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This is the 6.1.130 stable release
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commit 9253c54e01b6505d348afbc02abaa4d9f8a01395 upstream.
Syskiller has produced an out of bounds access in fill_meta_index().
That out of bounds access is ultimately caused because the inode
has an inode number with the invalid value of zero, which was not checked.
The reason this causes the out of bounds access is due to following
sequence of events:
1. Fill_meta_index() is called to allocate (via empty_meta_index())
and fill a metadata index. It however suffers a data read error
and aborts, invalidating the newly returned empty metadata index.
It does this by setting the inode number of the index to zero,
which means unused (zero is not a valid inode number).
2. When fill_meta_index() is subsequently called again on another
read operation, locate_meta_index() returns the previous index
because it matches the inode number of 0. Because this index
has been returned it is expected to have been filled, and because
it hasn't been, an out of bounds access is performed.
This patch adds a sanity check which checks that the inode number
is not zero when the inode is created and returns -EINVAL if it is.
[phillip@squashfs.org.uk: whitespace fix]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240409204723.446925-1-phillip@squashfs.org.uk
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240408220206.435788-1-phillip@squashfs.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Reported-by: "Ubisectech Sirius" <bugreport@ubisectech.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87f5c007-b8a5-41ae-8b57-431e924c5915.bugreport@ubisectech.com/
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit add117e48df4788a86a21bd0515833c0a6db1ad1 ]
When allocating and building an afs_server_list struct object from a VLDB
record, we look up each server address to get the server record for it -
but a server may have more than one entry in the record and we discard the
duplicate pointers. Currently, however, when we discard, we only put a
server record, not unuse it - but the lookup got as an active-user count.
The active-user count on an afs_server_list object determines its lifetime
whereas the refcount keeps the memory backing it around. Failing to reduce
the active-user counter prevents the record from being cleaned up and can
lead to multiple copied being seen - and pointing to deleted afs_cell
objects and other such things.
Fix this by switching the incorrect 'put' to an 'unuse' instead.
Without this, occasionally, a dead server record can be seen in
/proc/net/afs/servers and list corruption may be observed:
list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffff888102423e40, but was 0000000000000000. (prev=ffff88810140cd38)
Fixes: 977e5f8ed0ab ("afs: Split the usage count on struct afs_server")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250218192250.296870-5-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ca0e79a46097d54e4af46c67c852479d97af35bb ]
Make it possible to find the afs_volume structs that are using an
afs_server struct to aid in breaking volume callbacks.
The way this is done is that each afs_volume already has an array of
afs_server_entry records that point to the servers where that volume might
be found. An afs_volume backpointer and a list node is added to each entry
and each entry is then added to an RCU-traversable list on the afs_server
to which it points.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Stable-dep-of: add117e48df4 ("afs: Fix the server_list to unuse a displaced server rather than putting it")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 318b83b71242998814a570c3420c042ee6165fca ]
Variable nr_servers is no longer being used, the last reference
to it was removed in commit 45df8462730d ("afs: Fix server list handling")
so clean up the code by removing it.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221020173923.21342-1-colin.i.king@gmail.com/
Stable-dep-of: add117e48df4 ("afs: Fix the server_list to unuse a displaced server rather than putting it")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c84e125fff2615b4d9c259e762596134eddd2f27 ]
The issue was caused by dput(upper) being called before
ovl_dentry_update_reval(), while upper->d_flags was still
accessed in ovl_dentry_remote().
Move dput(upper) after its last use to prevent use-after-free.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ovl_dentry_remote fs/overlayfs/util.c:162 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ovl_dentry_update_reval+0xd2/0xf0 fs/overlayfs/util.c:167
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:114
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0xc3/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601
ovl_dentry_remote fs/overlayfs/util.c:162 [inline]
ovl_dentry_update_reval+0xd2/0xf0 fs/overlayfs/util.c:167
ovl_link_up fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:610 [inline]
ovl_copy_up_one+0x2105/0x3490 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:1170
ovl_copy_up_flags+0x18d/0x200 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:1223
ovl_rename+0x39e/0x18c0 fs/overlayfs/dir.c:1136
vfs_rename+0xf84/0x20a0 fs/namei.c:4893
...
</TASK>
Fixes: b07d5cc93e1b ("ovl: update of dentry revalidate flags after copy up")
Reported-by: syzbot+316db8a1191938280eb6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=316db8a1191938280eb6
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250214215148.761147-1-kovalev@altlinux.org
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 860ca5e50f73c2a1cef7eefc9d39d04e275417f7 upstream.
Add check for the return value of cifs_buf_get() and cifs_small_buf_get()
in receive_encrypted_standard() to prevent null pointer dereference.
Fixes: eec04ea11969 ("smb: client: fix OOB in receive_encrypted_standard()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <haoxiang_li2024@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
# Conflicts:
# drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
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This is the 6.1.129 stable release
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commit 96cfeb0389530ae32ade8a48ae3ae1ac3b6c009d upstream.
It should wait all existing dio write IOs before block removal,
otherwise, previous direct write IO may overwrite data in the
block which may be reused by other inode.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alva Lan <alvalan9@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 367a9bffabe08c04f6d725032cce3d891b2b9e1a upstream.
nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers(), which iterates through the buffers
attached to dirty data folios/pages, accesses the attached buffers without
locking the folios/pages.
For data cache, nilfs_clear_folio_dirty() may be called asynchronously
when the file system degenerates to read only, so
nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers() still has the potential to cause use
after free issues when buffers lose the protection of their dirty state
midway due to this asynchronous clearing and are unintentionally freed by
try_to_free_buffers().
Eliminate this race issue by adjusting the lock section in this function.
[konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com: adjusted for page/folio conversion]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250107200202.6432-3-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8c26c4e2694a ("nilfs2: fix issue with flush kernel thread after remount in RO mode because of driver's internal error or metadata corruption")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ca76bb226bf47ff04c782cacbd299f12ddee1ec1 upstream.
Patch series "nilfs2: protect busy buffer heads from being force-cleared".
This series fixes the buffer head state inconsistency issues reported by
syzbot that occurs when the filesystem is corrupted and falls back to
read-only, and the associated buffer head use-after-free issue.
This patch (of 2):
Syzbot has reported that after nilfs2 detects filesystem corruption and
falls back to read-only, inconsistencies in the buffer state may occur.
One of the inconsistencies is that when nilfs2 calls mark_buffer_dirty()
to set a data or metadata buffer as dirty, but it detects that the buffer
is not in the uptodate state:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6049 at fs/buffer.c:1177 mark_buffer_dirty+0x2e5/0x520
fs/buffer.c:1177
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
nilfs_palloc_commit_alloc_entry+0x4b/0x160 fs/nilfs2/alloc.c:598
nilfs_ifile_create_inode+0x1dd/0x3a0 fs/nilfs2/ifile.c:73
nilfs_new_inode+0x254/0x830 fs/nilfs2/inode.c:344
nilfs_mkdir+0x10d/0x340 fs/nilfs2/namei.c:218
vfs_mkdir+0x2f9/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:4257
do_mkdirat+0x264/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4280
__do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4295 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4293 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdirat+0x87/0xa0 fs/namei.c:4293
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The other is when nilfs_btree_propagate(), which propagates the dirty
state to the ancestor nodes of a b-tree that point to a dirty buffer,
detects that the origin buffer is not dirty, even though it should be:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5245 at fs/nilfs2/btree.c:2089
nilfs_btree_propagate+0xc79/0xdf0 fs/nilfs2/btree.c:2089
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
nilfs_bmap_propagate+0x75/0x120 fs/nilfs2/bmap.c:345
nilfs_collect_file_data+0x4d/0xd0 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:587
nilfs_segctor_apply_buffers+0x184/0x340 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1006
nilfs_segctor_scan_file+0x28c/0xa50 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1045
nilfs_segctor_collect_blocks fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1216 [inline]
nilfs_segctor_collect fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1540 [inline]
nilfs_segctor_do_construct+0x1c28/0x6b90 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2115
nilfs_segctor_construct+0x181/0x6b0 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2479
nilfs_segctor_thread_construct fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2587 [inline]
nilfs_segctor_thread+0x69e/0xe80 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2701
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Both of these issues are caused by the callbacks that handle the
page/folio write requests, forcibly clear various states, including the
working state of the buffers they hold, at unexpected times when they
detect read-only fallback.
Fix these issues by checking if the buffer is referenced before clearing
the page/folio state, and skipping the clear if it is.
[konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com: adjusted for page/folio conversion]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250107200202.6432-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250107200202.6432-2-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+b2b14916b77acf8626d7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b2b14916b77acf8626d7
Reported-by: syzbot+d98fd19acd08b36ff422@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d98fd19acd08b36ff422
Fixes: 8c26c4e2694a ("nilfs2: fix issue with flush kernel thread after remount in RO mode because of driver's internal error or metadata corruption")
Tested-by: syzbot+b2b14916b77acf8626d7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 299910dcb4525ac0274f3efa9527876315ba4f67 upstream.
After detecting file system corruption and degrading to a read-only mount,
dirty folios and buffers in the page cache are cleared, and a large number
of warnings are output at that time, often filling up the kernel log.
In this case, since the degrading to a read-only mount is output to the
kernel log, these warnings are not very meaningful, and are rather a
nuisance in system management and debugging.
The related nilfs2-specific page/folio routines have a silent argument
that suppresses the warning output, but since it is not currently used
meaningfully, remove both the silent argument and the warning output.
[konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com: adjusted for page/folio conversion]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240816090128.4561-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: ca76bb226bf4 ("nilfs2: do not force clear folio if buffer is referenced")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit da2dccd7451de62b175fb8f0808d644959e964c7 upstream.
At btrfs_write_check() if our file's i_size is not sector size aligned and
we have a write that starts at an offset larger than the i_size that falls
within the same page of the i_size, then we end up not zeroing the file
range [i_size, write_offset).
The code is this:
start_pos = round_down(pos, fs_info->sectorsize);
oldsize = i_size_read(inode);
if (start_pos > oldsize) {
/* Expand hole size to cover write data, preventing empty gap */
loff_t end_pos = round_up(pos + count, fs_info->sectorsize);
ret = btrfs_cont_expand(BTRFS_I(inode), oldsize, end_pos);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
So if our file's i_size is 90269 bytes and a write at offset 90365 bytes
comes in, we get 'start_pos' set to 90112 bytes, which is less than the
i_size and therefore we don't zero out the range [90269, 90365) by
calling btrfs_cont_expand().
This is an old bug introduced in commit 9036c10208e1 ("Btrfs: update hole
handling v2"), from 2008, and the buggy code got moved around over the
years.
Fix this by discarding 'start_pos' and comparing against the write offset
('pos') without any alignment.
This bug was recently exposed by test case generic/363 which tests this
scenario by polluting ranges beyond EOF with an mmap write and than verify
that after a file increases we get zeroes for the range which is supposed
to be a hole and not what we wrote with the previous mmaped write.
We're only seeing this exposed now because generic/363 used to run only
on xfs until last Sunday's fstests update.
The test was failing like this:
$ ./check generic/363
FSTYP -- btrfs
PLATFORM -- Linux/x86_64 debian0 6.13.0-rc7-btrfs-next-185+ #17 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Mon Feb 3 12:28:46 WET 2025
MKFS_OPTIONS -- /dev/sdc
MOUNT_OPTIONS -- /dev/sdc /home/fdmanana/btrfs-tests/scratch_1
generic/363 0s ... [failed, exit status 1]- output mismatch (see /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//generic/363.out.bad)
# --- tests/generic/363.out 2025-02-05 15:31:14.013646509 +0000
# +++ /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//generic/363.out.bad 2025-02-05 17:25:33.112630781 +0000
@@ -1 +1,46 @@
QA output created by 363
+READ BAD DATA: offset = 0xdcad, size = 0xd921, fname = /home/fdmanana/btrfs-tests/dev/junk
+OFFSET GOOD BAD RANGE
+0x1609d 0x0000 0x3104 0x0
+operation# (mod 256) for the bad data may be 4
+0x1609e 0x0000 0x0472 0x1
+operation# (mod 256) for the bad data may be 4
...
(Run 'diff -u /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/tests/generic/363.out /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//generic/363.out.bad' to see the entire diff)
Ran: generic/363
Failures: generic/363
Failed 1 of 1 tests
Fixes: 9036c10208e1 ("Btrfs: update hole handling v2")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f7c848431632598ff9bce57a659db6af60d75b39 ]
I got a syzbot report: slab-out-of-bounds Read in
orangefs_debug_write... several people suggested fixes,
I tested Al Viro's suggestion and made this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+fc519d7875f2d9186c1f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 036ac2778f7b28885814c6fbc07e156ad1624d03 upstream.
If nfs4_client is in courtesy state then there is no point to send
the callback. This causes nfsd4_shutdown_callback to hang since
cl_cb_inflight is not 0. This hang lasts about 15 minutes until TCP
notifies NFSD that the connection was dropped.
This patch modifies nfsd4_run_cb_work to skip the RPC call if
nfs4_client is in courtesy state.
Signed-off-by: Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com>
Fixes: 66af25799940 ("NFSD: add courteous server support for thread with only delegation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7faf14a7b0366f153284db0ad3347c457ea70136 upstream.
If getting acl_default fails, acl_access and acl_default will be released
simultaneously. However, acl_access will still retain a pointer pointing
to the released posix_acl, which will trigger a WARNING in
nfs3svc_release_getacl like this:
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 3199 at lib/refcount.c:28
refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
Modules linked in:
CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 3199 Comm: nfsd Not tainted
6.12.0-rc6-00079-g04ae226af01f-dirty #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
Code: cc cc 0f b6 1d b3 20 a5 03 80 fb 01 0f 87 65 48 d8 00 83 e3 01 75
e4 48 c7 c7 c0 3b 9b 85 c6 05 97 20 a5 03 01 e8 fb 3e 30 ff <0f> 0b eb
cd 0f b6 1d 8a3
RSP: 0018:ffffc90008637cd8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff83904fde
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88871ed36380
RBP: ffff888158beeb40 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520010c6f56
R10: ffffc90008637ab7 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff888140e77400 R14: ffff888140e77408 R15: ffffffff858b42c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88871ed00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000562384d32158 CR3: 000000055cc6a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
? __warn+0xa5/0x140
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
? report_bug+0x1b1/0x1e0
? handle_bug+0x53/0xa0
? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? tick_nohz_tick_stopped+0x1e/0x40
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
nfs3svc_release_getacl+0xc9/0xe0
svc_process_common+0x5db/0xb60
? __pfx_svc_process_common+0x10/0x10
? __rcu_read_unlock+0x69/0xa0
? __pfx_nfsd_dispatch+0x10/0x10
? svc_xprt_received+0xa1/0x120
? xdr_init_decode+0x11d/0x190
svc_process+0x2a7/0x330
svc_handle_xprt+0x69d/0x940
svc_recv+0x180/0x2d0
nfsd+0x168/0x200
? __pfx_nfsd+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x1a2/0x1e0
? kthread+0xf4/0x1e0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...
Clear acl_access/acl_default after posix_acl_release is called to prevent
UAF from being triggered.
Fixes: a257cdd0e217 ("[PATCH] NFSD: Add server support for NFSv3 ACLs.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241107014705.2509463-1-lilingfeng@huaweicloud.com/
Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Rick Macklem <rmacklem@uoguelph.ca>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 2c8507c63f5498d4ee4af404a8e44ceae4345056 upstream.
This commit re-attempts the backport of the change to the linux-6.1.y
branch. Commit bb8e287f596b ("btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when
activating a swap file") on this branch was reverted.
During swap activation we iterate over the extents of a file and we can
have many thousands of them, so we can end up in a busy loop monopolizing
a core. Avoid this by doing a voluntary reschedule after processing each
extent.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <koichiro.den@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
This reverts commit bb8e287f596b62fac18ed84cc03a9f1752f6b3b8.
The backport for linux-6.1.y, commit bb8e287f596b ("btrfs: avoid
monopolizing a core when activating a swap file"), inserted
cond_resched() in the wrong location.
Revert it now; a subsequent commit will re-backport the original patch.
Fixes: bb8e287f596b ("btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when activating a swap file") # linux-6.1.y
Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <koichiro.den@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 31ad74b20227ce6b40910ff78b1c604e42975cf1 upstream.
At present, the object->file has the NULL pointer dereference problem in
ondemand-mode. The root cause is that the allocated fd and object->file
lifetime are inconsistent, and the user-space invocation to anon_fd uses
object->file. Following is the process that triggers the issue:
[write fd] [umount]
cachefiles_ondemand_fd_write_iter
fscache_cookie_state_machine
cachefiles_withdraw_cookie
if (!file) return -ENOBUFS
cachefiles_clean_up_object
cachefiles_unmark_inode_in_use
fput(object->file)
object->file = NULL
// file NULL pointer dereference!
__cachefiles_write(..., file, ...)
Fix this issue by add an additional reference count to the object->file
before write/llseek, and decrement after it finished.
Fixes: c8383054506c ("cachefiles: notify the user daemon when looking up cookie")
Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241107110649.3980193-5-wozizhi@huawei.com
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bin Lan <lanbincn@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit b0fce54b8c0d8e5f2b4c243c803c5996e73baee8 upstream.
syz reports an out of bounds read:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334
[inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0
fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88804d8b9982 by task syz-executor.2/14802
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 14802 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1
04/01/2014
Sched_ext: serialise (enabled+all), task: runnable_at=-10ms
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x229/0x350 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x164/0x530 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0x147/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602
ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334 [inline]
ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367
ocfs2_find_entry_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:414 [inline]
ocfs2_find_entry+0x1143/0x2db0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1078
ocfs2_find_files_on_disk+0x18e/0x530 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1981
ocfs2_lookup_ino_from_name+0xb6/0x110 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:2003
ocfs2_lookup+0x30a/0xd40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:122
lookup_open fs/namei.c:3627 [inline]
open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3748 [inline]
path_openat+0x145a/0x3870 fs/namei.c:3984
do_filp_open+0xe9/0x1c0 fs/namei.c:4014
do_sys_openat2+0x135/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1402
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1417 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1433 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1428 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x15d/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1428
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x210 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f01076903ad
Code: c3 e8 a7 2b 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89
f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01
f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f01084acfc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f01077cbf80 RCX: 00007f01076903ad
RDX: 0000000000105042 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c
RBP: 00007f01077cbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000001ff R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f01077cbf80 R14: 00007f010764fc90 R15: 00007f010848d000
</TASK>
==================================================================
And a general protection fault in ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert:
==================================================================
loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 32768
JBD2: Ignoring recovery information on journal
ocfs2: Mounting device (7,0) on (node local, slot 0) with ordered data
mode.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5096 Comm: syz-executor792 Not tainted
6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller-00002-gb0da640826ba #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_find_dir_space_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:3406 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x3309/0x5c70 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:4280
Code: 00 00 e8 2a 25 13 fe e9 ba 06 00 00 e8 20 25 13 fe e9 4f 01 00 00
e8 16 25 13 fe 49 8d 7f 08 49 8d 5f 09 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6
04 20 84 c0 0f 85 bd 23 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000af9f020 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff88801e27a440
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000400 RDI: 0000000000000008
RBP: ffffc9000af9f830 R08: ffffffff8380395b R09: ffffffff838090a7
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88801e27a440 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffff88803c660878 R14: f700000000000088 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 000055555a677380(0000) GS:ffff888020800000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000560bce569178 CR3: 000000001de5a000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ocfs2_mknod+0xcaf/0x2b40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:292
vfs_mknod+0x36d/0x3b0 fs/namei.c:4088
do_mknodat+0x3ec/0x5b0
__do_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4166 [inline]
__se_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4163 [inline]
__x64_sys_mknodat+0xa7/0xc0 fs/namei.c:4163
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f2dafda3a99
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 17 00 00 90 48 89
f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08
0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8
64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffe336a6658 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
0000000000000103
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX:
00007f2dafda3a99
RDX: 00000000000021c0 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI:
00000000ffffff9c
RBP: 00007f2dafe1b5f0 R08: 0000000000004480 R09:
000055555a6784c0
R10: 0000000000000103 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
00007ffe336a6680
R13: 00007ffe336a68a8 R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15:
00007f2dafdec03b
</TASK>
==================================================================
The two reports are all caused invalid negative i_size of dir inode. For
ocfs2, dir_inode can't be negative or zero.
Here add a check in which is called by ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry(). It
fixes the second report as ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry() must be called
before ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert(). Also set a up limit for dir with
OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL. The i_size can't be great than blocksize.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250106140640.92260-1-glass.su@suse.com
Reported-by: Jiacheng Xu <stitch@zju.edu.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ocfs2-devel/17a04f01.1ae74.19436d003fc.Coremail.stitch@zju.edu.cn/T/#u
Reported-by: syzbot+5a64828fcc4c2ad9b04f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000005894f3062018caf1@google.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Su Yue <glass.su@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6438ef381c183444f7f9d1de18f22661cba1e946 upstream.
Since nilfs_bmap_lookup_contig() in nilfs_fiemap() calculates its result
by being prepared to go through potentially maxblocks == INT_MAX blocks,
the value in n may experience an overflow caused by left shift of blkbits.
While it is extremely unlikely to occur, play it safe and cast right hand
expression to wider type to mitigate the issue.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with static analysis
tool SVACE.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250124222133.5323-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Fixes: 622daaff0a89 ("nilfs2: fiemap support")
Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru>
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 2b4c2094da6d84e69b843dd3317902e977bf64bd upstream.
Patch series "Convert ocfs2 to use folios".
Mark did a conversion of ocfs2 to use folios and sent it to me as a
giant patch for review ;-)
So I've redone it as individual patches, and credited Mark for the patches
where his code is substantially the same. It's not a bad way to do it;
his patch had some bugs and my patches had some bugs. Hopefully all our
bugs were different from each other. And hopefully Mark likes all the
changes I made to his code!
This patch (of 23):
If we can't read the buffer, be sure to unlock the page before returning.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241205171653.3179945-1-willy@infradead.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241205171653.3179945-2-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Tinguely <mark.tinguely@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit f921da2c34692dfec5f72b5ae347b1bea22bb369 upstream.
Commit 23aab037106d ("ocfs2: fix UBSAN warning in ocfs2_verify_volume()")
introduced a regression bug. The blksz_bits value is already converted to
CPU endian in the previous code; therefore, the code shouldn't use
le32_to_cpu() anymore.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250121112204.12834-1-heming.zhao@suse.com
Fixes: 23aab037106d ("ocfs2: fix UBSAN warning in ocfs2_verify_volume()")
Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit eb3fabde15bccdf34f1c9b35a83aa4c0dacbb4ca upstream.
If ff_layout_pg_get_read()'s attempt to get a layout segment results
in -EAGAIN have ff_layout_pg_init_read() retry it after sleeping.
If "softerr" mount is used, use 'io_maxretrans' to limit the number of
attempts to get a layout segment.
This fixes a long-standing issue of O_DIRECT reads failing with
-EAGAIN (11) when using flexfiles Client Side Mirroring (CSM).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 26b63bee2f6e711c5a169997fd126fddcfb90848 upstream.
In xfs_inactive(), xfs_reflink_cancel_cow_range() is called
without error handling, risking unnoticed failures and
inconsistent behavior compared to other parts of the code.
Fix this issue by adding an error handling for the
xfs_reflink_cancel_cow_range(), improving code robustness.
Fixes: 6231848c3aa5 ("xfs: check for cow blocks before trying to clear them")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.17
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit aab98e2dbd648510f8f51b83fbf4721206ccae45 upstream.
On 32bit systems the addition operations in ipc_msg_alloc() can
potentially overflow leading to memory corruption.
Add bounds checking using KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD to avoid overflow.
Fixes: 0626e6641f6b ("cifsd: add server handler for central processing and tranport layers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 55cf2f4b945f6a6416cc2524ba740b83cc9af25a upstream.
Most of these sizes and counts are capped at 256MB so the math doesn't
result in an integer overflow. The "relocs" count needs to be checked
as well. Otherwise on 32bit systems the calculation of "full_data"
could be wrong.
full_data = data_len + relocs * sizeof(unsigned long);
Fixes: c995ee28d29d ("binfmt_flat: prevent kernel dammage from corrupted executable headers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <npitre@baylibre.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5be17f6c-5338-43be-91ef-650153b975cb@stanley.mountain
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ab251dacfbae28772c897f068a4184f478189ff2 upstream.
The field "eip" (instruction pointer) and "esp" (stack pointer) of a task
can be read from /proc/PID/stat. These fields can be interesting for
coredump.
However, these fields were disabled by commit 0a1eb2d474ed ("fs/proc: Stop
reporting eip and esp in /proc/PID/stat"), because it is generally unsafe
to do so. But it is safe for a coredumping process, and therefore
exceptions were made:
- for a coredumping thread by commit fd7d56270b52 ("fs/proc: Report
eip/esp in /prod/PID/stat for coredumping").
- for all other threads in a coredumping process by commit cb8f381f1613
("fs/proc/array.c: allow reporting eip/esp for all coredumping
threads").
The above two commits check the PF_DUMPCORE flag to determine a coredump thread
and the PF_EXITING flag for the other threads.
Unfortunately, commit 92307383082d ("coredump: Don't perform any cleanups
before dumping core") moved coredump to happen earlier and before PF_EXITING is
set. Thus, checking PF_EXITING is no longer the correct way to determine
threads in a coredumping process.
Instead of PF_EXITING, use PF_POSTCOREDUMP to determine the other threads.
Checking of PF_EXITING was added for coredumping, so it probably can now be
removed. But it doesn't hurt to keep.
Fixes: 92307383082d ("coredump: Don't perform any cleanups before dumping core")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d89af63d478d6c64cc46a01420b46fd6eb147d6f.1735805772.git.namcao@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 57e4a9bd61c308f607bc3e55e8fa02257b06b552 upstream.
MS-SMB2 section 2.2.13.2.10 specifies that 'epoch' should be a 16-bit
unsigned integer used to track lease state changes. Change the data
type of all instances of 'epoch' from unsigned int to __u16. This
simplifies the epoch change comparisons and makes the code more
compliant with the protocol spec.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Meetakshi Setiya <msetiya@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4b8d867ca6e2fc6d152f629fdaf027053b81765a ]
Emmanual Florac reports a strange occurrence when project quota limits
are enabled, free space is lower than the remaining quota, and someone
runs statvfs:
# mkfs.xfs -f /dev/sda
# mount /dev/sda /mnt -o prjquota
# xfs_quota -x -c 'limit -p bhard=2G 55' /mnt
# mkdir /mnt/dir
# xfs_io -c 'chproj 55' -c 'chattr +P' -c 'stat -vvvv' /mnt/dir
# fallocate -l 19g /mnt/a
# df /mnt /mnt/dir
Filesystem Size Used Avail Use% Mounted on
/dev/sda 20G 20G 345M 99% /mnt
/dev/sda 2.0G 0 2.0G 0% /mnt
I think the bug here is that xfs_fill_statvfs_from_dquot unconditionally
assigns to f_bfree without checking that the filesystem has enough free
space to fill the remaining project quota. However, this is a
longstanding behavior of xfs so it's unclear what to do here.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.18
Fixes: 932f2c323196c2 ("[XFS] statvfs component of directory/project quota support, code originally by Glen.")
Reported-by: Emmanuel Florac <eflorac@intellique.com>
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9a17ebfea9d0c7e0bb7409dcf655bf982a5d6e52 ]
On the data device, calling statvfs on a projinherit directory results
in the block and avail counts being curtailed to the project quota block
limits, if any are set. Do the same for realtime files or directories,
only use the project quota rt block limits.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Stable-dep-of: 4b8d867ca6e2 ("xfs: don't over-report free space or inodes in statvfs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6a4730b325aaa48f7a5d5ba97aff0a955e2d9cec ]
This BUG_ON is meant to catch backref cache problems, but these can
arise from either bugs in the backref cache or corruption in the extent
tree. Fix it to be a proper error.
Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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btrfs_drop_extents()
[ Upstream commit 5324c4e10e9c2ce307a037e904c0d9671d7137d9 ]
A data race occurs when the function `insert_ordered_extent_file_extent()`
and the function `btrfs_inode_safe_disk_i_size_write()` are executed
concurrently. The function `insert_ordered_extent_file_extent()` is not
locked when reading inode->disk_i_size, causing
`btrfs_inode_safe_disk_i_size_write()` to cause data competition when
writing inode->disk_i_size, thus affecting the value of `modify_tree`.
The specific call stack that appears during testing is as follows:
============DATA_RACE============
btrfs_drop_extents+0x89a/0xa060 [btrfs]
insert_reserved_file_extent+0xb54/0x2960 [btrfs]
insert_ordered_extent_file_extent+0xff5/0x1760 [btrfs]
btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x1b85/0x36a0 [btrfs]
btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x37/0x60 [btrfs]
finish_ordered_fn+0x3e/0x50 [btrfs]
btrfs_work_helper+0x9c9/0x27a0 [btrfs]
process_scheduled_works+0x716/0xf10
worker_thread+0xb6a/0x1190
kthread+0x292/0x330
ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
============OTHER_INFO============
btrfs_inode_safe_disk_i_size_write+0x4ec/0x600 [btrfs]
btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x24c7/0x36a0 [btrfs]
btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x37/0x60 [btrfs]
finish_ordered_fn+0x3e/0x50 [btrfs]
btrfs_work_helper+0x9c9/0x27a0 [btrfs]
process_scheduled_works+0x716/0xf10
worker_thread+0xb6a/0x1190
kthread+0x292/0x330
ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
=================================
The main purpose of the check of the inode's disk_i_size is to avoid
taking write locks on a btree path when we have a write at or beyond
EOF, since in these cases we don't expect to find extent items in the
root to drop. However if we end up taking write locks due to a data
race on disk_i_size, everything is still correct, we only add extra
lock contention on the tree in case there's concurrency from other tasks.
If the race causes us to not take write locks when we actually need them,
then everything is functionally correct as well, since if we find out we
have extent items to drop and we took read locks (modify_tree set to 0),
we release the path and retry again with write locks.
Since this data race does not affect the correctness of the function,
it is a harmless data race, use data_race() to check inode->disk_i_size.
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Hao-ran Zheng <zhenghaoran154@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 543841d1806029889c2f69f040e88b247aba8e22 ]
Zbigniew mentioned at Linux Plumber's that systemd is interested in
switching to execveat() for service execution, but can't, because the
contents of /proc/pid/comm are the file descriptor which was used,
instead of the path to the binary[1]. This makes the output of tools like
top and ps useless, especially in a world where most fds are opened
CLOEXEC so the number is truly meaningless.
When the filename passed in is empty (e.g. with AT_EMPTY_PATH), use the
dentry's filename for "comm" instead of using the useless numeral from
the synthetic fdpath construction. This way the actual exec machinery
is unchanged, but cosmetically the comm looks reasonable to admins
investigating things.
Instead of adding TASK_COMM_LEN more bytes to bprm, use one of the unused
flag bits to indicate that we need to set "comm" from the dentry.
Suggested-by: Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Suggested-by: Tycho Andersen <tandersen@netflix.com>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://github.com/uapi-group/kernel-features#set-comm-field-before-exec [1]
Reviewed-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Tested-by: Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e2f0943cf37305dbdeaf9846e3c941451bcdef63 ]
When we are trying to join the current transaction and if it's aborted,
we read its 'aborted' field after unlocking fs_info->trans_lock and
without holding any extra reference count on it. This means that a
concurrent task that is aborting the transaction may free the transaction
before we read its 'aborted' field, leading to a use-after-free.
Fix this by reading the 'aborted' field while holding fs_info->trans_lock
since any freeing task must first acquire that lock and set
fs_info->running_transaction to NULL before freeing the transaction.
This was reported by syzbot and Dmitry with the following stack traces
from KASAN:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in join_transaction+0xd9b/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:278
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888011839024 by task kworker/u4:9/1128
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1128 Comm: kworker/u4:9 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-syzkaller-00019-gc45323b7560e #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602
join_transaction+0xd9b/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:278
start_transaction+0xaf8/0x1670 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:697
flush_space+0x448/0xcf0 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:803
btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x159/0x510 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1321
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3236 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa66/0x1840 kernel/workqueue.c:3317
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3398
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Allocated by task 5315:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x243/0x390 mm/slub.c:4329
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:901 [inline]
join_transaction+0x144/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:308
start_transaction+0xaf8/0x1670 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:697
btrfs_create_common+0x1b2/0x2e0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6572
lookup_open fs/namei.c:3649 [inline]
open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3748 [inline]
path_openat+0x1c03/0x3590 fs/namei.c:3984
do_filp_open+0x27f/0x4e0 fs/namei.c:4014
do_sys_openat2+0x13e/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1402
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1417 [inline]
__do_sys_creat fs/open.c:1495 [inline]
__se_sys_creat fs/open.c:1489 [inline]
__x64_sys_creat+0x123/0x170 fs/open.c:1489
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 5336:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:582
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x59/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2353 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4613 [inline]
kfree+0x196/0x430 mm/slub.c:4761
cleanup_transaction fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2063 [inline]
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x2c97/0x3720 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2598
insert_balance_item+0x1284/0x20b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3757
btrfs_balance+0x992/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4633
btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888011839000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 36 bytes inside of
freed 2048-byte region [ffff888011839000, ffff888011839800)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x11838
head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0xfff00000000040(head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801ac42000 ffffea0000493400 dead000000000002
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801ac42000 ffffea0000493400 dead000000000002
head: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 00fff00000000003 ffffea0000460e01 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 57, tgid 57 (kworker/0:2), ts 67248182943, free_ts 67229742023
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1f3/0x230 mm/page_alloc.c:1558
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1566 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x365c/0x37a0 mm/page_alloc.c:3476
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x292/0x710 mm/page_alloc.c:4753
alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x3e1/0x780 mm/mempolicy.c:2269
alloc_slab_page+0x6a/0x110 mm/slub.c:2423
allocate_slab+0x5a/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2589
new_slab mm/slub.c:2642 [inline]
___slab_alloc+0xc27/0x14a0 mm/slub.c:3830
__slab_alloc+0x58/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3920
__slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3995 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4156 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4297 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x2e9/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:4317
kmalloc_reserve+0x111/0x2a0 net/core/skbuff.c:609
__alloc_skb+0x1f3/0x440 net/core/skbuff.c:678
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1323 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc3/0x820 net/core/skbuff.c:6612
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x91a/0xa60 net/core/sock.c:2884
sock_alloc_send_skb include/net/sock.h:1803 [inline]
mld_newpack+0x1c3/0xaf0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1747
add_grhead net/ipv6/mcast.c:1850 [inline]
add_grec+0x1492/0x19a0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1988
mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2114 [inline]
mld_ifc_work+0x691/0xd90 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2651
page last free pid 5300 tgid 5300 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1127 [inline]
free_unref_page+0xd3f/0x1010 mm/page_alloc.c:2659
__slab_free+0x2c2/0x380 mm/slub.c:4524
qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline]
qlist_free_all+0x9a/0x140 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179
kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x14f/0x170 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x23/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:329
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:250 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4119 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4168 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4297 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x236/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:4310
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1037 [inline]
fib_create_info+0xc14/0x25b0 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1435
fib_table_insert+0x1f6/0x1f20 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1231
fib_magic+0x3d8/0x620 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:1112
fib_add_ifaddr+0x40c/0x5e0 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:1156
fib_netdev_event+0x375/0x490 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:1494
notifier_call_chain+0x1a5/0x3f0 kernel/notifier.c:85
__dev_notify_flags+0x207/0x400
dev_change_flags+0xf0/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:9045
do_setlink+0xc90/0x4210 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3109
rtnl_changelink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3723 [inline]
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3875 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x1bb6/0x2210 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4012
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888011838f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888011838f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff888011839000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff888011839080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888011839100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Reported-by: syzbot+45212e9d87a98c3f5b42@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/678e7da5.050a0220.303755.007c.GAE@google.com/
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CACT4Y+ZFBdo7pT8L2AzM=vegZwjp-wNkVJZQf0Ta3vZqtExaSw@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 871383be592b ("btrfs: add missing unlocks to transaction abort paths")
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit d0f038104fa37380e2a725e669508e43d0c503e9 upstream.
There is a recent ML report that mounting a large fs backed by hardware
RAID56 controller (with one device missing) took too much time, and
systemd seems to kill the mount attempt.
In that case, the only error message is:
BTRFS error (device sdj): open_ctree failed
There is no reason on why the failure happened, making it very hard to
understand the reason.
At least output the error number (in the particular case it should be
-EINTR) to provide some clue.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/9b9c4d2810abcca2f9f76e32220ed9a90febb235.camel@scientia.org/
Reported-by: Christoph Anton Mitterer <calestyo@scientia.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 961b4b5e86bf56a2e4b567f81682defa5cba957e upstream.
I noticed that once an NFSv4.1 callback operation gets a
NFS4ERR_DELAY status on CB_SEQUENCE and then the connection is lost,
the callback client loops, resending it indefinitely.
The switch arm in nfsd4_cb_sequence_done() that handles
NFS4ERR_DELAY uses rpc_restart_call() to rearm the RPC state machine
for the retransmit, but that path does not call the rpc_prepare_call
callback again. Thus cb_seq_status is set to -10008 by the first
NFS4ERR_DELAY result, but is never set back to 1 for the retransmits.
nfsd4_cb_sequence_done() thinks it's getting nothing but a
long series of CB_SEQUENCE NFS4ERR_DELAY replies.
Fixes: 7ba6cad6c88f ("nfsd: New helper nfsd4_cb_sequence_done() for processing more cb errors")
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 91b587ba79e1b68bb718d12b0758dbcdab4e9cb7 upstream.
This patch addresses an issue where some files in case-insensitive
directories become inaccessible due to changes in how the kernel function,
utf8_casefold(), generates case-folded strings from the commit 5c26d2f1d3f5
("unicode: Don't special case ignorable code points").
F2FS uses these case-folded names to calculate hash values for locating
dentries and stores them on disk. Since utf8_casefold() can produce
different output across kernel versions, stored hash values and newly
calculated hash values may differ. This results in affected files no
longer being found via the hash-based lookup.
To resolve this, the patch introduces a linear search fallback.
If the initial hash-based search fails, F2FS will sequentially scan the
directory entries.
Fixes: 5c26d2f1d3f5 ("unicode: Don't special case ignorable code points")
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219586
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lee <chullee@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bdb0ca39e0acccf6771db49c3f94ed787d05f2d7 ]
Clearing slab cache will free all znode in memory and make
c->zroot.znode = NULL, then dumping tnc tree will access
c->zroot.znode which cause null pointer dereference.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219624#c0
Fixes: 1e51764a3c2a ("UBIFS: add new flash file system")
Signed-off-by: pangliyuan <pangliyuan1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 668135b9348c53fd205f5e07d11e82b10f31b55b ]
OFFLOAD_CANCEL should be marked MOVEABLE for when we need to move
tasks off a non-functional transport.
Fixes: c975c2092657 ("NFS send OFFLOAD_CANCEL when COPY killed")
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e8380c2d06055665b3df6c03964911375d7f9290 ]
We need to include sequence size in the compound.
Fixes: 0491567b51ef ("NFS: add COPY_NOTIFY operation")
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 276c61385f6bc3223a5ecd307cf4aba2dfbb9a31 ]
While running fstests generic/329, the kernel workqueue
quota_release_workfn is dead looping in calling ocfs2_release_dquot().
The ocfs2 state is already readonly but ocfs2_release_dquot wants to
start a transaction but fails and returns.
=====================================================================
[ 2918.123602 ][ T275 ] On-disk corruption discovered. Please run
fsck.ocfs2 once the filesystem is unmounted.
[ 2918.124034 ][ T275 ] (kworker/u135:1,275,11):ocfs2_release_dquot:765
ERROR: status = -30
[ 2918.124452 ][ T275 ] (kworker/u135:1,275,11):ocfs2_release_dquot:795
ERROR: status = -30
[ 2918.124883 ][ T275 ] (kworker/u135:1,275,11):ocfs2_start_trans:357
ERROR: status = -30
[ 2918.125276 ][ T275 ] OCFS2: abort (device dm-0): ocfs2_start_trans:
Detected aborted journal
[ 2918.125710 ][ T275 ] On-disk corruption discovered. Please run
fsck.ocfs2 once the filesystem is unmounted.
=====================================================================
ocfs2_release_dquot() is much like dquot_release(), which is called by
ext4 to handle similar situation. So here fix it by marking the dquot as
inactive like what dquot_release() does.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250106140653.92292-1-glass.su@suse.com
Fixes: 9e33d69f553a ("ocfs2: Implementation of local and global quota file handling")
Signed-off-by: Su Yue <glass.su@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit be7a6a77669588bfa5022a470989702bbbb11e7f ]
It isn't guaranteed that NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO::LinkSpeed will always
be set by the server, so the client must handle any values and then
prevent oopses like below from happening:
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1323 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41
04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs] Code: 00 00 48
89 df e8 3b cd 1b c1 41 f6 44 24 2c 04 0f 84 50 01 00 00 48 89 ef e8
e7 d0 1b c1 49 8b 44 24 18 31 d2 49 8d 7c 24 28 <48> f7 74 24 18 48 89
c3 e8 6e cf 1b c1 41 8b 6c 24 28 49 8d 7c 24
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001817be0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811230022c RCX: ffffffffc041bd99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000567 RDI: ffff888112300228
RBP: ffff888112300218 R08: fffff52000302f5f R09: ffffed1022fa58ac
R10: ffff888117d2c566 R11: 00000000fffffffe R12: ffff888112300200
R13: 000000012a15343f R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff888113f2db58
FS: 00007fe27119e740(0000) GS:ffff888148600000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe2633c5000 CR3: 0000000124da0000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
? die+0x2e/0x50
? do_trap+0x159/0x1b0
? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
? do_error_trap+0x90/0x130
? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
? exc_divide_error+0x39/0x50
? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
? asm_exc_divide_error+0x1a/0x20
? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa39/0x1460 [cifs]
? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
? seq_read_iter+0x42e/0x790
seq_read_iter+0x19a/0x790
proc_reg_read_iter+0xbe/0x110
? __pfx_proc_reg_read_iter+0x10/0x10
vfs_read+0x469/0x570
? do_user_addr_fault+0x398/0x760
? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10
? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0
? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
ksys_read+0xd3/0x170
? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
? __rcu_read_unlock+0x50/0x270
? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe271288911
Code: 00 48 8b 15 01 25 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd e8
20 ad 01 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d b5 a7 10 00 00 74 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d
00 f0 ff ff 77 4f c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec
RSP: 002b:00007ffe87c079d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000040000 RCX: 00007fe271288911
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007fe2633c6000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffe87c07a00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fe2713e6380
R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000040000
R13: 00007fe2633c6000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Fix this by setting cifs_server_iface::speed to a sane value (1Gbps)
by default when link speed is unset.
Cc: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Fixes: a6d8fb54a515 ("cifs: distribute channels across interfaces based on speed")
Reported-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jay Shin <jaeshin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e30458d690f35abb01de8b3cbc09285deb725d00 ]
Fix a pair of bugs in the fallback handling for the YFS.RemoveFile2 RPC
call:
(1) Fix the abort code check to also look for RXGEN_OPCODE. The lack of
this masks the second bug.
(2) call->server is now not used for ordinary filesystem RPC calls that
have an operation descriptor. Fix to use call->op->server instead.
Fixes: e49c7b2f6de7 ("afs: Build an abstraction around an "operation" concept")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/109541.1736865963@warthog.procyon.org.uk
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 344af27715ddbf357cf76978d674428b88f8e92d ]
While working on implementing user access validation on powerpc
I got the following warnings on a pmac32_defconfig build:
CC fs/select.o
fs/select.o: warning: objtool: sys_pselect6+0x1bc: redundant UACCESS disable
fs/select.o: warning: objtool: sys_pselect6_time32+0x1bc: redundant UACCESS disable
On powerpc/32s, user_read_access_begin/end() are no-ops, but the
failure path has a user_access_end() instead of user_read_access_end()
which means an access end without any prior access begin.
Replace that user_access_end() by user_read_access_end().
Fixes: 7e71609f64ec ("pselect6() and friends: take handling the combined 6th/7th args into helper")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a7139e28d767a13e667ee3c79599a8047222ef36.1736751221.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 542243af7182efaeaf6d0f4643f7de437541a9af ]
Fix trivial typos in comments.
Fixes: 2a03ddbde1e1 ("pstore/blk: Move verify_size() macro out of function")
Fixes: 17639f67c1d6 ("pstore/blk: Introduce backend for block devices")
Signed-off-by: Eugen Hristev <eugen.hristev@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250101111921.850406-1-eugen.hristev@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d727935cad9f6f52c8d184968f9720fdc966c669 ]
Use proc_douintvec_minmax() instead of proc_dointvec_minmax() to handle
sysctl_nr_open, because its data type is unsigned int, not int.
Fixes: 9b80a184eaad ("fs/file: more unsigned file descriptors")
Signed-off-by: Jinliang Zheng <alexjlzheng@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241124034636.325337-1-alexjlzheng@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 07a10767853adcbdbf436dc91393b729b52c4e81 ]
The AFS directory format structure, union afs_xdr_dir_block::meta, has too
many alloc counter slots declared and so pushes the hash table along and
over the data. This doesn't cause a problem at the moment because I'm
currently ignoring the hash table and only using the correct number of
alloc_ctrs in the code anyway. In future, however, I should start using
the hash table to try and speed up afs_lookup().
Fix this by using the correct constant to declare the counter array.
Fixes: 4ea219a839bf ("afs: Split the directory content defs into a header")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241216204124.3752367-14-dhowells@redhat.com
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Bruce Ashfield
Phillip Lougher
David Howells
Colin Ian King
Vasiliy Kovalev
Haoxiang Li
Chao Yu
Ryusuke Konishi
Filipe Manana
Mike Marshall
Dai Ngo
Li Lingfeng
Koichiro Den
Zizhi Wo
Su Yue
Nikita Zhandarovich
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
Heming Zhao
Mike Snitzer
Wentao Liang
Dan Carpenter
Nam Cao
Meetakshi Setiya
Darrick J. Wong
Josef Bacik
Hao-ran Zheng
Kees Cook
Qu Wenruo
Chuck Lever
Daniel Lee
pangliyuan
Olga Kornievskaia
Paulo Alcantara
Christophe Leroy
Eugen Hristev
Jinliang Zheng