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2018-04-24thunderbolt: Prevent crash when ICM firmware is not runningMika Westerberg
commit ea9d7bb798900096f26c585957d6ad9c532417e6 upstream. On Lenovo ThinkPad Yoga 370 (and possibly some other Lenovo models as well) the Thunderbolt host controller sometimes comes up in such way that the ICM firmware is not running properly. This is most likely an issue in BIOS/firmware but as side-effect driver crashes the kernel due to NULL pointer dereference: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000980 IP: pci_write_config_dword+0x5/0x20 Call Trace: pcie2cio_write+0x3b/0x70 [thunderbolt] icm_driver_ready+0x168/0x260 [thunderbolt] ? tb_ctl_start+0x50/0x70 [thunderbolt] tb_domain_add+0x73/0xf0 [thunderbolt] nhi_probe+0x182/0x300 [thunderbolt] local_pci_probe+0x42/0xa0 ? pci_match_device+0xd9/0x100 pci_device_probe+0x146/0x1b0 driver_probe_device+0x315/0x480 ... Instead of crashing update the driver to bail out gracefully if we encounter such situation. Fixes: f67cf491175a ("thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM)") Reported-by: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-24thunderbolt: Wait a bit longer for ICM to authenticate the active NVMMika Westerberg
commit e4be8c9b6a512e274cb6bbac4ac869d73880a8b3 upstream. Sometimes during cold boot ICM has not yet authenticated the active NVM image leading to timeout and failing the driver probe. Allow ICM to take some more time and increase the timeout to 3 seconds before we give up. While there fix icm_firmware_init() to return the real error code without overwriting it with -ENODEV. Fixes: f67cf491175a ("thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM)") Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-09-03Merge branches 'acpi-x86', 'acpi-soc', 'acpi-pmic' and 'acpi-apple'Rafael J. Wysocki
* acpi-x86: ACPI / boot: Add number of legacy IRQs to debug output ACPI / boot: Correct address space of __acpi_map_table() ACPI / boot: Don't define unused variables * acpi-soc: ACPI / LPSS: Don't abort ACPI scan on missing mem resource * acpi-pmic: ACPI / PMIC: xpower: Do pinswitch magic when reading GPADC * acpi-apple: spi: Use Apple device properties in absence of ACPI resources ACPI / scan: Recognize Apple SPI and I2C slaves ACPI / property: Support Apple _DSM properties ACPI / property: Don't evaluate objects for devices w/o handle treewide: Consolidate Apple DMI checks
2017-08-03treewide: Consolidate Apple DMI checksLukas Wunner
We're about to amend ACPI bus scan with DMI checks whether we're running on a Mac to support Apple device properties in AML. The DMI checks are performed for every single device, adding overhead for everything x86 that isn't Apple, which is the majority. Rafael and Andy therefore request to perform the DMI match only once and cache the result. Outside of ACPI various other Apple DMI checks exist and it seems reasonable to use the cached value there as well. Rafael, Andy and Darren suggest performing the DMI check in arch code and making it available with a header in include/linux/platform_data/x86/. To this end, add early_platform_quirks() to arch/x86/kernel/quirks.c to perform the DMI check and invoke it from setup_arch(). Switch over all existing Apple DMI checks, thereby fixing two deficiencies: * They are now #defined to false on non-x86 arches and can thus be optimized away if they're located in cross-arch code. * Some of them only match "Apple Inc." but not "Apple Computer, Inc.", which is used by BIOSes released between January 2006 (when the first x86 Macs started shipping) and January 2007 (when the company name changed upon introduction of the iPhone). Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Suggested-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Suggested-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2017-07-31thunderbolt: icm: Ignore mailbox errors in icm_suspend()Rafael J. Wysocki
On one of my test machines nhi_mailbox_cmd() called from icm_suspend() times out and returnes an error which then is propagated to the caller and causes the entire system suspend to be aborted which isn't very useful. Instead of aborting system suspend, print the error into the log and continue. Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com>
2017-06-09thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgradeMika Westerberg
Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-09thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM)Mika Westerberg
Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>