:441 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x100/0x120 linux/kernel/softirq.c:381 local_bh_enable linux/./include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 rcu_read_unlock_bh linux/./include/linux/rcupdate.h:851 __dev_queue_xmit+0x871/0x3ee0 linux/net/core/dev.c:4378 dev_queue_xmit linux/./include/linux/netdevice.h:3169 neigh_hh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:526 neigh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:540 ip_finish_output2+0x169f/0x2550 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235 __ip_finish_output linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:313 __ip_finish_output+0x49e/0x950 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:295 ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323 NF_HOOK_COND linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:303 ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433 dst_output linux/./include/net/dst.h:451 ip_local_out linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 ip_send_skb+0x3e5/0x560 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 udp_send_skb+0x73f/0x1530 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:963 udp_sendmsg+0x1a36/0x2b40 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:1250 inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x140 linux/net/ipv4/af_inet.c:850 sock_sendmsg_nosec linux/net/socket.c:730 __sock_sendmsg linux/net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x42c/0x4e0 linux/net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2203 __se_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2199 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 linux/net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x270 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120 RIP: 0033:0x7f3434974f29 Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 37 8f 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff9154f2b8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3434974f29 RDX: 00000000000032c8 RSI: 00007fff9154f300 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fff915532e0 R08: 00007fff91553360 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 000055ed86d261d0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> In the critical scenario, either the relevant skb is freed or its ownership is transferred into a frag_lists. In both cases, the cleanup code must not free it again: we need to clear the skb reference earlier. Fixes: 1149557d64c9 ("tipc: eliminate unnecessary linearization of incoming buffers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-23852 Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/752f1ccf762223d109845365d07f55414058e5a3.1714484273.git.pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-17mptcp: ensure snd_nxt is properly initialized on connectPaolo Abeni
commit fb7a0d334894206ae35f023a82cad5a290fd7386 upstream. Christoph reported a splat hinting at a corrupted snd_una: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 38 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:1005 __mptcp_clean_una+0x4b3/0x620 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1005 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 38 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1-gbbeac67456c9 #59 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events mptcp_worker RIP: 0010:__mptcp_clean_una+0x4b3/0x620 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1005 Code: be 06 01 00 00 bf 06 01 00 00 e8 a8 12 e7 fe e9 00 fe ff ff e8 8e 1a e7 fe 0f b7 ab 3e 02 00 00 e9 d3 fd ff ff e8 7d 1a e7 fe <0f> 0b 4c 8b bb e0 05 00 00 e9 74 fc ff ff e8 6a 1a e7 fe 0f 0b e9 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000013fd48 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881029bd280 RCX: ffffffff82382fe4 RDX: ffff8881003cbd00 RSI: ffffffff823833c3 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff888138ba8000 R13: 0000000000000106 R14: ffff8881029bd908 R15: ffff888126560000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f604a5dae38 CR3: 0000000101dac002 CR4: 0000000000170ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> __mptcp_clean_una_wakeup net/mptcp/protocol.c:1055 [inline] mptcp_clean_una_wakeup net/mptcp/protocol.c:1062 [inline] __mptcp_retrans+0x7f/0x7e0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2615 mptcp_worker+0x434/0x740 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2767 process_one_work+0x1e0/0x560 kernel/workqueue.c:3254 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3335 [inline] worker_thread+0x3c7/0x640 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x121/0x170 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243 </TASK> When fallback to TCP happens early on a client socket, snd_nxt is not yet initialized and any incoming ack will copy such value into snd_una. If the mptcp worker (dumbly) tries mptcp-level re-injection after such ack, that would unconditionally trigger a send buffer cleanup using 'bad' snd_una values. We could easily disable re-injection for fallback sockets, but such dumb behavior already helped catching a few subtle issues and a very low to zero impact in practice. Instead address the issue always initializing snd_nxt (and write_seq, for consistency) at connect time. Fixes: 8fd738049ac3 ("mptcp: fallback in case of simultaneous connect") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com> Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/485 Tested-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240429-upstream-net-20240429-mptcp-snd_nxt-init-connect-v1-1-59ceac0a7dcb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-17ipv6: fib6_rules: avoid possible NULL dereference in fib6_rule_action()Eric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit d101291b2681e5ab938554e3e323f7a7ee33e3aa ] syzbot is able to trigger the following crash [1], caused by unsafe ip6_dst_idev() use. Indeed ip6_dst_idev() can return NULL, and must always be checked. [1] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 0 PID: 31648 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-next-20240417-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 RIP: 0010:__fib6_rule_action net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:237 [inline] RIP: 0010:fib6_rule_action+0x241/0x7b0 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:267 Code: 02 00 00 49 8d 9f d8 00 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 f9 32 bf f7 48 8b 1b 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 e0 32 bf f7 4c 8b 03 48 89 ef 4c RSP: 0018:ffffc9000fc1f2f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 1a772f98c8186700 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffffffff8bcac4e0 RDI: ffffffff8c1f9760 RBP: ffff8880673fb980 R08: ffffffff8fac15ef R09: 1ffffffff1f582bd R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1f582be R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: 0000000000000080 R14: ffff888076509000 R15: ffff88807a029a00 FS: 00007f55e82ca6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b31d23000 CR3: 0000000022b66000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> fib_rules_lookup+0x62c/0xdb0 net/core/fib_rules.c:317 fib6_rule_lookup+0x1fd/0x790 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:108 ip6_route_output_flags_noref net/ipv6/route.c:2637 [inline] ip6_route_output_flags+0x38e/0x610 net/ipv6/route.c:2649 ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:93 [inline] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x189/0x11a0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1120 ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0xb9/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1250 sctp_v6_get_dst+0x792/0x1e20 net/sctp/ipv6.c:326 sctp_transport_route+0x12c/0x2e0 net/sctp/transport.c:455 sctp_assoc_add_peer+0x614/0x15c0 net/sctp/associola.c:662 sctp_connect_new_asoc+0x31d/0x6c0 net/sctp/socket.c:1099 __sctp_connect+0x66d/0xe30 net/sctp/socket.c:1197 sctp_connect net/sctp/socket.c:4819 [inline] sctp_inet_connect+0x149/0x1f0 net/sctp/socket.c:4834 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2048 [inline] __sys_connect+0x2df/0x310 net/socket.c:2065 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2075 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2072 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:2072 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 5e5f3f0f8013 ("[IPV6] ADDRCONF: Convert ipv6_get_saddr() to ipv6_dev_get_saddr().") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507163145.835254-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17net: bridge: fix corrupted ethernet header on multicast-to-unicastFelix Fietkau
[ Upstream commit 86b29d830ad69eecff25b22dc96c14c6573718e6 ] The change from skb_copy to pskb_copy unfortunately changed the data copying to omit the ethernet header, since it was pulled before reaching this point. Fix this by calling __skb_push/pull around pskb_copy. Fixes: 59c878cbcdd8 ("net: bridge: fix multicast-to-unicast with fraglist GSO") Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17phonet: fix rtm_phonet_notify() skb allocationEric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit d8cac8568618dcb8a51af3db1103e8d4cc4aeea7 ] fill_route() stores three components in the skb: - struct rtmsg - RTA_DST (u8) - RTA_OIF (u32) Therefore, rtm_phonet_notify() should use NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct rtmsg)) + nla_total_size(1) + nla_total_size(4) Fixes: f062f41d0657 ("Phonet: routing table Netlink interface") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Rémi Denis-Courmont <courmisch@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502161700.1804476-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17rtnetlink: Correct nested IFLA_VF_VLAN_LIST attribute validationRoded Zats
[ Upstream commit 1aec77b2bb2ed1db0f5efc61c4c1ca3813307489 ] Each attribute inside a nested IFLA_VF_VLAN_LIST is assumed to be a struct ifla_vf_vlan_info so the size of such attribute needs to be at least of sizeof(struct ifla_vf_vlan_info) which is 14 bytes. The current size validation in do_setvfinfo is against NLA_HDRLEN (4 bytes) which is less than sizeof(struct ifla_vf_vlan_info) so this validation is not enough and a too small attribute might be cast to a struct ifla_vf_vlan_info, this might result in an out of bands read access when accessing the saved (casted) entry in ivvl. Fixes: 79aab093a0b5 ("net: Update API for VF vlan protocol 802.1ad support") Signed-off-by: Roded Zats <rzats@paloaltonetworks.com> Reviewed-by: Donald Hunter <donald.hunter@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502155751.75705-1-rzats@paloaltonetworks.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17Bluetooth: l2cap: fix null-ptr-deref in l2cap_chan_timeoutDuoming Zhou
[ Upstream commit adf0398cee86643b8eacde95f17d073d022f782c ] There is a race condition between l2cap_chan_timeout() and l2cap_chan_del(). When we use l2cap_chan_del() to delete the channel, the chan->conn will be set to null. But the conn could be dereferenced again in the mutex_lock() of l2cap_chan_timeout(). As a result the null pointer dereference bug will happen. The KASAN report triggered by POC is shown below: [ 472.074580] ================================================================== [ 472.075284] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0 [ 472.075308] Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000000158 by task kworker/0:0/7 [ 472.075308] [ 472.075308] CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-00356-g78c0094a146b #36 [ 472.075308] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu4 [ 472.075308] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout [ 472.075308] Call Trace: [ 472.075308] <TASK> [ 472.075308] dump_stack_lvl+0x137/0x1a0 [ 472.075308] print_report+0x101/0x250 [ 472.075308] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x77/0x160 [ 472.075308] ? mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0 [ 472.075308] kasan_report+0x139/0x170 [ 472.075308] ? mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0 [ 472.075308] kasan_check_range+0x2c3/0x2e0 [ 472.075308] mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0 [ 472.075308] l2cap_chan_timeout+0x181/0x300 [ 472.075308] process_one_work+0x5d2/0xe00 [ 472.075308] worker_thread+0xe1d/0x1660 [ 472.075308] ? pr_cont_work+0x5e0/0x5e0 [ 472.075308] kthread+0x2b7/0x350 [ 472.075308] ? pr_cont_work+0x5e0/0x5e0 [ 472.075308] ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0 [ 472.075308] ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 [ 472.075308] ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0 [ 472.075308] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 472.075308] </TASK> [ 472.075308] ================================================================== [ 472.094860] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 472.096136] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000158 [ 472.096136] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 472.096136] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 472.096136] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 472.096136] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 472.096136] CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G B 6.9.0-rc5-00356-g78c0094a146b #36 [ 472.096136] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu4 [ 472.096136] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout [ 472.096136] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x88/0xc0 [ 472.096136] Code: be 08 00 00 00 e8 f8 23 1f fd 4c 89 f7 be 08 00 00 00 e8 eb 23 1f fd 42 80 3c 23 00 74 08 48 88 [ 472.096136] RSP: 0018:ffff88800744fc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 472.096136] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff11000e89f8f RCX: ffffffff8457c865 [ 472.096136] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88800744fc78 [ 472.096136] RBP: 0000000000000158 R08: ffff88800744fc7f R09: 1ffff11000e89f8f [ 472.096136] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed1000e89f90 R12: dffffc0000000000 [ 472.096136] R13: 0000000000000158 R14: ffff88800744fc78 R15: ffff888007405a00 [ 472.096136] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88806d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 472.096136] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 472.096136] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 000000000da32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 472.096136] Call Trace: [ 472.096136] <TASK> [ 472.096136] ? __die_body+0x8d/0xe0 [ 472.096136] ? page_fault_oops+0x6b8/0x9a0 [ 472.096136] ? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x20c/0x2a0 [ 472.096136] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1027/0x1340 [ 472.096136] ? _printk+0x7a/0xa0 [ 472.096136] ? mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0 [ 472.096136] ? add_taint+0x42/0xd0 [ 472.096136] ? exc_page_fault+0x6a/0x1b0 [ 472.096136] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 [ 472.096136] ? mutex_lock+0x75/0xc0 [ 472.096136] ? mutex_lock+0x88/0xc0 [ 472.096136] ? mutex_lock+0x75/0xc0 [ 472.096136] l2cap_chan_timeout+0x181/0x300 [ 472.096136] process_one_work+0x5d2/0xe00 [ 472.096136] worker_thread+0xe1d/0x1660 [ 472.096136] ? pr_cont_work+0x5e0/0x5e0 [ 472.096136] kthread+0x2b7/0x350 [ 472.096136] ? pr_cont_work+0x5e0/0x5e0 [ 472.096136] ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0 [ 472.096136] ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 [ 472.096136] ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0 [ 472.096136] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 472.096136] </TASK> [ 472.096136] Modules linked in: [ 472.096136] CR2: 0000000000000158 [ 472.096136] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 472.096136] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x88/0xc0 [ 472.096136] Code: be 08 00 00 00 e8 f8 23 1f fd 4c 89 f7 be 08 00 00 00 e8 eb 23 1f fd 42 80 3c 23 00 74 08 48 88 [ 472.096136] RSP: 0018:ffff88800744fc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 472.096136] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff11000e89f8f RCX: ffffffff8457c865 [ 472.096136] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88800744fc78 [ 472.096136] RBP: 0000000000000158 R08: ffff88800744fc7f R09: 1ffff11000e89f8f [ 472.132932] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed1000e89f90 R12: dffffc0000000000 [ 472.132932] R13: 0000000000000158 R14: ffff88800744fc78 R15: ffff888007405a00 [ 472.132932] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88806d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 472.132932] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 472.132932] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 000000000da32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 472.132932] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 472.132932] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 472.132932] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- Add a check to judge whether the conn is null in l2cap_chan_timeout() in order to mitigate the bug. Fixes: 3df91ea20e74 ("Bluetooth: Revert to mutexes from RCU list") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17Bluetooth: Fix use-after-free bugs caused by sco_sock_timeoutDuoming Zhou
[ Upstream commit 483bc08181827fc475643272ffb69c533007e546 ] When the sco connection is established and then, the sco socket is releasing, timeout_work will be scheduled to judge whether the sco disconnection is timeout. The sock will be deallocated later, but it is dereferenced again in sco_sock_timeout. As a result, the use-after-free bugs will happen. The root cause is shown below: Cleanup Thread | Worker Thread sco_sock_release | sco_sock_close | __sco_sock_close | sco_sock_set_timer | schedule_delayed_work | sco_sock_kill | (wait a time) sock_put(sk) //FREE | sco_sock_timeout | sock_hold(sk) //USE The KASAN report triggered by POC is shown below: [ 95.890016] ================================================================== [ 95.890496] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_sock_timeout+0x5e/0x1c0 [ 95.890755] Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800c388080 by task kworker/0:0/7 ... [ 95.890755] Workqueue: events sco_sock_timeout [ 95.890755] Call Trace: [ 95.890755] <TASK> [ 95.890755] dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x110 [ 95.890755] print_address_description+0x78/0x390 [ 95.890755] print_report+0x11b/0x250 [ 95.890755] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xbe/0xf0 [ 95.890755] ? sco_sock_timeout+0x5e/0x1c0 [ 95.890755] kasan_report+0x139/0x170 [ 95.890755] ? update_load_avg+0xe5/0x9f0 [ 95.890755] ? sco_sock_timeout+0x5e/0x1c0 [ 95.890755] kasan_check_range+0x2c3/0x2e0 [ 95.890755] sco_sock_timeout+0x5e/0x1c0 [ 95.890755] process_one_work+0x561/0xc50 [ 95.890755] worker_thread+0xab2/0x13c0 [ 95.890755] ? pr_cont_work+0x490/0x490 [ 95.890755] kthread+0x279/0x300 [ 95.890755] ? pr_cont_work+0x490/0x490 [ 95.890755] ? kthread_blkcg+0xa0/0xa0 [ 95.890755] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60 [ 95.890755] ? kthread_blkcg+0xa0/0xa0 [ 95.890755] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 95.890755] </TASK> [ 95.890755] [ 95.890755] Allocated by task 506: [ 95.890755] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x70 [ 95.890755] __kasan_kmalloc+0x86/0x90 [ 95.890755] __kmalloc+0x17f/0x360 [ 95.890755] sk_prot_alloc+0xe1/0x1a0 [ 95.890755] sk_alloc+0x31/0x4e0 [ 95.890755] bt_sock_alloc+0x2b/0x2a0 [ 95.890755] sco_sock_create+0xad/0x320 [ 95.890755] bt_sock_create+0x145/0x320 [ 95.890755] __sock_create+0x2e1/0x650 [ 95.890755] __sys_socket+0xd0/0x280 [ 95.890755] __x64_sys_socket+0x75/0x80 [ 95.890755] do_syscall_64+0xc4/0x1b0 [ 95.890755] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f [ 95.890755] [ 95.890755] Freed by task 506: [ 95.890755] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x70 [ 95.890755] kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 [ 95.890755] poison_slab_object+0x118/0x180 [ 95.890755] __kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x30 [ 95.890755] kfree+0xb2/0x240 [ 95.890755] __sk_destruct+0x317/0x410 [ 95.890755] sco_sock_release+0x232/0x280 [ 95.890755] sock_close+0xb2/0x210 [ 95.890755] __fput+0x37f/0x770 [ 95.890755] task_work_run+0x1ae/0x210 [ 95.890755] get_signal+0xe17/0xf70 [ 95.890755] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x3f/0x520 [ 95.890755] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x55/0x120 [ 95.890755] do_syscall_64+0xd1/0x1b0 [ 95.890755] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f [ 95.890755] [ 95.890755] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c388000 [ 95.890755] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 [ 95.890755] The buggy address is located 128 bytes inside of [ 95.890755] freed 1024-byte region [ffff88800c388000, ffff88800c388400) [ 95.890755] [ 95.890755] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 95.890755] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88800c38a800 pfn:0xc388 [ 95.890755] head: order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 [ 95.890755] anon flags: 0x100000000000840(slab|head|node=0|zone=1) [ 95.890755] page_type: 0xffffffff() [ 95.890755] raw: 0100000000000840 ffff888006842dc0 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 [ 95.890755] raw: ffff88800c38a800 000000000010000a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 95.890755] head: 0100000000000840 ffff888006842dc0 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 [ 95.890755] head: ffff88800c38a800 000000000010000a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 95.890755] head: 0100000000000003 ffffea000030e201 ffffea000030e248 00000000ffffffff [ 95.890755] head: 0000000800000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 95.890755] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 95.890755] [ 95.890755] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 95.890755] ffff88800c387f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 95.890755] ffff88800c388000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 95.890755] >ffff88800c388080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 95.890755] ^ [ 95.890755] ffff88800c388100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 95.890755] ffff88800c388180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 95.890755] ================================================================== Fix this problem by adding a check protected by sco_conn_lock to judget whether the conn->hcon is null. Because the conn->hcon will be set to null, when the sock is releasing. Fixes: ba316be1b6a0 ("Bluetooth: schedule SCO timeouts with delayed_work") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().Kuniyuki Iwashima
[ Upstream commit f2db7230f73a80dbb179deab78f88a7947f0ab7e ] Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique() with nice analysis. Since commit ec94c2696f0b ("tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation for timewait hashdance"), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket's sk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock. Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try to reuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique() for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt. If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwritten and sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-free somewhere else. To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false. [0]: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8 RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0 RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0 R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84 R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0 FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80 RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885d RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0 R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK> Fixes: ec94c2696f0b ("tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation for timewait hashdance") Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/37a477a6-d39e-486b-9577-3463f655a6b7@allelesecurity.com/ Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501213145.62261-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for TCP_SYN_RECV socketsEric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 94062790aedb505bdda209b10bea47b294d6394f ] TCP_SYN_RECV state is really special, it is only used by cross-syn connections, mostly used by fuzzers. In the following crash [1], syzbot managed to trigger a divide by zero in tcp_rcv_space_adjust() A socket makes the following state transitions, without ever calling tcp_init_transfer(), meaning tcp_init_buffer_space() is also not called. TCP_CLOSE connect() TCP_SYN_SENT TCP_SYN_RECV shutdown() -> tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN) TCP_FIN_WAIT1 To fix this issue, change tcp_shutdown() to not perform a TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 transition, which makes no sense anyway. When tcp_rcv_state_process() later changes socket state from TCP_SYN_RECV to TCP_ESTABLISH, then look at sk->sk_shutdown to finally enter TCP_FIN_WAIT1 state, and send a FIN packet from a sane socket state. This means tcp_send_fin() can now be called from BH context, and must use GFP_ATOMIC allocations. [1] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 5084 Comm: syz-executor358 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-syzkaller-00022-g98369dccd2f8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 RIP: 0010:tcp_rcv_space_adjust+0x2df/0x890 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:767 Code: e3 04 4c 01 eb 48 8b 44 24 38 0f b6 04 10 84 c0 49 89 d5 0f 85 a5 03 00 00 41 8b 8e c8 09 00 00 89 e8 29 c8 48 0f af c3 31 d2 <48> f7 f1 48 8d 1c 43 49 8d 96 76 08 00 00 48 89 d0 48 c1 e8 03 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc900031ef3f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0c677a10441f8f42 RBX: 000000004fb95e7e RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000027d4b11f R08: ffffffff89e535a4 R09: 1ffffffff25e6ab7 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8135e920 R12: ffff88802a9f8d30 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802a9f8d00 R15: 1ffff1100553f2da FS: 00005555775c0380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1155bf2304 CR3: 000000002b9f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x106d/0x25a0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2513 tcp_recvmsg+0x25d/0x920 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2578 inet6_recvmsg+0x16a/0x730 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:680 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x109/0x280 net/socket.c:1068 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1db/0x470 net/socket.c:2803 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7faeb6363db9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 c1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffcc1997168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007faeb6363db9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000bc0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000122 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501125448.896529-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17xfrm: Preserve vlan tags for transport mode software GROPaul Davey
[ Upstream commit 58fbfecab965014b6e3cc956a76b4a96265a1add ] The software GRO path for esp transport mode uses skb_mac_header_rebuild prior to re-injecting the packet via the xfrm_napi_dev. This only copies skb->mac_len bytes of header which may not be sufficient if the packet contains 802.1Q tags or other VLAN tags. Worse copying only the initial header will leave a packet marked as being VLAN tagged but without the corresponding tag leading to mangling when it is later untagged. The VLAN tags are important when receiving the decrypted esp transport mode packet after GRO processing to ensure it is received on the correct interface. Therefore record the full mac header length in xfrm*_transport_input for later use in corresponding xfrm*_transport_finish to copy the entire mac header when rebuilding the mac header for GRO. The skb->data pointer is left pointing skb->mac_header bytes after the start of the mac header as is expected by the network stack and network and transport header offsets reset to this location. Fixes: 7785bba299a8 ("esp: Add a software GRO codepath") Signed-off-by: Paul Davey <paul.davey@alliedtelesis.co.nz> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17bpf, sockmap: Improved check for empty queueJohn Fastabend
[ Upstream commit 405df89dd52cbcd69a3cd7d9a10d64de38f854b2 ] We noticed some rare sk_buffs were stepping past the queue when system was under memory pressure. The general theory is to skip enqueueing sk_buffs when its not necessary which is the normal case with a system that is properly provisioned for the task, no memory pressure and enough cpu assigned. But, if we can't allocate memory due to an ENOMEM error when enqueueing the sk_buff into the sockmap receive queue we push it onto a delayed workqueue to retry later. When a new sk_buff is received we then check if that queue is empty. However, there is a problem with simply checking the queue length. When a sk_buff is being processed from the ingress queue but not yet on the sockmap msg receive queue its possible to also recv a sk_buff through normal path. It will check the ingress queue which is zero and then skip ahead of the pkt being processed. Previously we used sock lock from both contexts which made the problem harder to hit, but not impossible. To fix instead of popping the skb from the queue entirely we peek the skb from the queue and do the copy there. This ensures checks to the queue length are non-zero while skb is being processed. Then finally when the entire skb has been copied to user space queue or another socket we pop it off the queue. This way the queue length check allows bypassing the queue only after the list has been completely processed. To reproduce issue we run NGINX compliance test with sockmap running and observe some flakes in our testing that we attributed to this issue. Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()") Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: William Findlay <will@isovalent.com> Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-5-john.fastabend@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17bpf, sockmap: Reschedule is now done through backlogJohn Fastabend
[ Upstream commit bce22552f92ea7c577f49839b8e8f7d29afaf880 ] Now that the backlog manages the reschedule() logic correctly we can drop the partial fix to reschedule from recvmsg hook. Rescheduling on recvmsg hook was added to address a corner case where we still had data in the backlog state but had nothing to kick it and reschedule the backlog worker to run and finish copying data out of the state. This had a couple limitations, first it required user space to kick it introducing an unnecessary EBUSY and retry. Second it only handled the ingress case and egress redirects would still be hung. With the correct fix, pushing the reschedule logic down to where the enomem error occurs we can drop this fix. Fixes: bec217197b412 ("skmsg: Schedule psock work if the cached skb exists on the psock") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-4-john.fastabend@gmail.com Stable-dep-of: 405df89dd52c ("bpf, sockmap: Improved check for empty queue") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17bpf, sockmap: Convert schedule_work into delayed_workJohn Fastabend
[ Upstream commit 29173d07f79883ac94f5570294f98af3d4287382 ] Sk_buffs are fed into sockmap verdict programs either from a strparser (when the user might want to decide how framing of skb is done by attaching another parser program) or directly through tcp_read_sock. The tcp_read_sock is the preferred method for performance when the BPF logic is a stream parser. The flow for Cilium's common use case with a stream parser is, tcp_read_sock() sk_psock_verdict_recv ret = bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu() sk_psock_verdict_apply(sock, skb, ret) // if system is under memory pressure or app is slow we may // need to queue skb. Do this queuing through ingress_skb and // then kick timer to wake up handler skb_queue_tail(ingress_skb, skb) schedule_work(work); The work queue is wired up to sk_psock_backlog(). This will then walk the ingress_skb skb list that holds our sk_buffs that could not be handled, but should be OK to run at some later point. However, its possible that the workqueue doing this work still hits an error when sending the skb. When this happens the skbuff is requeued on a temporary 'state' struct kept with the workqueue. This is necessary because its possible to partially send an skbuff before hitting an error and we need to know how and where to restart when the workqueue runs next. Now for the trouble, we don't rekick the workqueue. This can cause a stall where the skbuff we just cached on the state variable might never be sent. This happens when its the last packet in a flow and no further packets come along that would cause the system to kick the workqueue from that side. To fix we could do simple schedule_work(), but while under memory pressure it makes sense to back off some instead of continue to retry repeatedly. So instead to fix convert schedule_work to schedule_delayed_work and add backoff logic to reschedule from backlog queue on errors. Its not obvious though what a good backoff is so use '1'. To test we observed some flakes whil running NGINX compliance test with sockmap we attributed these failed test to this bug and subsequent issue. >From on list discussion. This commit bec217197b41("skmsg: Schedule psock work if the cached skb exists on the psock") was intended to address similar race, but had a couple cases it missed. Most obvious it only accounted for receiving traffic on the local socket so if redirecting into another socket we could still get an sk_buff stuck here. Next it missed the case where copied=0 in the recv() handler and then we wouldn't kick the scheduler. Also its sub-optimal to require userspace to kick the internal mechanisms of sockmap to wake it up and copy data to user. It results in an extra syscall and requires the app to actual handle the EAGAIN correctly. Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: William Findlay <will@isovalent.com> Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-3-john.fastabend@gmail.com Stable-dep-of: 405df89dd52c ("bpf, sockmap: Improved check for empty queue") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17bpf, sockmap: Handle fin correctlyJohn Fastabend
[ Upstream commit 901546fd8f9ca4b5c481ce00928ab425ce9aacc0 ] The sockmap code is returning EAGAIN after a FIN packet is received and no more data is on the receive queue. Correct behavior is to return 0 to the user and the user can then close the socket. The EAGAIN causes many apps to retry which masks the problem. Eventually the socket is evicted from the sockmap because its released from sockmap sock free handling. The issue creates a delay and can cause some errors on application side. To fix this check on sk_msg_recvmsg side if length is zero and FIN flag is set then set return to zero. A selftest will be added to check this condition. Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: William Findlay <will@isovalent.com> Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-6-john.fastabend@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17bpf, sockmap: TCP data stall on recv before acceptJohn Fastabend
[ Upstream commit ea444185a6bf7da4dd0df1598ee953e4f7174858 ] A common mechanism to put a TCP socket into the sockmap is to hook the BPF_SOCK_OPS_{ACTIVE_PASSIVE}_ESTABLISHED_CB event with a BPF program that can map the socket info to the correct BPF verdict parser. When the user adds the socket to the map the psock is created and the new ops are assigned to ensure the verdict program will 'see' the sk_buffs as they arrive. Part of this process hooks the sk_data_ready op with a BPF specific handler to wake up the BPF verdict program when data is ready to read. The logic is simple enough (posted here for easy reading) static void sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(struct sock *sk) { struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket; if (unlikely(!sock || !sock->ops || !sock->ops->read_skb)) return; sock->ops->read_skb(sk, sk_psock_verdict_recv); } The oversight here is sk->sk_socket is not assigned until the application accepts() the new socket. However, its entirely ok for the peer application to do a connect() followed immediately by sends. The socket on the receiver is sitting on the backlog queue of the listening socket until its accepted and the data is queued up. If the peer never accepts the socket or is slow it will eventually hit data limits and rate limit the session. But, important for BPF sockmap hooks when this data is received TCP stack does the sk_data_ready() call but the read_skb() for this data is never called because sk_socket is missing. The data sits on the sk_receive_queue. Then once the socket is accepted if we never receive more data from the peer there will be no further sk_data_ready calls and all the data is still on the sk_receive_queue(). Then user calls recvmsg after accept() and for TCP sockets in sockmap we use the tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser() handler. The handler checks for data in the sk_msg ingress queue expecting that the BPF program has already run from the sk_data_ready hook and enqueued the data as needed. So we are stuck. To fix do an unlikely check in recvmsg handler for data on the sk_receive_queue and if it exists wake up data_ready. We have the sock locked in both read_skb and recvmsg so should avoid having multiple runners. Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-7-john.fastabend@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17net: mark racy access on sk->sk_rcvbuflinke li
[ Upstream commit c2deb2e971f5d9aca941ef13ee05566979e337a4 ] sk->sk_rcvbuf in __sock_queue_rcv_skb() and __sk_receive_skb() can be changed by other threads. Mark this as benign using READ_ONCE(). This patch is aimed at reducing the number of benign races reported by KCSAN in order to focus future debugging effort on harmful races. Signed-off-by: linke li <lilinke99@qq.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17wifi: cfg80211: fix rdev_dump_mpp() arguments orderIgor Artemiev
[ Upstream commit ec50f3114e55406a1aad24b7dfaa1c3f4336d8eb ] Fix the order of arguments in the TP_ARGS macro for the rdev_dump_mpp tracepoint event. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Signed-off-by: Igor Artemiev <Igor.A.Artemiev@mcst.ru> Link: https://msgid.link/20240311164519.118398-1-Igor.A.Artemiev@mcst.ru Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17wifi: mac80211: fix ieee80211_bss_*_flags kernel-docJeff Johnson
[ Upstream commit 774f8841f55d7ac4044c79812691649da203584a ] Running kernel-doc on ieee80211_i.h flagged the following: net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h:145: warning: expecting prototype for enum ieee80211_corrupt_data_flags. Prototype was for enum ieee80211_bss_corrupt_data_flags instead net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h:162: warning: expecting prototype for enum ieee80211_valid_data_flags. Prototype was for enum ieee80211_bss_valid_data_flags instead Fix these warnings. Signed-off-by: Jeff Johnson <quic_jjohnson@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://msgid.link/20240314-kdoc-ieee80211_i-v1-1-72b91b55b257@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17net: gro: add flush check in udp_gro_receive_segmentRichard Gobert
[ Upstream commit 5babae777c61aa8a8679d59d3cdc54165ad96d42 ] GRO-GSO path is supposed to be transparent and as such L3 flush checks are relevant to all UDP flows merging in GRO. This patch uses the same logic and code from tcp_gro_receive, terminating merge if flush is non zero. Fixes: e20cf8d3f1f7 ("udp: implement GRO for plain UDP sockets.") Signed-off-by: Richard Gobert <richardbgobert@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17tipc: fix a possible memleak in tipc_buf_appendXin Long
[ Upstream commit 97bf6f81b29a8efaf5d0983251a7450e5794370d ] __skb_linearize() doesn't free the skb when it fails, so move '*buf = NULL' after __skb_linearize(), so that the skb can be freed on the err path. Fixes: b7df21cf1b79 ("tipc: skb_linearize the head skb when reassembling msgs") Reported-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.q.nguyen@dektech.com.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/90710748c29a1521efac4f75ea01b3b7e61414cf.1714485818.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17net: core: reject skb_copy(_expand) for fraglist GSO skbsFelix Fietkau
[ Upstream commit d091e579b864fa790dd6a0cd537a22c383126681 ] SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs must not be linearized, otherwise they become invalid. Return NULL if such an skb is passed to skb_copy or skb_copy_expand, in order to prevent a crash on a potential later call to skb_gso_segment. Fixes: 3a1296a38d0c ("net: Support GRO/GSO fraglist chaining.") Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17net: bridge: fix multicast-to-unicast with fraglist GSOFelix Fietkau
[ Upstream commit 59c878cbcdd80ed39315573b3511d0acfd3501b5 ] Calling skb_copy on a SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skb is not valid, since it returns an invalid linearized skb. This code only needs to change the ethernet header, so pskb_copy is the right function to call here. Fixes: 6db6f0eae605 ("bridge: multicast to unicast") Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17net l2tp: drop flow hash on forwardDavid Bauer
[ Upstream commit 42f853b42899d9b445763b55c3c8adc72be0f0e1 ] Drop the flow-hash of the skb when forwarding to the L2TP netdev. This avoids the L2TP qdisc from using the flow-hash from the outer packet, which is identical for every flow within the tunnel. This does not affect every platform but is specific for the ethernet driver. It depends on the platform including L4 information in the flow-hash. One such example is the Mediatek Filogic MT798x family of networking processors. Fixes: d9e31d17ceba ("l2tp: Add L2TP ethernet pseudowire support") Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424171110.13701-1-mail@david-bauer.net Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17nsh: Restore skb->{protocol,data,mac_header} for outer header in ↵Kuniyuki Iwashima
nsh_gso_segment(). [ Upstream commit 4b911a9690d72641879ea6d13cce1de31d346d79 ] syzbot triggered various splats (see [0] and links) by a crafted GSO packet of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP layering the following protocols: ETH_P_8021AD + ETH_P_NSH + ETH_P_IPV6 + IPPROTO_UDP NSH can encapsulate IPv4, IPv6, Ethernet, NSH, and MPLS. As the inner protocol can be Ethernet, NSH GSO handler, nsh_gso_segment(), calls skb_mac_gso_segment() to invoke inner protocol GSO handlers. nsh_gso_segment() does the following for the original skb before calling skb_mac_gso_segment() 1. reset skb->network_header 2. save the original skb->{mac_heaeder,mac_len} in a local variable 3. pull the NSH header 4. resets skb->mac_header 5. set up skb->mac_len and skb->protocol for the inner protocol. and does the following for the segmented skb 6. set ntohs(ETH_P_NSH) to skb->protocol 7. push the NSH header 8. restore skb->mac_header 9. set skb->mac_header + mac_len to skb->network_header 10. restore skb->mac_len There are two problems in 6-7 and 8-9. (a) After 6 & 7, skb->data points to the NSH header, so the outer header (ETH_P_8021AD in this case) is stripped when skb is sent out of netdev. Also, if NSH is encapsulated by NSH + Ethernet (so NSH-Ethernet-NSH), skb_pull() in the first nsh_gso_segment() will make skb->data point to the middle of the outer NSH or Ethernet header because the Ethernet header is not pulled by the second nsh_gso_segment(). (b) While restoring skb->{mac_header,network_header} in 8 & 9, nsh_gso_segment() does not assume that the data in the linear buffer is shifted. However, udp6_ufo_fragment() could shift the data and change skb->mac_header accordingly as demonstrated by syzbot. If this happens, even the restored skb->mac_header points to the middle of the outer header. It seems nsh_gso_segment() has never worked with outer headers so far. At the end of nsh_gso_segment(), the outer header must be restored for the segmented skb, instead of the NSH header. To do that, let's calculate the outer header position relatively from the inner header and set skb->{data,mac_header,protocol} properly. [0]: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:524 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xf44/0x16b0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:668 ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:524 [inline] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xf44/0x16b0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:668 ipvlan_start_xmit+0x5c/0x1a0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:222 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4989 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5003 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3547 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x244/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3563 __dev_queue_xmit+0x33ed/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4351 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3819 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3980 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x705/0x1000 mm/slub.c:4001 kmalloc_reserve+0x249/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:582 __alloc_skb+0x352/0x790 net/core/skbuff.c:651 skb_segment+0x20aa/0x7080 net/core/skbuff.c:4647 udp6_ufo_fragment+0xcab/0x1150 net/ipv6/udp_offload.c:109 ipv6_gso_segment+0x14be/0x2ca0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:152 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3e8/0x760 net/core/gso.c:53 nsh_gso_segment+0x6f4/0xf70 net/nsh/nsh.c:108 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3e8/0x760 net/core/gso.c:53 __skb_gso_segment+0x4b0/0x730 net/core/gso.c:124 skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x107f/0x1930 net/core/dev.c:3628 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f28/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4343 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b CPU: 1 PID: 5101 Comm: syz-executor421 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc5-syzkaller-00297-gf2e367d6ad3b #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024 Fixes: c411ed854584 ("nsh: add GSO support") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+42a0dc856239de4de60e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=42a0dc856239de4de60e Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+c298c9f0e46a3c86332b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c298c9f0e46a3c86332b Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240415222041.18537-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424023549.21862-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17xdp: use flags field to disambiguate broadcast redirectToke Høiland-Jørgensen
[ Upstream commit 5bcf0dcbf9066348058b88a510c57f70f384c92c ] When redirecting a packet using XDP, the bpf_redirect_map() helper will set up the redirect destination information in struct bpf_redirect_info (using the __bpf_xdp_redirect_map() helper function), and the xdp_do_redirect() function will read this information after the XDP program returns and pass the frame on to the right redirect destination. When using the BPF_F_BROADCAST flag to do multicast redirect to a whole map, __bpf_xdp_redirect_map() sets the 'map' pointer in struct bpf_redirect_info to point to the destination map to be broadcast. And xdp_do_redirect() reacts to the value of this map pointer to decide whether it's dealing with a broadcast or a single-value redirect. However, if the destination map is being destroyed before xdp_do_redirect() is called, the map pointer will be cleared out (by bpf_clear_redirect_map()) without waiting for any XDP programs to stop running. This causes xdp_do_redirect() to think that the redirect was to a single target, but the target pointer is also NULL (since broadcast redirects don't have a single target), so this causes a crash when a NULL pointer is passed to dev_map_enqueue(). To fix this, change xdp_do_redirect() to react directly to the presence of the BPF_F_BROADCAST flag in the 'flags' value in struct bpf_redirect_info to disambiguate between a single-target and a broadcast redirect. And only read the 'map' pointer if the broadcast flag is set, aborting if that has been cleared out in the meantime. This prevents the crash, while keeping the atomic (cmpxchg-based) clearing of the map pointer itself, and without adding any more checks in the non-broadcast fast path. Fixes: e624d4ed4aa8 ("xdp: Extend xdp_redirect_map with broadcast support") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+af9492708df9797198d6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240418071840.156411-1-toke@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17xdp: Add xdp_do_redirect_frame() for pre-computed xdp_framesToke Høiland-Jørgensen
[ Upstream commit 1372d34ccf6dd480332b2bcb2fd59a2b9a0df415 ] Add an xdp_do_redirect_frame() variant which supports pre-computed xdp_frame structures. This will be used in bpf_prog_run() to avoid having to write to the xdp_frame structure when the XDP program doesn't modify the frame boundaries. Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220103150812.87914-6-toke@redhat.com Stable-dep-of: 5bcf0dcbf906 ("xdp: use flags field to disambiguate broadcast redirect") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17xdp: Move conversion to xdp_frame out of map functionsToke Høiland-Jørgensen
[ Upstream commit d53ad5d8b218a885e95080d4d3d556b16b91b1b9 ] All map redirect functions except XSK maps convert xdp_buff to xdp_frame before enqueueing it. So move this conversion of out the map functions and into xdp_do_redirect(). This removes a bit of duplicated code, but more importantly it makes it possible to support caller-allocated xdp_frame structures, which will be added in a subsequent commit. Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220103150812.87914-5-toke@redhat.com Stable-dep-of: 5bcf0dcbf906 ("xdp: use flags field to disambiguate broadcast redirect") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17sunrpc: add a struct rpc_stats arg to rpc_create_argsJosef Bacik
[ Upstream commit 2057a48d0dd00c6a2a94ded7df2bf1d3f2a4a0da ] We want to be able to have our rpc stats handled in a per network namespace manner, so add an option to rpc_create_args to specify a different rpc_stats struct instead of using the one on the rpc_program. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Stable-dep-of: 24457f1be29f ("nfs: Handle error of rpc_proc_register() in nfs_net_init().") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-17wifi: nl80211: don't free NULL coalescing ruleJohannes Berg
[ Upstream commit 801ea33ae82d6a9d954074fbcf8ea9d18f1543a7 ] If the parsing fails, we can dereference a NULL pointer here. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: be29b99a9b51 ("cfg80211/nl80211: Add packet coalesce support") Reviewed-by: Miriam Rachel Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com> Link: https://msgid.link/20240418105220.b328f80406e7.Id75d961050deb05b3e4e354e024866f350c68103@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-07Merge tag 'v5.15.158' into v5.15/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
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2024-05-02Merge tag 'v5.15.157' into v5.15/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
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2024-05-02udp: preserve the connected status if only UDP cmsgYick Xie
commit 680d11f6e5427b6af1321932286722d24a8b16c1 upstream. If "udp_cmsg_send()" returned 0 (i.e. only UDP cmsg), "connected" should not be set to 0. Otherwise it stops the connected socket from using the cached route. Fixes: 2e8de8576343 ("udp: add gso segment cmsg") Signed-off-by: Yick Xie <yick.xie@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240418170610.867084-1-yick.xie@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yick Xie <yick.xie@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-02tcp: Fix NEW_SYN_RECV handling in inet_twsk_purge()Eric Dumazet
commit 1c4e97dd2d3c9a3e84f7e26346aa39bc426d3249 upstream. inet_twsk_purge() uses rcu to find TIME_WAIT and NEW_SYN_RECV objects to purge. These objects use SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU semantic and need special care. We need to use refcount_inc_not_zero(&sk->sk_refcnt). Reuse the existing correct logic I wrote for TIME_WAIT, because both structures have common locations for sk_state, sk_family, and netns pointer. If after the refcount_inc_not_zero() the object fields longer match the keys, use sock_gen_put(sk) to release the refcount. Then we can call inet_twsk_deschedule_put() for TIME_WAIT, inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put() for NEW_SYN_RECV sockets, with BH disabled. Then we need to restart the loop because we had drop rcu_read_lock(). Fixes: 740ea3c4a0b2 ("tcp: Clean up kernel listener's reqsk in inet_twsk_purge()") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89iLvFuuihCtt9PME2uS1WJATnf5fKjDToa1WzVnRzHnPfg@mail.gmail.com/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240308200122.64357-2-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-02tcp: Clean up kernel listener's reqsk in inet_twsk_purge()Kuniyuki Iwashima
commit 740ea3c4a0b2e326b23d7cdf05472a0e92aa39bc upstream. Eric Dumazet reported a use-after-free related to the per-netns ehash series. [0] When we create a TCP socket from userspace, the socket always holds a refcnt of the netns. This guarantees that a reqsk timer is always fired before netns dismantle. Each reqsk has a refcnt of its listener, so the listener is not freed before the reqsk, and the net is not freed before the listener as well. OTOH, when in-kernel users create a TCP socket, it might not hold a refcnt of its netns. Thus, a reqsk timer can be fired after the netns dismantle and access freed per-netns ehash. To avoid the use-after-free, we need to clean up TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV sockets in inet_twsk_purge() if the netns uses a per-netns ehash. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89iLXMup0dRD_Ov79Xt8N9FM0XdhCHEN05sf3eLwxKweM6w@mail.gmail.com/ BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_or_dccp_get_hashinfo include/net/inet_hashtables.h:181 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in reqsk_queue_unlink+0x320/0x350 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:913 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807545bd80 by task syz-executor.2/8301 CPU: 1 PID: 8301 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.0.0-syzkaller-02757-gaf7d23f9d96a #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/22/2022 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:317 [inline] print_report.cold+0x2ba/0x719 mm/kasan/report.c:433 kasan_report+0xb1/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:495 tcp_or_dccp_get_hashinfo include/net/inet_hashtables.h:181 [inline] reqsk_queue_unlink+0x320/0x350 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:913 inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:927 [inline] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:939 [inline] reqsk_timer_handler+0x724/0x1160 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1053 call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x6b0 kernel/time/timer.c:1474 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1519 [inline] __run_timers.part.0+0x674/0xa80 kernel/time/timer.c:1790 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1768 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0xb3/0x1d0 kernel/time/timer.c:1803 __do_softirq+0x1d0/0x9c8 kernel/softirq.c:571 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:445 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0x123/0x180 kernel/softirq.c:650 irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:662 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x93/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1107 </IRQ> Fixes: d1e5e6408b30 ("tcp: Introduce optional per-netns ehash.") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221012145036.74960-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> [shaozhengchao: resolved conflicts in 5.15] Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-02ethernet: Add helper for assigning packet type when dest address does not ↵Rahul Rameshbabu
match device address commit 6e159fd653d7ebf6290358e0330a0cb8a75cf73b upstream. Enable reuse of logic in eth_type_trans for determining packet type. Suggested-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rahul Rameshbabu <rrameshbabu@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423181319.115860-3-rrameshbabu@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-02Bluetooth: Fix type of len in {l2cap,sco}_sock_getsockopt_old()Nathan Chancellor
commit 9bf4e919ccad613b3596eebf1ff37b05b6405307 upstream. After an innocuous optimization change in LLVM main (19.0.0), x86_64 allmodconfig (which enables CONFIG_KCSAN / -fsanitize=thread) fails to build due to the checks in check_copy_size(): In file included from net/bluetooth/sco.c:27: In file included from include/linux/module.h:13: In file included from include/linux/stat.h:19: In file included from include/linux/time.h:60: In file included from include/linux/time32.h:13: In file included from include/linux/timex.h:67: In file included from arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h:6: In file included from arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h:10: In file included from arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h:15: In file included from include/linux/percpu.h:7: In file included from include/linux/smp.h:118: include/linux/thread_info.h:244:4: error: call to '__bad_copy_from' declared with 'error' attribute: copy source size is too small 244 | __bad_copy_from(); | ^ The same exact error occurs in l2cap_sock.c. The copy_to_user() statements that are failing come from l2cap_sock_getsockopt_old() and sco_sock_getsockopt_old(). This does not occur with GCC with or without KCSAN or Clang without KCSAN enabled. len is defined as an 'int' because it is assigned from '__user int *optlen'. However, it is clamped against the result of sizeof(), which has a type of 'size_t' ('unsigned long' for 64-bit platforms). This is done with min_t() because min() requires compatible types, which results in both len and the result of sizeof() being casted to 'unsigned int', meaning len changes signs and the result of sizeof() is truncated. From there, len is passed to copy_to_user(), which has a third parameter type of 'unsigned long', so it is widened and changes signs again. This excessive casting in combination with the KCSAN instrumentation causes LLVM to fail to eliminate the __bad_copy_from() call, failing the build. The official recommendation from LLVM developers is to consistently use long types for all size variables to avoid the unnecessary casting in the first place. Change the type of len to size_t in both l2cap_sock_getsockopt_old() and sco_sock_getsockopt_old(). This clears up the error while allowing min_t() to be replaced with min(), resulting in simpler code with no casts and fewer implicit conversions. While len is a different type than optlen now, it should result in no functional change because the result of sizeof() will clamp all values of optlen in the same manner as before. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Closes: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/2007 Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/85647 Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-02af_unix: Suppress false-positive lockdep splat for spin_lock() in __unix_gc().Kuniyuki Iwashima
[ Upstream commit 1971d13ffa84a551d29a81fdf5b5ec5be166ac83 ] syzbot reported a lockdep splat regarding unix_gc_lock and unix_state_lock(). One is called from recvmsg() for a connected socket, and another is called from GC for TCP_LISTEN socket. So, the splat is false-positive. Let's add a dedicated lock class for the latter to suppress the splat. Note that this change is not necessary for net-next.git as the issue is only applied to the old GC impl. [0]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- kworker/u8:1/11 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] unix_notinflight+0x13d/0x390 net/unix/garbage.c:140 unix_detach_fds net/unix/af_unix.c:1819 [inline] unix_destruct_scm+0x221/0x350 net/unix/af_unix.c:1876 skb_release_head_state+0x100/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:1188 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1200 [inline] __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1216 [inline] kfree_skb_reason+0x16d/0x3b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1252 kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1262 [inline] manage_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2672 [inline] unix_stream_read_generic+0x1125/0x2700 net/unix/af_unix.c:2749 unix_stream_splice_read+0x239/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2981 do_splice_read fs/splice.c:985 [inline] splice_file_to_pipe+0x299/0x500 fs/splice.c:1295 do_splice+0xf2d/0x1880 fs/splice.c:1379 __do_splice fs/splice.c:1436 [inline] __do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1652 [inline] __se_sys_splice+0x331/0x4a0 fs/splice.c:1634 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(unix_gc_lock); lock(&u->lock); lock(unix_gc_lock); lock(&u->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kworker/u8:1/11: #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline] #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Fixes: 47d8ac011fe1 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fa379358c28cc87cc307@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa379358c28cc87cc307 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424170443.9832-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-02netfilter: nf_tables: honor table dormant flag from netdev release event pathPablo Neira Ayuso
[ Upstream commit 8e30abc9ace4f0add4cd761dfdbfaebae5632dd2 ] Check for table dormant flag otherwise netdev release event path tries to unregister an already unregistered hook. [524854.857999] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [524854.858010] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3386599 at net/netfilter/core.c:501 __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [...] [524854.858848] CPU: 0 PID: 3386599 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc3+ #365 [524854.858869] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net [524854.858886] RIP: 0010:__nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [524854.858903] Code: 24 e8 aa 73 83 ff 48 63 43 1c 83 f8 01 0f 85 3d ff ff ff e8 98 d1 f0 ff 48 8b 3c 24 e8 8f 73 83 ff 48 63 43 1c e9 26 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 18 48 c7 c7 00 68 e9 82 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 [524854.858914] RSP: 0018:ffff8881e36d79e0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [524854.858926] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881339ae790 RCX: ffffffff81ba524a [524854.858936] RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff8881c8a16438 [524854.858945] RBP: ffff8881c8a16438 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed103c6daf34 [524854.858954] R10: ffff8881e36d79a7 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 [524854.858962] R13: ffff8881c8a16000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881351b5a00 [524854.858971] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888390800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [524854.858982] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [524854.858991] CR2: 00007fc9be0f16f4 CR3: 00000001437cc004 CR4: 00000000001706f0 [524854.859000] Call Trace: [524854.859006] <TASK> [524854.859013] ? __warn+0x9f/0x1a0 [524854.859027] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [524854.859044] ? report_bug+0x1b1/0x1e0 [524854.859060] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 [524854.859071] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40 [524854.859083] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [524854.859100] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x6a/0x260 [524854.859116] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [524854.859135] nf_tables_netdev_event+0x337/0x390 [nf_tables] [524854.859304] ? __pfx_nf_tables_netdev_event+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables] [524854.859461] ? packet_notifier+0xb3/0x360 [524854.859476] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40 [524854.859489] ? dcbnl_netdevice_event+0x35/0x140 [524854.859507] ? __pfx_nf_tables_netdev_event+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables] [524854.859661] notifier_call_chain+0x7d/0x140 [524854.859677] unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x5e1/0xae0 Fixes: d54725cd11a5 ("netfilter: nf_tables: support for multiple devices per netdev hook") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
generated by cgit 1.2.3-korg (git 2.39.0) at 2024-06-17 08:12:44 +0000