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This is the 5.0.19 stable release
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This is the 5.0.18 stable release
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commit c6110222c6f49ea68169f353565eb865488a8619 upstream.
Add a callback map_lookup_elem_sys_only() that map implementations
could use over map_lookup_elem() from system call side in case the
map implementation needs to handle the latter differently than from
the BPF data path. If map_lookup_elem_sys_only() is set, this will
be preferred pick for map lookups out of user space. This hook is
used in a follow-up fix for LRU map, but once development window
opens, we can convert other map types from map_lookup_elem() (here,
the one called upon BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM cmd is meant) over to use
the callback to simplify and clean up the latter.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0edd6b64d1939e9e9168ff27947995bb7751db5d ]
Unless the very next line is schedule(), or implies it, one must not use
preempt_enable_no_resched(). It can cause a preemption to go missing and
thereby cause arbitrary delays, breaking the PREEMPT=y invariant.
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 4ec73791a64bab25cabf16a6067ee478692e506d upstream.
Due to an erratum in some Pericom PCIe-to-PCI bridges in reverse mode
(conventional PCI on primary side, PCIe on downstream side), the Retrain
Link bit needs to be cleared manually to allow the link training to
complete successfully.
If it is not cleared manually, the link training is continuously restarted
and no devices below the PCI-to-PCIe bridge can be accessed. That means
drivers for devices below the bridge will be loaded but won't work and may
even crash because the driver is only reading 0xffff.
See the Pericom Errata Sheet PI7C9X111SLB_errata_rev1.2_102711.pdf for
details. Devices known as affected so far are: PI7C9X110, PI7C9X111SL,
PI7C9X130.
Add a new flag, clear_retrain_link, in struct pci_dev. Quirks for affected
devices set this bit.
Note that pcie_retrain_link() lives in aspm.c because that's currently the
only place we use it, but this erratum is not specific to ASPM, and we may
retrain links for other reasons in the future.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Mätje <stefan.maetje@esd.eu>
[bhelgaas: apply regardless of CONFIG_PCIEASPM]
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ddcdc368b1033e19fd3a5f750752e10e28a87826 upstream.
get_zeroed_page() returns a virtual address for the page which is better
than allocating a struct page and doing a permanent kmap on it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Haggai Eran <haggaie@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 440868661f36071886ed360d91de83bd67c73b4f upstream.
Now, make the loop explicit to avoid clang warning.
./include/linux/of.h:238:37: warning: multiple unsequenced modifications
to 'cell' [-Wunsequenced]
r = (r << 32) | be32_to_cpu(*(cell++));
^~
./include/linux/byteorder/generic.h:95:21: note: expanded from macro
'be32_to_cpu'
^
./include/uapi/linux/byteorder/little_endian.h:40:59: note: expanded
from macro '__be32_to_cpu'
^
./include/uapi/linux/swab.h:118:21: note: expanded from macro '__swab32'
___constant_swab32(x) : \
^
./include/uapi/linux/swab.h:18:12: note: expanded from macro
'___constant_swab32'
(((__u32)(x) & (__u32)0x000000ffUL) << 24) | \
^
Signed-off-by: Phong Tran <tranmanphong@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/460
Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[robh: fix up whitespace]
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5467a68cbf6884c9a9d91e2a89140afb1839c835 upstream.
For lockless accesses to dentries we don't have pinned we rely
(among other things) upon having an RCU delay between dropping
the last reference and actually freeing the memory.
On the other hand, for things like pipes and sockets we neither
do that kind of lockless access, nor want to deal with the
overhead of an RCU delay every time a socket gets closed.
So delay was made optional - setting DCACHE_RCUACCESS in ->d_flags
made sure it would happen. We tried to avoid setting it unless
we knew we need it. Unfortunately, that had led to recurring
class of bugs, in which we missed the need to set it.
We only really need it for dentries that are created by
d_alloc_pseudo(), so let's not bother with trying to be smart -
just make having an RCU delay the default. The ones that do
*not* get it set the replacement flag (DCACHE_NORCU) and we'd
better use that sparingly. d_alloc_pseudo() is the only
such user right now.
FWIW, the race that finally prompted that switch had been
between __lock_parent() of immediate subdirectory of what's
currently the root of a disconnected tree (e.g. from
open-by-handle in progress) racing with d_splice_alias()
elsewhere picking another alias for the same inode, either
on outright corrupted fs image, or (in case of open-by-handle
on NFS) that subdirectory having been just moved on server.
It's not easy to hit, so the sky is not falling, but that's
not the first race on similar missed cases and the logics
for settinf DCACHE_RCUACCESS has gotten ridiculously
convoluted.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 185ce5c38ea76f29b6bd9c7c8c7a5e5408834920 ]
Zerocopy skbs without completion notification were added for packet
sockets with PACKET_TX_RING user buffers. Those signal completion
through the TP_STATUS_USER bit in the ring. Zerocopy annotation was
added only to avoid premature notification after clone or orphan, by
triggering a copy on these paths for these packets.
The mechanism had to define a special "no-uarg" mode because packet
sockets already use skb_uarg(skb) == skb_shinfo(skb)->destructor_arg
for a different pointer.
Before deferencing skb_uarg(skb), verify that it is a real pointer.
Fixes: 5cd8d46ea1562 ("packet: copy user buffers before orphan or clone")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0d52154bb0a700abb459a2cbce0a30fc2549b67e upstream.
When failing from creating cache jbd2_inode_cache, we will destroy the
previously created cache jbd2_handle_cache twice. This patch fixes
this by moving each cache initialization/destruction to its own
separate, individual function.
Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ea611d1cc180fbb56982c83cd5142a2b34881f5c upstream.
The FPS_PERIOD_MAX_US definitions are swapped for MAX20024 and MAX77620,
fix it.
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6b4814a9451add06d457e198be418bf6a3e6a990 upstream.
Mismatch between what is found in the Datasheets for DA9063 and DA9063L
provided by Dialog Semiconductor, and the register names provided in the
MFD registers file. The changes are for the OTP (one-time-programming)
control registers. The two naming errors are OPT instead of OTP, and
COUNT instead of CONT (i.e. control).
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Twiss <stwiss.opensource@diasemi.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1b426bac66e6cc83c9f2d92b96e4e72acf43419a upstream.
hugetlb uses a fault mutex hash table to prevent page faults of the
same pages concurrently. The key for shared and private mappings is
different. Shared keys off address_space and file index. Private keys
off mm and virtual address. Consider a private mappings of a populated
hugetlbfs file. A fault will map the page from the file and if needed
do a COW to map a writable page.
Hugetlbfs hole punch uses the fault mutex to prevent mappings of file
pages. It uses the address_space file index key. However, private
mappings will use a different key and could race with this code to map
the file page. This causes problems (BUG) for the page cache remove
code as it expects the page to be unmapped. A sample stack is:
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_mapped(page))
kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:169!
...
RIP: 0010:unaccount_page_cache_page+0x1b8/0x200
...
Call Trace:
__delete_from_page_cache+0x39/0x220
delete_from_page_cache+0x45/0x70
remove_inode_hugepages+0x13c/0x380
? __add_to_page_cache_locked+0x162/0x380
hugetlbfs_fallocate+0x403/0x540
? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
? __inode_security_revalidate+0x5d/0x70
? selinux_file_permission+0x100/0x130
vfs_fallocate+0x13f/0x270
ksys_fallocate+0x3c/0x80
__x64_sys_fallocate+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
There seems to be another potential COW issue/race with this approach
of different private and shared keys as noted in commit 8382d914ebf7
("mm, hugetlb: improve page-fault scalability").
Since every hugetlb mapping (even anon and private) is actually a file
mapping, just use the address_space index key for all mappings. This
results in potentially more hash collisions. However, this should not
be the common case.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190328234704.27083-3-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412165235.t4sscoujczfhuiyt@linux-r8p5
Fixes: b5cec28d36f5 ("hugetlbfs: truncate_hugepages() takes a range of pages")
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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addresses
commit fce86ff5802bac3a7b19db171aa1949ef9caac31 upstream.
Starting with c6f3c5ee40c1 ("mm/huge_memory.c: fix modifying of page
protection by insert_pfn_pmd()") vmf_insert_pfn_pmd() internally calls
pmdp_set_access_flags(). That helper enforces a pmd aligned @address
argument via VM_BUG_ON() assertion.
Update the implementation to take a 'struct vm_fault' argument directly
and apply the address alignment fixup internally to fix crash signatures
like:
kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:515!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 51 PID: 43713 Comm: java Tainted: G OE 4.19.35 #1
[..]
RIP: 0010:pmdp_set_access_flags+0x48/0x50
[..]
Call Trace:
vmf_insert_pfn_pmd+0x198/0x350
dax_iomap_fault+0xe82/0x1190
ext4_dax_huge_fault+0x103/0x1f0
? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
__handle_mm_fault+0x3f6/0x1370
? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
handle_mm_fault+0xda/0x200
__do_page_fault+0x249/0x4f0
do_page_fault+0x32/0x110
? page_fault+0x8/0x30
page_fault+0x1e/0x30
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155741946350.372037.11148198430068238140.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Fixes: c6f3c5ee40c1 ("mm/huge_memory.c: fix modifying of page protection by insert_pfn_pmd()")
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reported-by: Piotr Balcer <piotr.balcer@intel.com>
Tested-by: Yan Ma <yan.ma@intel.com>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pagupta@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Chandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is the 5.0.17 stable release
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This is the 5.0.16 stable release
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This is the 5.0.15 stable release
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This is the 5.0.14 stable release
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[ Upstream commit 4c3024debf62de4c6ac6d3cb4c0063be21d4f652 ]
BPF can adjust gso only for tcp bytestreams. Fail on other gso types.
But only on gso packets. It does not touch this field if !gso_size.
Fixes: b90efd225874 ("bpf: only adjust gso_size on bytestream protocols")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
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[ Upstream commit 1d487e9bf8ba66a7174c56a0029c54b1eca8f99c ]
These were found with smatch, and then generalized when applicable.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0082517fa4bce073e7cf542633439f26538a14cc ]
Upon reboot, the Acer TravelMate X514-51T laptop appears to complete the
shutdown process, but then it hangs in BIOS POST with a black screen.
The problem is intermittent - at some points it has appeared related to
Secure Boot settings or different kernel builds, but ultimately we have
not been able to identify the exact conditions that trigger the issue to
come and go.
Besides, the EFI mode cannot be disabled in the BIOS of this model.
However, after extensive testing, we observe that using the EFI reboot
method reliably avoids the issue in all cases.
So add a boot time quirk to use EFI reboot on such systems.
Buglink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203119
Signed-off-by: Jian-Hong Pan <jian-hong@endlessm.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Drake <drake@endlessm.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux@endlessm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412080152.3718-1-jian-hong@endlessm.com
[ Fix !CONFIG_EFI build failure, clarify the code and the changelog a bit. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 77f1e0a52d26242b6c2dba019f6ebebfb9ff701e ]
A previous commit moved the shallow depth and BFQ depth map calculations
to be done at init time, moving it outside of the hotter IO path. This
potentially causes hangs if the users changes the depth of the scheduler
map, by writing to the 'nr_requests' sysfs file for that device.
Add a blk-mq-sched hook that allows blk-mq to inform the scheduler if
the depth changes, so that the scheduler can update its internal state.
Tested-by: Kai Krakow <kai@kaishome.de>
Reported-by: Paolo Valente <paolo.valente@linaro.org>
Fixes: f0635b8a416e ("bfq: calculate shallow depths at init time")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429 upstream
Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more
complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.
Most users fall into a few basic categories:
a) they want all mitigations off;
b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
it's vulnerable; or
c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
vulnerable.
Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
aggregation of existing options:
- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.
- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.
- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
SMT if needed by a mitigation.
Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
anything. They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b07a8ef9b7c5055c3a4637c87d07c296d5016fe0.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8a4b06d391b0a42a373808979b5028f5c84d9c6a upstream
Add the sysfs reporting file for MDS. It exposes the vulnerability and
mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d808b7f759b50acf0784ce6230ffa63e12ef465d ]
The nvme target hadn't been taking the Get Log Page offset parameter
into consideration, and so has been returning corrupted log pages when
offsets are used. Since many tools, including nvme-cli, split the log
request to 4k, we've been breaking discovery log responses when more
than 3 subsystems exist.
Fix the returned data by internally generating the entire discovery
log page and copying only the requested bytes into the user buffer. The
command log page offset type has been modified to a native __le64 to
make it easier to extract the value from a command.
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Tested-by: Minwoo Im <minwoo.im@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <chaitanya.kulkarni@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1b8f21b74c3c9c82fce5a751d7aefb7cc0b8d33d ]
In NVMe's error handler, follows the typical steps of tearing down
hardware for recovering controller:
1) stop blk_mq hw queues
2) stop the real hw queues
3) cancel in-flight requests via
blk_mq_tagset_busy_iter(tags, cancel_request, ...)
cancel_request():
mark the request as abort
blk_mq_complete_request(req);
4) destroy real hw queues
However, there may be race between #3 and #4, because blk_mq_complete_request()
may run q->mq_ops->complete(rq) remotelly and asynchronously, and
->complete(rq) may be run after #4.
This patch introduces blk_mq_complete_request_sync() for fixing the
above race.
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Cc: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Cc: linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a0fe2c6479aab5723239b315ef1b552673f434a3 ]
Use parentheses around uses of the argument in u64_to_user_ptr() to
ensure that the cast doesn't apply to part of the argument.
There are existing uses of the macro of the form
u64_to_user_ptr(A + B)
which expands to
(void __user *)(uintptr_t)A + B
(the cast applies to the first operand of the addition, the addition
is a pointer addition). This happens to still work as intended, the
semantic difference doesn't cause a difference in behavior.
But I want to use u64_to_user_ptr() with a ternary operator in the
argument, like so:
u64_to_user_ptr(A ? B : C)
This currently doesn't work as intended.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Mukesh Ojha <mojha@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190329214652.258477-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 7c2e07130090ae001a97a6b65597830d6815e93e upstream.
Since commit 648e921888ad ("clk: x86: Stop marking clocks as
CLK_IS_CRITICAL"), the pmc_plt_clocks of the Bay Trail SoC are
unconditionally gated off. Unfortunately this will break systems where these
clocks are used for external purposes beyond the kernel's knowledge. Fix it
by implementing a system specific quirk to mark the necessary pmc_plt_clks as
critical.
Fixes: 648e921888ad ("clk: x86: Stop marking clocks as CLK_IS_CRITICAL")
Signed-off-by: David Müller <dave.mueller@gmx.ch>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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run simultaneously without deadlock
[ Upstream commit 10dce8af34226d90fa56746a934f8da5dcdba3df ]
Commit 9c225f2655e3 ("vfs: atomic f_pos accesses as per POSIX") added
locking for file.f_pos access and in particular made concurrent read and
write not possible - now both those functions take f_pos lock for the
whole run, and so if e.g. a read is blocked waiting for data, write will
deadlock waiting for that read to complete.
This caused regression for stream-like files where previously read and
write could run simultaneously, but after that patch could not do so
anymore. See e.g. commit 581d21a2d02a ("xenbus: fix deadlock on writes
to /proc/xen/xenbus") which fixes such regression for particular case of
/proc/xen/xenbus.
The patch that added f_pos lock in 2014 did so to guarantee POSIX thread
safety for read/write/lseek and added the locking to file descriptors of
all regular files. In 2014 that thread-safety problem was not new as it
was already discussed earlier in 2006.
However even though 2006'th version of Linus's patch was adding f_pos
locking "only for files that are marked seekable with FMODE_LSEEK (thus
avoiding the stream-like objects like pipes and sockets)", the 2014
version - the one that actually made it into the tree as 9c225f2655e3 -
is doing so irregardless of whether a file is seekable or not.
See
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/53022DB1.4070805@gmail.com/
https://lwn.net/Articles/180387
https://lwn.net/Articles/180396
for historic context.
The reason that it did so is, probably, that there are many files that
are marked non-seekable, but e.g. their read implementation actually
depends on knowing current position to correctly handle the read. Some
examples:
kernel/power/user.c snapshot_read
fs/debugfs/file.c u32_array_read
fs/fuse/control.c fuse_conn_waiting_read + ...
drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c atk_debugfs_ggrp_read
arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c hypfs_read_iter
...
Despite that, many nonseekable_open users implement read and write with
pure stream semantics - they don't depend on passed ppos at all. And for
those cases where read could wait for something inside, it creates a
situation similar to xenbus - the write could be never made to go until
read is done, and read is waiting for some, potentially external, event,
for potentially unbounded time -> deadlock.
Besides xenbus, there are 14 such places in the kernel that I've found
with semantic patch (see below):
drivers/xen/evtchn.c:667:8-24: ERROR: evtchn_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:963:8-24: ERROR: capi_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/input/evdev.c:527:1-17: ERROR: evdev_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c:1685:7-23: ERROR: cm4000_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
net/rfkill/core.c:1146:8-24: ERROR: rfkill_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/s390/char/fs3270.c:488:1-17: ERROR: fs3270_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c:310:1-17: ERROR: ld_usb_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/hid/uhid.c:635:1-17: ERROR: uhid_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c:80:1-17: ERROR: batadv_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c:198:1-17: ERROR: lirc_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/leds/uleds.c:77:1-17: ERROR: uleds_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:400:1-17: ERROR: uinput_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:985:7-23: ERROR: umad_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/gnss/core.c:45:1-17: ERROR: gnss_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
In addition to the cases above another regression caused by f_pos
locking is that now FUSE filesystems that implement open with
FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, can no longer implement bidirectional
stream-like files - for the same reason as above e.g. read can deadlock
write locking on file.f_pos in the kernel.
FUSE's FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE was added in 2008 in a7c1b990f715 ("fuse:
implement nonseekable open") to support OSSPD. OSSPD implements /dev/dsp
in userspace with FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, with corresponding read and
write routines not depending on current position at all, and with both
read and write being potentially blocking operations:
See
https://github.com/libfuse/osspd
https://lwn.net/Articles/308445
https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1406
https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1438-L1477
https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1479-L1510
Corresponding libfuse example/test also describes FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE as
"somewhat pipe-like files ..." with read handler not using offset.
However that test implements only read without write and cannot exercise
the deadlock scenario:
https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L124-L131
https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L146-L163
https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L209-L216
I've actually hit the read vs write deadlock for real while implementing
my FUSE filesystem where there is /head/watch file, for which open
creates separate bidirectional socket-like stream in between filesystem
and its user with both read and write being later performed
simultaneously. And there it is semantically not easy to split the
stream into two separate read-only and write-only channels:
https://lab.nexedi.com/kirr/wendelin.core/blob/f13aa600/wcfs/wcfs.go#L88-169
Let's fix this regression. The plan is:
1. We can't change nonseekable_open to include &~FMODE_ATOMIC_POS -
doing so would break many in-kernel nonseekable_open users which
actually use ppos in read/write handlers.
2. Add stream_open() to kernel to open stream-like non-seekable file
descriptors. Read and write on such file descriptors would never use
nor change ppos. And with that property on stream-like files read and
write will be running without taking f_pos lock - i.e. read and write
could be running simultaneously.
3. With semantic patch search and convert to stream_open all in-kernel
nonseekable_open users for which read and write actually do not
depend on ppos and where there is no other methods in file_operations
which assume @offset access.
4. Add FOPEN_STREAM to fs/fuse/ and open in-kernel file-descriptors via
steam_open if that bit is present in filesystem open reply.
It was tempting to change fs/fuse/ open handler to use stream_open
instead of nonseekable_open on just FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flags, but
grepping through Debian codesearch shows users of FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE,
and in particular GVFS which actually uses offset in its read and
write handlers
https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=-%3Enonseekable+%3D
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1080
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1247-1346
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1399-1481
so if we would do such a change it will break a real user.
5. Add stream_open and FOPEN_STREAM handling to stable kernels starting
from v3.14+ (the kernel where 9c225f2655 first appeared).
This will allow to patch OSSPD and other FUSE filesystems that
provide stream-like files to return FOPEN_STREAM | FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE
in their open handler and this way avoid the deadlock on all kernel
versions. This should work because fs/fuse/ ignores unknown open
flags returned from a filesystem and so passing FOPEN_STREAM to a
kernel that is not aware of this flag cannot hurt. In turn the kernel
that is not aware of FOPEN_STREAM will be < v3.14 where just
FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE is sufficient to implement streams without read vs
write deadlock.
This patch adds stream_open, converts /proc/xen/xenbus to it and adds
semantic patch to automatically locate in-kernel places that are either
required to be converted due to read vs write deadlock, or that are just
safe to be converted because read and write do not use ppos and there
are no other funky methods in file_operations.
Regarding semantic patch I've verified each generated change manually -
that it is correct to convert - and each other nonseekable_open instance
left - that it is either not correct to convert there, or that it is not
converted due to current stream_open.cocci limitations.
The script also does not convert files that should be valid to convert,
but that currently have .llseek = noop_llseek or generic_file_llseek for
unknown reason despite file being opened with nonseekable_open (e.g.
drivers/input/mousedev.c)
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Yongzhi Pan <panyongzhi@gmail.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Cc: Nikolaus Rath <Nikolaus@rath.org>
Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit c2b71462d294cf517a0bc6e4fd6424d7cee5596f upstream.
The syzkaller fuzzer reported a bug in the USB hub driver which turned
out to be caused by a negative runtime-PM usage counter. This allowed
a hub to be runtime suspended at a time when the driver did not expect
it. The symptom is a WARNING issued because the hub's status URB is
submitted while it is already active:
URB 0000000031fb463e submitted while active
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2917 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:363
The negative runtime-PM usage count was caused by an unfortunate
design decision made when runtime PM was first implemented for USB.
At that time, USB class drivers were allowed to unbind from their
interfaces without balancing the usage counter (i.e., leaving it with
a positive count). The core code would take care of setting the
counter back to 0 before allowing another driver to bind to the
interface.
Later on when runtime PM was implemented for the entire kernel, the
opposite decision was made: Drivers were required to balance their
runtime-PM get and put calls. In order to maintain backward
compatibility, however, the USB subsystem adapted to the new
implementation by keeping an independent usage counter for each
interface and using it to automatically adjust the normal usage
counter back to 0 whenever a driver was unbound.
This approach involves duplicating information, but what is worse, it
doesn't work properly in cases where a USB class driver delays
decrementing the usage counter until after the driver's disconnect()
routine has returned and the counter has been adjusted back to 0.
Doing so would cause the usage counter to become negative. There's
even a warning about this in the USB power management documentation!
As it happens, this is exactly what the hub driver does. The
kick_hub_wq() routine increments the runtime-PM usage counter, and the
corresponding decrement is carried out by hub_event() in the context
of the hub_wq work-queue thread. This work routine may sometimes run
after the driver has been unbound from its interface, and when it does
it causes the usage counter to go negative.
It is not possible for hub_disconnect() to wait for a pending
hub_event() call to finish, because hub_disconnect() is called with
the device lock held and hub_event() acquires that lock. The only
feasible fix is to reverse the original design decision: remove the
duplicate interface-specific usage counter and require USB drivers to
balance their runtime PM gets and puts. As far as I know, all
existing drivers currently do this.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+7634edaea4d0b341c625@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is the 5.0.12 stable release
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This is the 5.0.11 stable release
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This is the 5.0.10 stable release
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This is the 5.0.9 stable release
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This is the 5.0.8 stable release
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[ Upstream commit fcfc2aa0185f4a731d05a21e9f359968fdfd02e7 ]
There are a few system calls (pselect, ppoll, etc) which replace a task
sigmask while they are running in a kernel-space
When a task calls one of these syscalls, the kernel saves a current
sigmask in task->saved_sigmask and sets a syscall sigmask.
On syscall-exit-stop, ptrace traps a task before restoring the
saved_sigmask, so PTRACE_GETSIGMASK returns the syscall sigmask and
PTRACE_SETSIGMASK does nothing, because its sigmask is replaced by
saved_sigmask, when the task returns to user-space.
This patch fixes this problem. PTRACE_GETSIGMASK returns saved_sigmask
if it's set. PTRACE_SETSIGMASK drops the TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK flag.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181120060616.6043-1-avagin@gmail.com
Fixes: 29000caecbe8 ("ptrace: add ability to get/set signal-blocked mask")
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 15fab63e1e57be9fdb5eec1bbc5916e9825e9acb upstream.
Change pipe_buf_get() to return a bool indicating whether it succeeded
in raising the refcount of the page (if the thing in the pipe is a page).
This removes another mechanism for overflowing the page refcount. All
callers converted to handle a failure.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 88b1a17dfc3ed7728316478fae0f5ad508f50397 upstream.
This is the same as the traditional 'get_page()' function, but instead
of unconditionally incrementing the reference count of the page, it only
does so if the count was "safe". It returns whether the reference count
was incremented (and is marked __must_check, since the caller obviously
has to be aware of it).
Also like 'get_page()', you can't use this function unless you already
had a reference to the page. The intent is that you can use this
exactly like get_page(), but in situations where you want to limit the
maximum reference count.
The code currently does an unconditional WARN_ON_ONCE() if we ever hit
the reference count issues (either zero or negative), as a notification
that the conditional non-increment actually happened.
NOTE! The count access for the "safety" check is inherently racy, but
that doesn't matter since the buffer we use is basically half the range
of the reference count (ie we look at the sign of the count).
Acked-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f958d7b528b1b40c44cfda5eabe2d82760d868c3 upstream.
We have a VM_BUG_ON() to check that the page reference count doesn't
underflow (or get close to overflow) by checking the sign of the count.
That's all fine, but we actually want to allow people to use a "get page
ref unless it's already very high" helper function, and we want that one
to use the sign of the page ref (without triggering this VM_BUG_ON).
Change the VM_BUG_ON to only check for small underflows (or _very_ close
to overflowing), and ignore overflows which have strayed into negative
territory.
Acked-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1c5c12ee308aacf635c8819cd4baa3bd58f8a8b7 ]
Previously BMC's MAC address is calculated by simply adding 1 to the
last byte of network controller's MAC address, and it produces incorrect
result when network controller's MAC address ends with 0xFF.
The problem can be fixed by calling eth_addr_inc() function to increment
MAC address; besides, the MAC address is also validated before assigning
to BMC.
Fixes: cb10c7c0dfd9 ("net/ncsi: Add NCSI Broadcom OEM command")
Signed-off-by: Tao Ren <taoren@fb.com>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b987222654f84f7b4ca95b3a55eca784cb30235b upstream.
This fixes multiple issues in buffer_pipe_buf_ops:
- The ->steal() handler must not return zero unless the pipe buffer has
the only reference to the page. But generic_pipe_buf_steal() assumes
that every reference to the pipe is tracked by the page's refcount,
which isn't true for these buffers - buffer_pipe_buf_get(), which
duplicates a buffer, doesn't touch the page's refcount.
Fix it by using generic_pipe_buf_nosteal(), which refuses every
attempted theft. It should be easy to actually support ->steal, but the
only current users of pipe_buf_steal() are the virtio console and FUSE,
and they also only use it as an optimization. So it's probably not worth
the effort.
- The ->get() and ->release() handlers can be invoked concurrently on pipe
buffers backed by the same struct buffer_ref. Make them safe against
concurrency by using refcount_t.
- The pointers stored in ->private were only zeroed out when the last
reference to the buffer_ref was dropped. As far as I know, this
shouldn't be necessary anyway, but if we do it, let's always do it.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190404215925.253531-1-jannh@google.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 73a757e63114d ("ring-buffer: Return reader page back into existing ring buffer")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3ff9c075cc767b3060bdac12da72fc94dd7da1b8 upstream.
Verify the stack frame pointer on kretprobe trampoline handler,
If the stack frame pointer does not match, it skips the wrong
entry and tries to find correct one.
This can happen if user puts the kretprobe on the function
which can be used in the path of ftrace user-function call.
Such functions should not be probed, so this adds a warning
message that reports which function should be blacklisted.
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155094059185.6137.15527904013362842072.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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dumping
commit 04f5866e41fb70690e28397487d8bd8eea7d712a upstream.
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8065a779f17e94536a1c4dcee4f9d88011672f97 ]
When a netdev appears through hot plug then gets enslaved by a failover
master that is already up and running, the slave will be opened
right away after getting enslaved. Today there's a race that userspace
(udev) may fail to rename the slave if the kernel (net_failover)
opens the slave earlier than when the userspace rename happens.
Unlike bond or team, the primary slave of failover can't be renamed by
userspace ahead of time, since the kernel initiated auto-enslavement is
unable to, or rather, is never meant to be synchronized with the rename
request from userspace.
As the failover slave interfaces are not designed to be operated
directly by userspace apps: IP configuration, filter rules with
regard to network traffic passing and etc., should all be done on master
interface. In general, userspace apps only care about the
name of master interface, while slave names are less important as long
as admin users can see reliable names that may carry
other information describing the netdev. For e.g., they can infer that
"ens3nsby" is a standby slave of "ens3", while for a
name like "eth0" they can't tell which master it belongs to.
Historically the name of IFF_UP interface can't be changed because
there might be admin script or management software that is already
relying on such behavior and assumes that the slave name can't be
changed once UP. But failover is special: with the in-kernel
auto-enslavement mechanism, the userspace expectation for device
enumeration and bring-up order is already broken. Previously initramfs
and various userspace config tools were modified to bypass failover
slaves because of auto-enslavement and duplicate MAC address. Similarly,
in case that users care about seeing reliable slave name, the new type
of failover slaves needs to be taken care of specifically in userspace
anyway.
It's less risky to lift up the rename restriction on failover slave
which is already UP. Although it's possible this change may potentially
break userspace component (most likely configuration scripts or
management software) that assumes slave name can't be changed while
UP, it's relatively a limited and controllable set among all userspace
components, which can be fixed specifically to listen for the rename
events on failover slaves. Userspace component interacting with slaves
is expected to be changed to operate on failover master interface
instead, as the failover slave is dynamic in nature which may come and
go at any point. The goal is to make the role of failover slaves less
relevant, and userspace components should only deal with failover master
in the long run.
Fixes: 30c8bd5aa8b2 ("net: Introduce generic failover module")
Signed-off-by: Si-Wei Liu <si-wei.liu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Sridhar Samudrala <sridhar.samudrala@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a4046c06be50a4f01d435aa7fe57514818e6cc82 ]
Use offsetof() to calculate offset of a field to take advantage of
compiler built-in version when possible, and avoid UBSAN warning when
compiling with Clang:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in mm/swapfile.c:3010:38
member access within null pointer of type 'union swap_header'
CPU: 6 PID: 1833 Comm: swapon Tainted: G S 4.19.23 #43
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x194
show_stack+0x20/0x2c
__dump_stack+0x20/0x28
dump_stack+0x70/0x94
ubsan_epilogue+0x14/0x44
ubsan_type_mismatch_common+0xf4/0xfc
__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1+0x34/0x54
__se_sys_swapon+0x654/0x1084
__arm64_sys_swapon+0x1c/0x24
el0_svc_common+0xa8/0x150
el0_svc_compat_handler+0x2c/0x38
el0_svc_compat+0x8/0x18
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190312081902.223764-1-pihsun@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Pi-Hsun Shih <pihsun@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6377f787aeb945cae7abbb6474798de129e1f3ac ]
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pde_subdir_find+0x12d/0x150 fs/proc/generic.c:71
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881f41fe5b0 by task syz-executor.0/2806
CPU: 0 PID: 2806 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
pde_subdir_find+0x12d/0x150 fs/proc/generic.c:71
remove_proc_entry+0xe8/0x420 fs/proc/generic.c:667
atalk_proc_exit+0x18/0x820 [appletalk]
atalk_exit+0xf/0x5a [appletalk]
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x3dc/0x5e0 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fb2de6b9c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000200001c0
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb2de6ba6bc
R13: 00000000004bccaa R14: 00000000006f6bc8 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Allocated by task 2806:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:496
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:444 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2739 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2747 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0xcf/0x250 mm/slub.c:2752
kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:730 [inline]
__proc_create+0x30f/0xa20 fs/proc/generic.c:408
proc_mkdir_data+0x47/0x190 fs/proc/generic.c:469
0xffffffffc10c01bb
0xffffffffc10c0166
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 2806:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:458
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1436 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2986 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0xa6/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:3002
pde_put+0x6e/0x80 fs/proc/generic.c:647
remove_proc_entry+0x1d3/0x420 fs/proc/generic.c:684
0xffffffffc10c031c
0xffffffffc10c0166
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881f41fe500
which belongs to the cache proc_dir_entry of size 256
The buggy address is located 176 bytes inside of
256-byte region [ffff8881f41fe500, ffff8881f41fe600)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007d07f80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6e69a00 index:0x0
flags: 0x2fffc0000000200(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff8881f6e69a00
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8881f41fe480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8881f41fe500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8881f41fe580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8881f41fe600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8881f41fe680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
It should check the return value of atalk_proc_init fails,
otherwise atalk_exit will trgger use-after-free in pde_subdir_find
while unload the module.This patch fix error cleanup path of atalk_init
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ffc8599aa9763f39f6736a79da4d1575e7006f9a ]
On machines where the GART aperture is mapped over physical RAM,
/proc/kcore contains the GART aperture range. Accessing the GART range via
/proc/kcore results in a kernel crash.
vmcore used to have the same issue, until it was fixed with commit
2a3e83c6f96c ("x86/gart: Exclude GART aperture from vmcore")', leveraging
existing hook infrastructure in vmcore to let /proc/vmcore return zeroes
when attempting to read the aperture region, and so it won't read from the
actual memory.
Apply the same workaround for kcore. First implement the same hook
infrastructure for kcore, then reuse the hook functions introduced in the
previous vmcore fix. Just with some minor adjustment, rename some functions
for more general usage, and simplify the hook infrastructure a bit as there
is no module usage yet.
Suggested-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190308030508.13548-1-kasong@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit cf94db21905333e610e479688add629397a4b384 upstream.
vring_create_virtqueue() allows the caller to specify via the
may_reduce_num parameter whether the vring code is allowed to
allocate a smaller ring than specified.
However, the split ring allocation code tries to allocate a
smaller ring on allocation failure regardless of what the
caller specified. This may cause trouble for e.g. virtio-pci
in legacy mode, which does not support ring resizing. (The
packed ring code does not resize in any case.)
Let's fix this by bailing out immediately in the split ring code
if the requested size cannot be allocated and may_reduce_num has
not been specified.
While at it, fix a typo in the usage instructions.
Fixes: 2a2d1382fe9d ("virtio: Add improved queue allocation API")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.6+
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0b3d6e6f2dd0a7b697b1aa8c167265908940624b upstream.
Since commit a983b5ebee57 ("mm: memcontrol: fix excessive complexity in
memory.stat reporting") memcg dirty and writeback counters are managed
as:
1) per-memcg per-cpu values in range of [-32..32]
2) per-memcg atomic counter
When a per-cpu counter cannot fit in [-32..32] it's flushed to the
atomic. Stat readers only check the atomic. Thus readers such as
balance_dirty_pages() may see a nontrivial error margin: 32 pages per
cpu.
Assuming 100 cpus:
4k x86 page_size: 13 MiB error per memcg
64k ppc page_size: 200 MiB error per memcg
Considering that dirty+writeback are used together for some decisions the
errors double.
This inaccuracy can lead to undeserved oom kills. One nasty case is
when all per-cpu counters hold positive values offsetting an atomic
negative value (i.e. per_cpu[*]=32, atomic=n_cpu*-32).
balance_dirty_pages() only consults the atomic and does not consider
throttling the next n_cpu*32 dirty pages. If the file_lru is in the
13..200 MiB range then there's absolutely no dirty throttling, which
burdens vmscan with only dirty+writeback pages thus resorting to oom
kill.
It could be argued that tiny containers are not supported, but it's more
subtle. It's the amount the space available for file lru that matters.
If a container has memory.max-200MiB of non reclaimable memory, then it
will also suffer such oom kills on a 100 cpu machine.
The following test reliably ooms without this patch. This patch avoids
oom kills.
$ cat test
mount -t cgroup2 none /dev/cgroup
cd /dev/cgroup
echo +io +memory > cgroup.subtree_control
mkdir test
cd test
echo 10M > memory.max
(echo $BASHPID > cgroup.procs && exec /memcg-writeback-stress /foo)
(echo $BASHPID > cgroup.procs && exec dd if=/dev/zero of=/foo bs=2M count=100)
$ cat memcg-writeback-stress.c
/*
* Dirty pages from all but one cpu.
* Clean pages from the non dirtying cpu.
* This is to stress per cpu counter imbalance.
* On a 100 cpu machine:
* - per memcg per cpu dirty count is 32 pages for each of 99 cpus
* - per memcg atomic is -99*32 pages
* - thus the complete dirty limit: sum of all counters 0
* - balance_dirty_pages() only sees atomic count -99*32 pages, which
* it max()s to 0.
* - So a workload can dirty -99*32 pages before balance_dirty_pages()
* cares.
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <err.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/sysinfo.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static char *buf;
static int bufSize;
static void set_affinity(int cpu)
{
cpu_set_t affinity;
CPU_ZERO(&affinity);
CPU_SET(cpu, &affinity);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(affinity), &affinity))
err(1, "sched_setaffinity");
}
static void dirty_on(int output_fd, int cpu)
{
int i, wrote;
set_affinity(cpu);
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
for (wrote = 0; wrote < bufSize; ) {
int ret = write(output_fd, buf+wrote, bufSize-wrote);
if (ret == -1)
err(1, "write");
wrote += ret;
}
}
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int cpu, flush_cpu = 1, output_fd;
const char *output;
if (argc != 2)
errx(1, "usage: output_file");
output = argv[1];
bufSize = getpagesize();
buf = malloc(getpagesize());
if (buf == NULL)
errx(1, "malloc failed");
output_fd = open(output, O_CREAT|O_RDWR);
if (output_fd == -1)
err(1, "open(%s)", output);
for (cpu = 0; cpu < get_nprocs(); cpu++) {
if (cpu != flush_cpu)
dirty_on(output_fd, cpu);
}
set_affinity(flush_cpu);
if (fsync(output_fd))
err(1, "fsync(%s)", output);
if (close(output_fd))
err(1, "close(%s)", output);
free(buf);
}
Make balance_dirty_pages() and wb_over_bg_thresh() work harder to
collect exact per memcg counters. This avoids the aforementioned oom
kills.
This does not affect the overhead of memory.stat, which still reads the
single atomic counter.
Why not use percpu_counter? memcg already handles cpus going offline, so
no need for that overhead from percpu_counter. And the percpu_counter
spinlocks are more heavyweight than is required.
It probably also makes sense to use exact dirty and writeback counters
in memcg oom reports. But that is saved for later.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190329174609.164344-1-gthelen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.16+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6147e136ff5071609b54f18982dea87706288e21 upstream.
clang points out with hundreds of warnings that the bitrev macros have a
problem with constant input:
drivers/hwmon/sht15.c:187:11: error: variable '__x' is uninitialized when used within its own initialization
[-Werror,-Wuninitialized]
u8 crc = bitrev8(data->val_status & 0x0F);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/bitrev.h:102:21: note: expanded from macro 'bitrev8'
__constant_bitrev8(__x) : \
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~
include/linux/bitrev.h:67:11: note: expanded from macro '__constant_bitrev8'
u8 __x = x; \
~~~ ^
Both the bitrev and the __constant_bitrev macros use an internal
variable named __x, which goes horribly wrong when passing one to the
other.
The obvious fix is to rename one of the variables, so this adds an extra
'_'.
It seems we got away with this because
- there are only a few drivers using bitrev macros
- usually there are no constant arguments to those
- when they are constant, they tend to be either 0 or (unsigned)-1
(drivers/isdn/i4l/isdnhdlc.o, drivers/iio/amplifiers/ad8366.c) and
give the correct result by pure chance.
In fact, the only driver that I could find that gets different results
with this is drivers/net/wan/slic_ds26522.c, which in turn is a driver
for fairly rare hardware (adding the maintainer to Cc for testing).
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190322140503.123580-1-arnd@arndb.de
Fixes: 556d2f055bf6 ("ARM: 8187/1: add CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE to support rbit instruction")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Zhao Qiang <qiang.zhao@nxp.com>
Cc: Yalin Wang <yalin.wang@sonymobile.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Bruce Ashfield
Daniel Borkmann
Peter Zijlstra
Stefan Mätje
Jason Gunthorpe
Phong Tran
Al Viro
Willem de Bruijn
Chengguang Xu
Dmitry Osipenko
Steve Twiss
Mike Kravetz
Dan Williams
Paolo Bonzini
Jian-Hong Pan
Jens Axboe
Josh Poimboeuf
Thomas Gleixner
Keith Busch
Ming Lei
Jann Horn
David Müller
Kirill Smelkov
Alan Stern
Andrei Vagin
Matthew Wilcox
Linus Torvalds
Tao Ren
Masami Hiramatsu
Andrea Arcangeli
Si-Wei Liu
Pi-Hsun Shih
YueHaibing
Kairui Song
Cornelia Huck
Greg Thelen
Arnd Bergmann