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[ Upstream commit 1ab19c5de4c537ec0d9b21020395a5b5a6c059b2 ]
The GLF_LRU flag is checked under lru_lock in gfs2_glock_remove_from_lru() to
remove the glock from the lru list in __gfs2_glock_put().
On the shrink scan path, the same flag is cleared under lru_lock but because
of cond_resched_lock(&lru_lock) in gfs2_dispose_glock_lru(), progress on the
put side can be made without deleting the glock from the lru list.
Keep GLF_LRU across the race window opened by cond_resched_lock(&lru_lock) to
ensure correct behavior on both sides - clear GLF_LRU after list_del under
lru_lock.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+34ba7ddbf3021981a228@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 43a511c44e58e357a687d61a20cf5ef1dc9e5a7c ]
When a direct I/O write falls entirely and falls back to buffered I/O and the
buffered I/O fails, the write failed with return value 0 instead of the error
number reported by the buffered I/O. Fix that.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 94f0b2d4a1d0c52035aef425da5e022bd2cb1c71 upstream.
Commit 591a22c14d3f ("proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct") we
started using __mem_open() to track the mm_struct at open-time, so that
we could then check it for writes.
But that also ended up making the permission checks at open time much
stricter - and not just for writes, but for reads too. And that in turn
caused a regression for at least Fedora 29, where NIC interfaces fail to
start when using NetworkManager.
Since only the write side wanted the mm_struct test, ignore any failures
by __mem_open() at open time, leaving reads unaffected. The write()
time verification of the mm_struct pointer will then catch the failure
case because a NULL pointer will not match a valid 'current->mm'.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/YMjTlp2FSJYvoyFa@unreal/
Fixes: 591a22c14d3f ("proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct")
Reported-and-tested-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f8849e206ef52b584cd9227255f4724f0cc900bb upstream.
Currently if __nfs4_proc_set_acl fails with NFS4ERR_BADOWNER it
re-enables the idmapper by clearing NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP before
retrying again. The NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP remains cleared even if
the retry fails. This causes problem for subsequent setattr
requests for v4 server that does not have idmapping configured.
This patch modifies nfs4_proc_set_acl to detect NFS4ERR_BADOWNER
and NFS4ERR_BADNAME and skips the retry, since the kernel isn't
involved in encoding the ACEs, and return -EINVAL.
Steps to reproduce the problem:
# mount -o vers=4.1,sec=sys server:/export/test /tmp/mnt
# touch /tmp/mnt/file1
# chown 99 /tmp/mnt/file1
# nfs4_setfacl -a A::unknown.user@xyz.com:wrtncy /tmp/mnt/file1
Failed setxattr operation: Invalid argument
# chown 99 /tmp/mnt/file1
chown: changing ownership of ‘/tmp/mnt/file1’: Invalid argument
# umount /tmp/mnt
# mount -o vers=4.1,sec=sys server:/export/test /tmp/mnt
# chown 99 /tmp/mnt/file1
#
v2: detect NFS4ERR_BADOWNER and NFS4ERR_BADNAME and skip retry
in nfs4_proc_set_acl.
Signed-off-by: Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c3aba897c6e67fa464ec02b1f17911577d619713 upstream.
If the inode is being evicted but has to return a layout first, then
that too can cause a deadlock in the corner case where the server
reboots.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 476bdb04c501fc64bf3b8464ffddefc8dbe01577 upstream.
KASAN reports a use-after-free when attempting to mount two different
exports through two different NICs that belong to the same server.
Olga was able to hit this with kernels starting somewhere between 5.7
and 5.10, but I traced the patch that introduced the clear_bit() call to
4.13. So something must have changed in the refcounting of the clp
pointer to make this call to nfs_put_client() the very last one.
Fixes: 8dcbec6d20 ("NFSv41: Handle EXCHID4_FLAG_CONFIRMED_R during NFSv4.1 migration")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.13+
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit dfe1fe75e00e4c724ede7b9e593f6f680e446c5f ]
If the inode is being evicted, but has to return a delegation first,
then it can cause a deadlock in the corner case where the server reboots
before the delegreturn completes, but while the call to iget5_locked() in
nfs4_opendata_get_inode() is waiting for the inode free to complete.
Since the open call still holds a session slot, the reboot recovery
cannot proceed.
In order to break the logjam, we can turn the delegation return into a
privileged operation for the case where we're evicting the inode. We
know that in that case, there can be no other state recovery operation
that conflicts.
Reported-by: zhangxiaoxu (A) <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Fixes: 5fcdfacc01f3 ("NFSv4: Return delegations synchronously in evict_inode")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 09226e8303beeec10f2ff844d2e46d1371dc58e0 ]
None of the callers are expecting NULL returns from nfs_get_client() so
this code will lead to an Oops. It's better to return an error
pointer. I expect that this is dead code so hopefully no one is
affected.
Fixes: 31434f496abb ("nfs: check hostname in nfs_get_client")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit aefd7f7065567a4666f42c0fc8cdb379d2e036bf upstream.
Syzbot managed to trigger this assert while performing its fuzzing.
Turns out it's better to have those asserts turned into full-fledged
checks so that in case buggy btrfs images are mounted the users gets
an error and mounting is stopped. Alternatively with CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT
disabled such image would have been erroneously allowed to be mounted.
Reported-by: syzbot+a6bf271c02e4fe66b4e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add uuids to the messages ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e7b2ec3d3d4ebeb4cff7ae45cf430182fa6a49fb upstream.
We always return 0 even in case of an error in btrfs_mark_extent_written().
Fix it to return proper error value in case of a failure. All callers
handle it.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 591a22c14d3f45cc38bd1931c593c221df2f1881 upstream.
Commit bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
tried to make sure that there could not be a confusion between the opener of
a /proc/$pid/attr/ file and the writer. It used struct cred to make sure
the privileges didn't change. However, there were existing cases where a more
privileged thread was passing the opened fd to a differently privileged thread
(during container setup). Instead, use mm_struct to track whether the opener
and writer are still the same process. (This is what several other proc files
already do, though for different reasons.)
Reported-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Fixes: bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5e753a817b2d5991dfe8a801b7b1e8e79a1c5a20 upstream.
The following test case reproduces an issue of wrongly freeing in-use
blocks on the readonly seed device when fstrim is called on the rw sprout
device. As shown below.
Create a seed device and add a sprout device to it:
$ mkfs.btrfs -fq -dsingle -msingle /dev/loop0
$ btrfstune -S 1 /dev/loop0
$ mount /dev/loop0 /btrfs
$ btrfs dev add -f /dev/loop1 /btrfs
BTRFS info (device loop0): relocating block group 290455552 flags system
BTRFS info (device loop0): relocating block group 1048576 flags system
BTRFS info (device loop0): disk added /dev/loop1
$ umount /btrfs
Mount the sprout device and run fstrim:
$ mount /dev/loop1 /btrfs
$ fstrim /btrfs
$ umount /btrfs
Now try to mount the seed device, and it fails:
$ mount /dev/loop0 /btrfs
mount: /btrfs: wrong fs type, bad option, bad superblock on /dev/loop0, missing codepage or helper program, or other error.
Block 5292032 is missing on the readonly seed device:
$ dmesg -kt | tail
<snip>
BTRFS error (device loop0): bad tree block start, want 5292032 have 0
BTRFS warning (device loop0): couldn't read-tree root
BTRFS error (device loop0): open_ctree failed
>From the dump-tree of the seed device (taken before the fstrim). Block
5292032 belonged to the block group starting at 5242880:
$ btrfs inspect dump-tree -e /dev/loop0 | grep -A1 BLOCK_GROUP
<snip>
item 3 key (5242880 BLOCK_GROUP_ITEM 8388608) itemoff 16169 itemsize 24
block group used 114688 chunk_objectid 256 flags METADATA
<snip>
>From the dump-tree of the sprout device (taken before the fstrim).
fstrim used block-group 5242880 to find the related free space to free:
$ btrfs inspect dump-tree -e /dev/loop1 | grep -A1 BLOCK_GROUP
<snip>
item 1 key (5242880 BLOCK_GROUP_ITEM 8388608) itemoff 16226 itemsize 24
block group used 32768 chunk_objectid 256 flags METADATA
<snip>
BPF kernel tracing the fstrim command finds the missing block 5292032
within the range of the discarded blocks as below:
kprobe:btrfs_discard_extent {
printf("freeing start %llu end %llu num_bytes %llu:\n",
arg1, arg1+arg2, arg2);
}
freeing start 5259264 end 5406720 num_bytes 147456
<snip>
Fix this by avoiding the discard command to the readonly seed device.
Reported-by: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 011b28acf940eb61c000059dd9e2cfcbf52ed96b upstream.
This function has the following pattern
while (1) {
ret = whatever();
if (ret)
goto out;
}
ret = 0
out:
return ret;
However several places in this while loop we simply break; when there's
a problem, thus clearing the return value, and in one case we do a
return -EIO, and leak the memory for the path.
Fix this by re-arranging the loop to deal with ret == 1 coming from
btrfs_search_slot, and then simply delete the
ret = 0;
out:
bit so everybody can break if there is an error, which will allow for
proper error handling to occur.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 856bd270dc4db209c779ce1e9555c7641ffbc88e upstream.
We are unconditionally returning 0 in cleanup_ref_head, despite the fact
that btrfs_del_csums could fail. We need to return the error so the
transaction gets aborted properly, fix this by returning ret from
btrfs_del_csums in cleanup_ref_head.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b86652be7c83f70bf406bed18ecf55adb9bfb91b upstream.
Error injection stress would sometimes fail with checksums on disk that
did not have a corresponding extent. This occurred because the pattern
in btrfs_del_csums was
while (1) {
ret = btrfs_search_slot();
if (ret < 0)
break;
}
ret = 0;
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
If we got an error from btrfs_search_slot we'd clear the error because
we were breaking instead of goto out. Instead of using goto out, simply
handle the cases where we may leave a random value in ret, and get rid
of the
ret = 0;
out:
pattern and simply allow break to have the proper error reporting. With
this fix we properly abort the transaction and do not commit thinking we
successfully deleted the csum.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d61bec08b904cf171835db98168f82bc338e92e4 upstream.
While doing error injection testing I saw that sometimes we'd get an
abort that wouldn't stop the current transaction commit from completing.
This abort was coming from finish ordered IO, but at this point in the
transaction commit we should have gotten an error and stopped.
It turns out the abort came from finish ordered io while trying to write
out the free space cache. It occurred to me that any failure inside of
finish_ordered_io isn't actually raised to the person doing the writing,
so we could have any number of failures in this path and think the
ordered extent completed successfully and the inode was fine.
Fix this by marking the ordered extent with BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR, and
marking the mapping of the inode with mapping_set_error, so any callers
that simply call fdatawait will also get the error.
With this we're seeing the IO error on the free space inode when we fail
to do the finish_ordered_io.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6bba4471f0cc1296fe3c2089b9e52442d3074b2e upstream.
When fallocate punches holes out of inode size, if original isize is in
the middle of last cluster, then the part from isize to the end of the
cluster will be zeroed with buffer write, at that time isize is not yet
updated to match the new size, if writeback is kicked in, it will invoke
ocfs2_writepage()->block_write_full_page() where the pages out of inode
size will be dropped. That will cause file corruption. Fix this by
zero out eof blocks when extending the inode size.
Running the following command with qemu-image 4.2.1 can get a corrupted
coverted image file easily.
qemu-img convert -p -t none -T none -f qcow2 $qcow_image \
-O qcow2 -o compat=1.1 $qcow_image.conv
The usage of fallocate in qemu is like this, it first punches holes out
of inode size, then extend the inode size.
fallocate(11, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE|FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE, 2276196352, 65536) = 0
fallocate(11, 0, 2276196352, 65536) = 0
v1: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg193999.html
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20210525093034.GB4112@quack2.suse.cz/T/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210528210648.9124-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 082cd4ec240b8734a82a89ffb890216ac98fec68 upstream.
We got follow bug_on when run fsstress with injecting IO fault:
[130747.323114] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:762!
[130747.323117] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
......
[130747.334329] Call trace:
[130747.334553] ext4_es_cache_extent+0x150/0x168 [ext4]
[130747.334975] ext4_cache_extents+0x64/0xe8 [ext4]
[130747.335368] ext4_find_extent+0x300/0x330 [ext4]
[130747.335759] ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x74/0x1178 [ext4]
[130747.336179] ext4_map_blocks+0x2f4/0x5f0 [ext4]
[130747.336567] ext4_mpage_readpages+0x4a8/0x7a8 [ext4]
[130747.336995] ext4_readpage+0x54/0x100 [ext4]
[130747.337359] generic_file_buffered_read+0x410/0xae8
[130747.337767] generic_file_read_iter+0x114/0x190
[130747.338152] ext4_file_read_iter+0x5c/0x140 [ext4]
[130747.338556] __vfs_read+0x11c/0x188
[130747.338851] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[130747.339110] ksys_read+0x74/0xf0
This patch's modification is according to Jan Kara's suggestion in:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linux-ext4/patch/20210428085158.3728201-1-yebin10@huawei.com/
"I see. Now I understand your patch. Honestly, seeing how fragile is trying
to fix extent tree after split has failed in the middle, I would probably
go even further and make sure we fix the tree properly in case of ENOSPC
and EDQUOT (those are easily user triggerable). Anything else indicates a
HW problem or fs corruption so I'd rather leave the extent tree as is and
don't try to fix it (which also means we will not create overlapping
extents)."
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506141042.3298679-1-yebin10@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1119a72e223f3073a604f8fccb3a470ccd8a4416 upstream.
The tree checker checks the extent ref hash at read and write time to
make sure we do not corrupt the file system. Generally extent
references go inline, but if we have enough of them we need to make an
item, which looks like
key.objectid = <bytenr>
key.type = <BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_REF_KEY|BTRFS_TREE_BLOCK_REF_KEY>
key.offset = hash(tree, owner, offset)
However if key.offset collide with an unrelated extent reference we'll
simply key.offset++ until we get something that doesn't collide.
Obviously this doesn't match at tree checker time, and thus we error
while writing out the transaction. This is relatively easy to
reproduce, simply do something like the following
xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 1M" file
offset=2
for i in {0..10000}
do
xfs_io -c "reflink file 0 ${offset}M 1M" file
offset=$(( offset + 2 ))
done
xfs_io -c "reflink file 0 17999258914816 1M" file
xfs_io -c "reflink file 0 35998517829632 1M" file
xfs_io -c "reflink file 0 53752752058368 1M" file
btrfs filesystem sync
And the sync will error out because we'll abort the transaction. The
magic values above are used because they generate hash collisions with
the first file in the main subvol.
The fix for this is to remove the hash value check from tree checker, as
we have no idea which offset ours should belong to.
Reported-by: Tuomas Lähdekorpi <tuomas.lahdekorpi@gmail.com>
Fixes: 0785a9aacf9d ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add EXTENT_DATA_REF check")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add comment]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c0d46717b95735b0eacfddbcca9df37a49de9c7a ]
See MS-SMB2 3.2.4.1.4, file ids in compounded requests should be set to
0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF (we were treating it as u32 not u64 and setting
it incorrectly).
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reported-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 91df99a6eb50d5a1bc70fff4a09a0b7ae6aab96d ]
While doing error injection testing I got the following panic
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:1862!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 7836 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1+ #305
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:link_to_fixup_dir+0xd5/0xe0
RSP: 0018:ffffb5800180fa30 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: fffffffffffffffb RBX: 00000000fffffffb RCX: ffff8f595287faf0
RDX: ffffb5800180fa37 RSI: ffff8f5954978800 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff8f5953af9450 R08: 0000000000000019 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 000151f408682970 R11: 0000000120021001 R12: ffff8f5954978800
R13: ffff8f595287faf0 R14: ffff8f5953c77dd0 R15: 0000000000000065
FS: 00007fc5284c8c40(0000) GS:ffff8f59bbd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc5287f47c0 CR3: 000000011275e002 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
Call Trace:
replay_one_buffer+0x409/0x470
? btree_read_extent_buffer_pages+0xd0/0x110
walk_up_log_tree+0x157/0x1e0
walk_log_tree+0xa6/0x1d0
btrfs_recover_log_trees+0x1da/0x360
? replay_one_extent+0x7b0/0x7b0
open_ctree+0x1486/0x1720
btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea
? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x12f/0x240
legacy_get_tree+0x24/0x40
vfs_get_tree+0x22/0xb0
vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0
btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380
? vfs_parse_fs_string+0x4d/0x90
legacy_get_tree+0x24/0x40
vfs_get_tree+0x22/0xb0
path_mount+0x433/0xa10
__x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
We can get -EIO or any number of legitimate errors from
btrfs_search_slot(), panicing here is not the appropriate response. The
error path for this code handles errors properly, simply return the
error.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit 15c7745c9a0078edad1f7df5a6bb7b80bc8cca23 ]
`xfs_io -c 'fiemap <off> <len>' <file>`
can give surprising results on btrfs that differ from xfs.
btrfs prints out extents trimmed to fit the user input. If the user's
fiemap request has an offset, then rather than returning each whole
extent which intersects that range, we also trim the start extent to not
have start < off.
Documentation in filesystems/fiemap.txt and the xfs_io man page suggests
that returning the whole extent is expected.
Some cases which all yield the same fiemap in xfs, but not btrfs:
dd if=/dev/zero of=$f bs=4k count=1
sudo xfs_io -c 'fiemap 0 1024' $f
0: [0..7]: 26624..26631
sudo xfs_io -c 'fiemap 2048 1024' $f
0: [4..7]: 26628..26631
sudo xfs_io -c 'fiemap 2048 4096' $f
0: [4..7]: 26628..26631
sudo xfs_io -c 'fiemap 3584 512' $f
0: [7..7]: 26631..26631
sudo xfs_io -c 'fiemap 4091 5' $f
0: [7..6]: 26631..26630
I believe this is a consequence of the logic for merging contiguous
extents represented by separate extent items. That logic needs to track
the last offset as it loops through the extent items, which happens to
pick up the start offset on the first iteration, and trim off the
beginning of the full extent. To fix it, start `off` at 0 rather than
`start` so that we keep the iteration/merging intact without cutting off
the start of the extent.
after the fix, all the above commands give:
0: [0..7]: 26624..26631
The merging logic is exercised by fstest generic/483, and I have written
a new fstest for checking we don't have backwards or zero-length fiemaps
for cases like those above.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
commit e67afa7ee4a59584d7253e45d7f63b9528819a13 upstream.
Since commit bdcc2cd14e4e ("NFSv4.2: handle NFS-specific llseek errors"),
nfs42_proc_llseek would return -EOPNOTSUPP rather than -ENOTSUPP when
SEEK_DATA on NFSv4.0/v4.1.
This will lead xfstests generic/285 not run on NFSv4.0/v4.1 when set the
CONFIG_NFS_V4_2, rather than run failed.
Fixes: bdcc2cd14e4e ("NFSv4.2: handle NFS-specific llseek errors")
Cc: <stable.vger.kernel.org> # 4.2
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0d0ea309357dea0d85a82815f02157eb7fcda39f upstream.
The value of mirror->pg_bytes_written should only be updated after a
successful attempt to flush out the requests on the list.
Fixes: a7d42ddb3099 ("nfs: add mirroring support to pgio layer")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 56517ab958b7c11030e626250c00b9b1a24b41eb upstream.
Ensure that nfs_pageio_error_cleanup() resets the mirror array contents,
so that the structure reflects the fact that it is now empty.
Also change the test in nfs_pageio_do_add_request() to be more robust by
checking whether or not the list is empty rather than relying on the
value of pg_count.
Fixes: a7d42ddb3099 ("nfs: add mirroring support to pgio layer")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 769b01ea68b6c49dc3cde6adf7e53927dacbd3a8 upstream.
The "sizeof(struct nfs_fh)" is two bytes too large and could lead to
memory corruption. It should be NFS_MAXFHSIZE because that's the size
of the ->data[] buffer.
I reversed the size of the arguments to put the variable on the left.
Fixes: 16b374ca439f ("NFSv4.1: pnfs: filelayout: add driver's LAYOUTGET and GETDEVICEINFO infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bb002388901151fe35b6697ab116f6ed0721a9ed upstream.
We set the state of the current process to TASK_KILLABLE via
prepare_to_wait(). Should we use fatal_signal_pending() to detect
the signal here?
Fixes: b4868b44c562 ("NFSv4: Wait for stateid updates after CLOSE/OPEN_DOWNGRADE")
Signed-off-by: zhouchuangao <zhouchuangao@vivo.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bfb819ea20ce8bbeeba17e1a6418bf8bda91fc28 upstream.
Fix another "confused deputy" weakness[1]. Writes to /proc/$pid/attr/
files need to check the opener credentials, since these fds do not
transition state across execve(). Without this, it is possible to
trick another process (which may have different credentials) to write
to its own /proc/$pid/attr/ files, leading to unexpected and possibly
exploitable behaviors.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html?highlight=confused#open-file-credentials
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f41 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a421d218603ffa822a0b8045055c03eae394a7eb upstream.
Commit de144ff4234f changes _pnfs_return_layout() to call
pnfs_mark_matching_lsegs_return() passing NULL as the struct
pnfs_layout_range argument. Unfortunately,
pnfs_mark_matching_lsegs_return() doesn't check if we have a value here
before dereferencing it, causing an oops.
I'm able to hit this crash consistently when running connectathon basic
tests on NFS v4.1/v4.2 against Ontap.
Fixes: de144ff4234f ("NFSv4: Don't discard segments marked for return in _pnfs_return_layout()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6d2fcfe6b517fe7cbf2687adfb0a16cdcd5d9243 upstream.
SMB3.0 doesn't have encryption negotiate context but simply uses
the SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION flag.
When that flag is present in the neg response cifs.ko uses AES-128-CCM
which is the only cipher available in this context.
cipher_type was set to the server cipher only when parsing encryption
negotiate context (SMB3.1.1).
For SMB3.0 it was set to 0. This means cipher_type value can be 0 or 1
for AES-128-CCM.
Fix this by checking for SMB3.0 and encryption capability and setting
cipher_type appropriately.
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f053cf7aa66cd9d592b0fc967f4d887c2abff1b7 upstream.
ext4 didn't properly clean up if verity failed to be enabled on a file:
- It left verity metadata (pages past EOF) in the page cache, which
would be exposed to userspace if the file was later extended.
- It didn't truncate the verity metadata at all (either from cache or
from disk) if an error occurred while setting the verity bit.
Fix these bugs by adding a call to truncate_inode_pages() and ensuring
that we truncate the verity metadata (both from cache and from disk) in
all error paths. Also rework the code to cleanly separate the success
path from the error paths, which makes it much easier to understand.
Reported-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@hihonor.com>
Fixes: c93d8f885809 ("ext4: add basic fs-verity support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302200420.137977-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e1436df2f2550bc89d832ffd456373fdf5d5b5d7 upstream.
This reverts commit 2c2a7552dd6465e8fde6bc9cccf8d66ed1c1eb72.
Because of recent interactions with developers from @umn.edu, all
commits from them have been recently re-reviewed to ensure if they were
correct or not.
Upon review, this commit was found to be incorrect for the reasons
below, so it must be reverted. It will be fixed up "correctly" in a
later kernel change.
The original commit log for this change was incorrect, no "error
handling code" was added, things will blow up just as badly as before if
any of these cases ever were true. As this BUG_ON() never fired, and
most of these checks are "obviously" never going to be true, let's just
revert to the original code for now until this gets unwound to be done
correctly in the future.
Cc: Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>
Fixes: 2c2a7552dd64 ("ecryptfs: replace BUG_ON with error handling code")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-49-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d201d7631ca170b038e7f8921120d05eec70d7c5 upstream.
When using smb2_copychunk_range() for large ranges we will
run through several iterations of a loop calling SMB2_ioctl()
but never actually free the returned buffer except for the final
iteration.
This leads to memory leaks everytime a large copychunk is requested.
Fixes: 9bf0c9cd4314 ("CIFS: Fix SMB2/SMB3 Copy offload support (refcopy) for large files")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 71795ee590111e3636cc3c148289dfa9fa0a5fc3 upstream.
Generally a delayed iput is added when we might do the final iput, so
usually we'll end up sleeping while processing the delayed iputs
naturally. However there's no guarantee of this, especially for small
files. In production we noticed 5 instances of RCU stalls while testing
a kernel release overnight across 1000 machines, so this is relatively
common:
host count: 5
rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
rcu: ....: (20998 ticks this GP) idle=59e/1/0x4000000000000002 softirq=12333372/12333372 fqs=3208
(t=21031 jiffies g=27810193 q=41075) NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 1713 Comm: btrfs-cleaner Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.6.13-0_fbk12_rc1_5520_gec92bffc1ec9 #1
Call Trace:
<IRQ> dump_stack+0x50/0x70
nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold.6+0x30/0x65
? lapic_can_unplug_cpu.cold.30+0x40/0x40
nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0xba/0xca
rcu_dump_cpu_stacks+0x99/0xc7
rcu_sched_clock_irq.cold.90+0x1b2/0x3a3
? trigger_load_balance+0x5c/0x200
? tick_sched_do_timer+0x60/0x60
? tick_sched_do_timer+0x60/0x60
update_process_times+0x24/0x50
tick_sched_timer+0x37/0x70
__hrtimer_run_queues+0xfe/0x270
hrtimer_interrupt+0xf4/0x210
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x5e/0x120
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 </IRQ>
RIP: 0010:queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x17d/0x1b0
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000da5fe48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff889fa81d0cd8 RCX: 0000000000000029
RDX: ffff889fff86c0c0 RSI: 0000000000080000 RDI: ffff88bfc2da7200
RBP: ffff888f2dcdd768 R08: 0000000001040000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffff82a55560 R12: ffff88bfc2da7200
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88bff6c2a360 R15: ffffffff814bd870
? kzalloc.constprop.57+0x30/0x30
list_lru_add+0x5a/0x100
inode_lru_list_add+0x20/0x40
iput+0x1c1/0x1f0
run_delayed_iput_locked+0x46/0x90
btrfs_run_delayed_iputs+0x3f/0x60
cleaner_kthread+0xf2/0x120
kthread+0x10b/0x130
Fix this by adding a cond_resched_lock() to the loop processing delayed
iputs so we can avoid these sort of stalls.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit cf7b39a0cbf6bf57aa07a008d46cf695add05b4c ]
We get a bug:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in iov_iter_revert+0x11c/0x404
lib/iov_iter.c:1139
Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000d3fb11f8 by task
CPU: 0 PID: 12582 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted
5.10.0-00843-g352c8610ccd2 #2
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2d0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:132
show_stack+0x28/0x34 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:196
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x110/0x164 lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description+0x78/0x5c8 mm/kasan/report.c:385
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:545 [inline]
kasan_report+0x148/0x1e4 mm/kasan/report.c:562
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
__asan_load8+0xb4/0xbc mm/kasan/generic.c:252
iov_iter_revert+0x11c/0x404 lib/iov_iter.c:1139
io_read fs/io_uring.c:3421 [inline]
io_issue_sqe+0x2344/0x2d64 fs/io_uring.c:5943
__io_queue_sqe+0x19c/0x520 fs/io_uring.c:6260
io_queue_sqe+0x2a4/0x590 fs/io_uring.c:6326
io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6395 [inline]
io_submit_sqes+0x4c0/0xa04 fs/io_uring.c:6624
__do_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:9013 [inline]
__se_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:8960 [inline]
__arm64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x190/0x708 fs/io_uring.c:8960
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline]
el0_svc_common arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:158 [inline]
do_el0_svc+0x120/0x290 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:227
el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367
el0_sync_handler+0x98/0x170 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:383
el0_sync+0x140/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:670
Allocated by task 12570:
stack_trace_save+0x80/0xb8 kernel/stacktrace.c:121
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xdc/0x120 mm/kasan/common.c:461
kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14 mm/kasan/common.c:475
__kmalloc+0x23c/0x334 mm/slub.c:3970
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:557 [inline]
__io_alloc_async_data+0x68/0x9c fs/io_uring.c:3210
io_setup_async_rw fs/io_uring.c:3229 [inline]
io_read fs/io_uring.c:3436 [inline]
io_issue_sqe+0x2954/0x2d64 fs/io_uring.c:5943
__io_queue_sqe+0x19c/0x520 fs/io_uring.c:6260
io_queue_sqe+0x2a4/0x590 fs/io_uring.c:6326
io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6395 [inline]
io_submit_sqes+0x4c0/0xa04 fs/io_uring.c:6624
__do_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:9013 [inline]
__se_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:8960 [inline]
__arm64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x190/0x708 fs/io_uring.c:8960
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline]
el0_svc_common arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:158 [inline]
do_el0_svc+0x120/0x290 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:227
el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367
el0_sync_handler+0x98/0x170 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:383
el0_sync+0x140/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:670
Freed by task 12570:
stack_trace_save+0x80/0xb8 kernel/stacktrace.c:121
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
kasan_set_track+0x38/0x6c mm/kasan/common.c:56
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:355
__kasan_slab_free+0x124/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:422
kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x1c mm/kasan/common.c:431
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1544 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1577 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:3142 [inline]
kfree+0x104/0x38c mm/slub.c:4124
io_dismantle_req fs/io_uring.c:1855 [inline]
__io_free_req+0x70/0x254 fs/io_uring.c:1867
io_put_req_find_next fs/io_uring.c:2173 [inline]
__io_queue_sqe+0x1fc/0x520 fs/io_uring.c:6279
__io_req_task_submit+0x154/0x21c fs/io_uring.c:2051
io_req_task_submit+0x2c/0x44 fs/io_uring.c:2063
task_work_run+0xdc/0x128 kernel/task_work.c:151
get_signal+0x6f8/0x980 kernel/signal.c:2562
do_signal+0x108/0x3a4 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:658
do_notify_resume+0xbc/0x25c arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:722
work_pending+0xc/0x180
blkdev_read_iter can truncate iov_iter's count since the count + pos may
exceed the size of the blkdev. This will confuse io_read that we have
consume the iovec. And once we do the iov_iter_revert in io_read, we
will trigger the slab-out-of-bounds. Fix it by reexpand the count with
size has been truncated.
blkdev_write_iter can trigger the problem too.
Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silencec@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401071807.3328235-1-yangerkun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 10a7052c7868bc7bc72d947f5aac6f768928db87 ]
Ensure that we invalidate the fscache whenever we invalidate the
pagecache.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 3c0315424f5e3d2a4113c7272367bee1e8e6a174 upstream.
f2fs didn't properly clean up if verity failed to be enabled on a file:
- It left verity metadata (pages past EOF) in the page cache, which
would be exposed to userspace if the file was later extended.
- It didn't truncate the verity metadata at all (either from cache or
from disk) if an error occurred while setting the verity bit.
Fix these bugs by adding a call to truncate_inode_pages() and ensuring
that we truncate the verity metadata (both from cache and from disk) in
all error paths. Also rework the code to cleanly separate the success
path from the error paths, which makes it much easier to understand.
Finally, log a message if f2fs_truncate() fails, since it might
otherwise fail silently.
Reported-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@hihonor.com>
Fixes: 95ae251fe828 ("f2fs: add fs-verity support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1cea335d1db1ce6ab71b3d2f94a807112b738a0f upstream.
bio completions can race when a page spans more than one file system
block. Add a spinlock to synchronize marking the page uptodate.
Fixes: 9dc55f1389f9 ("iomap: add support for sub-pagesize buffered I/O without buffer heads")
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 22247efd822e6d263f3c8bd327f3f769aea9b1d9 upstream.
Patch series "mm/hugetlb: Fix issues on file sealing and fork", v2.
Hugh reported issue with F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE not applied correctly to
hugetlbfs, which I can easily verify using the memfd_test program, which
seems that the program is hardly run with hugetlbfs pages (as by default
shmem).
Meanwhile I found another probably even more severe issue on that hugetlb
fork won't wr-protect child cow pages, so child can potentially write to
parent private pages. Patch 2 addresses that.
After this series applied, "memfd_test hugetlbfs" should start to pass.
This patch (of 2):
F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE is missing for hugetlb starting from the first day.
There is a test program for that and it fails constantly.
$ ./memfd_test hugetlbfs
memfd-hugetlb: CREATE
memfd-hugetlb: BASIC
memfd-hugetlb: SEAL-WRITE
memfd-hugetlb: SEAL-FUTURE-WRITE
mmap() didn't fail as expected
Aborted (core dumped)
I think it's probably because no one is really running the hugetlbfs test.
Fix it by checking FUTURE_WRITE also in hugetlbfs_file_mmap() as what we
do in shmem_mmap(). Generalize a helper for that.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210503234356.9097-1-peterx@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210503234356.9097-2-peterx@redhat.com
Fixes: ab3948f58ff84 ("mm/memfd: add an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal to memfd")
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d6e621de1fceb3b098ebf435ef7ea91ec4838a1a upstream.
Sysbot has reported a "divide error" which has been identified as being
caused by a corrupted file_size value within the file inode. This value
has been corrupted to a much larger value than expected.
Calculate_skip() is passed i_size_read(inode) >> msblk->block_log. Due to
the file_size value corruption this overflows the int argument/variable in
that function, leading to the divide error.
This patch changes the function to use u64. This will accommodate any
unexpectedly large values due to corruption.
The value returned from calculate_skip() is clamped to be never more than
SQUASHFS_CACHED_BLKS - 1, or 7. So file_size corruption does not lead to
an unexpectedly large return result here.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210507152618.9447-1-phillip@squashfs.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Reported-by: <syzbot+e8f781243ce16ac2f962@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Reported-by: <syzbot+7b98870d4fec9447b951@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c3187cf32216313fb316084efac4dab3a8459b1d upstream.
I believe there are some issues introduced by commit 31651c607151
("hfsplus: avoid deadlock on file truncation")
HFS+ has extent records which always contains 8 extents. In case the
first extent record in catalog file gets full, new ones are allocated from
extents overflow file.
In case shrinking truncate happens to middle of an extent record which
locates in extents overflow file, the logic in hfsplus_file_truncate() was
changed so that call to hfs_brec_remove() is not guarded any more.
Right action would be just freeing the extents that exceed the new size
inside extent record by calling hfsplus_free_extents(), and then check if
the whole extent record should be removed. However since the guard
(blk_cnt > start) is now after the call to hfs_brec_remove(), this has
unfortunate effect that the last matching extent record is removed
unconditionally.
To reproduce this issue, create a file which has at least 10 extents, and
then perform shrinking truncate into middle of the last extent record, so
that the number of remaining extents is not under or divisible by 8. This
causes the last extent record (8 extents) to be removed totally instead of
truncating into middle of it. Thus this causes corruption, and lost data.
Fix for this is simply checking if the new truncated end is below the
start of this extent record, making it safe to remove the full extent
record. However call to hfs_brec_remove() can't be moved to it's previous
place since we're dropping ->tree_lock and it can cause a race condition
and the cached info being invalidated possibly corrupting the node data.
Another issue is related to this one. When entering into the block
(blk_cnt > start) we are not holding the ->tree_lock. We break out from
the loop not holding the lock, but hfs_find_exit() does unlock it. Not
sure if it's possible for someone else to take the lock under our feet,
but it can cause hard to debug errors and premature unlocking. Even if
there's no real risk of it, the locking should still always be kept in
balance. Thus taking the lock now just before the check.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210429165139.3082828-1-jouni.roivas@tuxera.com
Fixes: 31651c607151f ("hfsplus: avoid deadlock on file truncation")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Roivas <jouni.roivas@tuxera.com>
Reviewed-by: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com>
Cc: Anatoly Trosinenko <anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com>
Cc: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1775c7ddacfcea29051c67409087578f8f4d751b ]
Fixes: 878dabb64117 ("ceph: don't return -ESTALE if there's still an open file")
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 73f5c88f521a630ea1628beb9c2d48a2e777a419 ]
Currently the client ignores the value of the sr_eof of the SEEK
operation. According to the spec, if the server didn't find the
requested extent and reached the end of the file, the server
would return sr_eof=true. In case the request for DATA and no
data was found (ie in the middle of the hole), then the lseek
expects that ENXIO would be returned.
Fixes: 1c6dcbe5ceff8 ("NFS: Implement SEEK")
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ed34695e15aba74f45247f1ee2cf7e09d449f925 ]
We (adam zabrocki, alexander matrosov, alexander tereshkin, maksym
bazalii) observed the check:
if (fh->size > sizeof(struct nfs_fh))
should not use the size of the nfs_fh struct which includes an extra two
bytes from the size field.
struct nfs_fh {
unsigned short size;
unsigned char data[NFS_MAXFHSIZE];
}
but should determine the size from data[NFS_MAXFHSIZE] so the memcpy
will not write 2 bytes beyond destination. The proposed fix is to
compare against the NFS_MAXFHSIZE directly, as is done elsewhere in fs
code base.
Fixes: d67ae825a59d ("pnfs/flexfiles: Add the FlexFile Layout Driver")
Signed-off-by: Nikola Livic <nlivic@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9fdbfad1777cb4638f489eeb62d85432010c0031 ]
We need to use unsigned long subtraction and then convert to signed in
order to deal correcly with C overflow rules.
Fixes: f5062003465c ("NFS: Set an attribute barrier on all updates")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 99f23783224355e7022ceea9b8d9f62c0fd01bd8 ]
Whether we're allocating or delallocating space, we should flush out the
pending writes in order to avoid races with attribute updates.
Fixes: 1e564d3dbd68 ("NFSv4.2: Fix a race in nfs42_proc_deallocate()")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 28e18ee636ba28532dbe425540af06245a0bbecb ]
The uninitialized variable dn.node_changed does not get set when a
call to f2fs_get_node_page fails. This uninitialized value gets used
in the call to f2fs_balance_fs() that may or not may not balances
dirty node and dentry pages depending on the uninitialized state of
the variable. Fix this by only calling f2fs_balance_fs if err is
not set.
Thanks to Jaegeuk Kim for suggesting an appropriate fix.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Uninitialized scalar variable")
Fixes: 2a3407607028 ("f2fs: call f2fs_balance_fs only when node was changed")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8217673d07256b22881127bf50dce874d0e51653 ]
For cloned connections cuse_channel_release() will be called more than
once, resulting in use after free.
Prevent device cloning for CUSE, which does not make sense at this point,
and highly unlikely to be used in real life.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 92c48950b43f4a767388cf87709d8687151a641f ]
This patch fixes the following message which randomly pops up during
glocktop call:
seq_file: buggy .next function table_seq_next did not update position index
The issue is that seq_read_iter() in fs/seq_file.c also needs an
increment of the index in an non next record case as well which this
patch fixes otherwise seq_read_iter() will print out the above message.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 7b279bbfd2b230c7a210ff8f405799c7e46bbf48 upstream.
Smatch complains about missing that the ovl_override_creds() doesn't
have a matching revert_creds() if the dentry is disconnected. Fix this
by moving the ovl_override_creds() until after the disconnected check.
Fixes: aa3ff3c152ff ("ovl: copy up of disconnected dentries")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Hillf Danton
Andreas Gruenbacher
Linus Torvalds
Dai Ngo
Trond Myklebust
Anna Schumaker
Dan Carpenter
Nikolay Borisov
Ritesh Harjani
Kees Cook
Anand Jain
Josef Bacik
Junxiao Bi
Ye Bin
Steve French
Boris Burkov
Zhang Xiaoxu
zhouchuangao
Aurelien Aptel
Eric Biggers
Greg Kroah-Hartman
Ronnie Sahlberg
yangerkun
Jeff Layton
Christoph Hellwig
Peter Xu
Phillip Lougher
Jouni Roivas
Olga Kornievskaia
Nikola Livic
Colin Ian King
Miklos Szeredi
Alexander Aring