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This looks like refactoring, but its also a bug fix.
Problem is that the compat path (32bit iptables, 64bit kernel) lacks a few
sanity tests that are done in the normal path.
For example, we do not check for underflows and the base chain policies.
While its possible to also add such checks to the compat path, its more
copy&pastry, for instance we cannot reuse check_underflow() helper as
e->target_offset differs in the compat case.
Other problem is that it makes auditing for validation errors harder; two
places need to be checked and kept in sync.
At a high level 32 bit compat works like this:
1- initial pass over blob:
validate match/entry offsets, bounds checking
lookup all matches and targets
do bookkeeping wrt. size delta of 32/64bit structures
assign match/target.u.kernel pointer (points at kernel
implementation, needed to access ->compatsize etc.)
2- allocate memory according to the total bookkeeping size to
contain the translated ruleset
3- second pass over original blob:
for each entry, copy the 32bit representation to the newly allocated
memory. This also does any special match translations (e.g.
adjust 32bit to 64bit longs, etc).
4- check if ruleset is free of loops (chase all jumps)
5-first pass over translated blob:
call the checkentry function of all matches and targets.
The alternative implemented by this patch is to drop steps 3&4 from the
compat process, the translation is changed into an intermediate step
rather than a full 1:1 translate_table replacement.
In the 2nd pass (step #3), change the 64bit ruleset back to a kernel
representation, i.e. put() the kernel pointer and restore ->u.user.name .
This gets us a 64bit ruleset that is in the format generated by a 64bit
iptables userspace -- we can then use translate_table() to get the
'native' sanity checks.
This has two drawbacks:
1. we re-validate all the match and target entry structure sizes even
though compat translation is supposed to never generate bogus offsets.
2. we put and then re-lookup each match and target.
THe upside is that we get all sanity tests and ruleset validations
provided by the normal path and can remove some duplicated compat code.
iptables-restore time of autogenerated ruleset with 300k chains of form
-A CHAIN0001 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0002
-A CHAIN0002 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0003
shows no noticeable differences in restore times:
old: 0m30.796s
new: 0m31.521s
64bit: 0m25.674s
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Always returned 0.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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32bit rulesets have different layout and alignment requirements, so once
more integrity checks get added to xt_check_entry_offsets it will reject
well-formed 32bit rulesets.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Once we add more sanity testing to xt_check_entry_offsets it
becomes relvant if we're expecting a 32bit 'config_compat' blob
or a normal one.
Since we already have a lot of similar-named functions (check_entry,
compat_check_entry, find_and_check_entry, etc.) and the current
incarnation is short just fold its contents into the callers.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Currently arp/ip and ip6tables each implement a short helper to check that
the target offset is large enough to hold one xt_entry_target struct and
that t->u.target_size fits within the current rule.
Unfortunately these checks are not sufficient.
To avoid adding new tests to all of ip/ip6/arptables move the current
checks into a helper, then extend this helper in followup patches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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When we see a jump also check that the offset gets us to beginning of
a rule (an ipt_entry).
The extra overhead is negible, even with absurd cases.
300k custom rules, 300k jumps to 'next' user chain:
[ plus one jump from INPUT to first userchain ]:
Before:
real 0m24.874s
user 0m7.532s
sys 0m16.076s
After:
real 0m27.464s
user 0m7.436s
sys 0m18.840s
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Base chains enforce absolute verdict.
User defined chains are supposed to end with an unconditional return,
xtables userspace adds them automatically.
But if such return is missing we will move to non-existent next rule.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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GET_ENTRIES
Make sure the table names via getsockopt GET_ENTRIES is nul-terminated
in ebtables and all the x_tables variants and their respective compat
code. Uncovered by KASAN.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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We should check that e->target_offset is sane before
mark_source_chains gets called since it will fetch the target entry
for loop detection.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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delay hook registration until the table is being requested inside a
namespace.
Historically, a particular table (iptables mangle, ip6tables filter, etc)
was registered on module load.
When netns support was added to iptables only the ip/ip6tables ruleset was
made namespace aware, not the actual hook points.
This means f.e. that when ipt_filter table/module is loaded on a system,
then each namespace on that system has an (empty) iptables filter ruleset.
In other words, if a namespace sends a packet, such skb is 'caught' by
netfilter machinery and fed to hooking points for that table (i.e. INPUT,
FORWARD, etc).
Thanks to Eric Biederman, hooks are no longer global, but per namespace.
This means that we can avoid allocation of empty ruleset in a namespace and
defer hook registration until we need the functionality.
We register a tables hook entry points ONLY in the initial namespace.
When an iptables get/setockopt is issued inside a given namespace, we check
if the table is found in the per-namespace list.
If not, we attempt to find it in the initial namespace, and, if found,
create an empty default table in the requesting namespace and register the
needed hooks.
Hook points are destroyed only once namespace is deleted, there is no
'usage count' (it makes no sense since there is no 'remove table' operation
in xtables api).
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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This change prepares for upcoming on-demand xtables hook registration.
We change the protoypes of the register/unregister functions.
A followup patch will then add nf_hook_register/unregister calls
to the iptables one.
Once a hook is registered packets will be picked up, so all assignments
of the form
net->ipv4.iptable_$table = new_table
have to be moved to ip(6)t_register_table, else we can see NULL
net->ipv4.iptable_$table later.
This patch doesn't change functionality; without this the actual change
simply gets too big.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Use tabs instead of spaces to indent code.
No changes detected by objdiff.
Signed-off-by: Ian Morris <ipm@chirality.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Use tabs instead of spaces to indent second line of parameters in
function definitions.
No changes detected by objdiff.
Signed-off-by: Ian Morris <ipm@chirality.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Correct whitespace layout of ternary operators in the netfilter-ipv4
code.
No changes detected by objdiff.
Signed-off-by: Ian Morris <ipm@chirality.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Whitespace cleansing: Labels should not be indented.
No changes detected by objdiff.
Signed-off-by: Ian Morris <ipm@chirality.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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As xt_action_param lives on the stack this does not bloat any
persistent data structures.
This is a first step in making netfilter code that needs to know
which network namespace it is executing in simpler.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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The values of ops->hooknum and state->hook are guaraneted to be equal
making the hook argument to ip6t_do_table, arp_do_table, and
ipt_do_table is unnecessary. Remove the unnecessary hook argument.
In the callers use state->hook instead of ops->hooknum for clarity and
to reduce the number of cachelines the callers touch.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Instead of saying "net = dev_net(state->in?state->in:state->out)"
just say "state->net". As that information is now availabe,
much less confusing and much less error prone.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This reverts commit 98d1bd802cdbc8f56868fae51edec13e86b59515.
mark_source_chains will not re-visit chains, so
*filter
:INPUT ACCEPT [365:25776]
:FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0]
:OUTPUT ACCEPT [217:45832]
:t1 - [0:0]
:t2 - [0:0]
:t3 - [0:0]
:t4 - [0:0]
-A t1 -i lo -j t2
-A t2 -i lo -j t3
-A t3 -i lo -j t4
# -A INPUT -j t4
# -A INPUT -j t3
# -A INPUT -j t2
-A INPUT -j t1
COMMIT
Will compute a chain depth of 2 if the comments are removed.
Revert back to counting the number of chains for the time being.
Reported-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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sparse complains:
ip_tables.c:361:27: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different modifiers)
ip_tables.c:361:27: expected struct ipt_entry *[assigned] e
ip_tables.c:361:27: got struct ipt_entry [pure] *
doesn't change generated code.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Don't bother testing if we need to switch to alternate stack
unless TEE target is used.
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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In most cases there is no reentrancy into ip/ip6tables.
For skbs sent by REJECT or SYNPROXY targets, there is one level
of reentrancy, but its not relevant as those targets issue an absolute
verdict, i.e. the jumpstack can be clobbered since its not used
after the target issues absolute verdict (ACCEPT, DROP, STOLEN, etc).
So the only special case where it is relevant is the TEE target, which
returns XT_CONTINUE.
This patch changes ip(6)_do_table to always use the jump stack starting
from 0.
When we detect we're operating on an skb sent via TEE (percpu
nf_skb_duplicated is 1) we switch to an alternate stack to leave
the original one alone.
Since there is no TEE support for arptables, it doesn't need to
test if tee is active.
The jump stack overflow tests are no longer needed as well --
since ->stacksize is the largest call depth we cannot exceed it.
A much better alternative to the external jumpstack would be to just
declare a jumps[32] stack on the local stack frame, but that would mean
we'd have to reject iptables rulesets that used to work before.
Another alternative would be to start rejecting rulesets with a larger
call depth, e.g. 1000 -- in this case it would be feasible to allocate the
entire stack in the percpu area which would avoid one dereference.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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The {arp,ip,ip6tables} jump stack is currently sized based
on the number of user chains.
However, its rather unlikely that every user defined chain jumps to the
next, so lets use the existing loop detection logic to also track the
chain depths.
The stacksize is then set to the largest chain depth seen.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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After Florian patches, there is no need for XT_TABLE_INFO_SZ anymore :
Only one copy of table is kept, instead of one copy per cpu.
We also can avoid a dereference if we put table data right after
xt_table_info. It reduces register pressure and helps compiler.
Then, we attempt a kmalloc() if total size is under order-3 allocation,
to reduce TLB pressure, as in many cases, rules fit in 32 KB.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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We store the rule blob per (possible) cpu. Unfortunately this means we can
waste lot of memory on big smp machines. ipt_entry structure ('rule head')
is 112 byte, so e.g. with maxcpu=64 one single rule eats
close to 8k RAM.
Since previous patch made counters percpu it appears there is nothing
left in the rule blob that needs to be percpu.
On my test system (144 possible cpus, 400k dummy rules) this
change saves close to 9 Gigabyte of RAM.
Reported-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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The binary arp/ip/ip6tables ruleset is stored per cpu.
The only reason left as to why we need percpu duplication are the rule
counters embedded into ipt_entry et al -- since each cpu has its own copy
of the rules, all counters can be lockless.
The downside is that the more cpus are supported, the more memory is
required. Rules are not just duplicated per online cpu but for each
possible cpu, i.e. if maxcpu is 144, then rule is duplicated 144 times,
not for the e.g. 64 cores present.
To save some memory and also improve utilization of shared caches it
would be preferable to only store the rule blob once.
So we first need to separate counters and the rule blob.
Instead of using entry->counters, allocate this percpu and store the
percpu address in entry->counters.pcnt on CONFIG_SMP.
This change makes no sense as-is; it is merely an intermediate step to
remove the percpu duplication of the rule set in a followup patch.
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Pablo Neira Ayuso says:
====================
Netfilter updates for net-next
The following patchset contains Netfilter updates for net-next, they are:
1) default CONFIG_NETFILTER_INGRESS to y for easier compile-testing of all
options.
2) Allow to bind a table to net_device. This introduces the internal
NFT_AF_NEEDS_DEV flag to perform a mandatory check for this binding.
This is required by the next patch.
3) Add the 'netdev' table family, this new table allows you to create ingress
filter basechains. This provides access to the existing nf_tables features
from ingress.
4) Kill unused argument from compat_find_calc_{match,target} in ip_tables
and ip6_tables, from Florian Westphal.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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After improving setsockopt() coverage in trinity, I started triggering
vmalloc failures pretty reliably from this code path:
warn_alloc_failed+0xe9/0x140
__vmalloc_node_range+0x1be/0x270
vzalloc+0x4b/0x50
__do_replace+0x52/0x260 [ip_tables]
do_ipt_set_ctl+0x15d/0x1d0 [ip_tables]
nf_setsockopt+0x65/0x90
ip_setsockopt+0x61/0xa0
raw_setsockopt+0x16/0x60
sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
It turns out we don't validate that the num_counters field in the
struct we pass in from userspace is initialized.
The same problem also exists in ebtables, arptables, ipv6, and the
compat variants.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Since fab4085 ("netfilter: log: nf_log_packet() as real unified
interface"), the loginfo structure that is passed to nf_log_packet() is
used to explicitly indicate the logger type you want to use.
This is a problem for people tracing rules through nfnetlink_log since
packets are always routed to the NF_LOG_TYPE logger after the
aforementioned patch.
We can fix this by removing the trace loginfo structures, but that still
changes the log level from 4 to 5 for tracing messages and there may be
someone relying on this outthere. So let's just introduce a new
nf_log_trace() function that restores the former behaviour.
Reported-by: Markus Kötter <koetter@rrzn.uni-hannover.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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All xtables variants suffer from the defect that the copy_to_user()
to copy the counters to user memory may fail after the table has
already been exchanged and thus exposed. Return an error at this
point will result in freeing the already exposed table. Any
subsequent packet processing will result in a kernel panic.
We can't copy the counters before exposing the new tables as we
want provide the counter state after the old table has been
unhooked. Therefore convert this into a silent error.
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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During kernel stability testing on an SMP ARMv7 system, Yalin Wang
reported the following panic from the netfilter code:
1fe0: 0000001c 5e2d3b10 4007e779 4009e110 60000010 00000032 ff565656 ff545454
[<c06c48dc>] (ipt_do_table+0x448/0x584) from [<c0655ef0>] (nf_iterate+0x48/0x7c)
[<c0655ef0>] (nf_iterate+0x48/0x7c) from [<c0655f7c>] (nf_hook_slow+0x58/0x104)
[<c0655f7c>] (nf_hook_slow+0x58/0x104) from [<c0683bbc>] (ip_local_deliver+0x88/0xa8)
[<c0683bbc>] (ip_local_deliver+0x88/0xa8) from [<c0683718>] (ip_rcv_finish+0x418/0x43c)
[<c0683718>] (ip_rcv_finish+0x418/0x43c) from [<c062b1c4>] (__netif_receive_skb+0x4cc/0x598)
[<c062b1c4>] (__netif_receive_skb+0x4cc/0x598) from [<c062b314>] (process_backlog+0x84/0x158)
[<c062b314>] (process_backlog+0x84/0x158) from [<c062de84>] (net_rx_action+0x70/0x1dc)
[<c062de84>] (net_rx_action+0x70/0x1dc) from [<c0088230>] (__do_softirq+0x11c/0x27c)
[<c0088230>] (__do_softirq+0x11c/0x27c) from [<c008857c>] (do_softirq+0x44/0x50)
[<c008857c>] (do_softirq+0x44/0x50) from [<c0088614>] (local_bh_enable_ip+0x8c/0xd0)
[<c0088614>] (local_bh_enable_ip+0x8c/0xd0) from [<c06b0330>] (inet_stream_connect+0x164/0x298)
[<c06b0330>] (inet_stream_connect+0x164/0x298) from [<c061d68c>] (sys_connect+0x88/0xc8)
[<c061d68c>] (sys_connect+0x88/0xc8) from [<c000e340>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30)
Code: 2a000021 e59d2028 e59de01c e59f011c (e7824103)
---[ end trace da227214a82491bd ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
This comes about because CPU1 is executing xt_replace_table in response
to a setsockopt syscall, resulting in:
ret = xt_jumpstack_alloc(newinfo);
--> newinfo->jumpstack = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
[...]
table->private = newinfo;
newinfo->initial_entries = private->initial_entries;
Meanwhile, CPU0 is handling the network receive path and ends up in
ipt_do_table, resulting in:
private = table->private;
[...]
jumpstack = (struct ipt_entry **)private->jumpstack[cpu];
On weakly ordered memory architectures, the writes to table->private
and newinfo->jumpstack from CPU1 can be observed out of order by CPU0.
Furthermore, on architectures which don't respect ordering of address
dependencies (i.e. Alpha), the reads from CPU0 can also be re-ordered.
This patch adds an smp_wmb() before the assignment to table->private
(which is essentially publishing newinfo) to ensure that all writes to
newinfo will be observed before plugging it into the table structure.
A dependent-read barrier is also added on the consumer sides, to ensure
the same ordering requirements are also respected there.
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Wang, Yalin <Yalin.Wang@sonymobile.com>
Tested-by: Wang, Yalin <Yalin.Wang@sonymobile.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Add copyright statements to all netfilter files which have had significant
changes done by myself in the past.
Some notes:
- nf_conntrack_ecache.c was incorrectly attributed to Rusty and Netfilter
Core Team when it got split out of nf_conntrack_core.c. The copyrights
even state a date which lies six years before it was written. It was
written in 2005 by Harald and myself.
- net/ipv{4,6}/netfilter.c, net/netfitler/nf_queue.c were missing copyright
statements. I've added the copyright statement from net/netfilter/core.c,
where this code originated
- for nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c I've also added Jozsef, since I didn't want
it to give the wrong impression
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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This patch adds netns support to nf_log and it prepares netns
support for existing loggers. It is composed of four major
changes.
1) nf_log_register has been split to two functions: nf_log_register
and nf_log_set. The new nf_log_register is used to globally
register the nf_logger and nf_log_set is used for enabling
pernet support from nf_loggers.
Per netns is not yet complete after this patch, it comes in
separate follow up patches.
2) Add net as a parameter of nf_log_bind_pf. Per netns is not
yet complete after this patch, it only allows to bind the
nf_logger to the protocol family from init_net and it skips
other cases.
3) Adapt all nf_log_packet callers to pass netns as parameter.
After this patch, this function only works for init_net.
4) Make the sysctl net/netfilter/nf_log pernet.
Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Allow an unpriviled user who has created a user namespace, and then
created a network namespace to effectively use the new network
namespace, by reducing capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) and
capable(CAP_NET_RAW) calls to be ns_capable(net->user_ns,
CAP_NET_ADMIN), or capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) calls.
Settings that merely control a single network device are allowed.
Either the network device is a logical network device where
restrictions make no difference or the network device is hardware NIC
that has been explicity moved from the initial network namespace.
In general policy and network stack state changes are allowed
while resource control is left unchanged.
Allow creating raw sockets.
Allow the SIOCSARP ioctl to control the arp cache.
Allow the SIOCSIFFLAG ioctl to allow setting network device flags.
Allow the SIOCSIFADDR ioctl to allow setting a netdevice ipv4 address.
Allow the SIOCSIFBRDADDR ioctl to allow setting a netdevice ipv4 broadcast address.
Allow the SIOCSIFDSTADDR ioctl to allow setting a netdevice ipv4 destination address.
Allow the SIOCSIFNETMASK ioctl to allow setting a netdevice ipv4 netmask.
Allow the SIOCADDRT and SIOCDELRT ioctls to allow adding and deleting ipv4 routes.
Allow the SIOCADDTUNNEL, SIOCCHGTUNNEL and SIOCDELTUNNEL ioctls for
adding, changing and deleting gre tunnels.
Allow the SIOCADDTUNNEL, SIOCCHGTUNNEL and SIOCDELTUNNEL ioctls for
adding, changing and deleting ipip tunnels.
Allow the SIOCADDTUNNEL, SIOCCHGTUNNEL and SIOCDELTUNNEL ioctls for
adding, changing and deleting ipsec virtual tunnel interfaces.
Allow setting the MRT_INIT, MRT_DONE, MRT_ADD_VIF, MRT_DEL_VIF, MRT_ADD_MFC,
MRT_DEL_MFC, MRT_ASSERT, MRT_PIM, MRT_TABLE socket options on multicast routing
sockets.
Allow setting and receiving IPOPT_CIPSO, IP_OPT_SEC, IP_OPT_SID and
arbitrary ip options.
Allow setting IP_SEC_POLICY/IP_XFRM_POLICY ipv4 socket option.
Allow setting the IP_TRANSPARENT ipv4 socket option.
Allow setting the TCP_REPAIR socket option.
Allow setting the TCP_CONGESTION socket option.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Standardize the net core ratelimited logging functions.
Coalesce formats, align arguments.
Change a printk then vprintk sequence to use printf extension %pV.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Use of "unsigned int" is preferred to bare "unsigned" in net tree.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kaber/nf-next-2.6
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We currently use a percpu spinlock to 'protect' rule bytes/packets
counters, after various attempts to use RCU instead.
Lately we added a seqlock so that get_counters() can run without
blocking BH or 'writers'. But we really only need the seqcount in it.
Spinlock itself is only locked by the current/owner cpu, so we can
remove it completely.
This cleanups api, using correct 'writer' vs 'reader' semantic.
At replace time, the get_counters() call makes sure all cpus are done
using the old table.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@medozas.de>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
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Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed.
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
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commit f3c5c1bfd4308 (make ip_tables reentrant) introduced a race in
handling the stackptr restore, at the end of ipt_do_table()
We should do it before the call to xt_info_rdunlock_bh(), or we allow
cpu preemption and another cpu overwrites stackptr of original one.
A second fix is to change the underflow test to check the origptr value
instead of 0 to detect underflow, or else we allow a jump from different
hooks.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@medozas.de>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
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Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first and the third bugs were introduced before the git epoch; the
second was introduced in 2722971c (v2.6.17-rc1). To trigger the bug
one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
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Florian Westphal
Pablo Neira Ayuso
Ian Morris
Eric W. Biederman
Eric Dumazet
David S. Miller
Dave Jones
Thomas Graf
Will Deacon
Patrick McHardy
Gao feng
YOSHIFUJI Hideaki / 吉藤英明
Joe Perches
Eric Dumazet
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
Lucas De Marchi
Vasiliy Kulikov