| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
|
|
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
|
|
commit b1b65750b8db67834482f758fc385bfa7560d228 upstream.
If FAT length == 0, the image doesn't have any data. And it can be the
cause of overlapping the root dir and FAT entries.
Also Windows treats it as invalid format.
Reported-by: syzbot+6f1624f937d9d6911e2d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87r1wz8mrd.fsf@mail.parknet.co.jp
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit ef1548adada51a2f32ed7faef50aa465e1b4c5da upstream.
Recently syzbot reported that unmounting proc when there is an ongoing
inotify watch on the root directory of proc could result in a use
after free when the watch is removed after the unmount of proc
when the watcher exits.
Commit 69879c01a0c3 ("proc: Remove the now unnecessary internal mount
of proc") made it easier to unmount proc and allowed syzbot to see the
problem, but looking at the code it has been around for a long time.
Looking at the code the fsnotify watch should have been removed by
fsnotify_sb_delete in generic_shutdown_super. Unfortunately the inode
was allocated with new_inode_pseudo instead of new_inode so the inode
was not on the sb->s_inodes list. Which prevented
fsnotify_unmount_inodes from finding the inode and removing the watch
as well as made it so the "VFS: Busy inodes after unmount" warning
could not find the inodes to warn about them.
Make all of the inodes in proc visible to generic_shutdown_super,
and fsnotify_sb_delete by using new_inode instead of new_inode_pseudo.
The only functional difference is that new_inode places the inodes
on the sb->s_inodes list.
I wrote a small test program and I can verify that without changes it
can trigger this issue, and by replacing new_inode_pseudo with
new_inode the issues goes away.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/000000000000d788c905a7dfa3f4@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot+7d2debdcdb3cb93c1e5e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 0097875bd415 ("proc: Implement /proc/thread-self to point at the directory of the current thread")
Fixes: 021ada7dff22 ("procfs: switch /proc/self away from proc_dir_entry")
Fixes: 51f0885e5415 ("vfs,proc: guarantee unique inodes in /proc")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 520da69d265a91c6536c63851cbb8a53946974f0 upstream.
In ovl_copy_xattr, if all the xattrs to be copied are overlayfs private
xattrs, the copy loop will terminate without assigning anything to the
error variable, thus returning an uninitialized value.
If ovl_copy_xattr is called from ovl_clear_empty, this uninitialized error
value is put into a pointer by ERR_PTR(), causing potential invalid memory
accesses down the line.
This commit initialize error with 0. This is the correct value because when
there's no xattr to copy, because all xattrs are private, ovl_copy_xattr
should succeed.
This bug is discovered with the help of INIT_STACK_ALL and clang.
Signed-off-by: Yuxuan Shui <yshuiv7@gmail.com>
Link: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1050405
Fixes: 0956254a2d5b ("ovl: don't copy up opaqueness")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.8
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 522f6e6cba6880a038e2bd88e10390b84cd3febd upstream.
syzbot reported out of bounds memory access from open_by_handle_at()
with a crafted file handle that looks like this:
{ .handle_bytes = 2, .handle_type = OVL_FILEID_V1 }
handle_bytes gets rounded down to 0 and we end up calling:
ovl_check_fh_len(fh, 0) => ovl_check_fb_len(fh + 3, -3)
But fh buffer is only 2 bytes long, so accessing struct ovl_fb at
fh + 3 is illegal.
Fixes: cbe7fba8edfc ("ovl: make sure that real fid is 32bit aligned in memory")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+61958888b1c60361a791@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.5
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 4518a3cc273cf82efdd36522fb1f13baad173c70 upstream.
In io_uring_cancel_files(), after refcount_sub_and_test() leaves 0
req->refs, it calls io_put_req(), which would also put a ref. Call
io_free_req() instead.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2ca10259b418 ("io_uring: prune request from overflow list on flush")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit d8f1b9716cfd1a1f74c0fedad40c5f65a25aa208 upstream.
The prepare_to_wait() and finish_wait() calls in io_uring_cancel_files()
are mismatched. Currently I don't see any issues related this bug, just
find it by learning codes.
Signed-off-by: Xiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 8301c719a2bd131436438e49130ee381d30933f5 upstream.
After commit c3aab9a0bd91 ("mm/filemap.c: don't initiate writeback if
mapping has no dirty pages"), the following null pointer dereference has
been reported on nilfs2:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a8
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
...
RIP: 0010:percpu_counter_add_batch+0xa/0x60
...
Call Trace:
__test_set_page_writeback+0x2d3/0x330
nilfs_segctor_do_construct+0x10d3/0x2110 [nilfs2]
nilfs_segctor_construct+0x168/0x260 [nilfs2]
nilfs_segctor_thread+0x127/0x3b0 [nilfs2]
kthread+0xf8/0x130
...
This crash turned out to be caused by set_page_writeback() call for
segment summary buffers at nilfs_segctor_prepare_write().
set_page_writeback() can call inc_wb_stat(inode_to_wb(inode),
WB_WRITEBACK) where inode_to_wb(inode) is NULL if the inode of
underlying block device does not have an associated wb.
This fixes the issue by calling inode_attach_wb() in advance to ensure
to associate the bdev inode with its wb.
Fixes: c3aab9a0bd91 ("mm/filemap.c: don't initiate writeback if mapping has no dirty pages")
Reported-by: Walton Hoops <me@waltonhoops.com>
Reported-by: Tomas Hlavaty <tom@logand.com>
Reported-by: ARAI Shun-ichi <hermes@ceres.dti.ne.jp>
Reported-by: Hideki EIRAKU <hdk1983@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.4+]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200608.011819.1399059588922299158.konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 7866c177a03b18be3d83175014c643546e5b53c6 upstream.
Missing the final 's' in "max_channels" mount option when displayed in
/proc/mounts (or by mount command)
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
charge in smb2 ioctl
commit ebf57440ec59a36e1fc5fe91e31d66ae0d1662d0 upstream.
Some of tests in xfstests failed with cifsd kernel server since commit
e80ddeb2f70e. cifsd kernel server validates credit charge from client
by calculating it base on max((InputCount + OutputCount) and
(MaxInputResponse + MaxOutputResponse)) according to specification.
MS-SMB2 specification describe credit charge calculation of smb2 ioctl :
If Connection.SupportsMultiCredit is TRUE, the server MUST validate
CreditCharge based on the maximum of (InputCount + OutputCount) and
(MaxInputResponse + MaxOutputResponse), as specified in section 3.3.5.2.5.
If the validation fails, it MUST fail the IOCTL request with
STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER.
This patch add indatalen that can be a non-zero value to calculation of
credit charge in SMB2_ioctl_init().
Fixes: e80ddeb2f70e ("smb3: fix incorrect number of credits when ioctl
MaxOutputResponse > 64K")
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit e80ddeb2f70ebd0786aa7cdba3e58bc931fa0bb5 upstream.
We were not checking to see if ioctl requests asked for more than
64K (ie when CIFSMaxBufSize was > 64K) so when setting larger
CIFSMaxBufSize then ioctls would fail with invalid parameter errors.
When requests ask for more than 64K in MaxOutputResponse then we
need to ask for more than 1 credit.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit a8c73c1a614f6da6c0b04c393f87447e28cb6de4 upstream.
Use kvfree() to free the pages and vmas, since they are allocated by
kvmalloc_array() in a loop.
Fixes: d4ef647510b1 ("io_uring: avoid page allocation warnings")
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200605093203.40087-1-efremov@linux.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 530f32fc370fd1431ea9802dbc53ab5601dfccdb upstream.
Avi Kivity reports that on fuse filesystems running in a user namespace
asyncronous fsync fails with EOVERFLOW.
The reason is that f_ops->fsync() is called with the creds of the kthread
performing aio work instead of the creds of the process originally
submitting IOCB_CMD_FSYNC.
Fuse sends the creds of the caller in the request header and it needs to
translate the uid and gid into the server's user namespace. Since the
kthread is running in init_user_ns, the translation will fail and the
operation returns an error.
It can be argued that fsync doesn't actually need any creds, but just
zeroing out those fields in the header (as with requests that currently
don't take creds) is a backward compatibility risk.
Instead of working around this issue in fuse, solve the core of the problem
by calling the filesystem with the proper creds.
Reported-by: Avi Kivity <avi@scylladb.com>
Tested-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
Fixes: c9582eb0ff7d ("fuse: Fail all requests with invalid uids or gids")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18+
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 2f02fd3fa13e51713b630164f8a8e5b42de8283b ]
The comments in fanotify_group_event_mask() say:
"If the event is on dir/child and this mark doesn't care about
events on dir/child, don't send it!"
Specifically, mount and filesystem marks do not care about events
on child, but they can still specify an ignore mask for those events.
For example, a group that has:
- A mount mark with mask 0 and ignore_mask FAN_OPEN
- An inode mark on a directory with mask FAN_OPEN | FAN_OPEN_EXEC
with flag FAN_EVENT_ON_CHILD
A child file open for exec would be reported to group with the FAN_OPEN
event despite the fact that FAN_OPEN is in ignore mask of mount mark,
because the mark iteration loop skips over non-inode marks for events
on child when calculating the ignore mask.
Move ignore mask calculation to the top of the iteration loop block
before excluding marks for events on dir/child.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200524072441.18258-1-amir73il@gmail.com
Reported-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20200521162443.GA26052@quack2.suse.cz/
Fixes: 55bf882c7f13 "fanotify: fix merging marks masks with FAN_ONDIR"
Fixes: b469e7e47c8a "fanotify: fix handling of events on child..."
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 20be493b787cd581c9fffad7fcd6bfbe6af1050c ]
Fix several issues in the previous gfs2_find_jhead fix:
* When updating @blocks_submitted, @block refers to the first block block not
submitted yet, not the last block submitted, so fix an off-by-one error.
* We want to ensure that @blocks_submitted is far enough ahead of @blocks_read
to guarantee that there is in-flight I/O. Otherwise, we'll eventually end up
waiting for pages that haven't been submitted, yet.
* It's much easier to compare the number of blocks added with the number of
blocks submitted to limit the maximum bio size.
* Even with bio chaining, we can keep adding blocks until we reach the maximum
bio size, as long as we stop at a page boundary. This simplifies the logic.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit d4ae271dfaae2a5f41c015f2f20d62a1deeec734 ]
In io_sq_thread(), currently if we get an -EBUSY error and go to sleep,
we will won't clear it again, which will result in io_sq_thread() will
never have a chance to submit sqes again. Below test program test.c
can reveal this bug:
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct io_uring ring;
int i, fd, ret;
struct io_uring_sqe *sqe;
struct io_uring_cqe *cqe;
struct iovec *iovecs;
void *buf;
struct io_uring_params p;
if (argc < 2) {
printf("%s: file\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
memset(&p, 0, sizeof(p));
p.flags = IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL;
ret = io_uring_queue_init_params(4, &ring, &p);
if (ret < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "queue_init: %s\n", strerror(-ret));
return 1;
}
fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("open");
return 1;
}
iovecs = calloc(10, sizeof(struct iovec));
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
if (posix_memalign(&buf, 4096, 4096))
return 1;
iovecs[i].iov_base = buf;
iovecs[i].iov_len = 4096;
}
ret = io_uring_register_files(&ring, &fd, 1);
if (ret < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: register %d\n", __FUNCTION__, ret);
return ret;
}
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
sqe = io_uring_get_sqe(&ring);
if (!sqe)
break;
io_uring_prep_readv(sqe, 0, &iovecs[i], 1, 0);
sqe->flags |= IOSQE_FIXED_FILE;
ret = io_uring_submit(&ring);
sleep(1);
printf("submit %d\n", i);
}
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
io_uring_wait_cqe(&ring, &cqe);
printf("receive: %d\n", i);
if (cqe->res != 4096) {
fprintf(stderr, "ret=%d, wanted 4096\n", cqe->res);
ret = 1;
}
io_uring_cqe_seen(&ring, cqe);
}
close(fd);
io_uring_queue_exit(&ring);
return 0;
}
sudo ./test testfile
above command will hang on the tenth request, to fix this bug, when io
sq_thread is waken up, we reset the variable 'ret' to be zero.
Suggested-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Xiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit bd2ab18a1d6267446eae1b47dd839050452bdf7f ]
As for other not inlined requests, alloc req->io for FORCE_ASYNC reqs,
so they can be prepared properly.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 650b548129b60b0d23508351800108196f4aa89f ]
If req->io is not NULL, it's already prepared. Don't do it again,
it's dangerous.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 583863ed918136412ddf14de2e12534f17cfdc6f ]
Ensure that ctx->sqo_wait is initialized as soon as the ctx is allocated,
instead of deferring it to the offload setup. This fixes a syzbot
reported lockdep complaint, which is really due to trying to wake_up
on an uninitialized wait queue:
RSP: 002b:00007fffb1fb9aa8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001a9
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000441319
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000140 RDI: 000000000000047b
RBP: 0000000000010475 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000402260
R13: 00000000004022f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
INFO: trying to register non-static key.
the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation.
turning off the locking correctness validator.
CPU: 1 PID: 7090 Comm: syz-executor222 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc1-next-20200415-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x188/0x20d lib/dump_stack.c:118
assign_lock_key kernel/locking/lockdep.c:913 [inline]
register_lock_class+0x1664/0x1760 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1225
__lock_acquire+0x104/0x4c50 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4234
lock_acquire+0x1f2/0x8f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4934
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8c/0xbf kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
__wake_up_common_lock+0xb4/0x130 kernel/sched/wait.c:122
io_cqring_ev_posted+0xa5/0x1e0 fs/io_uring.c:1160
io_poll_remove_all fs/io_uring.c:4357 [inline]
io_ring_ctx_wait_and_kill+0x2bc/0x5a0 fs/io_uring.c:7305
io_uring_create fs/io_uring.c:7843 [inline]
io_uring_setup+0x115e/0x22b0 fs/io_uring.c:7870
do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
RIP: 0033:0x441319
Code: e8 5c ae 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 bb 0a fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fffb1fb9aa8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001a9
Reported-by: syzbot+8c91f5d054e998721c57@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 1d605416fb7175e1adf094251466caa52093b413 ]
KMSAN reported uninitialized data being written to disk when dumping
core. As a result, several kilobytes of kmalloc memory may be written
to the core file and then read by a non-privileged user.
Reported-by: sam <sunhaoyl@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200419100848.63472-1-glider@google.com
Link: https://github.com/google/kmsan/issues/76
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit fb33c114d3ed5bdac230716f5b0a93b56b92a90d ]
It's possible for the VFS to completely forget about an inode, but for
it to still be sitting on the cap release queue. If the MDS sends the
client a cap message for such an inode, it just ignores it today, which
can lead to a stall of up to 5s until the cap release queue is flushed.
If we get a cap message for an inode that can't be located, then go
ahead and flush the cap release queue.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/45532
Fixes: 1e9c2eb6811e ("ceph: delete stale dentry when last reference is dropped")
Reported-and-Tested-by: Andrej Filipčič <andrej.filipcic@ijs.si>
Suggested-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 9bd21d4b1a767c3abebec203342f3820dcb84662 ]
Coverity scan noted a redundant null check
Coverity-id: 728517
Reported-by: Coverity <scan-admin@coverity.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 7bb0c5338436dae953622470d52689265867f032 ]
There is a potential race in fscache operation enqueuing for reading and
copying multiple pages from cachefiles to netfs. The problem can be seen
easily on a heavy loaded system (for example many processes reading files
continually on an NFS share covered by fscache triggered this problem within
a few minutes).
The race is due to cachefiles_read_waiter() adding the op to the monitor
to_do list and then then drop the object->work_lock spinlock before
completing fscache_enqueue_operation(). Once the lock is dropped,
cachefiles_read_copier() grabs the op, completes processing it, and
makes it through fscache_retrieval_complete() which sets the op->state to
the final state of FSCACHE_OP_ST_COMPLETE(4). When cachefiles_read_waiter()
finally gets through the remainder of fscache_enqueue_operation()
it sees the invalid state, and hits the ASSERTCMP and the following
oops is seen:
[ 2259.612361] FS-Cache:
[ 2259.614785] FS-Cache: Assertion failed
[ 2259.618639] FS-Cache: 4 == 5 is false
[ 2259.622456] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 2259.627190] kernel BUG at fs/fscache/operation.c:70!
...
[ 2259.791675] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffc061b4cf>] [<ffffffffc061b4cf>] fscache_enqueue_operation+0xff/0x170 [fscache]
[ 2259.802059] RSP: 0000:ffffa0263d543be0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 2259.807521] RAX: 0000000000000019 RBX: ffffa01a4d390480 RCX: 0000000000000006
[ 2259.814847] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000046 RDI: ffffa0263d553890
[ 2259.822176] RBP: ffffa0263d543be8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffa0263c2d8708
[ 2259.829502] R10: 0000000000001e7f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa01a4d390480
[ 2259.844483] R13: ffff9fa9546c5920 R14: ffffa0263d543c80 R15: ffffa0293ff9bf10
[ 2259.859554] FS: 00007f4b6efbd700(0000) GS:ffffa0263d540000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 2259.875571] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 2259.889117] CR2: 00007f49e1624ff0 CR3: 0000012b38b38000 CR4: 00000000007607e0
[ 2259.904015] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 2259.918764] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 2259.933449] PKRU: 55555554
[ 2259.943654] Call Trace:
[ 2259.953592] <IRQ>
[ 2259.955577] [<ffffffffc03a7c12>] cachefiles_read_waiter+0x92/0xf0 [cachefiles]
[ 2259.978039] [<ffffffffa34d3942>] __wake_up_common+0x82/0x120
[ 2259.991392] [<ffffffffa34d3a63>] __wake_up_common_lock+0x83/0xc0
[ 2260.004930] [<ffffffffa34d3510>] ? task_rq_unlock+0x20/0x20
[ 2260.017863] [<ffffffffa34d3ab3>] __wake_up+0x13/0x20
[ 2260.030230] [<ffffffffa34c72a0>] __wake_up_bit+0x50/0x70
[ 2260.042535] [<ffffffffa35bdcdb>] unlock_page+0x2b/0x30
[ 2260.054495] [<ffffffffa35bdd09>] page_endio+0x29/0x90
[ 2260.066184] [<ffffffffa368fc81>] mpage_end_io+0x51/0x80
CPU1
cachefiles_read_waiter()
20 static int cachefiles_read_waiter(wait_queue_entry_t *wait, unsigned mode,
21 int sync, void *_key)
22 {
...
61 spin_lock(&object->work_lock);
62 list_add_tail(&monitor->op_link, &op->to_do);
63 spin_unlock(&object->work_lock);
<begin race window>
64
65 fscache_enqueue_retrieval(op);
182 static inline void fscache_enqueue_retrieval(struct fscache_retrieval *op)
183 {
184 fscache_enqueue_operation(&op->op);
185 }
58 void fscache_enqueue_operation(struct fscache_operation *op)
59 {
60 struct fscache_cookie *cookie = op->object->cookie;
61
62 _enter("{OBJ%x OP%x,%u}",
63 op->object->debug_id, op->debug_id, atomic_read(&op->usage));
64
65 ASSERT(list_empty(&op->pend_link));
66 ASSERT(op->processor != NULL);
67 ASSERT(fscache_object_is_available(op->object));
68 ASSERTCMP(atomic_read(&op->usage), >, 0);
<end race window>
CPU2
cachefiles_read_copier()
168 while (!list_empty(&op->to_do)) {
...
202 fscache_end_io(op, monitor->netfs_page, error);
203 put_page(monitor->netfs_page);
204 fscache_retrieval_complete(op, 1);
CPU1
58 void fscache_enqueue_operation(struct fscache_operation *op)
59 {
...
69 ASSERTIFCMP(op->state != FSCACHE_OP_ST_IN_PROGRESS,
70 op->state, ==, FSCACHE_OP_ST_CANCELLED);
Signed-off-by: Lei Xue <carmark.dlut@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit f4e2f5e1a527ce58fc9f85145b03704779a3123e ]
This patch rearranges gfs2_add_revoke so that the extra glock
reference is added earlier on in the function to avoid races in which
the glock is freed before the new reference is taken.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 4ed0c30811cb4d30ef89850b787a53a84d5d2bcb ]
Before this patch, function gfs2_quota_lock checked if it was called
from a privileged user, and if so, it bypassed the quota check:
superuser can operate outside the quotas.
That's the wrong place for the check because the lock/unlock functions
are separate from the lock_check function, and you can do lock and
unlock without actually checking the quotas.
This patch moves the check to gfs2_quota_lock_check.
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit c410bf01933e5e09d142c66c3df9ad470a7eec13 upstream.
rxrpc currently uses a fixed 4s retransmission timeout until the RTT is
sufficiently sampled. This can cause problems with some fileservers with
calls to the cache manager in the afs filesystem being dropped from the
fileserver because a packet goes missing and the retransmission timeout is
greater than the call expiry timeout.
Fix this by:
(1) Copying the RTT/RTO calculation code from Linux's TCP implementation
and altering it to fit rxrpc.
(2) Altering the various users of the RTT to make use of the new SRTT
value.
(3) Replacing the use of rxrpc_resend_timeout to use the calculated RTO
value instead (which is needed in jiffies), along with a backoff.
Notes:
(1) rxrpc provides RTT samples by matching the serial numbers on outgoing
DATA packets that have the RXRPC_REQUEST_ACK set and PING ACK packets
against the reference serial number in incoming REQUESTED ACK and
PING-RESPONSE ACK packets.
(2) Each packet that is transmitted on an rxrpc connection gets a new
per-connection serial number, even for retransmissions, so an ACK can
be cross-referenced to a specific trigger packet. This allows RTT
information to be drawn from retransmitted DATA packets also.
(3) rxrpc maintains the RTT/RTO state on the rxrpc_peer record rather than
on an rxrpc_call because many RPC calls won't live long enough to
generate more than one sample.
(4) The calculated SRTT value is in units of 8ths of a microsecond rather
than nanoseconds.
The (S)RTT and RTO values are displayed in /proc/net/rxrpc/peers.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ([AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both"")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit b14c94908b1b884276a6608dea3d0b1b510338b7 ]
This reverts commit df5db5f9ee112e76b5202fbc331f990a0fc316d6.
This patch fixes a regression: patch df5db5f9ee112 allowed function
run_queue() to bypass its call to do_xmote() if revokes were queued for
the glock. That's wrong because its call to do_xmote() is what is
responsible for calling the go_sync() glops functions to sync both
the ail list and any revokes queued for it. By bypassing the call,
gfs2 could get into a stand-off where the glock could not be demoted
until its revokes are written back, but the revokes would not be
written back because do_xmote() was never called.
It "sort of" works, however, because there are other mechanisms like
the log flush daemon (logd) that can sync the ail items and revokes,
if it deems it necessary. The problem is: without file system pressure,
it might never deem it necessary.
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 4d8e28ff3106b093d98bfd2eceb9b430c70a8758 ]
If the ceph_mdsc_open_export_target_session() return fails, it will
do a "goto retry", but the session mutex has already been unlocked.
Re-lock the mutex in that case to ensure that we don't unlock it
twice.
Signed-off-by: Wu Bo <wubo40@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 8aebfffacfa379ba400da573a5bf9e49634e38cb ]
configfs_rmdir() invokes configfs_get_config_item(), which returns a
reference of the specified config_item object to "parent_item" with
increased refcnt.
When configfs_rmdir() returns, local variable "parent_item" becomes
invalid, so the refcount should be decreased to keep refcount balanced.
The reference counting issue happens in one exception handling path of
configfs_rmdir(). When down_write_killable() fails, the function forgets
to decrease the refcnt increased by configfs_get_config_item(), causing
a refcnt leak.
Fix this issue by calling config_item_put() when down_write_killable()
fails.
Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang <xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xin Tan <tanxin.ctf@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 9d1be4f4dc5ff1c66c86acfd2c35765d9e3776b3 ]
Don't call req->page_done() on each page as we finish filling it with
the data coming from the network. Whilst this might speed up the
application a bit, it's a problem if there's a network failure and the
operation has to be reissued.
If this happens, an oops occurs because afs_readpages_page_done() clears
the pointer to each page it unlocks and when a retry happens, the
pointers to the pages it wants to fill are now NULL (and the pages have
been unlocked anyway).
Instead, wait till the operation completes successfully and only then
release all the pages after clearing any terminal gap (the server can
give us less data than we requested as we're allowed to ask for more
than is available).
KASAN produces a bug like the following, and even without KASAN, it can
oops and panic.
BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in _copy_to_iter+0x323/0x5f4
Write of size 1404 at addr 0005088000000000 by task md5sum/5235
CPU: 0 PID: 5235 Comm: md5sum Not tainted 5.7.0-rc3-fscache+ #250
Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014
Call Trace:
memcpy+0x39/0x58
_copy_to_iter+0x323/0x5f4
__skb_datagram_iter+0x89/0x2a6
skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x129/0x135
rxrpc_recvmsg_data.isra.0+0x615/0xd42
rxrpc_kernel_recv_data+0x1e9/0x3ae
afs_extract_data+0x139/0x33a
yfs_deliver_fs_fetch_data64+0x47a/0x91b
afs_deliver_to_call+0x304/0x709
afs_wait_for_call_to_complete+0x1cc/0x4ad
yfs_fs_fetch_data+0x279/0x288
afs_fetch_data+0x1e1/0x38d
afs_readpages+0x593/0x72e
read_pages+0xf5/0x21e
__do_page_cache_readahead+0x128/0x23f
ondemand_readahead+0x36e/0x37f
generic_file_buffered_read+0x234/0x680
new_sync_read+0x109/0x17e
vfs_read+0xe6/0x138
ksys_read+0xd8/0x14d
do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x8a
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
Fixes: 196ee9cd2d04 ("afs: Make afs_fs_fetch_data() take a list of pages")
Fixes: 30062bd13e36 ("afs: Implement YFS support in the fs client")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit ecf84096a526f2632ee85c32a3d05de3fa60ce80 ]
When "ubifs: introduce UBIFS_ATIME_SUPPORT to ubifs" introduced atime
support to ubifs, it also added lazytime support. As far as I can tell
the lazytime support is terminally broken, as it causes
mark_inode_dirty_sync to be called from __writeback_single_inode, which
will then trigger the locking assert in ubifs_dirty_inode. Just remove
the broken lazytime support for now, it can be added back later,
especially as some infrastructure changes should make that easier soon.
Fixes: 8c1c5f263833 ("ubifs: introduce UBIFS_ATIME_SUPPORT to ubifs")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 566d136289dc57816ac290de87a9a0f7d9bd3cbb ]
syzbot is reporting that splice()ing from non-empty read side to
already-full write side causes unkillable task, for opipe_prep() is by
error not inverting pipe_full() test.
CPU: 0 PID: 9460 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-next-20200228-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:rol32 include/linux/bitops.h:105 [inline]
RIP: 0010:iterate_chain_key kernel/locking/lockdep.c:369 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x6a3/0x5270 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4178
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0x197/0x420 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4720
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x156/0x13c0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
pipe_lock_nested fs/pipe.c:66 [inline]
pipe_double_lock+0x1a0/0x1e0 fs/pipe.c:104
splice_pipe_to_pipe fs/splice.c:1562 [inline]
do_splice+0x35f/0x1520 fs/splice.c:1141
__do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1447 [inline]
__se_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1427 [inline]
__x64_sys_splice+0x2b5/0x320 fs/splice.c:1427
do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Reported-by: syzbot+b48daca8639150bc5e73@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=9386d051e11e09973d5a4cf79af5e8cedf79386d
Fixes: 8cefc107ca54c8b0 ("pipe: Use head and tail pointers for the ring, not cursor and length")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 4e89b7210403fa4a8acafe7c602b6212b7af6c3b ]
cpy and set really should be size_t; we won't get an overflow on that,
since sysctl_nr_open can't be set above ~(size_t)0 / sizeof(void *),
so nr that would've managed to overflow size_t on that multiplication
won't get anywhere near copy_fdtable() - we'll fail with EMFILE
before that.
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v2.6.25+
Fixes: 9cfe015aa424 (get rid of NR_OPEN and introduce a sysctl_nr_open)
Reported-by: Thiago Macieira <thiago.macieira@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 3c3c32f85b6cc05e5db78693457deff03ac0f434 ]
crypto_shash_descsize() returns the size of the shash_desc context
needed to compute the hash, not the size of the hash itself.
crypto_shash_digestsize() would be correct, or alternatively using
c->hash_len and c->hmac_desc_len which already store the correct values.
But actually it's simpler to just use stack arrays, so do that instead.
Fixes: 49525e5eecca ("ubifs: Add helper functions for authentication support")
Fixes: da8ef65f9573 ("ubifs: Authenticate replayed journal")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+
Cc: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 9aafc1b0187322fa4fd4eb905d0903172237206c ]
The "buflen" value comes from the user and there is a potential that it
could be zero. In do_handle_to_path() we know that "handle->handle_bytes"
is non-zero and we do:
handle_dwords = handle->handle_bytes >> 2;
So values 1-3 become zero. Then in ovl_fh_to_dentry() we do:
int len = fh_len << 2;
So now len is in the "0,4-128" range and a multiple of 4. But if
"buflen" is zero it will try to copy negative bytes when we do the
memcpy in ovl_fid_to_fh().
memcpy(&fh->fb, fid, buflen - OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET);
And that will lead to a crash. Thanks to Amir Goldstein for his help
with this patch.
Fixes: cbe7fba8edfc ("ovl: make sure that real fid is 32bit aligned in memory")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.5
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 55bf882c7f13dda8bbe624040c6d5b4fbb812d16 upstream.
Change the logic of FAN_ONDIR in two ways that are similar to the logic
of FAN_EVENT_ON_CHILD, that was fixed in commit 54a307ba8d3c ("fanotify:
fix logic of events on child"):
1. The flag is meaningless in ignore mask
2. The flag refers only to events in the mask of the mark where it is set
This is what the fanotify_mark.2 man page says about FAN_ONDIR:
"Without this flag, only events for files are created." It doesn't
say anything about setting this flag in ignore mask to stop getting
events on directories nor can I think of any setup where this capability
would be useful.
Currently, when marks masks are merged, the FAN_ONDIR flag set in one
mark affects the events that are set in another mark's mask and this
behavior causes unexpected results. For example, a user adds a mark on a
directory with mask FAN_ATTRIB | FAN_ONDIR and a mount mark with mask
FAN_OPEN (without FAN_ONDIR). An opendir() of that directory (which is
inside that mount) generates a FAN_OPEN event even though neither of the
marks requested to get open events on directories.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200319151022.31456-10-amir73il@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Rachel Sibley <rasibley@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit f87d1c9559164294040e58f5e3b74a162bf7c6e8 upstream.
I goofed when I added mm->user_ns support to would_dump. I missed the
fact that in the case of binfmt_loader, binfmt_em86, binfmt_misc, and
binfmt_script bprm->file is reassigned. Which made the move of
would_dump from setup_new_exec to __do_execve_file before exec_binprm
incorrect as it can result in would_dump running on the script instead
of the interpreter of the script.
The net result is that the code stopped making unreadable interpreters
undumpable. Which allows them to be ptraced and written to disk
without special permissions. Oops.
The move was necessary because the call in set_new_exec was after
bprm->mm was no longer valid.
To correct this mistake move the misplaced would_dump from
__do_execve_file into flos_old_exec, before exec_mmap is called.
I tested and confirmed that without this fix I can attach with gdb to
a script with an unreadable interpreter, and with this fix I can not.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f84df2a6f268 ("exec: Ensure mm->user_ns contains the execed files")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit a48137996063d22ffba77e077425f49873856ca5 upstream.
Failed async writes that are requeued may not clean up a refcount
on the file, which can result in a leaked open. This scenario arises
very reliably when using persistent handles and a reconnect occurs
while writing.
cifs_writev_requeue only releases the reference if the write fails
(rc != 0). The server->ops->async_writev operation will take its own
reference, so the initial reference can always be released.
Signed-off-by: Adam McCoy <adam@forsedomani.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 8eed292bc8cbf737e46fb1c119d4c8f6dcb00650 ]
Prior to commit e3d3ab64dd66 ("SUNRPC: Use au_rslack when
computing reply buffer size"), there was enough slack in the reply
buffer to commodate filehandles of size 60bytes. However, the real
problem was that the reply buffer size for the MOUNT operation was
not correctly calculated. Received buffer size used the filehandle
size for NFSv2 (32bytes) which is much smaller than the allowed
filehandle size for the v3 mounts.
Fix the reply buffer size (decode arguments size) for the MNT command.
Fixes: 2c94b8eca1a2 ("SUNRPC: Use au_rslack when computing reply buffer size")
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 65759097d804d2a9ad2b687db436319704ba7019 ]
There is a possible race when ep_scan_ready_list() leaves ->rdllist and
->obflist empty for a short period of time although some events are
pending. It is quite likely that ep_events_available() observes empty
lists and goes to sleep.
Since commit 339ddb53d373 ("fs/epoll: remove unnecessary wakeups of
nested epoll") we are conservative in wakeups (there is only one place
for wakeup and this is ep_poll_callback()), thus ep_events_available()
must always observe correct state of two lists.
The easiest and correct way is to do the final check under the lock.
This does not impact the performance, since lock is taken anyway for
adding a wait entry to the wait queue.
The discussion of the problem can be found here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/a2f22c3c-c25a-4bda-8339-a7bdaf17849e@akamai.com/
In this patch barrierless __set_current_state() is used. This is safe
since waitqueue_active() is called under the same lock on wakeup side.
Short-circuit for fatal signals (i.e. fatal_signal_pending() check) is
moved to the line just before actual events harvesting routine. This is
fully compliant to what is said in the comment of the patch where the
actual fatal_signal_pending() check was added: c257a340ede0 ("fs, epoll:
short circuit fetching events if thread has been killed").
Fixes: 339ddb53d373 ("fs/epoll: remove unnecessary wakeups of nested epoll")
Reported-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Roman Penyaev <rpenyaev@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200505145609.1865152-1-rpenyaev@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 29fe839976266bc7c55b927360a1daae57477723 ]
We add the new state to the nfsi->open_states list, making it
potentially visible to other threads, before we've finished initializing
it.
That wasn't a problem when all the readers were also taking the i_lock
(as we do here), but since we switched to RCU, there's now a possibility
that a reader could see the partially initialized state.
Symptoms observed were a crash when another thread called
nfs4_get_valid_delegation() on a NULL inode, resulting in an oops like:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffffffffb0 ...
RIP: 0010:nfs4_get_valid_delegation+0x6/0x30 [nfsv4] ...
Call Trace:
nfs4_open_prepare+0x80/0x1c0 [nfsv4]
__rpc_execute+0x75/0x390 [sunrpc]
? finish_task_switch+0x75/0x260
rpc_async_schedule+0x29/0x40 [sunrpc]
process_one_work+0x1ad/0x370
worker_thread+0x30/0x390
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
kthread+0x10c/0x130
? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Fixes: 9ae075fdd190 "NFSv4: Convert open state lookup to use RCU"
Reviewed-by: Seiichi Ikarashi <s.ikarashi@fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: Daisuke Matsuda <matsuda-daisuke@fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: Masayoshi Mizuma <m.mizuma@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 50eaa652b54df1e2b48dc398d9e6114c9ed080eb ]
Commit 402cb8dda949 ("fscache: Attach the index key and aux data to
the cookie") added the aux_data and aux_data_len to parameters to
fscache_acquire_cookie(), and updated the callers in the NFS client.
In the process it modified the aux_data to include the change_attr,
but missed adding change_attr to a couple places where aux_data was
used. Specifically, when opening a file and the change_attr is not
added, the following attempt to lookup an object will fail inside
cachefiles_check_object_xattr() = -116 due to
nfs_fscache_inode_check_aux() failing memcmp on auxdata and returning
FSCACHE_CHECKAUX_OBSOLETE.
Fix this by adding nfs_fscache_update_auxdata() to set the auxdata
from all relevant fields in the inode, including the change_attr.
Fixes: 402cb8dda949 ("fscache: Attach the index key and aux data to the cookie")
Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 15751612734ca0c419ac43ce986c9badcb5e2829 ]
Commit f2aedb713c28 ("NFS: Add fs_context support.") reworked
NFS mount code paths for fs_context support which included
super_block initialization. In the process there was an extra
return left in the code and so we never call
nfs_fscache_get_super_cookie even if 'fsc' is given on as mount
option. In addition, there is an extra check inside
nfs_fscache_get_super_cookie for the NFS_OPTION_FSCACHE which
is unnecessary since the only caller nfs_get_cache_cookie
checks this flag.
Fixes: f2aedb713c28 ("NFS: Add fs_context support.")
Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit d9bfced1fbcb35b28d8fbed4e785d2807055ed2b ]
Commit 402cb8dda949 ("fscache: Attach the index key and aux data to
the cookie") added the index_key and index_key_len parameters to
fscache_acquire_cookie(), and updated the callers in the NFS client.
One of the callers was inside nfs_fscache_get_super_cookie()
and was changed to use the full struct nfs_fscache_key as the
index_key. However, a couple members of this structure contain
pointers and thus will change each time the same NFS share is
remounted. Since index_key is used for fscache_cookie->key_hash
and this subsequently is used to compare cookies, the effectiveness
of fscache with NFS is reduced to the point at which a umount
occurs. Any subsequent remount of the same share will cause a
unique NFS super_block index_key and key_hash to be generated for
the same data, rendering any prior fscache data unable to be
found. A simple reproducer demonstrates the problem.
1. Mount share with 'fsc', create a file, drop page cache
systemctl start cachefilesd
mount -o vers=3,fsc 127.0.0.1:/export /mnt
dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/file1.bin bs=4096 count=1
echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
2. Read file into page cache and fscache, then unmount
dd if=/mnt/file1.bin of=/dev/null bs=4096 count=1
umount /mnt
3. Remount and re-read which should come from fscache
mount -o vers=3,fsc 127.0.0.1:/export /mnt
echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
dd if=/mnt/file1.bin of=/dev/null bs=4096 count=1
4. Check for READ ops in mountstats - there should be none
grep READ: /proc/self/mountstats
Looking at the history and the removed function, nfs_super_get_key(),
we should only use nfs_fscache_key.key plus any uniquifier, for
the fscache index_key.
Fixes: 402cb8dda949 ("fscache: Attach the index key and aux data to the cookie")
Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit aa83da7f47b26c9587bade6c4bc4736ffa308f0a ]
It turns out that when extending an existing bio, gfs2_find_jhead fails to
check if the block number is consecutive, which leads to incorrect reads for
fragmented journals.
In addition, limit the maximum bio size to an arbitrary value of 2 megabytes:
since commit 07173c3ec276 ("block: enable multipage bvecs"), if we just keep
adding pages until bio_add_page fails, bios will grow much larger than useful,
which pins more memory than necessary with barely any additional performance
gains.
Fixes: f4686c26ecc3 ("gfs2: read journal in large chunks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
cachefiles_read_or_alloc_pages()
[ Upstream commit c5f9d9db83d9f84d2b4aae5a1b29d9b582ccff2f ]
The patch which changed cachefiles from calling ->bmap() to using the
bmap() wrapper overwrote the running return value with the result of
calling bmap(). This causes an assertion failure elsewhere in the code.
Fix this by using ret2 rather than ret to hold the return value.
The oops looks like:
kernel BUG at fs/nfs/fscache.c:468!
...
RIP: 0010:__nfs_readpages_from_fscache+0x18b/0x190 [nfs]
...
Call Trace:
nfs_readpages+0xbf/0x1c0 [nfs]
? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x16c/0x320
read_pages+0x67/0x1a0
__do_page_cache_readahead+0x1cf/0x1f0
ondemand_readahead+0x172/0x2b0
page_cache_async_readahead+0xaa/0xe0
generic_file_buffered_read+0x852/0xd50
? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0x6e/0x140
? nfs4_have_delegation+0x19/0x30 [nfsv4]
generic_file_read_iter+0x100/0x140
? nfs_revalidate_mapping+0x176/0x2b0 [nfs]
nfs_file_read+0x6d/0xc0 [nfs]
new_sync_read+0x11a/0x1c0
__vfs_read+0x29/0x40
vfs_read+0x8e/0x140
ksys_read+0x61/0xd0
__x64_sys_read+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7f5d148267e0
Fixes: 10d83e11a582 ("cachefiles: drop direct usage of ->bmap method.")
Reported-by: David Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: David Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 566a2ab3c9005f62e784bd39022d58d34ef4365c ]
Make sure we don't walk past the end of the metadata in gfs2_walk_metadata: the
inode holds fewer pointers than indirect blocks.
Slightly clean up gfs2_iomap_get.
Fixes: a27a0c9b6a20 ("gfs2: gfs2_walk_metadata fix")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3+
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 4ee3631451c9a62e6b6bc7ee51fb9a5b34e33509 ]
io_req_defer() do double-checked locking. Use proper helpers for that,
i.e. list_empty_careful().
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 3fd44c86711f71156b586c22b0495c58f69358bb ]
While working on to make io_uring sqpoll mode support syscalls that need
struct files_struct, I got cpu soft lockup in io_ring_ctx_wait_and_kill(),
while (ctx->sqo_thread && !wq_has_sleeper(&ctx->sqo_wait))
cpu_relax();
above loop never has an chance to exit, it's because preempt isn't enabled
in the kernel, and the context calling io_ring_ctx_wait_and_kill() and
io_sq_thread() run in the same cpu, if io_sq_thread calls a cond_resched()
yield cpu and another context enters above loop, then io_sq_thread() will
always in runqueue and never exit.
Use cond_resched() can fix this issue.
Reported-by: syzbot+66243bb7126c410cefe6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
Bruce Ashfield
OGAWA Hirofumi
Eric W. Biederman
Yuxuan Shui
Amir Goldstein
Pavel Begunkov
Xiaoguang Wang
Ryusuke Konishi
Steve French
Namjae Jeon
Denis Efremov
Miklos Szeredi
Andreas Gruenbacher
Jens Axboe
Alexander Potapenko
Jeff Layton
Lei Xue
Bob Peterson
David Howells
Wu Bo
Xiyu Yang
Christoph Hellwig
Tetsuo Handa
Al Viro
Eric Biggers
Dan Carpenter
Adam McCoy
Olga Kornievskaia
Roman Penyaev
J. Bruce Fields
Dave Wysochanski