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commit 56062d60f117dccfb5281869e0ab61e090baf864 upstream.
Presently ia32 registers stored in ptregs are unconditionally cast to
unsigned int by the ia32 stub. They are then cast to long when passed to
__se_sys*, but will not be sign extended.
This takes the sign of the syscall argument into account in the ia32
stub. It still casts to unsigned int to avoid implementation specific
behavior. However then casts to int or unsigned int as necessary. So that
the following cast to long sign extends the value.
This fixes the io_pgetevents02 LTP test when compiled with -m32. Presently
the systemcall io_pgetevents_time64() unexpectedly accepts -1 for the
maximum number of events.
It doesn't appear other systemcalls with signed arguments are effected
because they all have compat variants defined and wired up.
Fixes: ebeb8c82ffaf ("syscalls/x86: Use 'struct pt_regs' based syscall calling for IA32_EMULATION and x32")
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <rpalethorpe@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110130122.3836513-1-nik.borisov@suse.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20210921130127.24131-1-rpalethorpe@suse.com/
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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No upstream commit exists.
This imports the io_uring codebase from 5.15.85, wholesale. Changes
from that code base:
- Drop IOCB_ALLOC_CACHE, we don't have that in 5.10.
- Drop MKDIRAT/SYMLINKAT/LINKAT. Would require further VFS backports,
and we don't support these in 5.10 to begin with.
- sock_from_file() old style calling convention.
- Use compat_get_bitmap() only for CONFIG_COMPAT=y
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2ca408d9c749c32288bc28725f9f12ba30299e8f upstream.
Commit
121b32a58a3a ("x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments")
converted native x86-32 which take 64-bit arguments to use the
compat handlers to allow conversion to passing args via pt_regs.
sys_fanotify_mark() was however missed, as it has a general compat
handler. Add a config option that will use the syscall wrapper that
takes the split args for native 32-bit.
[ bp: Fix typo in Kconfig help text. ]
Fixes: 121b32a58a3a ("x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments")
Reported-by: Paweł Jasiak <pawel@jasiak.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201130223059.101286-1-brgerst@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Use a more generic form for __section that requires quotes to avoid
complications with clang and gcc differences.
Remove the quote operator # from compiler_attributes.h __section macro.
Convert all unquoted __section(foo) uses to quoted __section("foo").
Also convert __attribute__((section("foo"))) uses to __section("foo")
even if the __attribute__ has multiple list entry forms.
Conversion done using the script at:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/75393e5ddc272dc7403de74d645e6c6e0f4e70eb.camel@perches.com/2-convert_section.pl
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@gooogle.com>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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There is usecase that System Management Software(SMS) want to give a
memory hint like MADV_[COLD|PAGEEOUT] to other processes and in the
case of Android, it is the ActivityManagerService.
The information required to make the reclaim decision is not known to the
app. Instead, it is known to the centralized userspace
daemon(ActivityManagerService), and that daemon must be able to initiate
reclaim on its own without any app involvement.
To solve the issue, this patch introduces a new syscall
process_madvise(2). It uses pidfd of an external process to give the
hint. It also supports vector address range because Android app has
thousands of vmas due to zygote so it's totally waste of CPU and power if
we should call the syscall one by one for each vma.(With testing 2000-vma
syscall vs 1-vector syscall, it showed 15% performance improvement. I
think it would be bigger in real practice because the testing ran very
cache friendly environment).
Another potential use case for the vector range is to amortize the cost
ofTLB shootdowns for multiple ranges when using MADV_DONTNEED; this could
benefit users like TCP receive zerocopy and malloc implementations. In
future, we could find more usecases for other advises so let's make it
happens as API since we introduce a new syscall at this moment. With
that, existing madvise(2) user could replace it with process_madvise(2)
with their own pid if they want to have batch address ranges support
feature.
ince it could affect other process's address range, only privileged
process(PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) or something else(e.g., being the same
UID) gives it the right to ptrace the process could use it successfully.
The flag argument is reserved for future use if we need to extend the API.
I think supporting all hints madvise has/will supported/support to
process_madvise is rather risky. Because we are not sure all hints make
sense from external process and implementation for the hint may rely on
the caller being in the current context so it could be error-prone. Thus,
I just limited hints as MADV_[COLD|PAGEOUT] in this patch.
If someone want to add other hints, we could hear the usecase and review
it for each hint. It's safer for maintenance rather than introducing a
buggy syscall but hard to fix it later.
So finally, the API is as follows,
ssize_t process_madvise(int pidfd, const struct iovec *iovec,
unsigned long vlen, int advice, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
The process_madvise() system call is used to give advice or directions
to the kernel about the address ranges from external process as well as
local process. It provides the advice to address ranges of process
described by iovec and vlen. The goal of such advice is to improve
system or application performance.
The pidfd selects the process referred to by the PID file descriptor
specified in pidfd. (See pidofd_open(2) for further information)
The pointer iovec points to an array of iovec structures, defined in
<sys/uio.h> as:
struct iovec {
void *iov_base; /* starting address */
size_t iov_len; /* number of bytes to be advised */
};
The iovec describes address ranges beginning at address(iov_base)
and with size length of bytes(iov_len).
The vlen represents the number of elements in iovec.
The advice is indicated in the advice argument, which is one of the
following at this moment if the target process specified by pidfd is
external.
MADV_COLD
MADV_PAGEOUT
Permission to provide a hint to external process is governed by a
ptrace access mode PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS check; see ptrace(2).
The process_madvise supports every advice madvise(2) has if target
process is in same thread group with calling process so user could
use process_madvise(2) to extend existing madvise(2) to support
vector address ranges.
RETURN VALUE
On success, process_madvise() returns the number of bytes advised.
This return value may be less than the total number of requested
bytes, if an error occurred. The caller should check return value
to determine whether a partial advice occurred.
FAQ:
Q.1 - Why does any external entity have better knowledge?
Quote from Sandeep
"For Android, every application (including the special SystemServer)
are forked from Zygote. The reason of course is to share as many
libraries and classes between the two as possible to benefit from the
preloading during boot.
After applications start, (almost) all of the APIs end up calling into
this SystemServer process over IPC (binder) and back to the
application.
In a fully running system, the SystemServer monitors every single
process periodically to calculate their PSS / RSS and also decides
which process is "important" to the user for interactivity.
So, because of how these processes start _and_ the fact that the
SystemServer is looping to monitor each process, it does tend to *know*
which address range of the application is not used / useful.
Besides, we can never rely on applications to clean things up
themselves. We've had the "hey app1, the system is low on memory,
please trim your memory usage down" notifications for a long time[1].
They rely on applications honoring the broadcasts and very few do.
So, if we want to avoid the inevitable killing of the application and
restarting it, some way to be able to tell the OS about unimportant
memory in these applications will be useful.
- ssp
Q.2 - How to guarantee the race(i.e., object validation) between when
giving a hint from an external process and get the hint from the target
process?
process_madvise operates on the target process's address space as it
exists at the instant that process_madvise is called. If the space
target process can run between the time the process_madvise process
inspects the target process address space and the time that
process_madvise is actually called, process_madvise may operate on
memory regions that the calling process does not expect. It's the
responsibility of the process calling process_madvise to close this
race condition. For example, the calling process can suspend the
target process with ptrace, SIGSTOP, or the freezer cgroup so that it
doesn't have an opportunity to change its own address space before
process_madvise is called. Another option is to operate on memory
regions that the caller knows a priori will be unchanged in the target
process. Yet another option is to accept the race for certain
process_madvise calls after reasoning that mistargeting will do no
harm. The suggested API itself does not provide synchronization. It
also apply other APIs like move_pages, process_vm_write.
The race isn't really a problem though. Why is it so wrong to require
that callers do their own synchronization in some manner? Nobody
objects to write(2) merely because it's possible for two processes to
open the same file and clobber each other's writes --- instead, we tell
people to use flock or something. Think about mmap. It never
guarantees newly allocated address space is still valid when the user
tries to access it because other threads could unmap the memory right
before. That's where we need synchronization by using other API or
design from userside. It shouldn't be part of API itself. If someone
needs more fine-grained synchronization rather than process level,
there were two ideas suggested - cookie[2] and anon-fd[3]. Both are
applicable via using last reserved argument of the API but I don't
think it's necessary right now since we have already ways to prevent
the race so don't want to add additional complexity with more
fine-grained optimization model.
To make the API extend, it reserved an unsigned long as last argument
so we could support it in future if someone really needs it.
Q.3 - Why doesn't ptrace work?
Injecting an madvise in the target process using ptrace would not work
for us because such injected madvise would have to be executed by the
target process, which means that process would have to be runnable and
that creates the risk of the abovementioned race and hinting a wrong
VMA. Furthermore, we want to act the hint in caller's context, not the
callee's, because the callee is usually limited in cpuset/cgroups or
even freezed state so they can't act by themselves quick enough, which
causes more thrashing/kill. It doesn't work if the target process are
ptraced(e.g., strace, debugger, minidump) because a process can have at
most one ptracer.
[1] https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/memory"
[2] process_getinfo for getting the cookie which is updated whenever
vma of process address layout are changed - Daniel Colascione -
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190520035254.57579-1-minchan@kernel.org/T/#m7694416fd179b2066a2c62b5b139b14e3894e224
[3] anonymous fd which is used for the object(i.e., address range)
validation - Michal Hocko -
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200120112722.GY18451@dhcp22.suse.cz/
[minchan@kernel.org: fix process_madvise build break for arm64]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200303145756.GA219683@google.com
[minchan@kernel.org: fix build error for mips of process_madvise]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508052517.GA197378@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix patch ordering issue]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arm64 whoops]
[minchan@kernel.org: make process_madvise() vlen arg have type size_t, per Florian]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 build]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix syscall numbering]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200905142639.49fc3f1a@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: madvise.c needs compat.h]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200908204547.285646b4@canb.auug.org.au
[minchan@kernel.org: fix mips build]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200909173655.GC2435453@google.com
[yuehaibing@huawei.com: remove duplicate header which is included twice]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915121550.30584-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
[minchan@kernel.org: do not use helper functions for process_madvise]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200921175539.GB387368@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: pidfd_get_pid() gained an argument]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix up for "iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec"]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200928212542.468e1fef@canb.auug.org.au
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sj38.park@gmail.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200302193630.68771-3-minchan@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508183320.GA125527@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-4-minchan@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-4-minchan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This patchset is based on Google-internal RSEQ work done by Paul
Turner and Andrew Hunter.
When working with per-CPU RSEQ-based memory allocations, it is
sometimes important to make sure that a global memory location is no
longer accessed from RSEQ critical sections. For example, there can be
two per-CPU lists, one is "active" and accessed per-CPU, while another
one is inactive and worked on asynchronously "off CPU" (e.g. garbage
collection is performed). Then at some point the two lists are
swapped, and a fast RCU-like mechanism is required to make sure that
the previously active list is no longer accessed.
This patch introduces such a mechanism: in short, membarrier() syscall
issues an IPI to a CPU, restarting a potentially active RSEQ critical
section on the CPU.
Signed-off-by: Peter Oskolkov <posk@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200923233618.2572849-1-posk@google.com
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Since commit 61a47c1ad3a4dc ("sysctl: Remove the sysctl system call"),
sys_sysctl is actually unavailable: any input can only return an error.
We have been warning about people using the sysctl system call for years
and believe there are no more users. Even if there are users of this
interface if they have not complained or fixed their code by now they
probably are not going to, so there is no point in warning them any
longer.
So completely remove sys_sysctl on all architectures.
[nixiaoming@huawei.com: s390: fix build error for sys_call_table_emu]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200618141426.16884-1-nixiaoming@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> [arm/arm64]
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Bin Meng <bin.meng@windriver.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: chenzefeng <chenzefeng2@huawei.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes@flameeyes.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kars de Jong <jongk@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Cc: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: Zhou Yanjie <zhouyanjie@wanyeetech.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616030734.87257-1-nixiaoming@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "clean up address limit helpers", v2.
In preparation for eventually phasing out direct use of set_fs(), this
series removes the segment_eq() arch helper that is only used to implement
or duplicate the uaccess_kernel() API, and then adds descriptive helpers
to force the kernel address limit.
This patch (of 6):
Use the uaccess_kernel helper instead of duplicating it.
[hch@lst.de: arm: don't call addr_limit_user_check for nommu]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200721045834.GA9613@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>
Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Cc: Vincent Chen <deanbo422@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200714105505.935079-1-hch@lst.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710135706.537715-1-hch@lst.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710135706.537715-2-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull init and set_fs() cleanups from Al Viro:
"Christoph's 'getting rid of ksys_...() uses under KERNEL_DS' series"
* 'hch.init_path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (50 commits)
init: add an init_dup helper
init: add an init_utimes helper
init: add an init_stat helper
init: add an init_mknod helper
init: add an init_mkdir helper
init: add an init_symlink helper
init: add an init_link helper
init: add an init_eaccess helper
init: add an init_chmod helper
init: add an init_chown helper
init: add an init_chroot helper
init: add an init_chdir helper
init: add an init_rmdir helper
init: add an init_unlink helper
init: add an init_umount helper
init: add an init_mount helper
init: mark create_dev as __init
init: mark console_on_rootfs as __init
init: initialize ramdisk_execute_command at compile time
devtmpfs: refactor devtmpfsd()
...
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Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Support 6Ghz band in ath11k driver, from Rajkumar Manoharan.
2) Support UDP segmentation in code TSO code, from Eric Dumazet.
3) Allow flashing different flash images in cxgb4 driver, from Vishal
Kulkarni.
4) Add drop frames counter and flow status to tc flower offloading,
from Po Liu.
5) Support n-tuple filters in cxgb4, from Vishal Kulkarni.
6) Various new indirect call avoidance, from Eric Dumazet and Brian
Vazquez.
7) Fix BPF verifier failures on 32-bit pointer arithmetic, from
Yonghong Song.
8) Support querying and setting hardware address of a port function via
devlink, use this in mlx5, from Parav Pandit.
9) Support hw ipsec offload on bonding slaves, from Jarod Wilson.
10) Switch qca8k driver over to phylink, from Jonathan McDowell.
11) In bpftool, show list of processes holding BPF FD references to
maps, programs, links, and btf objects. From Andrii Nakryiko.
12) Several conversions over to generic power management, from Vaibhav
Gupta.
13) Add support for SO_KEEPALIVE et al. to bpf_setsockopt(), from Dmitry
Yakunin.
14) Various https url conversions, from Alexander A. Klimov.
15) Timestamping and PHC support for mscc PHY driver, from Antoine
Tenart.
16) Support bpf iterating over tcp and udp sockets, from Yonghong Song.
17) Support 5GBASE-T i40e NICs, from Aleksandr Loktionov.
18) Add kTLS RX HW offload support to mlx5e, from Tariq Toukan.
19) Fix the ->ndo_start_xmit() return type to be netdev_tx_t in several
drivers. From Luc Van Oostenryck.
20) XDP support for xen-netfront, from Denis Kirjanov.
21) Support receive buffer autotuning in MPTCP, from Florian Westphal.
22) Support EF100 chip in sfc driver, from Edward Cree.
23) Add XDP support to mvpp2 driver, from Matteo Croce.
24) Support MPTCP in sock_diag, from Paolo Abeni.
25) Commonize UDP tunnel offloading code by creating udp_tunnel_nic
infrastructure, from Jakub Kicinski.
26) Several pci_ --> dma_ API conversions, from Christophe JAILLET.
27) Add FLOW_ACTION_POLICE support to mlxsw, from Ido Schimmel.
28) Add SK_LOOKUP bpf program type, from Jakub Sitnicki.
29) Refactor a lot of networking socket option handling code in order to
avoid set_fs() calls, from Christoph Hellwig.
30) Add rfc4884 support to icmp code, from Willem de Bruijn.
31) Support TBF offload in dpaa2-eth driver, from Ioana Ciornei.
32) Support XDP_REDIRECT in qede driver, from Alexander Lobakin.
33) Support PCI relaxed ordering in mlx5 driver, from Aya Levin.
34) Support TCP syncookies in MPTCP, from Flowian Westphal.
35) Fix several tricky cases of PMTU handling wrt. briding, from Stefano
Brivio.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2056 commits)
net: thunderx: initialize VF's mailbox mutex before first usage
usb: hso: remove bogus check for EINPROGRESS
usb: hso: no complaint about kmalloc failure
hso: fix bailout in error case of probe
ip_tunnel_core: Fix build for archs without _HAVE_ARCH_IPV6_CSUM
selftests/net: relax cpu affinity requirement in msg_zerocopy test
mptcp: be careful on subflow creation
selftests: rtnetlink: make kci_test_encap() return sub-test result
selftests: rtnetlink: correct the final return value for the test
net: dsa: sja1105: use detected device id instead of DT one on mismatch
tipc: set ub->ifindex for local ipv6 address
ipv6: add ipv6_dev_find()
net: openvswitch: silence suspicious RCU usage warning
Revert "vxlan: fix tos value before xmit"
ptp: only allow phase values lower than 1 period
farsync: switch from 'pci_' to 'dma_' API
wan: wanxl: switch from 'pci_' to 'dma_' API
hv_netvsc: do not use VF device if link is down
dpaa2-eth: Fix passing zero to 'PTR_ERR' warning
net: macb: Properly handle phylink on at91sam9x
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull close_range() implementation from Christian Brauner:
"This adds the close_range() syscall. It allows to efficiently close a
range of file descriptors up to all file descriptors of a calling
task.
This is coordinated with the FreeBSD folks which have copied our
version of this syscall and in the meantime have already merged it in
April 2019:
https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21627
https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=359836
The syscall originally came up in a discussion around the new mount
API and making new file descriptor types cloexec by default. During
this discussion, Al suggested the close_range() syscall.
First, it helps to close all file descriptors of an exec()ing task.
This can be done safely via (quoting Al's example from [1] verbatim):
/* that exec is sensitive */
unshare(CLONE_FILES);
/* we don't want anything past stderr here */
close_range(3, ~0U);
execve(....);
The code snippet above is one way of working around the problem that
file descriptors are not cloexec by default. This is aggravated by the
fact that we can't just switch them over without massively regressing
userspace. For a whole class of programs having an in-kernel method of
closing all file descriptors is very helpful (e.g. demons, service
managers, programming language standard libraries, container managers
etc.).
Second, it allows userspace to avoid implementing closing all file
descriptors by parsing through /proc/<pid>/fd/* and calling close() on
each file descriptor and other hacks. From looking at various
large(ish) userspace code bases this or similar patterns are very
common in service managers, container runtimes, and programming
language runtimes/standard libraries such as Python or Rust.
In addition, the syscall will also work for tasks that do not have
procfs mounted and on kernels that do not have procfs support compiled
in. In such situations the only way to make sure that all file
descriptors are closed is to call close() on each file descriptor up
to UINT_MAX or RLIMIT_NOFILE, OPEN_MAX trickery.
Based on Linus' suggestion close_range() also comes with a new flag
CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE to more elegantly handle file descriptor dropping
right before exec. This would usually be expressed in the sequence:
unshare(CLONE_FILES);
close_range(3, ~0U);
as pointed out by Linus it might be desirable to have this be a part
of close_range() itself under a new flag CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE which
gets especially handy when we're closing all file descriptors above a
certain threshold.
Test-suite as always included"
* tag 'close-range-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
tests: add CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE tests
close_range: add CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE
tests: add close_range() tests
arch: wire-up close_range()
open: add close_range()
|
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Add a simple helper to mknod with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_mknod.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
Add a simple helper to mkdir with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_mkdir.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
Add a simple helper to symlink with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_symlink.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
Add a simple helper to link with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_link.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
Add a simple helper to check if a file exists based on kernel space file
name and switch the early init code over to it. Note that this
theoretically changes behavior as it always is based on the effective
permissions. But during early init that doesn't make a difference.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
Add a simple helper to chmod with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
Add a simple helper to chroot with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_chroot.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
Add a simple helper to chdir with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_chdir.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
Add a simple helper to rmdir with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_rmdir.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
Add a simple helper to unlink with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_unlink.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
Like ksys_umount, but takes a kernel pointer for the destination path.
Switch over the umount in the init code, which just happen to work due to
the implicit set_fs(KERNEL_DS) during early init right now.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
This mirrors do_unlinkat and will make life a little easier for
the init code to reuse the whole function with a kernel filename.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
Fold it into the only remaining caller.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Fold it into the only remaining caller.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Fold it into the only remaining caller.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Just open code it in the two callers.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Just open code it in the only caller.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
There is no good reason to mess with file descriptors from in-kernel
code, switch the initrd loading to struct file based read and writes
instead.
Also Pass an explicit offset instead of ->f_pos, and to make that easier,
use file scope file structs and offsets everywhere except for
identify_ramdisk_image instead of the current strange mix.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Now that the ->compat_{get,set}sockopt proto_ops methods are gone
there is no good reason left to keep the compat syscalls separate.
This fixes the odd use of unsigned int for the compat_setsockopt
optlen and the missing sock_use_custom_sol_socket.
It would also easily allow running the eBPF hooks for the compat
syscalls, but such a large change in behavior does not belong into
a consolidation patch like this one.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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|
This adds the close_range() syscall. It allows to efficiently close a range
of file descriptors up to all file descriptors of a calling task.
I was contacted by FreeBSD as they wanted to have the same close_range()
syscall as we proposed here. We've coordinated this and in the meantime, Kyle
was fast enough to merge close_range() into FreeBSD already in April:
https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21627
https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=359836
and the current plan is to backport close_range() to FreeBSD 12.2 (cf. [2])
once its merged in Linux too. Python is in the process of switching to
close_range() on FreeBSD and they are waiting on us to merge this to switch on
Linux as well: https://bugs.python.org/issue38061
The syscall came up in a recent discussion around the new mount API and
making new file descriptor types cloexec by default. During this
discussion, Al suggested the close_range() syscall (cf. [1]). Note, a
syscall in this manner has been requested by various people over time.
First, it helps to close all file descriptors of an exec()ing task. This
can be done safely via (quoting Al's example from [1] verbatim):
/* that exec is sensitive */
unshare(CLONE_FILES);
/* we don't want anything past stderr here */
close_range(3, ~0U);
execve(....);
The code snippet above is one way of working around the problem that file
descriptors are not cloexec by default. This is aggravated by the fact that
we can't just switch them over without massively regressing userspace. For
a whole class of programs having an in-kernel method of closing all file
descriptors is very helpful (e.g. demons, service managers, programming
language standard libraries, container managers etc.).
(Please note, unshare(CLONE_FILES) should only be needed if the calling
task is multi-threaded and shares the file descriptor table with another
thread in which case two threads could race with one thread allocating file
descriptors and the other one closing them via close_range(). For the
general case close_range() before the execve() is sufficient.)
Second, it allows userspace to avoid implementing closing all file
descriptors by parsing through /proc/<pid>/fd/* and calling close() on each
file descriptor. From looking at various large(ish) userspace code bases
this or similar patterns are very common in:
- service managers (cf. [4])
- libcs (cf. [6])
- container runtimes (cf. [5])
- programming language runtimes/standard libraries
- Python (cf. [2])
- Rust (cf. [7], [8])
As Dmitry pointed out there's even a long-standing glibc bug about missing
kernel support for this task (cf. [3]).
In addition, the syscall will also work for tasks that do not have procfs
mounted and on kernels that do not have procfs support compiled in. In such
situations the only way to make sure that all file descriptors are closed
is to call close() on each file descriptor up to UINT_MAX or RLIMIT_NOFILE,
OPEN_MAX trickery (cf. comment [8] on Rust).
The performance is striking. For good measure, comparing the following
simple close_all_fds() userspace implementation that is essentially just
glibc's version in [6]:
static int close_all_fds(void)
{
int dir_fd;
DIR *dir;
struct dirent *direntp;
dir = opendir("/proc/self/fd");
if (!dir)
return -1;
dir_fd = dirfd(dir);
while ((direntp = readdir(dir))) {
int fd;
if (strcmp(direntp->d_name, ".") == 0)
continue;
if (strcmp(direntp->d_name, "..") == 0)
continue;
fd = atoi(direntp->d_name);
if (fd == dir_fd || fd == 0 || fd == 1 || fd == 2)
continue;
close(fd);
}
closedir(dir);
return 0;
}
to close_range() yields:
1. closing 4 open files:
- close_all_fds(): ~280 us
- close_range(): ~24 us
2. closing 1000 open files:
- close_all_fds(): ~5000 us
- close_range(): ~800 us
close_range() is designed to allow for some flexibility. Specifically, it
does not simply always close all open file descriptors of a task. Instead,
callers can specify an upper bound.
This is e.g. useful for scenarios where specific file descriptors are
created with well-known numbers that are supposed to be excluded from
getting closed.
For extra paranoia close_range() comes with a flags argument. This can e.g.
be used to implement extension. Once can imagine userspace wanting to stop
at the first error instead of ignoring errors under certain circumstances.
There might be other valid ideas in the future. In any case, a flag
argument doesn't hurt and keeps us on the safe side.
From an implementation side this is kept rather dumb. It saw some input
from David and Jann but all nonsense is obviously my own!
- Errors to close file descriptors are currently ignored. (Could be changed
by setting a flag in the future if needed.)
- __close_range() is a rather simplistic wrapper around __close_fd().
My reasoning behind this is based on the nature of how __close_fd() needs
to release an fd. But maybe I misunderstood specifics:
We take the files_lock and rcu-dereference the fdtable of the calling
task, we find the entry in the fdtable, get the file and need to release
files_lock before calling filp_close().
In the meantime the fdtable might have been altered so we can't just
retake the spinlock and keep the old rcu-reference of the fdtable
around. Instead we need to grab a fresh reference to the fdtable.
If my reasoning is correct then there's really no point in fancyfying
__close_range(): We just need to rcu-dereference the fdtable of the
calling task once to cap the max_fd value correctly and then go on
calling __close_fd() in a loop.
/* References */
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190516165021.GD17978@ZenIV.linux.org.uk/
[2]: https://github.com/python/cpython/blob/9e4f2f3a6b8ee995c365e86d976937c141d867f8/Modules/_posixsubprocess.c#L220
[3]: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=10353#c7
[4]: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/5238e9575906297608ff802a27e2ff9effa3b338/src/basic/fd-util.c#L217
[5]: https://github.com/lxc/lxc/blob/ddf4b77e11a4d08f09b7b9cd13e593f8c047edc5/src/lxc/start.c#L236
[6]: https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=blob;f=sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/grantpt.c;h=2030e07fa6e652aac32c775b8c6e005844c3c4eb;hb=HEAD#l17
Note that this is an internal implementation that is not exported.
Currently, libc seems to not provide an exported version of this
because of missing kernel support to do this.
Note, in a recent patch series Florian made grantpt() a nop thereby
removing the code referenced here.
[7]: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/12148
[8]: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/blob/5f47c0613ed4eb46fca3633c1297364c09e5e451/src/libstd/sys/unix/process2.rs#L303-L308
Rust's solution is slightly different but is equally unperformant.
Rust calls getdtablesize() which is a glibc library function that
simply returns the current RLIMIT_NOFILE or OPEN_MAX values. Rust then
goes on to call close() on each fd. That's obviously overkill for most
tasks. Rarely, tasks - especially non-demons - hit RLIMIT_NOFILE or
OPEN_MAX.
Let's be nice and assume an unprivileged user with RLIMIT_NOFILE set
to 1024. Even in this case, there's a very high chance that in the
common case Rust is calling the close() syscall 1021 times pointlessly
if the task just has 0, 1, and 2 open.
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Kyle Evans <self@kyle-evans.net>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
|
|
After the commit below, truncate() on x86 32bit uses ksys_ftruncate(). But
ksys_ftruncate() truncates the offset to unsigned long.
Switch the type of offset to loff_t which is what do_sys_ftruncate()
expects.
Fixes: 121b32a58a3a (x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments)
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200610114851.28549-1-jslaby@suse.cz
|
|
POSIX defines faccessat() as having a fourth "flags" argument, while the
linux syscall doesn't have it. Glibc tries to emulate AT_EACCESS and
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, but AT_EACCESS emulation is broken.
Add a new faccessat(2) syscall with the added flags argument and implement
both flags.
The value of AT_EACCESS is defined in glibc headers to be the same as
AT_REMOVEDIR. Use this value for the kernel interface as well, together
with the explanatory comment.
Also add AT_EMPTY_PATH support, which is not documented by POSIX, but can
be useful and is trivial to implement.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull thread management updates from Christian Brauner:
"Sargun Dhillon over the last cycle has worked on the pidfd_getfd()
syscall.
This syscall allows for the retrieval of file descriptors of a process
based on its pidfd. A task needs to have ptrace_may_access()
permissions with PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (suggested by Oleg and
Andy) on the target.
One of the main use-cases is in combination with seccomp's user
notification feature. As a reminder, seccomp's user notification
feature was made available in v5.0. It allows a task to retrieve a
file descriptor for its seccomp filter. The file descriptor is usually
handed of to a more privileged supervising process. The supervisor can
then listen for syscall events caught by the seccomp filter of the
supervisee and perform actions in lieu of the supervisee, usually
emulating syscalls. pidfd_getfd() is needed to expand its uses.
There are currently two major users that wait on pidfd_getfd() and one
future user:
- Netflix, Sargun said, is working on a service mesh where users
should be able to connect to a dns-based VIP. When a user connects
to e.g. 1.2.3.4:80 that runs e.g. service "foo" they will be
redirected to an envoy process. This service mesh uses seccomp user
notifications and pidfd to intercept all connect calls and instead
of connecting them to 1.2.3.4:80 connects them to e.g.
127.0.0.1:8080.
- LXD uses the seccomp notifier heavily to intercept and emulate
mknod() and mount() syscalls for unprivileged containers/processes.
With pidfd_getfd() more uses-cases e.g. bridging socket connections
will be possible.
- The patchset has also seen some interest from the browser corner.
Right now, Firefox is using a SECCOMP_RET_TRAP sandbox managed by a
broker process. In the future glibc will start blocking all signals
during dlopen() rendering this type of sandbox impossible. Hence,
in the future Firefox will switch to a seccomp-user-nofication
based sandbox which also makes use of file descriptor retrieval.
The thread for this can be found at
https://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2019-12/msg00079.html
With pidfd_getfd() it is e.g. possible to bridge socket connections
for the supervisee (binding to a privileged port) and taking actions
on file descriptors on behalf of the supervisee in general.
Sargun's first version was using an ioctl on pidfds but various people
pushed for it to be a proper syscall which he duely implemented as
well over various review cycles. Selftests are of course included.
I've also added instructions how to deal with merge conflicts below.
There's also a small fix coming from the kernel mentee project to
correctly annotate struct sighand_struct with __rcu to fix various
sparse warnings. We've received a few more such fixes and even though
they are mostly trivial I've decided to postpone them until after -rc1
since they came in rather late and I don't want to risk introducing
build warnings.
Finally, there's a new prctl() command PR_{G,S}ET_IO_FLUSHER which is
needed to avoid allocation recursions triggerable by storage drivers
that have userspace parts that run in the IO path (e.g. dm-multipath,
iscsi, etc). These allocation recursions deadlock the device.
The new prctl() allows such privileged userspace components to avoid
allocation recursions by setting the PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO and
PF_LESS_THROTTLE flags. The patch carries the necessary acks from the
relevant maintainers and is routed here as part of prctl()
thread-management."
* tag 'threads-v5.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
prctl: PR_{G,S}ET_IO_FLUSHER to support controlling memory reclaim
sched.h: Annotate sighand_struct with __rcu
test: Add test for pidfd getfd
arch: wire up pidfd_getfd syscall
pid: Implement pidfd_getfd syscall
vfs, fdtable: Add fget_task helper
|
|
git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground
Pull y2038 updates from Arnd Bergmann:
"Core, driver and file system changes
These are updates to device drivers and file systems that for some
reason or another were not included in the kernel in the previous
y2038 series.
I've gone through all users of time_t again to make sure the kernel is
in a long-term maintainable state, replacing all remaining references
to time_t with safe alternatives.
Some related parts of the series were picked up into the nfsd, xfs,
alsa and v4l2 trees. A final set of patches in linux-mm removes the
now unused time_t/timeval/timespec types and helper functions after
all five branches are merged for linux-5.6, ensuring that no new users
get merged.
As a result, linux-5.6, or my backport of the patches to 5.4 [1],
should be the first release that can serve as a base for a 32-bit
system designed to run beyond year 2038, with a few remaining caveats:
- All user space must be compiled with a 64-bit time_t, which will be
supported in the coming musl-1.2 and glibc-2.32 releases, along
with installed kernel headers from linux-5.6 or higher.
- Applications that use the system call interfaces directly need to
be ported to use the time64 syscalls added in linux-5.1 in place of
the existing system calls. This impacts most users of futex() and
seccomp() as well as programming languages that have their own
runtime environment not based on libc.
- Applications that use a private copy of kernel uapi header files or
their contents may need to update to the linux-5.6 version, in
particular for sound/asound.h, xfs/xfs_fs.h, linux/input.h,
linux/elfcore.h, linux/sockios.h, linux/timex.h and
linux/can/bcm.h.
- A few remaining interfaces cannot be changed to pass a 64-bit
time_t in a compatible way, so they must be configured to use
CLOCK_MONOTONIC times or (with a y2106 problem) unsigned 32-bit
timestamps. Most importantly this impacts all users of 'struct
input_event'.
- All y2038 problems that are present on 64-bit machines also apply
to 32-bit machines. In particular this affects file systems with
on-disk timestamps using signed 32-bit seconds: ext4 with
ext3-style small inodes, ext2, xfs (to be fixed soon) and ufs"
[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground.git/log/?h=y2038-endgame
* tag 'y2038-drivers-for-v5.6-signed' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground: (21 commits)
Revert "drm/etnaviv: reject timeouts with tv_nsec >= NSEC_PER_SEC"
y2038: sh: remove timeval/timespec usage from headers
y2038: sparc: remove use of struct timex
y2038: rename itimerval to __kernel_old_itimerval
y2038: remove obsolete jiffies conversion functions
nfs: fscache: use timespec64 in inode auxdata
nfs: fix timstamp debug prints
nfs: use time64_t internally
sunrpc: convert to time64_t for expiry
drm/etnaviv: avoid deprecated timespec
drm/etnaviv: reject timeouts with tv_nsec >= NSEC_PER_SEC
drm/msm: avoid using 'timespec'
hfs/hfsplus: use 64-bit inode timestamps
hostfs: pass 64-bit timestamps to/from user space
packet: clarify timestamp overflow
tsacct: add 64-bit btime field
acct: stop using get_seconds()
um: ubd: use 64-bit time_t where possible
xtensa: ISS: avoid struct timeval
dlm: use SO_SNDTIMEO_NEW instead of SO_SNDTIMEO_OLD
...
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull openat2 support from Al Viro:
"This is the openat2() series from Aleksa Sarai.
I'm afraid that the rest of namei stuff will have to wait - it got
zero review the last time I'd posted #work.namei, and there had been a
leak in the posted series I'd caught only last weekend. I was going to
repost it on Monday, but the window opened and the odds of getting any
review during that... Oh, well.
Anyway, openat2 part should be ready; that _did_ get sane amount of
review and public testing, so here it comes"
From Aleksa's description of the series:
"For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown
flags are present[1].
This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road
to being added to openat(2).
Furthermore, the need for some sort of control over VFS's path
resolution (to avoid malicious paths resulting in inadvertent
breakouts) has been a very long-standing desire of many userspace
applications.
This patchset is a revival of Al Viro's old AT_NO_JUMPS[3] patchset
(which was a variant of David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[4] which
was a spin-off of the Capsicum project[5]) with a few additions and
changes made based on the previous discussion within [6] as well as
others I felt were useful.
In line with the conclusions of the original discussion of
AT_NO_JUMPS, the flag has been split up into separate flags. However,
instead of being an openat(2) flag it is provided through a new
syscall openat2(2) which provides several other improvements to the
openat(2) interface (see the patch description for more details). The
following new LOOKUP_* flags are added:
LOOKUP_NO_XDEV:
Blocks all mountpoint crossings (upwards, downwards, or through
absolute links). Absolute pathnames alone in openat(2) do not
trigger this. Magic-link traversal which implies a vfsmount jump is
also blocked (though magic-link jumps on the same vfsmount are
permitted).
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS:
Blocks resolution through /proc/$pid/fd-style links. This is done
by blocking the usage of nd_jump_link() during resolution in a
filesystem. The term "magic-links" is used to match with the only
reference to these links in Documentation/, but I'm happy to change
the name.
It should be noted that this is different to the scope of
~LOOKUP_FOLLOW in that it applies to all path components. However,
you can do openat2(NO_FOLLOW|NO_MAGICLINKS) on a magic-link and it
will *not* fail (assuming that no parent component was a
magic-link), and you will have an fd for the magic-link.
In order to correctly detect magic-links, the introduction of a new
LOOKUP_MAGICLINK_JUMPED state flag was required.
LOOKUP_BENEATH:
Disallows escapes to outside the starting dirfd's
tree, using techniques such as ".." or absolute links. Absolute
paths in openat(2) are also disallowed.
Conceptually this flag is to ensure you "stay below" a certain
point in the filesystem tree -- but this requires some additional
to protect against various races that would allow escape using
"..".
Currently LOOKUP_BENEATH implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, because it
can trivially beam you around the filesystem (breaking the
protection). In future, there might be similar safety checks done
as in LOOKUP_IN_ROOT, but that requires more discussion.
In addition, two new flags are added that expand on the above ideas:
LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS:
Does what it says on the tin. No symlink resolution is allowed at
all, including magic-links. Just as with LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS this
can still be used with NOFOLLOW to open an fd for the symlink as
long as no parent path had a symlink component.
LOOKUP_IN_ROOT:
This is an extension of LOOKUP_BENEATH that, rather than blocking
attempts to move past the root, forces all such movements to be
scoped to the starting point. This provides chroot(2)-like
protection but without the cost of a chroot(2) for each filesystem
operation, as well as being safe against race attacks that
chroot(2) is not.
If a race is detected (as with LOOKUP_BENEATH) then an error is
generated, and similar to LOOKUP_BENEATH it is not permitted to
cross magic-links with LOOKUP_IN_ROOT.
The primary need for this is from container runtimes, which
currently need to do symlink scoping in userspace[7] when opening
paths in a potentially malicious container.
There is a long list of CVEs that could have bene mitigated by
having RESOLVE_THIS_ROOT (such as CVE-2017-1002101,
CVE-2017-1002102, CVE-2018-15664, and CVE-2019-5736, just to name a
few).
In order to make all of the above more usable, I'm working on
libpathrs[8] which is a C-friendly library for safe path resolution.
It features a userspace-emulated backend if the kernel doesn't support
openat2(2). Hopefully we can get userspace to switch to using it, and
thus get openat2(2) support for free once it's ready.
Future work would include implementing things like
RESOLVE_NO_AUTOMOUNT and possibly a RESOLVE_NO_REMOTE (to allow
programs to be sure they don't hit DoSes though stale NFS handles)"
* 'work.openat2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
Documentation: path-lookup: include new LOOKUP flags
selftests: add openat2(2) selftests
open: introduce openat2(2) syscall
namei: LOOKUP_{IN_ROOT,BENEATH}: permit limited ".." resolution
namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like scoped resolution
namei: LOOKUP_BENEATH: O_BENEATH-like scoped resolution
namei: LOOKUP_NO_XDEV: block mountpoint crossing
namei: LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: block magic-link resolution
namei: LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS: block symlink resolution
namei: allow set_root() to produce errors
namei: allow nd_jump_link() to produce errors
nsfs: clean-up ns_get_path() signature to return int
namei: only return -ECHILD from follow_dotdot_rcu()
|
|
/* Background. */
For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown flags
are present[1].
This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road to
being added to openat(2).
Userspace also has a hard time figuring out whether a particular flag is
supported on a particular kernel. While it is now possible with
contemporary kernels (thanks to [3]), older kernels will expose unknown
flag bits through fcntl(F_GETFL). Giving a clear -EINVAL during
openat(2) time matches modern syscall designs and is far more
fool-proof.
In addition, the newly-added path resolution restriction LOOKUP flags
(which we would like to expose to user-space) don't feel related to the
pre-existing O_* flag set -- they affect all components of path lookup.
We'd therefore like to add a new flag argument.
Adding a new syscall allows us to finally fix the flag-ignoring problem,
and we can make it extensible enough so that we will hopefully never
need an openat3(2).
/* Syscall Prototype. */
/*
* open_how is an extensible structure (similar in interface to
* clone3(2) or sched_setattr(2)). The size parameter must be set to
* sizeof(struct open_how), to allow for future extensions. All future
* extensions will be appended to open_how, with their zero value
* acting as a no-op default.
*/
struct open_how { /* ... */ };
int openat2(int dfd, const char *pathname,
struct open_how *how, size_t size);
/* Description. */
The initial version of 'struct open_how' contains the following fields:
flags
Used to specify openat(2)-style flags. However, any unknown flag
bits or otherwise incorrect flag combinations (like O_PATH|O_RDWR)
will result in -EINVAL. In addition, this field is 64-bits wide to
allow for more O_ flags than currently permitted with openat(2).
mode
The file mode for O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.
Must be set to zero if flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.
resolve
Restrict path resolution (in contrast to O_* flags they affect all
path components). The current set of flags are as follows (at the
moment, all of the RESOLVE_ flags are implemented as just passing
the corresponding LOOKUP_ flag).
RESOLVE_NO_XDEV => LOOKUP_NO_XDEV
RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS
RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS
RESOLVE_BENEATH => LOOKUP_BENEATH
RESOLVE_IN_ROOT => LOOKUP_IN_ROOT
open_how does not contain an embedded size field, because it is of
little benefit (userspace can figure out the kernel open_how size at
runtime fairly easily without it). It also only contains u64s (even
though ->mode arguably should be a u16) to avoid having padding fields
which are never used in the future.
Note that as a result of the new how->flags handling, O_PATH|O_TMPFILE
is no longer permitted for openat(2). As far as I can tell, this has
always been a bug and appears to not be used by userspace (and I've not
seen any problems on my machines by disallowing it). If it turns out
this breaks something, we can special-case it and only permit it for
openat(2) but not openat2(2).
After input from Florian Weimer, the new open_how and flag definitions
are inside a separate header from uapi/linux/fcntl.h, to avoid problems
that glibc has with importing that header.
/* Testing. */
In a follow-up patch there are over 200 selftests which ensure that this
syscall has the correct semantics and will correctly handle several
attack scenarios.
In addition, I've written a userspace library[4] which provides
convenient wrappers around openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) (this is necessary
because no other syscalls support RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, and thus lots of care
must be taken when using RESOLVE_IN_ROOT'd file descriptors with other
syscalls). During the development of this patch, I've run numerous
verification tests using libpathrs (showing that the API is reasonably
usable by userspace).
/* Future Work. */
Additional RESOLVE_ flags have been suggested during the review period.
These can be easily implemented separately (such as blocking auto-mount
during resolution).
Furthermore, there are some other proposed changes to the openat(2)
interface (the most obvious example is magic-link hardening[5]) which
would be a good opportunity to add a way for userspace to restrict how
O_PATH file descriptors can be re-opened.
Another possible avenue of future work would be some kind of
CHECK_FIELDS[6] flag which causes the kernel to indicate to userspace
which openat2(2) flags and fields are supported by the current kernel
(to avoid userspace having to go through several guesses to figure it
out).
[1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/588444/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFyyxJL1LyXZeBsf2ypriraj5ut1XkNDsunRBqgVjZU_6Q@mail.gmail.com
[3]: commit 629e014bb834 ("fs: completely ignore unknown open flags")
[4]: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17523
[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190930183316.10190-2-cyphar@cyphar.com/
[6]: https://youtu.be/ggD-eb3yPVs
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
This wires up the pidfd_getfd syscall for all architectures.
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200107175927.4558-4-sargun@sargun.me
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
This reverts commit 8243186f0cc7 ("fs: remove ksys_dup()") and the
subsequent fix for it in commit 2d3145f8d280 ("early init: fix error
handling when opening /dev/console").
Trying to use filp_open() and f_dupfd() instead of pseudo-syscalls
caused more trouble than what is worth it: it requires accessing vfs
internals and it turns out there were other bugs in it too.
In particular, the file reference counting was wrong - because unlike
the original "open+2*dup" sequence it used "filp_open+3*f_dupfd" and
thus had an extra leaked file reference.
That in turn then caused odd problems with Androidx86 long after boot
becaue of how the extra reference to the console kept the session active
even after all file descriptors had been closed.
Reported-by: youling 257 <youling257@gmail.com>
Cc: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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|
Take the renaming of timeval and timespec one level further,
also renaming itimerval to __kernel_old_itimerval, to avoid
namespace conflicts with the user-space structure that may
use 64-bit time_t members.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
|
|
ksys_dup() is used only at one place in the kernel, namely to duplicate
fd 0 of /dev/console to stdout and stderr. The same functionality can be
achieved by using functions already available within the kernel namespace.
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
|
|
In prepare_namespace(), do_mount() can be used instead of ksys_mount()
as the first and third argument are const strings in the kernel, the
second and fourth argument are passed through anyway, and the fifth
argument is NULL.
In do_mount_root(), ksys_mount() is called with the first and third
argument being already kernelspace strings, which do not need to be
copied over from userspace to kernelspace (again). The second and
fourth arguments are passed through to do_mount() anyway. The fifth
argument, while already residing in kernelspace, needs to be put into
a page of its own. Then, do_mount() can be used instead of
ksys_mount().
Once this is done, there are no in-kernel users to ksys_mount() left,
which can therefore be removed.
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
|
|
The compat_get_timeval() and timeval_valid() interfaces are deprecated
and getting removed along with the definition of struct timeval itself.
Change the two implementations of the settimeofday() system call to
open-code these helpers and completely avoid references to timeval.
The timeval_valid() call is not needed any more here, only a check to
avoid overflowing tv_nsec during the multiplication, as there is another
range check in do_sys_settimeofday64().
Tested-by: syzbot+dccce9b26ba09ca49966@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
|
|
All of the remaining syscalls that pass a timeval (gettimeofday, utime,
futimesat) can trivially be changed to pass a __kernel_old_timeval
instead, which has a compatible layout, but avoids ambiguity with
the timeval type in user space.
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
|
|
This is mainly a patch for clarification, and to let us remove
the time_t definition from the kernel to prevent new users from
creeping in that might not be y2038-safe.
All remaining uses of 'time_t' or '__kernel_time_t' are part of
the user API that cannot be changed by that either have a
replacement or that do not suffer from the y2038 overflow.
Acked-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
|
|
Matt bisected a sparc64 specific issue with semctl, shmctl and msgctl
to a commit from my y2038 series in linux-5.1, as I missed the custom
sys_ipc() wrapper that sparc64 uses in place of the generic version that
I patched.
The problem is that the sys_{sem,shm,msg}ctl() functions in the kernel
now do not allow being called with the IPC_64 flag any more, resulting
in a -EINVAL error when they don't recognize the command.
Instead, the correct way to do this now is to call the internal
ksys_old_{sem,shm,msg}ctl() functions to select the API version.
As we generally move towards these functions anyway, change all of
sparc_ipc() to consistently use those in place of the sys_*() versions,
and move the required ksys_*() declarations into linux/syscalls.h
The IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SYSVIPC) check is required to avoid link
errors when ipc is disabled.
Reported-by: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Fixes: 275f22148e87 ("ipc: rename old-style shmctl/semctl/msgctl syscalls")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Anatoly Pugachev <matorola@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs mount updates from Al Viro:
"The first part of mount updates.
Convert filesystems to use the new mount API"
* 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
mnt_init(): call shmem_init() unconditionally
constify ksys_mount() string arguments
don't bother with registering rootfs
init_rootfs(): don't bother with init_ramfs_fs()
vfs: Convert smackfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert selinuxfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert securityfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert apparmorfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert openpromfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert xenfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert gadgetfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert oprofilefs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert ibmasmfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert qib_fs/ipathfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert efivarfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert configfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert binfmt_misc to use the new mount API
convenience helper: get_tree_single()
convenience helper get_tree_nodev()
vfs: Kill sget_userns()
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull clone3 system call from Christian Brauner:
"This adds the clone3 syscall which is an extensible successor to clone
after we snagged the last flag with CLONE_PIDFD during the 5.2 merge
window for clone(). It cleanly supports all of the flags from clone()
and thus all legacy workloads.
There are few user visible differences between clone3 and clone.
First, CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3 so we can reuse
this flag. Second, the CSIGNAL flag is deprecated and will cause
EINVAL to be reported. It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal"
argument in struct clone_args thus freeing up even more flags. And
third, clone3 gives CLONE_PIDFD a dedicated return argument in struct
clone_args instead of abusing CLONE_PARENT_SETTID's parent_tidptr
argument.
The clone3 uapi is designed to be easy to handle on 32- and 64 bit:
/* uapi */
struct clone_args {
__aligned_u64 flags;
__aligned_u64 pidfd;
__aligned_u64 child_tid;
__aligned_u64 parent_tid;
__aligned_u64 exit_signal;
__aligned_u64 stack;
__aligned_u64 stack_size;
__aligned_u64 tls;
};
and a separate kernel struct is used that uses proper kernel typing:
/* kernel internal */
struct kernel_clone_args {
u64 flags;
int __user *pidfd;
int __user *child_tid;
int __user *parent_tid;
int exit_signal;
unsigned long stack;
unsigned long stack_size;
unsigned long tls;
};
The system call comes with a size argument which enables the kernel to
detect what version of clone_args userspace is passing in. clone3
validates that any additional bytes a given kernel does not know about
are set to zero and that the size never exceeds a page.
A nice feature is that this patchset allowed us to cleanup and
simplify various core kernel codepaths in kernel/fork.c by making the
internal _do_fork() function take struct kernel_clone_args even for
legacy clone().
This patch also unblocks the time namespace patchset which wants to
introduce a new CLONE_TIMENS flag.
Note, that clone3 has only been wired up for x86{_32,64}, arm{64}, and
xtensa. These were the architectures that did not require special
massaging.
Other architectures treat fork-like system calls individually and
after some back and forth neither Arnd nor I felt confident that we
dared to add clone3 unconditionally to all architectures. We agreed to
leave this up to individual architecture maintainers. This is why
there's an additional patch that introduces __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3
which any architecture can set once it has implemented support for
clone3. The patch also adds a cond_syscall(clone3) for architectures
such as nios2 or h8300 that generate their syscall table by simply
including asm-generic/unistd.h. The hope is to get rid of
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 and cond_syscall() rather soon"
* tag 'clone3-v5.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
arch: handle arches who do not yet define clone3
arch: wire-up clone3() syscall
fork: add clone3
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|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull pidfd updates from Christian Brauner:
"This adds two main features.
- First, it adds polling support for pidfds. This allows process
managers to know when a (non-parent) process dies in a race-free
way.
The notification mechanism used follows the same logic that is
currently used when the parent of a task is notified of a child's
death. With this patchset it is possible to put pidfds in an
{e}poll loop and get reliable notifications for process (i.e.
thread-group) exit.
- The second feature compliments the first one by making it possible
to retrieve pollable pidfds for processes that were not created
using CLONE_PIDFD.
A lot of processes get created with traditional PID-based calls
such as fork() or clone() (without CLONE_PIDFD). For these
processes a caller can currently not create a pollable pidfd. This
is a problem for Android's low memory killer (LMK) and service
managers such as systemd.
Both patchsets are accompanied by selftests.
It's perhaps worth noting that the work done so far and the work done
in this branch for pidfd_open() and polling support do already see
some adoption:
- Android is in the process of backporting this work to all their LTS
kernels [1]
- Service managers make use of pidfd_send_signal but will need to
wait until we enable waiting on pidfds for full adoption.
- And projects I maintain make use of both pidfd_send_signal and
CLONE_PIDFD [2] and will use polling support and pidfd_open() too"
[1] https://android-review.googlesource.com/q/topic:%22pidfd+polling+support+4.9+backport%22
https://android-review.googlesource.com/q/topic:%22pidfd+polling+support+4.14+backport%22
https://android-review.googlesource.com/q/topic:%22pidfd+polling+support+4.19+backport%22
[2] https://github.com/lxc/lxc/blob/aab6e3eb73c343231cdde775db938994fc6f2803/src/lxc/start.c#L1753
* tag 'pidfd-updates-v5.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
tests: add pidfd_open() tests
arch: wire-up pidfd_open()
pid: add pidfd_open()
pidfd: add polling selftests
pidfd: add polling support
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull force_sig() argument change from Eric Biederman:
"A source of error over the years has been that force_sig has taken a
task parameter when it is only safe to use force_sig with the current
task.
The force_sig function is built for delivering synchronous signals
such as SIGSEGV where the userspace application caused a synchronous
fault (such as a page fault) and the kernel responded with a signal.
Because the name force_sig does not make this clear, and because the
force_sig takes a task parameter the function force_sig has been
abused for sending other kinds of signals over the years. Slowly those
have been fixed when the oopses have been tracked down.
This set of changes fixes the remaining abusers of force_sig and
carefully rips out the task parameter from force_sig and friends
making this kind of error almost impossible in the future"
* 'siginfo-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (27 commits)
signal/x86: Move tsk inside of CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE in do_sigbus
signal: Remove the signal number and task parameters from force_sig_info
signal: Factor force_sig_info_to_task out of force_sig_info
signal: Generate the siginfo in force_sig
signal: Move the computation of force into send_signal and correct it.
signal: Properly set TRACE_SIGNAL_LOSE_INFO in __send_signal
signal: Remove the task parameter from force_sig_fault
signal: Use force_sig_fault_to_task for the two calls that don't deliver to current
signal: Explicitly call force_sig_fault on current
signal/unicore32: Remove tsk parameter from __do_user_fault
signal/arm: Remove tsk parameter from __do_user_fault
signal/arm: Remove tsk parameter from ptrace_break
signal/nds32: Remove tsk parameter from send_sigtrap
signal/riscv: Remove tsk parameter from do_trap
signal/sh: Remove tsk parameter from force_sig_info_fault
signal/um: Remove task parameter from send_sigtrap
signal/x86: Remove task parameter from send_sigtrap
signal: Remove task parameter from force_sig_mceerr
signal: Remove task parameter from force_sig
signal: Remove task parameter from force_sigsegv
...
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Richard Palethorpe
Jens Axboe
Brian Gerst
Joe Perches
Minchan Kim
Peter Oskolkov
Xiaoming Ni
Christoph Hellwig
Linus Torvalds
Christian Brauner
Jiri Slaby
Miklos Szeredi
Aleksa Sarai
Sargun Dhillon
Dominik Brodowski
Arnd Bergmann