Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
# Conflicts:
# kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
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This is the 4.14.240 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Tue 20 Jul 2021 10:19:07 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
# Conflicts:
# kernel/kthread.c
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This is the 4.14.239 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Sun 11 Jul 2021 06:48:23 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
# Conflicts:
# drivers/target/target_core_transport.c
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Linux 4.14.238
# gpg: Signature made Wed 30 Jun 2021 09:21:58 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key E27E5D8A3403A2EF66873BBCDEA66FF797772CDC
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
# Conflicts:
# kernel/workqueue.c
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This is the 4.14.237 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Wed 16 Jun 2021 05:53:48 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
# Conflicts:
# kernel/sched/fair.c
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This is the 4.14.236 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Thu 10 Jun 2021 06:44:06 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit b42b0bddcbc87b4c66f6497f66fc72d52b712aa7 upstream.
I got a UAF report when doing fuzz test:
[ 152.880091][ T8030] ==================================================================
[ 152.881240][ T8030] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.882442][ T8030] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810d31bd00 by task kworker/3:2/8030
[ 152.883578][ T8030]
[ 152.883932][ T8030] CPU: 3 PID: 8030 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 5.13.0+ #249
[ 152.885014][ T8030] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[ 152.886442][ T8030] Workqueue: events pwq_unbound_release_workfn
[ 152.887358][ T8030] Call Trace:
[ 152.887837][ T8030] dump_stack_lvl+0x75/0x9b
[ 152.888525][ T8030] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.889371][ T8030] print_address_description.constprop.10+0x48/0x70
[ 152.890326][ T8030] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.891163][ T8030] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.891999][ T8030] kasan_report.cold.15+0x82/0xdb
[ 152.892740][ T8030] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.893594][ T8030] __asan_load4+0x69/0x90
[ 152.894243][ T8030] pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.895057][ T8030] process_one_work+0x47b/0x890
[ 152.895778][ T8030] worker_thread+0x5c/0x790
[ 152.896439][ T8030] ? process_one_work+0x890/0x890
[ 152.897163][ T8030] kthread+0x223/0x250
[ 152.897747][ T8030] ? set_kthread_struct+0xb0/0xb0
[ 152.898471][ T8030] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 152.899114][ T8030]
[ 152.899446][ T8030] Allocated by task 8884:
[ 152.900084][ T8030] kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50
[ 152.900769][ T8030] __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[ 152.901416][ T8030] __kmalloc+0x29c/0x460
[ 152.902014][ T8030] alloc_workqueue+0x111/0x8e0
[ 152.902690][ T8030] __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x11e/0x2a0
[ 152.903459][ T8030] btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x6d/0x1d0
[ 152.904198][ T8030] scrub_workers_get+0x1e8/0x490
[ 152.904929][ T8030] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1b9/0x9c0
[ 152.905599][ T8030] btrfs_ioctl+0x122c/0x4e50
[ 152.906247][ T8030] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x190
[ 152.906916][ T8030] do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
[ 152.907535][ T8030] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 152.908365][ T8030]
[ 152.908688][ T8030] Freed by task 8884:
[ 152.909243][ T8030] kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50
[ 152.909893][ T8030] kasan_set_track+0x20/0x30
[ 152.910541][ T8030] kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40
[ 152.911265][ T8030] __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140
[ 152.911964][ T8030] kfree+0x9e/0x3d0
[ 152.912501][ T8030] alloc_workqueue+0x7d7/0x8e0
[ 152.913182][ T8030] __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x11e/0x2a0
[ 152.913949][ T8030] btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x6d/0x1d0
[ 152.914703][ T8030] scrub_workers_get+0x1e8/0x490
[ 152.915402][ T8030] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1b9/0x9c0
[ 152.916077][ T8030] btrfs_ioctl+0x122c/0x4e50
[ 152.916729][ T8030] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x190
[ 152.917414][ T8030] do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
[ 152.918034][ T8030] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 152.918872][ T8030]
[ 152.919203][ T8030] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810d31bc00
[ 152.919203][ T8030] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 152.921155][ T8030] The buggy address is located 256 bytes inside of
[ 152.921155][ T8030] 512-byte region [ffff88810d31bc00, ffff88810d31be00)
[ 152.922993][ T8030] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 152.923800][ T8030] page:ffffea000434c600 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10d318
[ 152.925249][ T8030] head:ffffea000434c600 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[ 152.926399][ T8030] flags: 0x57ff00000010200(slab|head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[ 152.927515][ T8030] raw: 057ff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888009c42c80
[ 152.928716][ T8030] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 152.929890][ T8030] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 152.930759][ T8030]
[ 152.931076][ T8030] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 152.931851][ T8030] ffff88810d31bc00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 152.932967][ T8030] ffff88810d31bc80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 152.934068][ T8030] >ffff88810d31bd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 152.935189][ T8030] ^
[ 152.935763][ T8030] ffff88810d31bd80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 152.936847][ T8030] ffff88810d31be00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 152.937940][ T8030] ==================================================================
If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails in alloc_workqueue(), it will call put_pwq()
which invoke a work queue to call pwq_unbound_release_workfn() and use the 'wq'.
The 'wq' allocated in alloc_workqueue() will be freed in error path when
apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails. So it will lead a UAF.
CPU0 CPU1
alloc_workqueue()
alloc_and_link_pwqs()
apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails
apply_wqattrs_cleanup()
schedule_work(&pwq->unbound_release_work)
kfree(wq)
worker_thread()
pwq_unbound_release_workfn() <- trigger uaf here
If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails, the new pwq are not linked, it doesn't
hold any reference to the 'wq', 'wq' is invalid to access in the worker,
so add check pwq if linked to fix this.
Fixes: 2d5f0764b526 ("workqueue: split apply_workqueue_attrs() into 3 stages")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 67f0d6d9883c13174669f88adac4f0ee656cc16a upstream.
The "rb_per_cpu_empty()" misinterpret the condition (as not-empty) when
"head_page" and "commit_page" of "struct ring_buffer_per_cpu" points to
the same buffer page, whose "buffer_data_page" is empty and "read" field
is non-zero.
An error scenario could be constructed as followed (kernel perspective):
1. All pages in the buffer has been accessed by reader(s) so that all of
them will have non-zero "read" field.
2. Read and clear all buffer pages so that "rb_num_of_entries()" will
return 0 rendering there's no more data to read. It is also required
that the "read_page", "commit_page" and "tail_page" points to the same
page, while "head_page" is the next page of them.
3. Invoke "ring_buffer_lock_reserve()" with large enough "length"
so that it shot pass the end of current tail buffer page. Now the
"head_page", "commit_page" and "tail_page" points to the same page.
4. Discard current event with "ring_buffer_discard_commit()", so that
"head_page", "commit_page" and "tail_page" points to a page whose buffer
data page is now empty.
When the error scenario has been constructed, "tracing_read_pipe" will
be trapped inside a deadloop: "trace_empty()" returns 0 since
"rb_per_cpu_empty()" returns 0 when it hits the CPU containing such
constructed ring buffer. Then "trace_find_next_entry_inc()" always
return NULL since "rb_num_of_entries()" reports there's no more entry
to read. Finally "trace_seq_to_user()" returns "-EBUSY" spanking
"tracing_read_pipe" back to the start of the "waitagain" loop.
I've also written a proof-of-concept script to construct the scenario
and trigger the bug automatically, you can use it to trace and validate
my reasoning above:
https://github.com/aegistudio/RingBufferDetonator.git
Tests has been carried out on linux kernel 5.14-rc2
(2734d6c1b1a089fb593ef6a23d4b70903526fe0c), my fixed version
of kernel (for testing whether my update fixes the bug) and
some older kernels (for range of affected kernels). Test result is
also attached to the proof-of-concept repository.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/YPaNxsIlb2yjSi5Y@aegistudio/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/YPgrN85WL9VyrZ55@aegistudio
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bf41a158cacba ("ring-buffer: make reentrant")
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Haoran Luo <www@aegistudio.net>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 72d0ad7cb5bad265adb2014dbe46c4ccb11afaba ]
The time remaining until expiry of the refresh_timer can be negative.
Casting the type to an unsigned 64-bit value will cause integer
underflow, making the runtime_refresh_within return false instead of
true. These situations are rare, but they do happen.
This does not cause user-facing issues or errors; other than
possibly unthrottling cfs_rq's using runtime from the previous period(s),
making the CFS bandwidth enforcement less strict in those (special)
situations.
Signed-off-by: Odin Ugedal <odin@uged.al>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210629121452.18429-1-odin@uged.al
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 704adfb5a9978462cd861f170201ae2b5e3d3a80 upstream.
The histogram logic was allowing events with char * pointers to be used as
normal strings. But it was easy to crash the kernel with:
# echo 'hist:keys=filename' > events/syscalls/sys_enter_openat/trigger
And open some files, and boom!
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f2ced0c3280
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 1173fa067 P4D 1173fa067 PUD 1171b6067 PMD 1171dd067 PTE 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 6 PID: 1810 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.13.0-rc5-test+ #61
Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq Pro 6300 SFF/339A, BIOS K01
v03.03 07/14/2016
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x0/0x20
Code: f6 82 80 2a 0b a9 20 74 11 0f b6 50 01 48 83 c0 01 f6 82 80 2a 0b
a9 20 75 ef c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 <80> 3f 00 74
10 48 89 f8 48 83 c0 01 80 38 00 75 f7 48 29 f8 c3
RSP: 0018:ffffbdbf81567b50 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: ffff93815cdb3800 RCX: ffff9382401a22d0
RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007f2ced0c3280
RBP: 0000000000000100 R08: ffff9382409ff074 R09: ffffbdbf81567c98
R10: ffff9382409ff074 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9382409ff074
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff93815a744f00 R15: 00007f2ced0c3280
FS: 00007f2ced0f8580(0000) GS:ffff93825a800000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f2ced0c3280 CR3: 0000000107069005 CR4: 00000000001706e0
Call Trace:
event_hist_trigger+0x463/0x5f0
? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90
? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0xd0
? lock_release+0x155/0x440
? kernel_init_free_pages+0x6d/0x90
? preempt_count_sub+0x9b/0xd0
? kernel_init_free_pages+0x6d/0x90
? get_page_from_freelist+0x12c4/0x1680
? __rb_reserve_next+0xe5/0x460
? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x12a/0x3f0
event_triggers_call+0x52/0xe0
ftrace_syscall_enter+0x264/0x2c0
syscall_trace_enter.constprop.0+0x1ee/0x210
do_syscall_64+0x1c/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Where it triggered a fault on strlen(key) where key was the filename.
The reason is that filename is a char * to user space, and the histogram
code just blindly dereferenced it, with obvious bad results.
I originally tried to use strncpy_from_user/kernel_nofault() but found
that there's other places that its dereferenced and not worth the effort.
Just do not allow "char *" to act like strings.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210715000206.025df9d2@rorschach.local.home
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Tzvetomir Stoyanov <tz.stoyanov@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Fixes: 79e577cbce4c4 ("tracing: Support string type key properly")
Fixes: 5967bd5c4239 ("tracing: Let filter_assign_type() detect FILTER_PTR_STRING")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b81b3e959adb107cd5b36c7dc5ba1364bbd31eb2 upstream.
The tgid_map array records a mapping from pid to tgid, where the index
of an entry within the array is the pid & the value stored at that index
is the tgid.
The saved_tgids_next() function iterates over pointers into the tgid_map
array & dereferences the pointers which results in the tgid, but then it
passes that dereferenced value to trace_find_tgid() which treats it as a
pid & does a further lookup within the tgid_map array. It seems likely
that the intent here was to skip over entries in tgid_map for which the
recorded tgid is zero, but instead we end up skipping over entries for
which the thread group leader hasn't yet had its own tgid recorded in
tgid_map.
A minimal fix would be to remove the call to trace_find_tgid, turning:
if (trace_find_tgid(*ptr))
into:
if (*ptr)
..but it seems like this logic can be much simpler if we simply let
seq_read() iterate over the whole tgid_map array & filter out empty
entries by returning SEQ_SKIP from saved_tgids_show(). Here we take that
approach, removing the incorrect logic here entirely.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210630003406.4013668-1-paulburton@google.com
Fixes: d914ba37d714 ("tracing: Add support for recording tgid of tasks")
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paulburton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b22afcdf04c96ca58327784e280e10288cfd3303 upstream.
Alexey and Joshua tried to solve a cpusets related hotplug problem which is
user space visible and results in unexpected behaviour for some time after
a CPU has been plugged in and the corresponding uevent was delivered.
cpusets delegate the hotplug work (rebuilding cpumasks etc.) to a
workqueue. This is done because the cpusets code has already a lock
nesting of cgroups_mutex -> cpu_hotplug_lock. A synchronous callback or
waiting for the work to finish with cpu_hotplug_lock held can and will
deadlock because that results in the reverse lock order.
As a consequence the uevent can be delivered before cpusets have consistent
state which means that a user space invocation of sched_setaffinity() to
move a task to the plugged CPU fails up to the point where the scheduled
work has been processed.
The same is true for CPU unplug, but that does not create user observable
failure (yet).
It's still inconsistent to claim that an operation is finished before it
actually is and that's the real issue at hand. uevents just make it
reliably observable.
Obviously the problem should be fixed in cpusets/cgroups, but untangling
that is pretty much impossible because according to the changelog of the
commit which introduced this 8 years ago:
3a5a6d0c2b03("cpuset: don't nest cgroup_mutex inside get_online_cpus()")
the lock order cgroups_mutex -> cpu_hotplug_lock is a design decision and
the whole code is built around that.
So bite the bullet and invoke the relevant cpuset function, which waits for
the work to finish, in _cpu_up/down() after dropping cpu_hotplug_lock and
only when tasks are not frozen by suspend/hibernate because that would
obviously wait forever.
Waiting there with cpu_add_remove_lock, which is protecting the present
and possible CPU maps, held is not a problem at all because neither work
queues nor cpusets/cgroups have any lockchains related to that lock.
Waiting in the hotplug machinery is not problematic either because there
are already state callbacks which wait for hardware queues to drain. It
makes the operations slightly slower, but hotplug is slow anyway.
This ensures that state is consistent before returning from a hotplug
up/down operation. It's still inconsistent during the operation, but that's
a different story.
Add a large comment which explains why this is done and why this is not a
dump ground for the hack of the day to work around half thought out locking
schemes. Document also the implications vs. hotplug operations and
serialization or the lack of it.
Thanks to Alexy and Joshua for analyzing why this temporary
sched_setaffinity() failure happened.
Fixes: 3a5a6d0c2b03("cpuset: don't nest cgroup_mutex inside get_online_cpus()")
Reported-by: Alexey Klimov <aklimov@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Joshua Baker <jobaker@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Alexey Klimov <aklimov@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87tuowcnv3.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync()
commit 5fa54346caf67b4b1b10b1f390316ae466da4d53 upstream.
The system might hang with the following backtrace:
schedule+0x80/0x100
schedule_timeout+0x48/0x138
wait_for_common+0xa4/0x134
wait_for_completion+0x1c/0x2c
kthread_flush_work+0x114/0x1cc
kthread_cancel_work_sync.llvm.16514401384283632983+0xe8/0x144
kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x18/0x2c
xxxx_pm_notify+0xb0/0xd8
blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x80/0x194
pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x28/0x4c
suspend_prepare+0x40/0x260
enter_state+0x80/0x3f4
pm_suspend+0x60/0xdc
state_store+0x108/0x144
kobj_attr_store+0x38/0x88
sysfs_kf_write+0x64/0xc0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x108/0x1d0
vfs_write+0x2f4/0x368
ksys_write+0x7c/0xec
It is caused by the following race between kthread_mod_delayed_work()
and kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync():
CPU0 CPU1
Context: Thread A Context: Thread B
kthread_mod_delayed_work()
spin_lock()
__kthread_cancel_work()
spin_unlock()
del_timer_sync()
kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync()
spin_lock()
__kthread_cancel_work()
spin_unlock()
del_timer_sync()
spin_lock()
work->canceling++
spin_unlock
spin_lock()
queue_delayed_work()
// dwork is put into the worker->delayed_work_list
spin_unlock()
kthread_flush_work()
// flush_work is put at the tail of the dwork
wait_for_completion()
Context: IRQ
kthread_delayed_work_timer_fn()
spin_lock()
list_del_init(&work->node);
spin_unlock()
BANG: flush_work is not longer linked and will never get proceed.
The problem is that kthread_mod_delayed_work() checks work->canceling
flag before canceling the timer.
A simple solution is to (re)check work->canceling after
__kthread_cancel_work(). But then it is not clear what should be
returned when __kthread_cancel_work() removed the work from the queue
(list) and it can't queue it again with the new @delay.
The return value might be used for reference counting. The caller has
to know whether a new work has been queued or an existing one was
replaced.
The proper solution is that kthread_mod_delayed_work() will remove the
work from the queue (list) _only_ when work->canceling is not set. The
flag must be checked after the timer is stopped and the remaining
operations can be done under worker->lock.
Note that kthread_mod_delayed_work() could remove the timer and then
bail out. It is fine. The other canceling caller needs to cancel the
timer as well. The important thing is that the queue (list)
manipulation is done atomically under worker->lock.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210610133051.15337-3-pmladek@suse.com
Fixes: 9a6b06c8d9a220860468a ("kthread: allow to modify delayed kthread work")
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reported-by: Martin Liu <liumartin@google.com>
Cc: <jenhaochen@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@google.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 34b3d5344719d14fd2185b2d9459b3abcb8cf9d8 upstream.
Patch series "kthread_worker: Fix race between kthread_mod_delayed_work()
and kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync()".
This patchset fixes the race between kthread_mod_delayed_work() and
kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync() including proper return value
handling.
This patch (of 2):
Simple code refactoring as a preparation step for fixing a race between
kthread_mod_delayed_work() and kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync().
It does not modify the existing behavior.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210610133051.15337-2-pmladek@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: <jenhaochen@google.com>
Cc: Martin Liu <liumartin@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@google.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fe19bd3dae3d15d2fbfdb3de8839a6ea0fe94264 ]
If more than one futex is placed on a shmem huge page, it can happen
that waking the second wakes the first instead, and leaves the second
waiting: the key's shared.pgoff is wrong.
When 3.11 commit 13d60f4b6ab5 ("futex: Take hugepages into account when
generating futex_key"), the only shared huge pages came from hugetlbfs,
and the code added to deal with its exceptional page->index was put into
hugetlb source. Then that was missed when 4.8 added shmem huge pages.
page_to_pgoff() is what others use for this nowadays: except that, as
currently written, it gives the right answer on hugetlbfs head, but
nonsense on hugetlbfs tails. Fix that by calling hugetlbfs-specific
hugetlb_basepage_index() on PageHuge tails as well as on head.
Yes, it's unconventional to declare hugetlb_basepage_index() there in
pagemap.h, rather than in hugetlb.h; but I do not expect anything but
page_to_pgoff() ever to need it.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: give hugetlb_basepage_index() prototype the correct scope]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b17d946b-d09-326e-b42a-52884c36df32@google.com
Fixes: 800d8c63b2e9 ("shmem: add huge pages support")
Reported-by: Neel Natu <neelnatu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Zhang Yi <wetpzy@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Note on stable backport: leave redundant #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
in kernel/futex.c, to avoid conflict over the header files included.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 89529d8b8f8daf92d9979382b8d2eb39966846ea upstream.
The trace_clock_global() tries to make sure the events between CPUs is
somewhat in order. A global value is used and updated by the latest read
of a clock. If one CPU is ahead by a little, and is read by another CPU, a
lock is taken, and if the timestamp of the other CPU is behind, it will
simply use the other CPUs timestamp.
The lock is also only taken with a "trylock" due to tracing, and strange
recursions can happen. The lock is not taken at all in NMI context.
In the case where the lock is not able to be taken, the non synced
timestamp is returned. But it will not be less than the saved global
timestamp.
The problem arises because when the time goes "backwards" the time
returned is the saved timestamp plus 1. If the lock is not taken, and the
plus one to the timestamp is returned, there's a small race that can cause
the time to go backwards!
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
trace_clock_global() {
ts = clock() [ 1000 ]
trylock(clock_lock) [ success ]
global_ts = ts; [ 1000 ]
<interrupted by NMI>
trace_clock_global() {
ts = clock() [ 999 ]
if (ts < global_ts)
ts = global_ts + 1 [ 1001 ]
trylock(clock_lock) [ fail ]
return ts [ 1001]
}
unlock(clock_lock);
return ts; [ 1000 ]
}
trace_clock_global() {
ts = clock() [ 1000 ]
if (ts < global_ts) [ false 1000 == 1000 ]
trylock(clock_lock) [ success ]
global_ts = ts; [ 1000 ]
unlock(clock_lock)
return ts; [ 1000 ]
}
The above case shows to reads of trace_clock_global() on the same CPU, but
the second read returns one less than the first read. That is, time when
backwards, and this is not what is allowed by trace_clock_global().
This was triggered by heavy tracing and the ring buffer checker that tests
for the clock going backwards:
Ring buffer clock went backwards: 20613921464 -> 20613921463
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3412 check_buffer+0x1b9/0x1c0
Modules linked in:
[..]
[CPU: 2]TIME DOES NOT MATCH expected:20620711698 actual:20620711697 delta:6790234 before:20613921463 after:20613921463
[20613915818] PAGE TIME STAMP
[20613915818] delta:0
[20613915819] delta:1
[20613916035] delta:216
[20613916465] delta:430
[20613916575] delta:110
[20613916749] delta:174
[20613917248] delta:499
[20613917333] delta:85
[20613917775] delta:442
[20613917921] delta:146
[20613918321] delta:400
[20613918568] delta:247
[20613918768] delta:200
[20613919306] delta:538
[20613919353] delta:47
[20613919980] delta:627
[20613920296] delta:316
[20613920571] delta:275
[20613920862] delta:291
[20613921152] delta:290
[20613921464] delta:312
[20613921464] delta:0 TIME EXTEND
[20613921464] delta:0
This happened more than once, and always for an off by one result. It also
started happening after commit aafe104aa9096 was added.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: aafe104aa9096 ("tracing: Restructure trace_clock_global() to never block")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4fdd595e4f9a1ff6d93ec702eaecae451cfc6591 upstream.
A while ago, when the "trace" file was opened, tracing was stopped, and
code was added to stop recording the comms to saved_cmdlines, for mapping
of the pids to the task name.
Code has been added that only records the comm if a trace event occurred,
and there's no reason to not trace it if the trace file is opened.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7ffbd48d5cab2 ("tracing: Cache comms only after an event occurred")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 85550c83da421fb12dc1816c45012e1e638d2b38 upstream.
The saved_cmdlines is used to map pids to the task name, such that the
output of the tracing does not just show pids, but also gives a human
readable name for the task.
If the name is not mapped, the output looks like this:
<...>-1316 [005] ...2 132.044039: ...
Instead of this:
gnome-shell-1316 [005] ...2 132.044039: ...
The names are updated when tracing is running, but are skipped if tracing
is stopped. Unfortunately, this stops the recording of the names if the
top level tracer is stopped, and not if there's other tracers active.
The recording of a name only happens when a new event is written into a
ring buffer, so there is no need to test if tracing is on or not. If
tracing is off, then no event is written and no need to test if tracing is
off or not.
Remove the check, as it hides the names of tasks for events in the
instance buffers.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7ffbd48d5cab2 ("tracing: Cache comms only after an event occurred")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3e08a9f9760f4a70d633c328a76408e62d6f80a3 upstream.
We've suffered from severe kernel crashes due to memory corruption on
our production environment, like,
Call Trace:
[1640542.554277] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[1640542.554856] CPU: 17 PID: 26996 Comm: python Kdump: loaded Tainted:G
[1640542.556629] RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_alloc+0x90/0x190
[1640542.559074] RSP: 0018:ffffb16faa597df8 EFLAGS: 00010286
[1640542.559587] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000400200 RCX:
0000000006e931bf
[1640542.560323] RDX: 0000000006e931be RSI: 0000000000400200 RDI:
ffff9a45ff004300
[1640542.560996] RBP: 0000000000400200 R08: 0000000000023420 R09:
0000000000000000
[1640542.561670] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
ffffffff9a20608d
[1640542.562366] R13: ffff9a45ff004300 R14: ffff9a45ff004300 R15:
696c662f65636976
[1640542.563128] FS: 00007f45d7c6f740(0000) GS:ffff9a45ff840000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[1640542.563937] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[1640542.564557] CR2: 00007f45d71311a0 CR3: 000000189d63e004 CR4:
00000000003606e0
[1640542.565279] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:
0000000000000000
[1640542.566069] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
[1640542.566742] Call Trace:
[1640542.567009] anon_vma_clone+0x5d/0x170
[1640542.567417] __split_vma+0x91/0x1a0
[1640542.567777] do_munmap+0x2c6/0x320
[1640542.568128] vm_munmap+0x54/0x70
[1640542.569990] __x64_sys_munmap+0x22/0x30
[1640542.572005] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0
[1640542.573724] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[1640542.575642] RIP: 0033:0x7f45d6e61e27
James Wang has reproduced it stably on the latest 4.19 LTS.
After some debugging, we finally proved that it's due to ftrace
buffer out-of-bound access using a debug tool as follows:
[ 86.775200] BUG: Out-of-bounds write at addr 0xffff88aefe8b7000
[ 86.780806] no_context+0xdf/0x3c0
[ 86.784327] __do_page_fault+0x252/0x470
[ 86.788367] do_page_fault+0x32/0x140
[ 86.792145] page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[ 86.795576] strncpy_from_unsafe+0x66/0xb0
[ 86.799789] fetch_memory_string+0x25/0x40
[ 86.804002] fetch_deref_string+0x51/0x60
[ 86.808134] kprobe_trace_func+0x32d/0x3a0
[ 86.812347] kprobe_dispatcher+0x45/0x50
[ 86.816385] kprobe_ftrace_handler+0x90/0xf0
[ 86.820779] ftrace_ops_assist_func+0xa1/0x140
[ 86.825340] 0xffffffffc00750bf
[ 86.828603] do_sys_open+0x5/0x1f0
[ 86.832124] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0
[ 86.835900] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
commit b220c049d519 ("tracing: Check length before giving out
the filter buffer") adds length check to protect trace data
overflow introduced in 0fc1b09ff1ff, seems that this fix can't prevent
overflow entirely, the length check should also take the sizeof
entry->array[0] into account, since this array[0] is filled the
length of trace data and occupy addtional space and risk overflow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210607125734.1770447-1-liangyan.peng@linux.alibaba.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fixes: b220c049d519 ("tracing: Check length before giving out the filter buffer")
Reviewed-by: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: yinbinbin <yinbinbin@alibabacloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Wetp Zhang <wetp.zy@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: James Wang <jnwang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Liangyan <liangyan.peng@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6c14133d2d3f768e0a35128faac8aa6ed4815051 upstream.
It was reported that a bug on arm64 caused a bad ip address to be used for
updating into a nop in ftrace_init(), but the error path (rightfully)
returned -EINVAL and not -EFAULT, as the bug caused more than one error to
occur. But because -EINVAL was returned, the ftrace_bug() tried to report
what was at the location of the ip address, and read it directly. This
caused the machine to panic, as the ip was not pointing to a valid memory
address.
Instead, read the ip address with copy_from_kernel_nofault() to safely
access the memory, and if it faults, report that the address faulted,
otherwise report what was in that location.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210607032329.28671-1-mark-pk.tsai@mediatek.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 05736a427f7e1 ("ftrace: warn on failure to disable mcount callers")
Reported-by: Mark-PK Tsai <mark-pk.tsai@mediatek.com>
Tested-by: Mark-PK Tsai <mark-pk.tsai@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6c605f8371159432ec61cbb1488dcf7ad24ad19a upstream.
KCSAN reports a data race between increment and decrement of pin_count:
write to 0xffff888237c2d4e0 of 4 bytes by task 15740 on cpu 1:
find_get_context kernel/events/core.c:4617
__do_sys_perf_event_open kernel/events/core.c:12097 [inline]
__se_sys_perf_event_open kernel/events/core.c:11933
...
read to 0xffff888237c2d4e0 of 4 bytes by task 15743 on cpu 0:
perf_unpin_context kernel/events/core.c:1525 [inline]
__do_sys_perf_event_open kernel/events/core.c:12328 [inline]
__se_sys_perf_event_open kernel/events/core.c:11933
...
Because neither read-modify-write here is atomic, this can lead to one
of the operations being lost, resulting in an inconsistent pin_count.
Fix it by adding the missing locking in the CPU-event case.
Fixes: fe4b04fa31a6 ("perf: Cure task_oncpu_function_call() races")
Reported-by: syzbot+142c9018f5962db69c7e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210527104711.2671610-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b7e24eb1caa5f8da20d405d262dba67943aedc42 upstream.
cgroup_mkdir() have restriction on newline usage in names:
$ mkdir $'/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test\ntest2'
mkdir: cannot create directory
'/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test\ntest2': Invalid argument
But in cgroup1_rename() such check is missed.
This allows us to make /proc/<pid>/cgroup unparsable:
$ mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test
$ mv /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test $'/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test\ntest2'
$ echo $$ > $'/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test\ntest2'
$ cat /proc/self/cgroup
11:pids:/
10:freezer:/
9:hugetlb:/
8:cpuset:/
7:blkio:/user.slice
6:memory:/user.slice
5:net_cls,net_prio:/
4:perf_event:/
3:devices:/user.slice
2:cpu,cpuacct:/test
test2
1:name=systemd:/
0::/
Signed-off-by: Alexander Kuznetsov <wwfq@yandex-team.ru>
Reported-by: Andrey Krasichkov <buglloc@yandex-team.ru>
Acked-by: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 940d71c6462e8151c78f28e4919aa8882ff2054e ]
If VCPU is suspended (VM suspend) in wq_watchdog_timer_fn() then
once this VCPU resumes it will see the new jiffies value, while it
may take a while before IRQ detects PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED on this
VCPU and updates all the watchdogs via pvclock_touch_watchdogs().
There is a small chance of misreported WQ stalls in the meantime,
because new jiffies is time_after() old 'ts + thresh'.
wq_watchdog_timer_fn()
{
for_each_pool(pool, pi) {
if (time_after(jiffies, ts + thresh)) {
pr_emerg("BUG: workqueue lockup - pool");
}
}
}
Save jiffies at the beginning of this function and use that value
for stall detection. If VM gets suspended then we continue using
"old" jiffies value and old WQ touch timestamps. If IRQ at some
point restarts the stall detection cycle (pvclock_touch_watchdogs())
then old jiffies will always be before new 'ts + thresh'.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 45e1ba40837ac2f6f4d4716bddb8d44bd7e4a251 ]
This patch effectively reverts the commit a3e72739b7a7 ("cgroup: fix
too early usage of static_branch_disable()"). The commit 6041186a3258
("init: initialize jump labels before command line option parsing") has
moved the jump_label_init() before parse_args() which has made the
commit a3e72739b7a7 unnecessary. On the other hand there are
consequences of disabling the controllers later as there are subsystems
doing the controller checks for different decisions. One such incident
is reported [1] regarding the memory controller and its impact on memory
reclaim code.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/921e53f3-4b13-aab8-4a9e-e83ff15371e4@nec.com
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Reported-by: NOMURA JUNICHI(野村 淳一) <junichi.nomura@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jun'ichi Nomura <junichi.nomura@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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This is the 4.14.234 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Wed 26 May 2021 05:47:29 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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This is the 4.14.233 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Sat 22 May 2021 05:22:37 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
|
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|
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This is the 4.14.231 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Fri 16 Apr 2021 05:58:10 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
|
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|
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This is the 4.14.229 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Wed 07 Apr 2021 06:47:37 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
|
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Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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The patch "ptrace: fix ptrace vs tasklist_lock race" changed
ptrace_freeze_traced() to take task->saved_state into account, but
ptrace_unfreeze_traced() has the same problem and needs a similar fix:
it should check/update both ->state and ->saved_state.
Reported-by: Luis Claudio R. Goncalves <lgoncalv@redhat.com>
Fixes: "ptrace: fix ptrace vs tasklist_lock race"
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable-rt@vger.kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit 0fdc91971b34cf6857b4cfd8c322ae936cfc189b)
Signed-off-by: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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The way user struct reference counting works changed significantly with,
fda31c50292a ("signal: avoid double atomic counter increments for user accounting")
Now user structs are only freed once the last pending signal is
dequeued. Make sigqueue_free_current() follow this new convention to
avoid freeing the user struct multiple times and triggering this
warning:
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6794 at lib/refcount.c:288 refcount_dec_not_one+0x45/0x50
Call Trace:
refcount_dec_and_lock_irqsave+0x16/0x60
free_uid+0x31/0xa0
__dequeue_signal+0x17c/0x190
dequeue_signal+0x5a/0x1b0
do_sigtimedwait+0x208/0x250
__x64_sys_rt_sigtimedwait+0x6f/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x72/0x200
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Reported-by: Daniel Wagner <wagi@monom.org>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
(cherry picked from commit 9567db2ebe566a93485e1a27d8759969d0002d7a)
Signed-off-by: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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The kernel bugzilla has the following race condition reported:
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
------------------------------------------------
test_set SCHED
test_set RUN
if SCHED
add_list
raise
clear RUN
<softirq>
test_set RUN
test_clear SCHED
->func
test_set SCHED
tasklet_try_unlock ->0
test_clear SCHED
test_set SCHED
->func
tasklet_try_unlock ->1
test_set RUN
if SCHED
add list
raise
clear RUN
test_set RUN
if SCHED
add list
raise
clear RUN
As a result the tasklet is enqueued on both CPUs and run on both CPUs. Due
to the nature of the list used here, it is possible that further
(different) tasklets, which are enqueued after this double-enqueued
tasklet, are scheduled on CPU2 but invoked on CPU1. It is also possible
that these tasklets won't be invoked at all, because during the second
enqueue process the t->next pointer is set to NULL - dropping everything
from the list.
This race will trigger one or two of the WARN_ON() in
tasklet_action_common().
The problem is that the tasklet may be invoked multiple times and clear
SCHED bit on each invocation. This makes it possible to enqueue the
very same tasklet on different CPUs.
Current RT-devel is using the upstream implementation which does not
re-run tasklets if they have SCHED set again and so it does not clear
the SCHED bit multiple times on a single invocation.
Introduce the CHAINED flag. The tasklet will only be enqueued if the
CHAINED flag has been set successfully.
If it is possible to exchange the flags (CHAINED | RUN) -> 0 then the
tasklet won't be re-run. Otherwise the possible SCHED flag is removed
and the tasklet is re-run again.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=61451
Not-signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
[bigeasy: patch description]
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 62d0a2a30cd01fabc7f6555df2cfae7dd3d9fad8)
Signed-off-by: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Conflicts:
kernel/softirq.c
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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[ Upstream 4.19-rt commit a854c3525b7082189996a41c1dc057dcb138e305 ]
When CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT_FULL is not set, some of the checks for using
lazy_list are not properly made as the IRQ_WORK_LAZY is not checked. There's
two locations that need this update, so a use_lazy_list() helper function is
added and used in both locations.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200321230028.GA22058@duo.ucw.cz
Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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[ Upstream commit dd430bf5ecb40f9a89679c85868826475d71de54 ]
The migrate_disable counter should not exceed 255 so it is enough to
store it in an 8bit field.
With this change we can move the `preempt_lazy_count' member into the
gap so the whole struct shrinks by 4 bytes to 12 bytes in total.
Remove the `padding' field, it is not needed.
Update the tracing fields in trace_define_common_fields() (it was
missing the preempt_lazy_count field).
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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[ Upstream commit b8162e61e9a33bd1de6452eb838fbf50a93ddd9a ]
We can rely on preempt_enable() to schedule. Besides simplifying the
code, this potentially allows sequences such as the following to be
permitted:
migrate_disable();
preempt_disable();
migrate_enable();
preempt_enable();
Suggested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <swood@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Conflicts:
kernel/sched/core.c
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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[ Upstream commit 2dcd94b443c5dcbc20281666321b7f025f9cc85c ]
Commit e6c287b1512d ("sched: migrate_enable: Use stop_one_cpu_nowait()")
adds a busy wait to deal with an edge case where the migrated thread
can resume running on another CPU before the stopper has consumed
cpu_stop_work. However, this is done with preemption disabled and can
potentially lead to deadlock.
While it is not guaranteed that the cpu_stop_work will be consumed before
the migrating thread resumes and exits the stack frame, it is guaranteed
that nothing other than the stopper can run on the old cpu between the
migrating thread scheduling out and the cpu_stop_work being consumed.
Thus, we can store cpu_stop_work in per-cpu data without it being
reused too early.
Fixes: e6c287b1512d ("sched: migrate_enable: Use stop_one_cpu_nowait()")
Suggested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <swood@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Conflicts:
kernel/sched/core.c
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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[ Upstream commit ba94e7aed7405c58251b1380e6e7d73aa8284b41 ]
SCHED_DEADLINE inactive timer needs to run in hardirq context (as
dl_task_timer already does) on PREEMPT_RT
Change the mode to HRTIMER_MODE_REL_HARD.
[ tglx: Fixed up the start site, so mode debugging works ]
Signed-off-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190731103715.4047-1-juri.lelli@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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[ Upstream commit 140d7f54a5fff02898d2ca9802b39548bf7455f1 ]
If user task changes the CPU affinity mask of a running task it will
dispatch migration request if the current CPU is no longer allowed. This
might happen shortly before a task enters a migrate_disable() section.
Upon leaving the migrate_disable() section, the task will notice that
the current CPU is no longer allowed and will will dispatch its own
migration request to move it off the current CPU.
While invoking __schedule() the first migration request will be
processed and the task returns on the "new" CPU with "arg.done = 0". Its
own migration request will be processed shortly after and will result in
memory corruption if the stack memory, designed for request, was used
otherwise in the meantime.
Spin until the migration request has been processed if it was accepted.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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[ Upstream commit a61d1977f692e46bad99a100f264981ba08cb4bd ]
The variable takedown_cpu_task is never declared/used on !HOTPLUG_CPU
except for migrate_enable(). This leads to a link error.
Don't use takedown_cpu_task in !HOTPLUG_CPU.
Reported-by: Dick Hollenbeck <dick@softplc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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[ Upstream commit 6b39a1fa8c53cae08dc03afdae193b7d3a78a173 ]
migrate_enable() can be called with current->state != TASK_RUNNING.
Avoid clobbering the existing state by using stop_one_cpu_nowait().
Since we're stopping the current cpu, we know that we won't get
past __schedule() until migration_cpu_stop() has run (at least up to
the point of migrating us to another cpu).
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <swood@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Conflicts:
kernel/sched/core.c
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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[ Upstream commit 425c5b38779a860062aa62219dc920d374b13c17 ]
Avoid overhead on the majority of migrate disable/enable sequences by
only manipulating scheduler data (and grabbing the relevant locks) when
the task actually schedules while migrate-disabled. A kernel build
showed around a 10% reduction in system time (with CONFIG_NR_CPUS=512).
Instead of cpuhp_pin_lock, CPU hotplug is handled by keeping a per-CPU
count of the number of pinned tasks (including tasks which have not
scheduled in the migrate-disabled section); takedown_cpu() will
wait until that reaches zero (confirmed by take_cpu_down() in stop
machine context to deal with races) before migrating tasks off of the
cpu.
To simplify synchronization, updating cpus_mask is no longer deferred
until migrate_enable(). This lets us not have to worry about
migrate_enable() missing the update if it's on the fast path (didn't
schedule during the migrate disabled section). It also makes the code
a bit simpler and reduces deviation from mainline.
While the main motivation for this is the performance benefit, lazy
migrate disable also eliminates the restriction on calling
migrate_disable() while atomic but leaving the atomic region prior to
calling migrate_enable() -- though this won't help with local_bh_disable()
(and thus rcutorture) unless something similar is done with the recently
added local_lock.
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <swood@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Conflicts:
include/linux/sched.h
init/init_task.c
kernel/sched/core.c
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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[ Upstream commit adfa969d4cfcc995a9d866020124e50f1827d2d1 ]
migrate_enable() currently open-codes a variant of select_fallback_rq().
However, it does not have the "No more Mr. Nice Guy" fallback and thus
it will pass an invalid CPU to the migration thread if cpus_mask only
contains a CPU that is !active.
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <swood@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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