| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
commit a1326b17ac03a9012cb3d01e434aacb4d67a416c upstream.
When using patchable-function-entry, the compiler will record the
callsites into a section named "__patchable_function_entries" rather
than "__mcount_loc". Let's abstract this difference behind a new
FTRACE_CALLSITE_SECTION, so that architectures don't have to handle this
explicitly (e.g. with custom module linker scripts).
As parisc currently handles this explicitly, it is fixed up accordingly,
with its custom linker script removed. Since FTRACE_CALLSITE_SECTION is
only defined when DYNAMIC_FTRACE is selected, the parisc module loading
code is updated to only use the definition in that case. When
DYNAMIC_FTRACE is not selected, modules shouldn't have this section, so
this removes some redundant work in that case.
To make sure that this is keep up-to-date for modules and the main
kernel, a comment is added to vmlinux.lds.h, with the existing ifdeffery
simplified for legibility.
I built parisc generic-{32,64}bit_defconfig with DYNAMIC_FTRACE enabled,
and verified that the section made it into the .ko files for modules.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Torsten Duwe <duwe@suse.de>
Tested-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Tested-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org>
Tested-by: Torsten Duwe <duwe@suse.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
used"
[ Upstream commit 67d6212afda218d564890d1674bab28e8612170f ]
This reverts commit 774a1221e862b343388347bac9b318767336b20b.
We need to finish all async code before the module init sequence is
done. In the reverted commit the PF_USED_ASYNC flag was added to mark a
thread that called async_schedule(). Then the PF_USED_ASYNC flag was
used to determine whether or not async_synchronize_full() needs to be
invoked. This works when modprobe thread is calling async_schedule(),
but it does not work if module dispatches init code to a worker thread
which then calls async_schedule().
For example, PCI driver probing is invoked from a worker thread based on
a node where device is attached:
if (cpu < nr_cpu_ids)
error = work_on_cpu(cpu, local_pci_probe, &ddi);
else
error = local_pci_probe(&ddi);
We end up in a situation where a worker thread gets the PF_USED_ASYNC
flag set instead of the modprobe thread. As a result,
async_synchronize_full() is not invoked and modprobe completes without
waiting for the async code to finish.
The issue was discovered while loading the pm80xx driver:
(scsi_mod.scan=async)
modprobe pm80xx worker
...
do_init_module()
...
pci_call_probe()
work_on_cpu(local_pci_probe)
local_pci_probe()
pm8001_pci_probe()
scsi_scan_host()
async_schedule()
worker->flags |= PF_USED_ASYNC;
...
< return from worker >
...
if (current->flags & PF_USED_ASYNC) <--- false
async_synchronize_full();
Commit 21c3c5d28007 ("block: don't request module during elevator init")
fixed the deadlock issue which the reverted commit 774a1221e862
("module, async: async_synchronize_full() on module init iff async is
used") tried to fix.
Since commit 0fdff3ec6d87 ("async, kmod: warn on synchronous
request_module() from async workers") synchronous module loading from
async is not allowed.
Given that the original deadlock issue is fixed and it is no longer
allowed to call synchronous request_module() from async we can remove
PF_USED_ASYNC flag to make module init consistently invoke
async_synchronize_full() unless async module probe is requested.
Signed-off-by: Igor Pylypiv <ipylypiv@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Changyuan Lyu <changyuanl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 0c18f29aae7ce3dadd26d8ee3505d07cc982df75 ]
Irrespective as to whether CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured, specifying
"module.sig_enforce=1" on the boot command line sets "sig_enforce".
Only allow "sig_enforce" to be set when CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured.
This patch makes the presence of /sys/module/module/parameters/sig_enforce
dependent on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y.
Fixes: fda784e50aac ("module: export module signature enforcement status")
Reported-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 262e6ae7081df304fc625cf368d5c2cbba2bb991 upstream.
If a TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE exports symbol, inherit the taint flag
for all modules importing these symbols, and don't allow loading
symbols from TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE modules if the module previously
imported gplonly symbols. Add a anti-circumvention devices so people
don't accidentally get themselves into trouble this way.
Comment from Greg:
"Ah, the proven-to-be-illegal "GPL Condom" defense :)"
[jeyu: pr_info -> pr_err and pr_warn as per discussion]
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/20200730162957.GA22469@lst.de
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit ef1dac6021cc8ec5de02ce31722bf26ac4ed5523 upstream.
Report the GPLONLY status through a new argument.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit cd8732cdcc37d7077c4fa2c966b748c0662b607e upstream.
Use the same spelling variant as the rest of the file.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 34e64705ad415ed7a816e60ef62b42fe6d1729d9 upstream.
__module_address is only used by built-in code.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 3fe1e56d0e68b623dd62d8d38265d2a052e7e185 upstream.
__module_text_address is only used by built-in code.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit a54e04914c211b5678602a46b3ede5d82ec1327d upstream.
each_symbol_section is only used inside of module.c.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 773110470e2fa3839523384ae014f8a723c4d178 upstream.
find_symbol is only used in module.c.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 7ef5264de773279b9f23b6cc8afb5addb30e970b upstream.
ref_module isn't used anywhere outside of module.c.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit ec2a29593c83ed71a7f16e3243941ebfcf75fdf6 ]
5fdc7db644 ("module: setup load info before module_sig_check()")
moved the ELF setup, so that it was done before the signature
check. This made the module name available to signature error
messages.
However, the checks for ELF correctness in setup_load_info
are not sufficient to prevent bad memory references due to
corrupted offset fields, indices, etc.
So, there's a regression in behavior here: a corrupt and unsigned
(or badly signed) module, which might previously have been rejected
immediately, can now cause an oops/crash.
Harden ELF handling for module loading by doing the following:
- Move the signature check back up so that it comes before ELF
initialization. It's best to do the signature check to see
if we can trust the module, before using the ELF structures
inside it. This also makes checks against info->len
more accurate again, as this field will be reduced by the
length of the signature in mod_check_sig().
The module name is now once again not available for error
messages during the signature check, but that seems like
a fair tradeoff.
- Check if sections have offset / size fields that at least don't
exceed the length of the module.
- Check if sections have section name offsets that don't fall
outside the section name table.
- Add a few other sanity checks against invalid section indices,
etc.
This is not an exhaustive consistency check, but the idea is to
at least get through the signature and blacklist checks without
crashing because of corrupted ELF info, and to error out gracefully
for most issues that would have caused problems later on.
Fixes: 5fdc7db6448a ("module: setup load info before module_sig_check()")
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 10ccd1abb808599a6dc7c9389560016ea3568085 ]
Let's move the common handling of the non-fatal errors after the *switch*
statement -- this avoids *goto*s inside that *switch*...
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omprussia.ru>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 705e9195187d85249fbb0eaa844b1604a98fbc9a ]
The 'reason' variable in module_sig_check() points to 3 strings across
the *switch* statement, all needlessly starting with the same text.
Let's put the starting text into the pr_notice() call -- it saves 21
bytes of the object code (x86 gcc 10.2.1).
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omprussia.ru>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit e9f35f634e099894f4d6c3b039cd3de5281ee637 ]
It is useful to know which module failed signature verification, so
print the module name along with the error message.
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit ebfac7b778fac8b0e8e92ec91d0b055f046b4604 upstream.
clang-12 -fno-pic (since
https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/a084c0388e2a59b9556f2de0083333232da3f1d6)
can emit `call __stack_chk_fail@PLT` instead of `call __stack_chk_fail`
on x86. The two forms should have identical behaviors on x86-64 but the
former causes GNU as<2.37 to produce an unreferenced undefined symbol
_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_.
(On x86-32, there is an R_386_PC32 vs R_386_PLT32 difference but the
linker behavior is identical as far as Linux kernel is concerned.)
Simply ignore _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ for now, like what
scripts/mod/modpost.c:ignore_undef_symbol does. This also fixes the
problem for gcc/clang -fpie and -fpic, which may emit `call foo@PLT` for
external function calls on x86.
Note: ld -z defs and dynamic loaders do not error for unreferenced
undefined symbols so the module loader is reading too much. If we ever
need to ignore more symbols, the code should be refactored to ignore
unreferenced symbols.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1250
Link: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=27178
Reported-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 38dc717e97153e46375ee21797aa54777e5498f3 ]
Apparently there has been a longstanding race between udev/systemd and
the module loader. Currently, the module loader sends a uevent right
after sysfs initialization, but before the module calls its init
function. However, some udev rules expect that the module has
initialized already upon receiving the uevent.
This race has been triggered recently (see link in references) in some
systemd mount unit files. For instance, the configfs module creates the
/sys/kernel/config mount point in its init function, however the module
loader issues the uevent before this happens. sys-kernel-config.mount
expects to be able to mount /sys/kernel/config upon receipt of the
module loading uevent, but if the configfs module has not called its
init function yet, then this directory will not exist and the mount unit
fails. A similar situation exists for sys-fs-fuse-connections.mount, as
the fuse sysfs mount point is created during the fuse module's init
function. If udev is faster than module initialization then the mount
unit would fail in a similar fashion.
To fix this race, delay the module KOBJ_ADD uevent until after the
module has finished calling its init routine.
References: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/17586
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-By: Nicolas Morey-Chaisemartin <nmoreychaisemartin@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 5e8ed280dab9eeabc1ba0b2db5dbe9fe6debb6b5 ]
If a module fails to load due to an error in prepare_coming_module(),
the following error handling in load_module() runs with
MODULE_STATE_COMING in module's state. Fix it by correctly setting
MODULE_STATE_GOING under "bug_cleanup" label.
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit fdf09ab887829cd1b671e45d9549f8ec1ffda0fa ]
Corentin hit the following workqueue warning when running with
CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 147 at kernel/workqueue.c:1473 __queue_work+0x3b8/0x3d0
Modules linked in: ghash_generic
CPU: 2 PID: 147 Comm: modprobe Not tainted
5.6.0-rc1-next-20200214-00068-g166c9264f0b1-dirty #545
Hardware name: Pine H64 model A (DT)
pc : __queue_work+0x3b8/0x3d0
Call trace:
__queue_work+0x3b8/0x3d0
queue_work_on+0x6c/0x90
do_init_module+0x188/0x1f0
load_module+0x1d00/0x22b0
I wasn't able to reproduce on x86 or rpi 3b+.
This is
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&work->entry))
from __queue_work(), and it happens because the init_free_wq work item
isn't initialized in time for a crypto test that requests the gcm
module. Some crypto tests were recently moved earlier in boot as
explained in commit c4741b230597 ("crypto: run initcalls for generic
implementations earlier"), which went into mainline less than two weeks
before the Fixes commit.
Avoid the warning by statically initializing init_free_wq and the
corresponding llist.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200217204803.GA13479@Red/
Fixes: 1a7b7d922081 ("modules: Use vmalloc special flag")
Reported-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Tested-on: sun50i-h6-pine-h64
Tested-on: imx8mn-ddr4-evk
Tested-on: sun50i-a64-bananapi-m64
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit af74262337faa65d5ac2944553437d3f5fb29123 ]
When pulling in Divya Indi's patch, I made a minor fix to remove unneeded
braces. I commited my fix up via "git commit -a --amend". Unfortunately, I
didn't realize I had some changes I was testing in the module code, and
those changes were applied to Divya's patch as well.
This reverts the accidental updates to the module code.
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Divya Indi <divya.indi@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Fixes: e585e6469d6f ("tracing: Verify if trace array exists before destroying it.")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit e585e6469d6f476b82aa148dc44aaf7ae269a4e2 ]
A trace array can be destroyed from userspace or kernel. Verify if the
trace array exists before proceeding to destroy/remove it.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1565805327-579-3-git-send-email-divya.indi@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Aruna Ramakrishna <aruna.ramakrishna@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Divya Indi <divya.indi@oracle.com>
[ Removed unneeded braces ]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 11990a5bd7e558e9203c1070fc52fb6f0488e75b upstream.
The only-root-readable /sys/module/$module/sections/$section files
did not truncate their output to the available buffer size. While most
paths into the kernfs read handlers end up using PAGE_SIZE buffers,
it's possible to get there through other paths (e.g. splice, sendfile).
Actually limit the output to the "count" passed into the read function,
and report it back correctly. *sigh*
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200805002015.GE23458@shao2-debian
Fixes: ed66f991bb19 ("module: Refactor section attr into bin attribute")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit b25a7c5af9051850d4f3d93ca500056ab6ec724b upstream.
The printing of section addresses in /sys/module/*/sections/* was not
using the correct credentials to evaluate visibility.
Before:
# cat /sys/module/*/sections/.*text
0xffffffffc0458000
...
# capsh --drop=CAP_SYSLOG -- -c "cat /sys/module/*/sections/.*text"
0xffffffffc0458000
...
After:
# cat /sys/module/*/sections/*.text
0xffffffffc0458000
...
# capsh --drop=CAP_SYSLOG -- -c "cat /sys/module/*/sections/.*text"
0x0000000000000000
...
Additionally replaces the existing (safe) /proc/modules check with
file->f_cred for consistency.
Reported-by: Dominik Czarnota <dominik.czarnota@trailofbits.com>
Fixes: be71eda5383f ("module: Fix display of wrong module .text address")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit ed66f991bb19d94cae5d38f77de81f96aac7813f upstream.
In order to gain access to the open file's f_cred for kallsym visibility
permission checks, refactor the module section attributes to use the
bin_attribute instead of attribute interface. Additionally removes the
redundant "name" struct member.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 160251842cd35a75edfb0a1d76afa3eb674ff40a upstream.
In order to perform future tests against the cred saved during open(),
switch kallsyms_show_value() to operate on a cred, and have all current
callers pass current_cred(). This makes it very obvious where callers
are checking the wrong credential in their "read" contexts. These will
be fixed in the coming patches.
Additionally switch return value to bool, since it is always used as a
direct permission check, not a 0-on-success, negative-on-error style
function return.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
info->mod->name
[ Upstream commit 708e0ada1916be765b7faa58854062f2bc620bbf ]
In setup_load_info(), info->name (which contains the name of the module,
mostly used for early logging purposes before the module gets set up)
gets unconditionally assigned if .modinfo is missing despite the fact
that there is an if (!info->name) check near the end of the function.
Avoid assigning a placeholder string to info->name if .modinfo doesn't
exist, so that we can fall back to info->mod->name later on.
Fixes: 5fdc7db6448a ("module: setup load info before module_sig_check()")
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit bf08949cc8b98b7d1e20cfbba169a5938d42dae8 ]
While running kprobe module test, find_module_all() caused
a suspicious RCU usage warning.
-----
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.4.0-next-20191202+ #63 Not tainted
-----------------------------
kernel/module.c:619 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by rmmod/642:
#0: ffffffff8227da80 (module_mutex){+.+.}, at: __x64_sys_delete_module+0x9a/0x230
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 642 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 5.4.0-next-20191202+ #63
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x71/0xa0
find_module_all+0xc1/0xd0
__x64_sys_delete_module+0xac/0x230
? do_syscall_64+0x12/0x1f0
do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4b6d49
-----
This is because list_for_each_entry_rcu(modules) is called
without rcu_read_lock(). This is safe because the module_mutex
is locked.
Pass lockdep_is_held(&module_mutex) to the list_for_each_entry_rcu()
to suppress this warning, This also fixes similar issue in
mod_find() and each_symbol_section().
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit f6d061d617124abbd55396a3bc37b9bf7d33233c ]
In module_add_modinfo_attrs() if sysfs_create_file() fails
on the first iteration of the loop (so i = 0), we forget to
free the modinfo_attrs.
Fixes: bc6f2a757d52 ("kernel/module: Fix mem leak in module_add_modinfo_attrs")
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 5d603311615f612320bb77bd2a82553ef1ced5b7 upstream.
Fix the race between load and unload a kernel module.
sys_delete_module()
try_stop_module()
mod->state = _GOING
add_unformed_module()
old = find_module_all()
(old->state == _GOING =>
wait_event_interruptible())
During pre-condition
finished_loading() rets 0
schedule()
(never gets waken up later)
free_module()
mod->state = _UNFORMED
list_del_rcu(&mod->list)
(dels mod from "modules" list)
return
The race above leads to modprobe hanging forever on loading
a module.
Error paths on loading module call wake_up_all(&module_wq) after
freeing module, so let's do the same on straight module unload.
Fixes: 6e6de3dee51a ("kernel/module.c: Only return -EEXIST for modules that have finished loading")
Reviewed-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khorenko <khorenko@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.
From the original description:
This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.
The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.
There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:
- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/
- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.
The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.
The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:
lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}
Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.
This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.
New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.
The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.
Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf
when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
this under category (c) of the DCO"
* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
kexec: Fix file verification on S390
security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
...
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The major feature in this time is IMA support for measuring and
appraising appended file signatures. In addition are a couple of bug
fixes and code cleanup to use struct_size().
In addition to the PE/COFF and IMA xattr signatures, the kexec kernel
image may be signed with an appended signature, using the same
scripts/sign-file tool that is used to sign kernel modules.
Similarly, the initramfs may contain an appended signature.
This contained a lot of refactoring of the existing appended signature
verification code, so that IMA could retain the existing framework of
calculating the file hash once, storing it in the IMA measurement list
and extending the TPM, verifying the file's integrity based on a file
hash or signature (eg. xattrs), and adding an audit record containing
the file hash, all based on policy. (The IMA support for appended
signatures patch set was posted and reviewed 11 times.)
The support for appended signature paves the way for adding other
signature verification methods, such as fs-verity, based on a single
system-wide policy. The file hash used for verifying the signature and
the signature, itself, can be included in the IMA measurement list"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: ima_api: Use struct_size() in kzalloc()
ima: use struct_size() in kzalloc()
sefltest/ima: support appended signatures (modsig)
ima: Fix use after free in ima_read_modsig()
MODSIGN: make new include file self contained
ima: fix freeing ongoing ahash_request
ima: always return negative code for error
ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
ima: Define ima-modsig template
ima: Collect modsig
ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures
integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
ima: initialize the "template" field with the default template
|
|
You can pass opaque pointers directly.
I also renamed 'va' and 'vb' into more meaningful arguments.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
|
|
Commit 8651ec01daed ("module: add support for symbol namespaces.")
broke linking for arm64 defconfig:
| lib/crypto/arc4.o: In function `__ksymtab_arc4_setkey':
| arc4.c:(___ksymtab+arc4_setkey+0x8): undefined reference to `no symbol'
| lib/crypto/arc4.o: In function `__ksymtab_arc4_crypt':
| arc4.c:(___ksymtab+arc4_crypt+0x8): undefined reference to `no symbol'
This is because the dummy initialisation of the 'namespace_offset' field
in 'struct kernel_symbol' when using EXPORT_SYMBOL on architectures with
support for PREL32 locations uses an offset from an absolute address (0)
in an effort to trick 'offset_to_pointer' into behaving as a NOP,
allowing non-namespaced symbols to be treated in the same way as those
belonging to a namespace.
Unfortunately, place-relative relocations require a symbol reference
rather than an absolute value and, although x86 appears to get away with
this due to placing the kernel text at the top of the address space, it
almost certainly results in a runtime failure if the kernel is relocated
dynamically as a result of KASLR.
Rework 'namespace_offset' so that a value of 0, which cannot occur for a
valid namespaced symbol, indicates that the corresponding symbol does
not belong to a namespace.
Cc: Matthias Maennich <maennich@google.com>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Fixes: 8651ec01daed ("module: add support for symbol namespaces.")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Tested-by: Matthias Maennich <maennich@google.com>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias Maennich <maennich@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
|
|
If MODULE_ALLOW_MISSING_NAMESPACE_IMPORTS is enabled (default=n), the
requirement for modules to import all namespaces that are used by
the module is relaxed.
Enabling this option effectively allows (invalid) modules to be loaded
while only a warning is emitted.
Disabling this option keeps the enforcement at module loading time and
loading is denied if the module's imports are not satisfactory.
Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Maennich <maennich@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
|
|
The EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS() and EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL() macros can be used to
export a symbol to a specific namespace. There are no _GPL_FUTURE and
_UNUSED variants because these are currently unused, and I'm not sure
they are necessary.
I didn't add EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS() for ASM exports; this patch sets the
namespace of ASM exports to NULL by default. In case of relative
references, it will be relocatable to NULL. If there's a need, this
should be pretty easy to add.
A module that wants to use a symbol exported to a namespace must add a
MODULE_IMPORT_NS() statement to their module code; otherwise, modpost
will complain when building the module, and the kernel module loader
will emit an error and fail when loading the module.
MODULE_IMPORT_NS() adds a modinfo tag 'import_ns' to the module. That
tag can be observed by the modinfo command, modpost and kernel/module.c
at the time of loading the module.
The ELF symbols are renamed to include the namespace with an asm label;
for example, symbol 'usb_stor_suspend' in namespace USB_STORAGE becomes
'usb_stor_suspend.USB_STORAGE'. This allows modpost to do namespace
checking, without having to go through all the effort of parsing ELF and
relocation records just to get to the struct kernel_symbols.
On x86_64 I saw no difference in binary size (compression), but at
runtime this will require a word of memory per export to hold the
namespace. An alternative could be to store namespaced symbols in their
own section and use a separate 'struct namespaced_kernel_symbol' for
that section, at the cost of making the module loader more complex.
Co-developed-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Maennich <maennich@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
|
|
Similar to modpost's get_next_modinfo(), introduce get_next_modinfo() in
kernel/module.c to acquire any further values associated with the same
modinfo tag name. That is useful for any tags that have multiple
occurrences (such as 'alias'), but is in particular introduced here as
part of the symbol namespaces patch series to read the (potentially)
multiple namespaces a module is importing.
Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Maennich <maennich@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
|
|
strict module rwx
We should keep the case of "#define debug_align(X) (X)" for all arches
without CONFIG_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX ability, which would save people, who
are sensitive to system size, a lot of memory when using modules,
especially for embedded systems. This is also the intention of the
original #ifdef... statement and still valid for now.
Note that this still keeps the effect of the fix of the following commit,
38f054d549a8 ("modules: always page-align module section allocations"),
since when CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is enabled, module pages are
aligned.
Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
|
|
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify.
I have adjusted the errors generated:
(1) If there's no signature (ENODATA) or we can't check it (ENOPKG,
ENOKEY), then:
(a) If signatures are enforced then EKEYREJECTED is returned.
(b) If there's no signature or we can't check it, but the kernel is
locked down then EPERM is returned (this is then consistent with
other lockdown cases).
(2) If the signature is unparseable (EBADMSG, EINVAL), the signature fails
the check (EKEYREJECTED) or a system error occurs (eg. ENOMEM), we
return the error we got.
Note that the X.509 code doesn't check for key expiry as the RTC might not
be valid or might not have been transferred to the kernel's clock yet.
[Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA integration. This will
be replaced with integration with the IMA architecture policy
patchset.]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export
the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the
appended signature trailer is valid.
Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it
and be able to use mod_check_sig() without having to depend on either
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG or CONFIG_MODULES.
s390 duplicated the definition of struct module_signature so now they can
use the new <linux/module_signature.h> header instead.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
Some arches (e.g., arm64, x86) have moved towards non-executable
module_alloc() allocations for security hardening reasons. That means
that the module loader will need to set the text section of a module to
executable, regardless of whether or not CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is set.
When CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=y, module section allocations are always
page-aligned to handle memory rwx permissions. On some arches with
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=n however, when setting the module text to
executable, the BUG_ON() in frob_text() gets triggered since module
section allocations are not page-aligned when CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=n.
Since the set_memory_* API works with pages, and since we need to call
set_memory_x() regardless of whether CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is set, we
might as well page-align all module section allocations for ease of
managing rwx permissions of module sections (text, rodata, etc).
Fixes: 2eef1399a866 ("modules: fix BUG when load module with rodata=n")
Reported-by: Martin Kaiser <lists@kaiser.cx>
Reported-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <brgl@bgdev.pl>
Tested-by: David Lechner <david@lechnology.com>
Tested-by: Martin Kaiser <martin@kaiser.cx>
Tested-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bgolaszewski@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linux
Pull module updates from Jessica Yu:
"Summary of modules changes for the 5.3 merge window:
- Code fixes and cleanups
- Fix bug where set_memory_x() wasn't being called when rodata=n
- Fix bug where -EEXIST was being returned for going modules
- Allow arches to override module_exit_section()"
* tag 'modules-for-v5.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linux:
modules: fix compile error if don't have strict module rwx
ARM: module: recognize unwind exit sections
module: allow arch overrides for .exit section names
modules: fix BUG when load module with rodata=n
kernel/module: Fix mem leak in module_add_modinfo_attrs
kernel: module: Use struct_size() helper
kernel/module.c: Only return -EEXIST for modules that have finished loading
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulmck/linux-rcu into core/rcu
Pull rcu/next + tools/memory-model changes from Paul E. McKenney:
- RCU flavor consolidation cleanups and optmizations
- Documentation updates
- Miscellaneous fixes
- SRCU updates
- RCU-sync flavor consolidation
- Torture-test updates
- Linux-kernel memory-consistency-model updates, most notably the addition of plain C-language accesses
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
If CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is not defined,
we need stub for module_enable_nx() and module_enable_x().
If CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is defined, but
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is disabled, we need stub for
module_enable_nx.
Move frob_text() outside of the CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX,
because it is needed anyway.
Fixes: 2eef1399a866 ("modules: fix BUG when load module with rodata=n")
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
|
|
Some archs like ARM store unwind information for .exit.text in sections
with unusual names. As this unwind information refers to .exit.text, it
must not be loaded when .exit.text is not loaded (when CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD
is unset); otherwise, loading a module can fail due to relocation failures.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@ew.tq-group.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
|
|
When loading a module with rodata=n, it causes an executing
NX-protected page BUG.
[ 32.379191] kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
[ 32.382917] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc0005000
[ 32.385947] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
[ 32.387662] #PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation
[ 32.389352] PGD 240c067 P4D 240c067 PUD 240e067 PMD 421a52067 PTE 8000000421a53063
[ 32.391396] Oops: 0011 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 32.392478] CPU: 7 PID: 2697 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 5.2.0-rc5+ #202
[ 32.394588] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 32.398157] RIP: 0010:ko_test_init+0x0/0x1000 [ko_test]
[ 32.399662] Code: Bad RIP value.
[ 32.400621] RSP: 0018:ffffc900029f3ca8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 32.402171] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 32.404332] RDX: 00000000000004c7 RSI: 0000000000000cc0 RDI: ffffffffc0005000
[ 32.406347] RBP: ffffffffc0005000 R08: ffff88842fbebc40 R09: ffffffff810ede4a
[ 32.408392] R10: ffffea00108e3480 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88842bee21a0
[ 32.410472] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffc900029f3e78
[ 32.412609] FS: 00007fb4f0c0a700(0000) GS:ffff88842fbc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 32.414722] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 32.416290] CR2: ffffffffc0004fd6 CR3: 0000000421a90004 CR4: 0000000000020ee0
[ 32.418471] Call Trace:
[ 32.419136] do_one_initcall+0x41/0x1df
[ 32.420199] ? _cond_resched+0x10/0x40
[ 32.421433] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x36/0x160
[ 32.422827] do_init_module+0x56/0x1f7
[ 32.423946] load_module+0x1e67/0x2580
[ 32.424947] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x150/0x2c0
[ 32.426413] ? map_vm_area+0x2d/0x40
[ 32.427530] ? __vmalloc_node_range+0x1ef/0x260
[ 32.428850] ? __do_sys_init_module+0x135/0x170
[ 32.430060] ? _cond_resched+0x10/0x40
[ 32.431249] __do_sys_init_module+0x135/0x170
[ 32.432547] do_syscall_64+0x43/0x120
[ 32.433853] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Because if rodata=n, set_memory_x() can't be called, fix this by
calling set_memory_x in complete_formation();
Fixes: f2c65fb3221a ("x86/modules: Avoid breaking W^X while loading modules")
Suggested-by: Jian Cheng <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
|
|
In module_add_modinfo_attrs if sysfs_create_file
fails, we forget to free allocated modinfo_attrs
and roll back the sysfs files.
Fixes: 03e88ae1b13d ("[PATCH] fix module sysfs files reference counting")
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
|
|
One of the more common cases of allocation size calculations is finding
the size of a structure that has a zero-sized array at the end, along
with memory for some number of elements for that array. For example:
struct module_sect_attrs {
...
struct module_sect_attr attrs[0];
};
Make use of the struct_size() helper instead of an open-coded version
in order to avoid any potential type mistakes.
So, replace the following form:
sizeof(*sect_attrs) + nloaded * sizeof(sect_attrs->attrs[0]
with:
struct_size(sect_attrs, attrs, nloaded)
This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
|
|
Microsoft HyperV disables the X86_FEATURE_SMCA bit on AMD systems, and
linux guests boot with repeated errors:
amd64_edac_mod: Unknown symbol amd_unregister_ecc_decoder (err -2)
amd64_edac_mod: Unknown symbol amd_register_ecc_decoder (err -2)
amd64_edac_mod: Unknown symbol amd_report_gart_errors (err -2)
amd64_edac_mod: Unknown symbol amd_unregister_ecc_decoder (err -2)
amd64_edac_mod: Unknown symbol amd_register_ecc_decoder (err -2)
amd64_edac_mod: Unknown symbol amd_report_gart_errors (err -2)
The warnings occur because the module code erroneously returns -EEXIST
for modules that have failed to load and are in the process of being
removed from the module list.
module amd64_edac_mod has a dependency on module edac_mce_amd. Using
modules.dep, systemd will load edac_mce_amd for every request of
amd64_edac_mod. When the edac_mce_amd module loads, the module has
state MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED and once the module load fails and the state
becomes MODULE_STATE_GOING. Another request for edac_mce_amd module
executes and add_unformed_module() will erroneously return -EEXIST even
though the previous instance of edac_mce_amd has MODULE_STATE_GOING.
Upon receiving -EEXIST, systemd attempts to load amd64_edac_mod, which
fails because of unknown symbols from edac_mce_amd.
add_unformed_module() must wait to return for any case other than
MODULE_STATE_LIVE to prevent a race between multiple loads of
dependent modules.
Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com>
Cc: David Arcari <darcari@redhat.com>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
|
|
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version this program is distributed in the
hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you
should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along
with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc
59 temple place suite 330 boston ma 02111 1307 usa
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1334 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070033.113240726@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Adding DEFINE_SRCU() or DEFINE_STATIC_SRCU() to a loadable module requires
that the size of the reserved region be increased, which is not something
we want to be doing all that often. One approach would be to require
that loadable modules define an srcu_struct and invoke init_srcu_struct()
from their module_init function and cleanup_srcu_struct() from their
module_exit function. However, this is more than a bit user unfriendly.
This commit therefore creates an ___srcu_struct_ptrs linker section,
and pointers to srcu_struct structures created by DEFINE_SRCU() and
DEFINE_STATIC_SRCU() within a module are placed into that module's
___srcu_struct_ptrs section. The required init_srcu_struct() and
cleanup_srcu_struct() functions are then automatically invoked as needed
when that module is loaded and unloaded, thus allowing modules to continue
to use DEFINE_SRCU() and DEFINE_STATIC_SRCU() while avoiding the need
to increase the size of the reserved region.
Many of the algorithms and some of the code was cheerfully cherry-picked
from other code making use of linker sections, perhaps most notably from
tracepoints. All bugs are nevertheless the sole property of the author.
Suggested-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
[ paulmck: Use __section() and use "default" in srcu_module_notify()'s
"switch" statement as suggested by Joel Fernandes. ]
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
|
Mark Rutland
Igor Pylypiv
Mimi Zohar
Christoph Hellwig
Frank van der Linden
Sergey Shtylyov
Jessica Yu
Fangrui Song
Miroslav Benes
Daniel Jordan
Steven Rostedt (VMware)
Divya Indi
Kees Cook
Masami Hiramatsu
YueHaibing
Konstantin Khorenko
Linus Torvalds
Masahiro Yamada
Will Deacon
Matthias Maennich
He Zhe
David Howells
Thiago Jung Bauermann
Ingo Molnar
Yang Yingliang
Matthias Schiffer
Gustavo A. R. Silva
Prarit Bhargava
Thomas Gleixner
Paul E. McKenney