| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
[ Upstream commit b58b1f563ab78955d37e9e43e02790a85c66ac05 ]
This is a follow up of commit f8d858e607b2 ("xfrm: make user policy API
complete"). The goal is to align userland API to the internal structures.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reviewed-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 88d0adb5f13b1c52fbb7d755f6f79db18c2f0c2c ]
This configuration knob is very sensible, it should be notified when
changing.
Fixes: 2d151d39073a ("xfrm: Add possibility to set the default to block if we have no policy")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit f8d858e607b2a36808ac6d4218f5f5203d7a7d63 ]
>From a userland POV, this API was based on some magic values:
- dirmask and action were bitfields but meaning of bits
(XFRM_POL_DEFAULT_*) are not exported;
- action is confusing, if a bit is set, does it mean drop or accept?
Let's try to simplify this uapi by using explicit field and macros.
Fixes: 2d151d39073a ("xfrm: Add possibility to set the default to block if we have no policy")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 5d8dbb7fb82b8661c16d496644b931c0e2e3a12e ]
We need to check up->dirmask to avoid shift-out-of-bounce bug,
since up->dirmask comes from userspace.
Also, added XFRM_USERPOLICY_DIRMASK_MAX constant to uapi to inform
user-space that up->dirmask has maximum possible value
Fixes: 2d151d39073a ("xfrm: Add possibility to set the default to block if we have no policy")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+9cd5837a045bbee5b810@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 2d151d39073aff498358543801fca0f670fea981 ]
As the default we assume the traffic to pass, if we have no
matching IPsec policy. With this patch, we have a possibility to
change this default from allow to block. It can be configured
via netlink. Each direction (input/output/forward) can be
configured separately. With the default to block configuered,
we need allow policies for all packet flows we accept.
We do not use default policy lookup for the loopback device.
v1->v2
- fix compiling when XFRM is disabled
- Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Christian Langrock <christian.langrock@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Langrock <christian.langrock@secunet.com>
Co-developed-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 4ff2980b6bd2aa6b4ded3ce3b7c0ccfab29980af ]
in tunnel mode, if outer interface(ipv4) is less, it is easily to let
inner IPV6 mtu be less than 1280. If so, a Packet Too Big ICMPV6 message
is received. When send again, packets are fragmentized with 1280, they
are still rejected with ICMPV6(Packet Too Big) by xfrmi_xmit2().
According to RFC4213 Section3.2.2:
if (IPv4 path MTU - 20) is less than 1280
if packet is larger than 1280 bytes
Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with MTU=1280
Drop packet
else
Encapsulate but do not set the Don't Fragment
flag in the IPv4 header. The resulting IPv4
packet might be fragmented by the IPv4 layer
on the encapsulator or by some router along
the IPv4 path.
endif
else
if packet is larger than (IPv4 path MTU - 20)
Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with
MTU = (IPv4 path MTU - 20).
Drop packet.
else
Encapsulate and set the Don't Fragment flag
in the IPv4 header.
endif
endif
Packets should be fragmentized with ipv4 outer interface, so change it.
After it is fragemtized with ipv4, there will be double fragmenation.
No.48 & No.51 are ipv6 fragment packets, No.48 is double fragmentized,
then tunneled with IPv4(No.49& No.50), which obey spec. And received peer
cannot decrypt it rightly.
48 2002::10 2002::11 1296(length) IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0xa20da5bc nxt=50)
49 0x0000 (0) 2002::10 2002::11 1304 IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0x7448042c nxt=44)
50 0x0000 (0) 2002::10 2002::11 200 ESP (SPI=0x00035000)
51 2002::10 2002::11 180 Echo (ping) request
52 0x56dc 2002::10 2002::11 248 IPv6 fragment (off=1232 more=n ident=0xa20da5bc nxt=50)
xfrm6_noneed_fragment has fixed above issues. Finally, it acted like below:
1 0x6206 192.168.1.138 192.168.1.1 1316 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=Encap Security Payload 50, off=0, ID=6206) [Reassembled in #2]
2 0x6206 2002::10 2002::11 88 IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0x1f440778 nxt=50)
3 0x0000 2002::10 2002::11 248 ICMPv6 Echo (ping) request
Signed-off-by: Lina Wang <lina.wang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit e03c3bba351f99ad932e8f06baa9da1afc418e02 ]
xfrm_migrate cannot handle address family change of an xfrm_state.
The symptons are the xfrm_state will be migrated to a wrong address,
and sending as well as receiving packets wil be broken.
This commit fixes it by breaking the original xfrm_state_clone
method into two steps so as to update the props.family before
running xfrm_init_state. As the result, xfrm_state's inner mode,
outer mode, type and IP header length in xfrm_state_migrate can
be updated with the new address family.
Tested with additions to Android's kernel unit test suite:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/kernel/tests/+/1885354
Signed-off-by: Yan Yan <evitayan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit c1aca3080e382886e2e58e809787441984a2f89b ]
This patch enables distinguishing SAs and SPs based on if_id during
the xfrm_migrate flow. This ensures support for xfrm interfaces
throughout the SA/SP lifecycle.
When there are multiple existing SPs with the same direction,
the same xfrm_selector and different endpoint addresses,
xfrm_migrate might fail with ENODATA.
Specifically, the code path for performing xfrm_migrate is:
Stage 1: find policy to migrate with
xfrm_migrate_policy_find(sel, dir, type, net)
Stage 2: find and update state(s) with
xfrm_migrate_state_find(mp, net)
Stage 3: update endpoint address(es) of template(s) with
xfrm_policy_migrate(pol, m, num_migrate)
Currently "Stage 1" always returns the first xfrm_policy that
matches, and "Stage 3" looks for the xfrm_tmpl that matches the
old endpoint address. Thus if there are multiple xfrm_policy
with same selector, direction, type and net, "Stage 1" might
rertun a wrong xfrm_policy and "Stage 3" will fail with ENODATA
because it cannot find a xfrm_tmpl with the matching endpoint
address.
The fix is to allow userspace to pass an if_id and add if_id
to the matching rule in Stage 1 and Stage 2 since if_id is a
unique ID for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state. For compatibility,
if_id will only be checked if the attribute is set.
Tested with additions to Android's kernel unit test suite:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/kernel/tests/+/1668886
Signed-off-by: Yan Yan <evitayan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit a3d9001b4e287fc043e5539d03d71a32ab114bcb upstream.
This reverts commit 68ac0f3810e76a853b5f7b90601a05c3048b8b54 because ID
0 was meant to be used for configuring the policy/state without
matching for a specific interface (e.g., Cilium is affected, see
https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/18789 and
https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/19019).
Signed-off-by: Kai Lueke <kailueke@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit a6d95c5a628a09be129f25d5663a7e9db8261f51 upstream.
This reverts commit b515d2637276a3810d6595e10ab02c13bfd0b63a.
Commit b515d2637276a3810d6595e10ab02c13bfd0b63a ("xfrm: xfrm_state_mtu
should return at least 1280 for ipv6") in v5.14 breaks the TCP MSS
calculation in ipsec transport mode, resulting complete stalls of TCP
connections. This happens when the (P)MTU is 1280 or slighly larger.
The desired formula for the MSS is:
MSS = (MTU - ESP_overhead) - IP header - TCP header
However, the above commit clamps the (MTU - ESP_overhead) to a
minimum of 1280, turning the formula into
MSS = max(MTU - ESP overhead, 1280) - IP header - TCP header
With the (P)MTU near 1280, the calculated MSS is too large and the
resulting TCP packets never make it to the destination because they
are over the actual PMTU.
The above commit also causes suboptimal double fragmentation in
xfrm tunnel mode, as described in
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20210429202529.codhwpc7w6kbudug@dwarf.suse.cz/
The original problem the above commit was trying to fix is now fixed
by commit 6596a0229541270fb8d38d989f91b78838e5e9da ("xfrm: fix MTU
regression").
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 7c76ecd9c99b6e9a771d813ab1aa7fa428b3ade1 upstream.
struct xfrm_user_offload has flags variable that received user input,
but kernel didn't check if valid bits were provided. It caused a situation
where not sanitized input was forwarded directly to the drivers.
For example, XFRM_OFFLOAD_IPV6 define that was exposed, was used by
strongswan, but not implemented in the kernel at all.
As a solution, check and sanitize input flags to forward
XFRM_OFFLOAD_INBOUND to the drivers.
Fixes: d77e38e612a0 ("xfrm: Add an IPsec hardware offloading API")
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 6d0d95a1c2b07270870e7be16575c513c29af3f1 upstream.
if_id will be always 0, because it was not yet initialized.
Fixes: 8dce43919566 ("xfrm: interface with if_id 0 should return error")
Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 23e7b1bfed61e301853b5e35472820d919498278 upstream.
Similar to commit 94e2238969e8 ("xfrm4: strip ECN bits from tos field"),
clear the ECN bits from iph->tos when setting ->flowi4_tos.
This ensures that the last bit of ->flowi4_tos is cleared, so
ip_route_output_key_hash() isn't going to restrict the scope of the
route lookup.
Use ~INET_ECN_MASK instead of IPTOS_RT_MASK, because we have no reason
to clear the high order bits.
Found by code inspection, compile tested only.
Fixes: 4da3089f2b58 ("[IPSEC]: Use TOS when doing tunnel lookups")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit bcf141b2eb551b3477b24997ebc09c65f117a803 upstream.
On egress side, xfrm lookup is called from __gre6_xmit() with the
fl6_gre_key field not initialized leading to policies selectors check
failure. Consequently, gre packets are sent without encryption.
On ingress side, INET6_PROTO_NOPOLICY was set, thus packets were not
checked against xfrm policies. Like for egress side, fl6_gre_key should be
correctly set, this is now done in decode_session6().
Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ghalem Boudour <ghalem.boudour@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 4e484b3e969b52effd95c17f7a86f39208b2ccf4 ]
Kernel generates mapping change message, XFRM_MSG_MAPPING,
when a source port chage is detected on a input state with UDP
encapsulation set. Kernel generates a message for each IPsec packet
with new source port. For a high speed flow per packet mapping change
message can be excessive, and can overload the user space listener.
Introduce rate limiting for XFRM_MSG_MAPPING message to the user space.
The rate limiting is configurable via netlink, when adding a new SA or
updating it. Use the new attribute XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH in seconds.
v1->v2 change:
update xfrm_sa_len()
v2->v3 changes:
use u32 insted unsigned long to reduce size of struct xfrm_state
fix xfrm_ompat size Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
accept XFRM_MSG_MAPPING only when XFRMA_ENCAP is present
Co-developed-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 68ac0f3810e76a853b5f7b90601a05c3048b8b54 ]
xfrm ineterface does not allow xfrm if_id = 0
fail to create or update xfrm state and policy.
With this commit:
ip xfrm policy add src 192.0.2.1 dst 192.0.2.2 dir out if_id 0
RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
ip xfrm state add src 192.0.2.1 dst 192.0.2.2 proto esp spi 1 \
reqid 1 mode tunnel aead 'rfc4106(gcm(aes))' \
0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 96 if_id 0
RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
v1->v2 change:
- add Fixes: tag
Fixes: 9f8550e4bd9d ("xfrm: fix disable_xfrm sysctl when used on xfrm interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 8dce43919566f06e865f7e8949f5c10d8c2493f5 ]
xfrm interface if_id = 0 would cause xfrm policy lookup errors since
Commit 9f8550e4bd9d.
Now explicitly fail to create an xfrm interface when if_id = 0
With this commit:
ip link add ipsec0 type xfrm dev lo if_id 0
Error: if_id must be non zero.
v1->v2 change:
- add Fixes: tag
Fixes: 9f8550e4bd9d ("xfrm: fix disable_xfrm sysctl when used on xfrm interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 7770a39d7c63faec6c4f33666d49a8cb664d0482 ]
copy_user_offload() will actually push a struct struct xfrm_user_offload,
which is different than (struct xfrm_state *)->xso
(struct xfrm_state_offload)
Fixes: d77e38e612a01 ("xfrm: Add an IPsec hardware offloading API")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 480e93e12aa04d857f7cc2e6fcec181c0d690404 ]
The list_for_each_entry() iterator, "pos" in this code, can never be
NULL so the warning will never be printed.
Signed-off-by: Harshvardhan Jha <harshvardhan.jha@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 4e9505064f58d1252805952f8547a5b7dbc5c111 upstream.
The attribute-translator has to take in mind maxtype, that is
xfrm_link::nla_max. When it is set, attributes are not of xfrm_attr_type_t.
Currently, they can be only XFRMA_SPD_MAX (message XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO),
their UABI is the same for 64/32-bit, so just copy them.
Thanks to YueHaibing for reporting this:
In xfrm_user_rcv_msg_compat() if maxtype is not zero and less than
XFRMA_MAX, nlmsg_parse_deprecated() do not initialize attrs array fully.
xfrm_xlate32() will access uninit 'attrs[i]' while iterating all attrs
array.
KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000041b58ab0-0x0000000041b58ab7]
CPU: 0 PID: 15799 Comm: syz-executor.2 Tainted: G W 5.14.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
RIP: 0010:nla_type include/net/netlink.h:1130 [inline]
RIP: 0010:xfrm_xlate32_attr net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c:410 [inline]
RIP: 0010:xfrm_xlate32 net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c:532 [inline]
RIP: 0010:xfrm_user_rcv_msg_compat+0x5e5/0x1070 net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c:577
[...]
Call Trace:
xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x556/0x8b0 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:2774
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504
xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6b/0x90 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:2824
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340
netlink_sendmsg+0x86d/0xdb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:702 [inline]
Fixes: 5106f4a8acff ("xfrm/compat: Add 32=>64-bit messages translator")
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 2580d3f40022642452dd8422bfb8c22e54cf84bb upstream.
xfrm_bydst_resize() calls synchronize_rcu() while holding
hash_resize_mutex. But then on PREEMPT_RT configurations,
xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype() may acquire that mutex while running in an
RCU read side critical section. This results in a deadlock.
In fact the scope of hash_resize_mutex is way beyond the purpose of
xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype() to just fetch a coherent and stable policy
for a given destination/direction, along with other details.
The lower level net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock, which among other things
protects per destination/direction references to policy entries, is
enough to serialize and benefit from priority inheritance against the
write side. As a bonus, it makes it officially a per network namespace
synchronization business where a policy table resize on namespace A
shouldn't block a policy lookup on namespace B.
Fixes: 77cc278f7b20 (xfrm: policy: Use sequence counters with associated lock)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ahmed S. Darwish <a.darwish@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Varad Gautam <varad.gautam@suse.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 7c1a80e80cde008f271bae630d28cf684351e807 ]
Syzbot reported memory leak in xfrm_user_rcv_msg(). The
problem was is non-freed skb's frag_list.
In skb_release_all() skb_release_data() will be called only
in case of skb->head != NULL, but netlink_skb_destructor()
sets head to NULL. So, allocated frag_list skb should be
freed manualy, since consume_skb() won't take care of it
Fixes: 5106f4a8acff ("xfrm/compat: Add 32=>64-bit messages translator")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fb347cf82c73a90efcca@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 6fd06963fa74197103cdbb4b494763127b3f2f34 ]
When memory allocation for XFRMA_ENCAP or XFRMA_COADDR fails,
the error will not be reported because the -ENOMEM assignment
to the err variable is overwritten before. Fix this by moving
these two in front of the function so that memory allocation
failures will be reported.
Reported-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit dd72fadf2186fc8a6018f97fe72f4d5ca05df440 ]
In case of xfrm offload, if xdo_dev_state_add() of driver returns
-EOPNOTSUPP, xfrm offload fallback is failed.
In xfrm state_add() both xso->dev and xso->real_dev are initialized to
dev and when err(-EOPNOTSUPP) is returned only xso->dev is set to null.
So in this scenario the condition in func validate_xmit_xfrm(),
if ((x->xso.dev != dev) && (x->xso.real_dev == dev))
return skb;
returns true, due to which skb is returned without calling esp_xmit()
below which has fallback code. Hence the CRYPTO_FALLBACK is failing.
So fixing this with by keeping x->xso.real_dev as NULL when err is
returned in func xfrm_dev_state_add().
Fixes: bdfd2d1fa79a ("bonding/xfrm: use real_dev instead of slave_dev")
Signed-off-by: Ayush Sawal <ayush.sawal@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit eebd49a4ffb420a991c606e54aa3c9f02857a334 ]
In commit 68dc022d04eb ("xfrm: BEET mode doesn't support fragments
for inner packets"), it tried to fix the issue that in TX side the
packet is fragmented before the ESP encapping while in the RX side
the fragments always get reassembled before decapping with ESP.
This is not true for IPv6. IPv6 is different, and it's using exthdr
to save fragment info, as well as the ESP info. Exthdrs are added
in TX and processed in RX both in order. So in the above case, the
ESP decapping will be done earlier than the fragment reassembling
in TX side.
Here just remove the fragment check for the IPv6 inner packets to
recover the fragments support for BEET mode.
Fixes: 68dc022d04eb ("xfrm: BEET mode doesn't support fragments for inner packets")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit b515d2637276a3810d6595e10ab02c13bfd0b63a ]
Jianwen reported that IPv6 Interoperability tests are failing in an
IPsec case where one of the links between the IPsec peers has an MTU
of 1280. The peer generates a packet larger than this MTU, the router
replies with a "Packet too big" message indicating an MTU of 1280.
When the peer tries to send another large packet, xfrm_state_mtu
returns 1280 - ipsec_overhead, which causes ip6_setup_cork to fail
with EINVAL.
We can fix this by forcing xfrm_state_mtu to return IPV6_MIN_MTU when
IPv6 is used. After going through IPsec, the packet will then be
fragmented to obey the actual network's PMTU, just before leaving the
host.
Currently, TFC padding is capped to PMTU - overhead to avoid
fragementation: after padding and encapsulation, we still fit within
the PMTU. That behavior is preserved in this patch.
Fixes: 91657eafb64b ("xfrm: take net hdr len into account for esp payload size calculation")
Reported-by: Jianwen Ji <jiji@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 68dc022d04eb0fd60a540e242dcb11ec1bee07e2 ]
BEET mode replaces the IP(6) Headers with new IP(6) Headers when sending
packets. However, when it's a fragment before the replacement, currently
kernel keeps the fragment flag and replace the address field then encaps
it with ESP. It would cause in RX side the fragments to get reassembled
before decapping with ESP, which is incorrect.
In Xiumei's testing, these fragments went over an xfrm interface and got
encapped with ESP in the device driver, and the traffic was broken.
I don't have a good way to fix it, but only to warn this out in dmesg.
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit c7dbf4c08868d9db89b8bfe8f8245ca61b01ed2f ]
Commit 94579ac3f6d0 ("xfrm: Fix double ESP trailer insertion in IPsec
crypto offload.") added a XFRM_XMIT flag to avoid duplicate ESP trailer
insertion on HW offload. This flag is set on the secpath that is shared
amongst segments. This lead to a situation where some segments are
not transformed correctly when segmentation happens at layer 3.
Fix this by using private skb extensions for segmented and hw offloaded
ESP packets.
Fixes: 94579ac3f6d0 ("xfrm: Fix double ESP trailer insertion in IPsec crypto offload.")
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit e88add19f68191448427a6e4eb059664650a837f ]
A sequence counter write section must be serialized or its internal
state can get corrupted. The "xfrm_state_hash_generation" seqcount is
global, but its write serialization lock (net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock) is
instantiated per network namespace. The write protection is thus
insufficient.
To provide full protection, localize the sequence counter per network
namespace instead. This should be safe as both the seqcount read and
write sections access data exclusively within the network namespace. It
also lays the foundation for transforming "xfrm_state_hash_generation"
data type from seqcount_t to seqcount_LOCKNAME_t in further commits.
Fixes: b65e3d7be06f ("xfrm: state: add sequence count to detect hash resizes")
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <a.darwish@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 9ab1265d52314fce1b51e8665ea6dbc9ac1a027c ]
A situation can occur where the interface bound to the sk is different
to the interface bound to the sk attached to the skb. The interface
bound to the sk is the correct one however this information is lost inside
xfrm_output2 and instead the sk on the skb is used in xfrm_output_resume
instead. This assumes that the sk bound interface and the bound interface
attached to the sk within the skb are the same which can lead to lookup
failures inside ip_route_me_harder resulting in the packet being dropped.
We have an l2tp v3 tunnel with ipsec protection. The tunnel is in the
global VRF however we have an encapsulated dot1q tunnel interface that
is within a different VRF. We also have a mangle rule that marks the
packets causing them to be processed inside ip_route_me_harder.
Prior to commit 31c70d5956fc ("l2tp: keep original skb ownership") this
worked fine as the sk attached to the skb was changed from the dot1q
encapsulated interface to the sk for the tunnel which meant the interface
bound to the sk and the interface bound to the skb were identical.
Commit 46d6c5ae953c ("netfilter: use actual socket sk rather than skb sk
when routing harder") fixed some of these issues however a similar
problem existed in the xfrm code.
Fixes: 31c70d5956fc ("l2tp: keep original skb ownership")
Signed-off-by: Evan Nimmo <evan.nimmo@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 8fc0e3b6a8666d656923d214e4dc791e9a17164a ]
Frag needed should only be sent if the header enables DF.
This fix allows packets larger than MTU to pass the xfrm interface
and be fragmented after encapsulation, aligning behavior with
non-interface xfrm.
Fixes: f203b76d7809 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit ef19e111337f6c3dca7019a8bad5fbc6fb18d635 upstream.
Replace WARN_ONCE() that can be triggered from userspace with
pr_warn_once(). Those still give user a hint what's the issue.
I've left WARN()s that are not possible to trigger with current
code-base and that would mean that the code has issues:
- relying on current compat_msg_min[type] <= xfrm_msg_min[type]
- expected 4-byte padding size difference between
compat_msg_min[type] and xfrm_msg_min[type]
- compat_policy[type].len <= xfrma_policy[type].len
(for every type)
Reported-by: syzbot+834ffd1afc7212eb8147@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 5f3eea6b7e8f ("xfrm/compat: Attach xfrm dumps to 64=>32 bit translator")
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit da64ae2d35d3673233f0403b035d4c6acbf71965 ]
Use three-way comparison for address components to avoid integer
wraparound in the result of xfrm_policy_addr_delta(). This ensures
that the search trees are built and traversed correctly.
Treat IPv4 and IPv6 similarly by returning 0 when prefixlen == 0.
Prefix /0 has only one equivalence class.
Fixes: 9cf545ebd591d ("xfrm: policy: store inexact policies in a tree ordered by destination address")
Signed-off-by: Visa Hankala <visa@hankala.org>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 9f8550e4bd9d78a8436c2061ad2530215f875376 ]
The disable_xfrm flag signals that xfrm should not be performed during
routing towards a device before reaching device xmit.
For xfrm interfaces this is usually desired as they perform the outbound
policy lookup as part of their xmit using their if_id.
Before this change enabling this flag on xfrm interfaces prevented them
from xmitting as xfrm_lookup_with_ifid() would not perform a policy lookup
in case the original dst had the DST_NOXFRM flag.
This optimization is incorrect when the lookup is done by the xfrm
interface xmit logic.
Fix by performing policy lookup when invoked by xfrmi as if_id != 0.
Similarly it's unlikely for the 'no policy exists on net' check to yield
any performance benefits when invoked from xfrmi.
Fixes: f203b76d7809 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 56ce7c25ae1525d83cf80a880cf506ead1914250 ]
When setting xfrm replay_window to values higher than 32, a rare
page-fault occurs in xfrm_replay_advance_bmp:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8af350ad7920
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD ad001067 P4D ad001067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 3 PID: 30 Comm: ksoftirqd/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.4.52-050452-generic #202007160732
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:xfrm_replay_advance_bmp+0xbb/0x130
RSP: 0018:ffffa1304013ba40 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 000000000000010d RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000ffffff4b
RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: 00000000004c234c RDI: 00000000ffb3dbff
RBP: ffffa1304013ba50 R08: ffff8af330ad7920 R09: 0000000007fffffa
R10: 0000000000000800 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: ffff8af29d6258c0
R13: ffff8af28b95c700 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8af29d6258fc
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8af339ac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff8af350ad7920 CR3: 0000000015ee4000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Call Trace:
xfrm_input+0x4e5/0xa10
xfrm4_rcv_encap+0xb5/0xe0
xfrm4_udp_encap_rcv+0x140/0x1c0
Analysis revealed offending code is when accessing:
replay_esn->bmp[nr] |= (1U << bitnr);
with 'nr' being 0x07fffffa.
This happened in an SMP system when reordering of packets was present;
A packet arrived with a "too old" sequence number (outside the window,
i.e 'diff > replay_window'), and therefore the following calculation:
bitnr = replay_esn->replay_window - (diff - pos);
yields a negative result, but since bitnr is u32 we get a large unsigned
quantity (in crash dump above: 0xffffff4b seen in ecx).
This was supposed to be protected by xfrm_input()'s former call to:
if (x->repl->check(x, skb, seq)) {
However, the state's spinlock x->lock is *released* after '->check()'
is performed, and gets re-acquired before '->advance()' - which gives a
chance for a different core to update the xfrm state, e.g. by advancing
'replay_esn->seq' when it encounters more packets - leading to a
'diff > replay_window' situation when original core continues to
xfrm_replay_advance_bmp().
An attempt to fix this issue was suggested in commit bcf66bf54aab
("xfrm: Perform a replay check after return from async codepaths"),
by calling 'x->repl->recheck()' after lock is re-acquired, but fix
applied only to asyncronous crypto algorithms.
Augment the fix, by *always* calling 'recheck()' - irrespective if we're
using async crypto.
Fixes: 0ebea8ef3559 ("[IPSEC]: Move state lock into x->type->input")
Signed-off-by: Shmulik Ladkani <shmulik.ladkani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
if xfrm_get_translator() failed, xfrm_user_policy() return without
freeing 'data', which is allocated in memdup_sockptr().
Fixes: 96392ee5a13b ("xfrm/compat: Translate 32-bit user_policy from sockptr")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
|
|
32-bit to 64-bit messages translator zerofies needed paddings in the
translation, the rest is the actual payload.
Don't allocate zero pages as they are not needed.
Fixes: 5106f4a8acff ("xfrm/compat: Add 32=>64-bit messages translator")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
|
|
32-bit messages translated by xfrm_compat can have attributes attached.
For all, but XFRMA_SA, XFRMA_POLICY the size of payload is the same
in 32-bit UABI and 64-bit UABI. For XFRMA_SA (struct xfrm_usersa_info)
and XFRMA_POLICY (struct xfrm_userpolicy_info) it's only tail-padding
that is present in 64-bit payload, but not in 32-bit.
The proper size for destination nlattr is already calculated by
xfrm_user_rcv_calculate_len64() and allocated with kvmalloc().
xfrm_attr_cpy32() copies 32-bit copy_len into 64-bit attribute
translated payload, zero-filling possible padding for SA/POLICY.
Due to a typo, *pos already has 64-bit payload size, in a result next
memset(0) is called on the memory after the translated attribute, not on
the tail-padding of it.
Fixes: 5106f4a8acff ("xfrm/compat: Add 32=>64-bit messages translator")
Reported-by: syzbot+c43831072e7df506a646@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
|
|
xfrm_xlate32() translates 64-bit message provided by kernel to be sent
for 32-bit listener (acknowledge or monitor). Translator code doesn't
expect XFRMA_UNSPEC attribute as it doesn't know its payload.
Kernel never attaches such attribute, but a user can.
I've searched if any opensource does it and the answer is no.
Nothing on github and google finds only tfcproject that has such code
commented-out.
What will happen if a user sends a netlink message with XFRMA_UNSPEC
attribute? Ipsec code ignores this attribute. But if there is a
monitor-process or 32-bit user requested ack - kernel will try to
translate such message and will hit WARN_ONCE() in xfrm_xlate64_attr().
Deal with XFRMA_UNSPEC by copying the attribute payload with
xfrm_nla_cpy(). In result, the default switch-case in xfrm_xlate64_attr()
becomes an unused code. Leave those 3 lines in case a new xfrm attribute
will be added.
Fixes: 5461fc0c8d9f ("xfrm/compat: Add 64=>32-bit messages translator")
Reported-by: syzbot+a7e701c8385bd8543074@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
1) Fix packet receiving of standard IP tunnels when the xfrm_interface
module is installed. From Xin Long.
2) Fix a race condition between spi allocating and hash list
resizing. From zhuoliang zhang.
====================
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
we found that the following race condition exists in
xfrm_alloc_userspi flow:
user thread state_hash_work thread
---- ----
xfrm_alloc_userspi()
__find_acq_core()
/*alloc new xfrm_state:x*/
xfrm_state_alloc()
/*schedule state_hash_work thread*/
xfrm_hash_grow_check() xfrm_hash_resize()
xfrm_alloc_spi /*hold lock*/
x->id.spi = htonl(spi) spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock)
/*waiting lock release*/ xfrm_hash_transfer()
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock) /*add x into hlist:net->xfrm.state_byspi*/
hlist_add_head_rcu(&x->byspi)
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock)
/*add x into hlist:net->xfrm.state_byspi 2 times*/
hlist_add_head_rcu(&x->byspi)
1. a new state x is alloced in xfrm_state_alloc() and added into the bydst hlist
in __find_acq_core() on the LHS;
2. on the RHS, state_hash_work thread travels the old bydst and tranfers every xfrm_state
(include x) into the new bydst hlist and new byspi hlist;
3. user thread on the LHS gets the lock and adds x into the new byspi hlist again.
So the same xfrm_state (x) is added into the same list_hash
(net->xfrm.state_byspi) 2 times that makes the list_hash become
an inifite loop.
To fix the race, x->id.spi = htonl(spi) in the xfrm_alloc_spi() is moved
to the back of spin_lock_bh, sothat state_hash_work thread no longer add x
which id.spi is zero into the hash_list.
Fixes: f034b5d4efdf ("[XFRM]: Dynamic xfrm_state hash table sizing.")
Signed-off-by: zhuoliang zhang <zhuoliang.zhang@mediatek.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
|
|
Simplify the code by using new function dev_fetch_sw_netstats().
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a6b816f4-bbf2-9db0-d59a-7e4e9cc808fe@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
As Nicolas noticed in his case, when xfrm_interface module is installed
the standard IP tunnels will break in receiving packets.
This is caused by the IP tunnel handlers with a higher priority in xfrm
interface processing incoming packets by xfrm_input(), which would drop
the packets and return 0 instead when anything wrong happens.
Rather than changing xfrm_input(), this patch is to adjust the priority
for the IP tunnel handlers in xfrm interface, so that the packets would
go to xfrmi's later than the others', as the others' would not drop the
packets when the handlers couldn't process them.
Note that IPCOMP also defines its own IPIP tunnel handler and it calls
xfrm_input() as well, so we must make its priority lower than xfrmi's,
which means having xfrmi loaded would still break IPCOMP. We may seek
another way to fix it in xfrm_input() in the future.
Reported-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Tested-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Fixes: da9bbf0598c9 ("xfrm: interface: support IPIP and IPIP6 tunnels processing with .cb_handler")
FIxes: d7b360c2869f ("xfrm: interface: support IP6IP6 and IP6IP tunnels processing with .cb_handler")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
|
|
use new helper for netstats settings
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Rejecting non-native endian BTF overlapped with the addition
of support for it.
The rest were more simple overlapping changes, except the
renesas ravb binding update, which had to follow a file
move as well as a YAML conversion.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2020-09-28
1) Fix a build warning in ip_vti if CONFIG_IPV6 is not set.
From YueHaibing.
2) Restore IPCB on espintcp before handing the packet to xfrm
as the information there is still needed.
From Sabrina Dubroca.
3) Fix pmtu updating for xfrm interfaces.
From Sabrina Dubroca.
4) Some xfrm state information was not cloned with xfrm_do_migrate.
Fixes to clone the full xfrm state, from Antony Antony.
5) Use the correct address family in xfrm_state_find. The struct
flowi must always be interpreted along with the original
address family. This got lost over the years.
Fix from Herbert Xu.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
The struct flowi must never be interpreted by itself as its size
depends on the address family. Therefore it must always be grouped
with its original family value.
In this particular instance, the original family value is lost in
the function xfrm_state_find. Therefore we get a bogus read when
it's coupled with the wrong family which would occur with inter-
family xfrm states.
This patch fixes it by keeping the original family value.
Note that the same bug could potentially occur in LSM through
the xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook. I checked the current code
there and it seems to be safe for now as only secid is used which
is part of struct flowi_common. But that API should be changed
so that so that we don't get new bugs in the future. We could
do that by replacing fl with just secid or adding a family field.
Reported-by: syzbot+577fbac3145a6eb2e7a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 48b8d78315bf ("[XFRM]: State selection update to use inner...")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
|
|
Provide compat_xfrm_userpolicy_info translation for xfrm setsocketopt().
Reallocate buffer and put the missing padding for 64-bit message.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
|
|
Provide the user-to-kernel translator under XFRM_USER_COMPAT, that
creates for 32-bit xfrm-user message a 64-bit translation.
The translation is afterwards reused by xfrm_user code just as if
userspace had sent 64-bit message.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
|
|
Currently nlmsg_unicast() is used by functions that dump structures that
can be different in size for compat tasks, see dump_one_state() and
dump_one_policy().
The following nlmsg_unicast() users exist today in xfrm:
Function | Message can be different
| in size on compat
-------------------------------------------|------------------------------
xfrm_get_spdinfo() | N
xfrm_get_sadinfo() | N
xfrm_get_sa() | Y
xfrm_alloc_userspi() | Y
xfrm_get_policy() | Y
xfrm_get_ae() | N
Besides, dump_one_state() and dump_one_policy() can be used by filtered
netlink dump for XFRM_MSG_GETSA, XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY.
Just as for xfrm multicast, allocate frag_list for compat skb journey
down to recvmsg() which will give user the desired skb according to
syscall bitness.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
|
Nicolas Dichtel
Pavel Skripkin
Steffen Klassert
Lina Wang
Yan Yan
Kai Lueke
Jiri Bohac
Leon Romanovsky
Antony Antony
Guillaume Nault
Ghalem Boudour
Eric Dumazet
Harshvardhan Jha
Dmitry Safonov
Frederic Weisbecker
Ayush Sawal
Xin Long
Sabrina Dubroca
Ahmed S. Darwish
Evan Nimmo
Eyal Birger
Visa Hankala
Shmulik Ladkani
Yu Kuai
Jakub Kicinski
zhuoliang zhang
Heiner Kallweit
Fabian Frederick
David S. Miller
Herbert Xu