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[ Upstream commit ca3574bd653aba234a4b31955f2778947403be16 ]
Update module_put_and_exit to call kthread_exit instead of do_exit.
Change the name to reflect this change in functionality. All of the
users of module_put_and_exit are causing the current kthread to exit
so this change makes it clear what is happening. There is no
functional change.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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commit 27016f75f5ed47e2d8e0ca75a8ff1f40bc1a5e27 upstream.
Disallow registration of two algorithms with identical driver names.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 744e1885922a9943458954cfea917b31064b4131 ]
The req->dst buffer size should be checked before copying from the
scomp_scratch->dst to avoid req->dst buffer overflow problem.
Fixes: 1ab53a77b772 ("crypto: acomp - add driver-side scomp interface")
Reported-by: syzbot+3eff5e51bf1db122a16e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000000b05cd060d6b5511@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Barry Song <v-songbaohua@oppo.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 67b164a871af1d736f131fd6fe78a610909f06f3 ]
Having multiple in-flight AIO requests results in unpredictable
output because they all share the same IV. Fix this by only allowing
one request at a time.
Fixes: 83094e5e9e49 ("crypto: af_alg - add async support to algif_aead")
Fixes: a596999b7ddf ("crypto: algif - change algif_skcipher to be asynchronous")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8f4f68e788c3a7a696546291258bfa5fdb215523 ]
We found a hungtask bug in test_aead_vec_cfg as follows:
INFO: task cryptomgr_test:391009 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
Call trace:
__switch_to+0x98/0xe0
__schedule+0x6c4/0xf40
schedule+0xd8/0x1b4
schedule_timeout+0x474/0x560
wait_for_common+0x368/0x4e0
wait_for_completion+0x20/0x30
wait_for_completion+0x20/0x30
test_aead_vec_cfg+0xab4/0xd50
test_aead+0x144/0x1f0
alg_test_aead+0xd8/0x1e0
alg_test+0x634/0x890
cryptomgr_test+0x40/0x70
kthread+0x1e0/0x220
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Kernel panic - not syncing: hung_task: blocked tasks
For padata_do_parallel, when the return err is 0 or -EBUSY, it will call
wait_for_completion(&wait->completion) in test_aead_vec_cfg. In normal
case, aead_request_complete() will be called in pcrypt_aead_serial and the
return err is 0 for padata_do_parallel. But, when pinst->flags is
PADATA_RESET, the return err is -EBUSY for padata_do_parallel, and it
won't call aead_request_complete(). Therefore, test_aead_vec_cfg will
hung at wait_for_completion(&wait->completion), which will cause
hungtask.
The problem comes as following:
(padata_do_parallel) |
rcu_read_lock_bh(); |
err = -EINVAL; | (padata_replace)
| pinst->flags |= PADATA_RESET;
err = -EBUSY |
if (pinst->flags & PADATA_RESET) |
rcu_read_unlock_bh() |
return err
In order to resolve the problem, we replace the return err -EBUSY with
-EAGAIN, which means parallel_data is changing, and the caller should call
it again.
v3:
remove retry and just change the return err.
v2:
introduce padata_try_do_parallel() in pcrypt_aead_encrypt and
pcrypt_aead_decrypt to solve the hungtask.
Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Guo Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit babb80b3ecc6f40c962e13c654ebcd27f25ee327 ]
strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().
Direct replacement is safe here since return value of -errno
is used to check for truncation instead of sizeof(dest).
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit ef5b52a631f8c18353e80ccab8408b963305510c upstream.
When the hash algorithm for the signature is not available the digest size
is 0 and the signature in the certificate is marked as unsupported.
When validating a self-signed certificate, this needs to be checked,
because otherwise trying to validate the signature will fail with an
warning:
Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:537 \
pkcs1pad_verify+0x46/0x12c
...
Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (-22)
Signed-off-by: Thore Sommer <public@thson.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Fixes: 6c2dc5ae4ab7 ("X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlier")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9ae4577bc077a7e32c3c7d442c95bc76865c0f17 ]
The function crypto_drop_spawn expects to be called in process
context. However, when an instance is unregistered while it still
has active users, the last user may cause the instance to be freed
in atomic context.
Fix this by delaying the freeing to a work queue.
Fixes: 6bfd48096ff8 ("[CRYPTO] api: Added spawns")
Reported-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+d769eed29cc42d75e2a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+610ec0671f51e838436e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 5b11d1a360ea23c80c6d4ec3f5986a788d0a0995 upstream.
The value of reqsize must only be changed through the helper.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c3d03e8e35e005e1a614e51bb59053eeb5857f76 upstream.
Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear
mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the
linear mapping area.
However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced
stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area,
which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs
adjacent pages.
Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to
store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it
to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The
buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x
Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4140aafcff167b5b9e8dae6a1709a6de7cac6f74 ]
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG tells the crypto driver that it should
internally backlog requests until the crypto hw's queue becomes
full. At that point, crypto_engine backlogs the request and returns
-EBUSY. Calling driver such as dm-crypt then waits until the
complete() function is called with a status of -EINPROGRESS before
sending a new request.
The problem lies in the call to complete() with a value of -EINPROGRESS
that is made when a backlog item is present on the queue. The call is
done before the successful execution of the crypto request. In the case
that do_one_request() returns < 0 and the retry support is available,
the request is put back in the queue. This leads upper drivers to send
a new request even if the queue is still full.
The problem can be reproduced by doing a large dd into a crypto
dm-crypt device. This is pretty easy to see when using
Freescale CAAM crypto driver and SWIOTLB dma. Since the actual amount
of requests that can be hold in the queue is unlimited we get IOs error
and dma allocation.
The fix is to call complete with a value of -EINPROGRESS only if
the request is not enqueued back in crypto_queue. This is done
by calling complete() later in the code. In order to delay the decision,
crypto_queue is modified to correctly set the backlog pointer
when a request is enqueued back.
Fixes: 6a89f492f8e5 ("crypto: engine - support for parallel requests based on retry mechanism")
Co-developed-by: Sylvain Ouellet <souellet@genetec.com>
Signed-off-by: Sylvain Ouellet <souellet@genetec.com>
Signed-off-by: Olivier Bacon <obacon@genetec.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6909823d47c17cba84e9244d04050b5db8d53789 ]
Use the crypto_request_complete helper instead of calling the
completion function directly.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Stable-dep-of: 4140aafcff16 ("crypto: engine - fix crypto_queue backlog handling")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4058cf08945c18a6de193f4118fd05d83d3d4285 ]
When doing iperf over ipsec with crypto hardware sun8i-ce, I hit some
spinlock recursion bug.
This is due to completion function called with enabled BH.
Add check a to detect this.
Fixes: 735d37b5424b ("crypto: engine - Introduce the block request crypto engine framework")
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Stable-dep-of: 4140aafcff16 ("crypto: engine - fix crypto_queue backlog handling")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 686cd976b6ddedeeb1a1fb09ba53a891d3cc9a03 ]
When jent initialisation fails for any reason other than ENOENT,
the entire drbg fails to initialise, even when we're not in FIPS
mode. This is wrong because we can still use the kernel RNG when
we're not in FIPS mode.
Change it so that it only fails when we are in FIPS mode.
Fixes: 57225e679788 ("crypto: drbg - Use callback API for random readiness")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 559edd47cce4cc407d606b4d7f376822816fd4b8 ]
Now that drbg_prepare_hrng() doesn't do anything but to instantiate a
jitterentropy crypto_rng instance, it looks a little odd to have the
related error handling at its only caller, drbg_instantiate().
Move the handling of jitterentropy allocation failures from
drbg_instantiate() close to the allocation itself in drbg_prepare_hrng().
There is no change in behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Stable-dep-of: 686cd976b6dd ("crypto: drbg - Only fail when jent is unavailable in FIPS mode")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit a543ada7db729514ddd3ba4efa45f4c7b802ad85 upstream.
The crypto_unregister_alg() function expects callers to ensure that any
algorithm that is unregistered has a refcnt of exactly 1, and issues a
BUG_ON() if this is not the case. However, there are in fact drivers that
will call crypto_unregister_alg() without ensuring that the refcnt has been
lowered first, most notably on system shutdown. This causes the BUG_ON() to
trigger, which prevents a clean shutdown and hangs the system.
To avoid such hangs on shutdown, demote the BUG_ON() in
crypto_unregister_alg() to a WARN_ON() with early return. Cc stable because
this problem was observed on a 6.2 kernel, cf the link below.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87r0tyq8ph.fsf@toke.dk
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3584c1dbfffdabf8e3dc1dd25748bb38dd01cd43 ]
These particular errors can be encountered while trying to kexec when
secureboot lockdown is in place. Without this change, even with a
signed debug build, one still needs to reboot the machine to add the
appropriate dyndbg parameters (since lockdown blocks debugfs).
Accordingly, upgrade all pr_debug() before fatal error into pr_warn().
Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220171254.592347-3-rharwood@redhat.com/ # v2
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4fc5c74dde69a7eda172514aaeb5a7df3600adb3 ]
The PE Format Specification (section "The Attribute Certificate Table
(Image Only)") states that `dwLength` is to be rounded up to 8-byte
alignment when used for traversal. Therefore, the field is not required
to be an 8-byte multiple in the first place.
Accordingly, pesign has not performed this alignment since version
0.110. This causes kexec failure on pesign'd binaries with "PEFILE:
Signature wrapper len wrong". Update the comment and relax the check.
Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/pe-format#the-attribute-certificate-table-image-only
Link: https://github.com/rhboot/pesign
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220171254.592347-2-rharwood@redhat.com/ # v2
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 564cabc0ca0bdfa8f0fc1ae74b24d0a7554522c5 ]
Use the akcipher_request_complete helper instead of calling the
completion function directly. In fact the previous code was buggy
in that EINPROGRESS was never passed back to the original caller.
Fixes: 3d5b1ecdea6f ("crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 51c082514c2dedf2711c99d93c196cc4eedceb40 ]
As it is xts only handles the special return value of EINPROGRESS,
which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the
request.
However, as the caller of xts may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need
to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way. Otherwise backlogged
requests will trigger a use-after-free.
Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 32e62025e5e52fbe4812ef044759de7010b15dbc ]
As it is seqiv only handles the special return value of EINPROGERSS,
which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the
request.
However, as the caller of seqiv may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need
to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way. Otherwise backlogged
requests will trigger a use-after-free.
Fixes: 0a270321dbf9 ("[CRYPTO] seqiv: Add Sequence Number IV Generator")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b5a772adf45a32c68bef28e60621f12617161556 ]
As it is essiv only handles the special return value of EINPROGERSS,
which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the
request.
However, as the caller of essiv may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need
to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way. Otherwise backlogged
requests will trigger a use-after-free.
Fixes: be1eb7f78aa8 ("crypto: essiv - create wrapper template...")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 10de7b54293995368c52d9aa153f3e7a359f04a1 ]
When support for ECDSA keys was added, constraints for data & signature
sizes were never updated. This makes it impossible to use such keys via
keyctl API from userspace.
Update constraint on max_data_size to 64 bytes in order to support
SHA512-based signatures. Also update the signature length constraints
per ECDSA signature encoding described in RFC 5480.
Fixes: 299f561a6693 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys")
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1aa33fc8d4032227253ceb736f47c52b859d9683 ]
In the past, the data for mb-skcipher test has been allocated
twice, that means the first allcated memory area is without
free, which may cause a potential memory leakage. So this
patch is to remove one allocation to fix this error.
Fixes: e161c5930c15 ("crypto: tcrypt - add multibuf skcipher...")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yiqun <zhangyiqun@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3a58c231172537f7b0e19d93ed33decd04f80eab ]
cryptd is buggy as it tries to use sync_skcipher without going
through the proper sync_skcipher interface. In fact it doesn't
even need sync_skcipher since it's already a proper skcipher and
can easily access the request context instead of using something
off the stack.
Fixes: 36b3875a97b8 ("crypto: cryptd - Remove VLA usage of skcipher")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit bc155c6c188c2f0c5749993b1405673d25a80389 ]
Changes from v1:
* removed the default implementation from set_pub_key: it is assumed that
an implementation must always have this callback defined as there are
no use case for an algorithm, which doesn't need a public key
Many akcipher implementations (like ECDSA) support only signature
verifications, so they don't have all callbacks defined.
Commit 78a0324f4a53 ("crypto: akcipher - default implementations for
request callbacks") introduced default callbacks for sign/verify
operations, which just return an error code.
However, these are not enough, because before calling sign the caller would
likely call set_priv_key first on the instantiated transform (as the
in-kernel testmgr does). This function does not have a default stub, so the
kernel crashes, when trying to set a private key on an akcipher, which
doesn't support signature generation.
I've noticed this, when trying to add a KAT vector for ECDSA signature to
the testmgr.
With this patch the testmgr returns an error in dmesg (as it should)
instead of crashing the kernel NULL ptr dereference.
Fixes: 78a0324f4a53 ("crypto: akcipher - default implementations for request callbacks")
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0815291a8fd66cdcf7db1445d4d99b0d16065829 ]
The signature verification of SM2 needs to add the Za value and
recalculate sig->digest, which requires the detection of the pkey_algo
in public_key_verify_signature(). As Eric Biggers said, the pkey_algo
field in sig is attacker-controlled and should be use pkey->pkey_algo
instead of sig->pkey_algo, and secondly, if sig->pkey_algo is NULL, it
will also cause signature verification failure.
The software_key_determine_akcipher() already forces the algorithms
are matched, so the SM3 algorithm is enforced in the SM2 signature,
although this has been checked, we still avoid using any algorithm
information in the signature as input.
Fixes: 215525639631 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verification")
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2d16803c562ecc644803d42ba98a8e0aef9c014e ]
BLAKE2s has no currently known use as an shash. Just remove all of this
unnecessary plumbing. Removing this shash was something we talked about
back when we were making BLAKE2s a built-in, but I simply never got
around to doing it. So this completes that project.
Importantly, this fixs a bug in which the lib code depends on
crypto_simd_disabled_for_test, causing linker errors.
Also add more alignment tests to the selftests and compare SIMD and
non-SIMD compression functions, to make up for what we lose from
testmgr.c.
Reported-by: gaochao <gaochao49@huawei.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6048fdcc5f26 ("lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit abfed87e2a12bd246047d78c01d81eb9529f1d06 upstream.
This is used by code that doesn't need CONFIG_CRYPTO, so move this into
lib/ with a Kconfig option so that it can be selected by whatever needs
it.
This fixes a linker error Zheng pointed out when
CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS!=y and CRYPTO=m:
lib/crypto/curve25519-selftest.o: In function `curve25519_selftest':
curve25519-selftest.c:(.init.text+0x60): undefined reference to `__crypto_memneq'
curve25519-selftest.c:(.init.text+0xec): undefined reference to `__crypto_memneq'
curve25519-selftest.c:(.init.text+0x114): undefined reference to `__crypto_memneq'
curve25519-selftest.c:(.init.text+0x154): undefined reference to `__crypto_memneq'
Reported-by: Zheng Bin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: aa127963f1ca ("crypto: lib/curve25519 - re-add selftests")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 91e8bcd7b4da182e09ea19a2c73167345fe14c98 ]
The access to cryptd_queue::cpu_queue is synchronized by disabling
preemption in cryptd_enqueue_request() and disabling BH in
cryptd_queue_worker(). This implies that access is allowed from BH.
If cryptd_enqueue_request() is invoked from preemptible context _and_
soft interrupt then this can lead to list corruption since
cryptd_enqueue_request() is not protected against access from
soft interrupt.
Replace get_cpu() in cryptd_enqueue_request() with local_bh_disable()
to ensure BH is always disabled.
Remove preempt_disable() from cryptd_queue_worker() since it is not
needed because local_bh_disable() ensures synchronisation.
Fixes: 254eff771441 ("crypto: cryptd - Per-CPU thread implementation...")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 7cc7ab73f83ee6d50dc9536bc3355495d8600fad upstream.
Correctly compare values that shall be greater-or-equal and not just
greater.
Fixes: 0d7a78643f69 ("crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 074bcd4000e0d812bc253f86fedc40f81ed59ccc upstream.
get_random_bytes() usually hasn't full entropy available by the time DRBG
instances are first getting seeded from it during boot. Thus, the DRBG
implementation registers random_ready_callbacks which would in turn
schedule some work for reseeding the DRBGs once get_random_bytes() has
sufficient entropy available.
For reference, the relevant history around handling DRBG (re)seeding in
the context of a not yet fully seeded get_random_bytes() is:
commit 16b369a91d0d ("random: Blocking API for accessing
nonblocking_pool")
commit 4c7879907edd ("crypto: drbg - add async seeding operation")
commit 205a525c3342 ("random: Add callback API for random pool
readiness")
commit 57225e679788 ("crypto: drbg - Use callback API for random
readiness")
commit c2719503f5e1 ("random: Remove kernel blocking API")
However, some time later, the initialization state of get_random_bytes()
has been made queryable via rng_is_initialized() introduced with commit
9a47249d444d ("random: Make crng state queryable"). This primitive now
allows for streamlining the DRBG reseeding from get_random_bytes() by
replacing that aforementioned asynchronous work scheduling from
random_ready_callbacks with some simpler, synchronous code in
drbg_generate() next to the related logic already present therein. Apart
from improving overall code readability, this change will also enable DRBG
users to rely on wait_for_random_bytes() for ensuring that the initial
seeding has completed, if desired.
The previous patches already laid the grounds by making drbg_seed() to
record at each DRBG instance whether it was being seeded at a time when
rng_is_initialized() still had been false as indicated by
->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL.
All that remains to be done now is to make drbg_generate() check for this
condition, determine whether rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true in
the meanwhile and invoke a reseed from get_random_bytes() if so.
Make this move:
- rename the former drbg_async_seed() work handler, i.e. the one in charge
of reseeding a DRBG instance from get_random_bytes(), to
"drbg_seed_from_random()",
- change its signature as appropriate, i.e. make it take a struct
drbg_state rather than a work_struct and change its return type from
"void" to "int" in order to allow for passing error information from
e.g. its __drbg_seed() invocation onwards to callers,
- make drbg_generate() invoke this drbg_seed_from_random() once it
encounters a DRBG instance with ->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL by
the time rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true and
- prune everything related to the former, random_ready_callback based
mechanism.
As drbg_seed_from_random() is now getting invoked from drbg_generate() with
the ->drbg_mutex being held, it must not attempt to recursively grab it
once again. Remove the corresponding mutex operations from what is now
drbg_seed_from_random(). Furthermore, as drbg_seed_from_random() can now
report errors directly to its caller, there's no need for it to temporarily
switch the DRBG's ->seeded state to DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED so that a
failure of the subsequently invoked __drbg_seed() will get signaled to
drbg_generate(). Don't do it then.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
[Jason: for stable, undid the modifications for the backport of 5acd3548.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 262d83a4290c331cd4f617a457408bdb82fbb738 upstream.
Since commit 42ea507fae1a ("crypto: drbg - reseed often if seedsource is
degraded"), the maximum seed lifetime represented by ->reseed_threshold
gets temporarily lowered if the get_random_bytes() source cannot provide
sufficient entropy yet, as is common during boot, and restored back to
the original value again once that has changed.
More specifically, if the add_random_ready_callback() invoked from
drbg_prepare_hrng() in the course of DRBG instantiation does not return
-EALREADY, that is, if get_random_bytes() has not been fully initialized
at this point yet, drbg_prepare_hrng() will lower ->reseed_threshold
to a value of 50. The drbg_async_seed() scheduled from said
random_ready_callback will eventually restore the original value.
A future patch will replace the random_ready_callback based notification
mechanism and thus, there will be no add_random_ready_callback() return
value anymore which could get compared to -EALREADY.
However, there's __drbg_seed() which gets invoked in the course of both,
the DRBG instantiation as well as the eventual reseeding from
get_random_bytes() in aforementioned drbg_async_seed(), if any. Moreover,
it knows about the get_random_bytes() initialization state by the time the
seed data had been obtained from it: the new_seed_state argument introduced
with the previous patch would get set to DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL in case
get_random_bytes() had not been fully initialized yet and to
DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL otherwise. Thus, __drbg_seed() provides a convenient
alternative for managing that ->reseed_threshold lowering and restoring at
a central place.
Move all ->reseed_threshold adjustment code from drbg_prepare_hrng() and
drbg_async_seed() respectively to __drbg_seed(). Make __drbg_seed()
lower the ->reseed_threshold to 50 in case its new_seed_state argument
equals DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL and let it restore the original value
otherwise.
There is no change in behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2bcd25443868aa8863779a6ebc6c9319633025d2 upstream.
Currently, the DRBG implementation schedules asynchronous works from
random_ready_callbacks for reseeding the DRBG instances with output from
get_random_bytes() once the latter has sufficient entropy available.
However, as the get_random_bytes() initialization state can get queried by
means of rng_is_initialized() now, there is no real need for this
asynchronous reseeding logic anymore and it's better to keep things simple
by doing it synchronously when needed instead, i.e. from drbg_generate()
once rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true.
Of course, for this to work, drbg_generate() would need some means by which
it can tell whether or not rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true since
the last seeding from get_random_bytes(). Or equivalently, whether or not
the last seed from get_random_bytes() has happened when
rng_is_initialized() was still evaluating to false.
As it currently stands, enum drbg_seed_state allows for the representation
of two different DRBG seeding states: DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED and
DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. The former makes drbg_generate() to invoke a full
reseeding operation involving both, the rather expensive jitterentropy as
well as the get_random_bytes() randomness sources. The DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL
state on the other hand implies that no reseeding at all is required for a
!->pr DRBG variant.
Introduce the new DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL state to enum drbg_seed_state for
representing the condition that a DRBG was being seeded when
rng_is_initialized() had still been false. In particular, this new state
implies that
- the given DRBG instance has been fully seeded from the jitterentropy
source (if enabled)
- and drbg_generate() is supposed to reseed from get_random_bytes()
*only* once rng_is_initialized() turns to true.
Up to now, the __drbg_seed() helper used to set the given DRBG instance's
->seeded state to constant DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. Introduce a new argument
allowing for the specification of the to be written ->seeded value instead.
Make the first of its two callers, drbg_seed(), determine the appropriate
value based on rng_is_initialized(). The remaining caller,
drbg_async_seed(), is known to get invoked only once rng_is_initialized()
is true, hence let it pass constant DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL for the new
argument to __drbg_seed().
There is no change in behaviour, except for that the pr_devel() in
drbg_generate() would now report "unseeded" for ->pr DRBG instances which
had last been seeded when rng_is_initialized() was still evaluating to
false.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ce8ce31b2c5c8b18667784b8c515650c65d57b4e upstream.
There are two different randomness sources the DRBGs are getting seeded
from, namely the jitterentropy source (if enabled) and get_random_bytes().
At initial DRBG seeding time during boot, the latter might not have
collected sufficient entropy for seeding itself yet and thus, the DRBG
implementation schedules a reseed work from a random_ready_callback once
that has happened. This is particularly important for the !->pr DRBG
instances, for which (almost) no further reseeds are getting triggered
during their lifetime.
Because collecting data from the jitterentropy source is a rather expensive
operation, the aforementioned asynchronously scheduled reseed work
restricts itself to get_random_bytes() only. That is, it in some sense
amends the initial DRBG seed derived from jitterentropy output at full
(estimated) entropy with fresh randomness obtained from get_random_bytes()
once that has been seeded with sufficient entropy itself.
With the advent of rng_is_initialized(), there is no real need for doing
the reseed operation from an asynchronously scheduled work anymore and a
subsequent patch will make it synchronous by moving it next to related
logic already present in drbg_generate().
However, for tracking whether a full reseed including the jitterentropy
source is required or a "partial" reseed involving only get_random_bytes()
would be sufficient already, the boolean struct drbg_state's ->seeded
member must become a tristate value.
Prepare for this by introducing the new enum drbg_seed_state and change
struct drbg_state's ->seeded member's type from bool to that type.
For facilitating review, enum drbg_seed_state is made to only contain
two members corresponding to the former ->seeded values of false and true
resp. at this point: DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED and DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. A
third one for tracking the intermediate state of "seeded from jitterentropy
only" will be introduced with a subsequent patch.
There is no change in behaviour at this point.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e56e18985596617ae426ed5997fb2e737cffb58b upstream.
Commit 6048fdcc5f269 ("lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in") took
away a number of prompt texts from other crypto libraries. This makes
values flip from built-in to module when oldconfig runs, and causes
problems when these crypto libs need to be built in for thingslike
BIG_KEYS.
Fixes: 6048fdcc5f269 ("lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in")
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org>
[Jason: - moved menu into submenu of lib/ instead of root menu
- fixed chacha sub-dependencies for CONFIG_CRYPTO]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5acd35487dc911541672b3ffc322851769c32a56 upstream.
We previously rolled our own randomness readiness notifier, which only
has two users in the whole kernel. Replace this with a more standard
atomic notifier block that serves the same purpose with less code. Also
unexport the symbols, because no modules use it, only unconditional
builtins. The only drawback is that it's possible for a notification
handler returning the "stop" code to prevent further processing, but
given that there are only two users, and that we're unexporting this
anyway, that doesn't seem like a significant drawback for the
simplification we receive here.
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
[Jason: for stable, also backported to crypto/drbg.c, not unexporting.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d2a02e3c8bb6b347818518edff5a4b40ff52d6d8 upstream.
blake2s_compress_generic is weakly aliased by blake2s_compress. The
current harness for function selection uses a function pointer, which is
ordinarily inlined and resolved at compile time. But when Clang's CFI is
enabled, CFI still triggers when making an indirect call via a weak
symbol. This seems like a bug in Clang's CFI, as though it's bucketing
weak symbols and strong symbols differently. It also only seems to
trigger when "full LTO" mode is used, rather than "thin LTO".
[ 0.000000][ T0] Kernel panic - not syncing: CFI failure (target: blake2s_compress_generic+0x0/0x1444)
[ 0.000000][ T0] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.16.0-mainline-06981-g076c855b846e #1
[ 0.000000][ T0] Hardware name: MT6873 (DT)
[ 0.000000][ T0] Call trace:
[ 0.000000][ T0] dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x1dc
[ 0.000000][ T0] dump_stack_lvl+0xa8/0x11c
[ 0.000000][ T0] panic+0x194/0x464
[ 0.000000][ T0] __cfi_check_fail+0x54/0x58
[ 0.000000][ T0] __cfi_slowpath_diag+0x354/0x4b0
[ 0.000000][ T0] blake2s_update+0x14c/0x178
[ 0.000000][ T0] _extract_entropy+0xf4/0x29c
[ 0.000000][ T0] crng_initialize_primary+0x24/0x94
[ 0.000000][ T0] rand_initialize+0x2c/0x6c
[ 0.000000][ T0] start_kernel+0x2f8/0x65c
[ 0.000000][ T0] __primary_switched+0xc4/0x7be4
[ 0.000000][ T0] Rebooting in 5 seconds..
Nonetheless, the function pointer method isn't so terrific anyway, so
this patch replaces it with a simple boolean, which also gets inlined
away. This successfully works around the Clang bug.
In general, I'm not too keen on all of the indirection involved here; it
clearly does more harm than good. Hopefully the whole thing can get
cleaned up down the road when lib/crypto is overhauled more
comprehensively. But for now, we go with a simple bandaid.
Fixes: 6048fdcc5f26 ("lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in")
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1567
Reported-by: Miles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com>
Tested-by: Miles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Tested-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6048fdcc5f269c7f31d774c295ce59081b36e6f9 upstream.
In preparation for using blake2s in the RNG, we change the way that it
is wired-in to the build system. Instead of using ifdefs to select the
right symbol, we use weak symbols. And because ARM doesn't need the
generic implementation, we make the generic one default only if an arch
library doesn't need it already, and then have arch libraries that do
need it opt-in. So that the arch libraries can remain tristate rather
than bool, we then split the shash part from the glue code.
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit dfe085d8dcd0bb1fe20cc2327e81c8064cead441 ]
The xts module needs ecb to be present as it's meant to work
on top of ecb. This patch adds a softdep so ecb can be included
automatically into the initramfs.
Reported-by: rftc <rftc@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 66eae850333d639fc278d6f915c6fc01499ea893 ]
The function crypto_authenc_decrypt_tail discards its flags
argument and always relies on the flags from the original request
when starting its sub-request.
This is clearly wrong as it may cause the SLEEPABLE flag to be
set when it shouldn't.
Fixes: 92d95ba91772 ("crypto: authenc - Convert to new AEAD interface")
Reported-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit a24611ea356c7f3f0ec926da11b9482ac1f414fd upstream.
Before checking whether the expected digest_info is present, we need to
check that there are enough bytes remaining.
Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+
Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d3481accd974541e6a5d6a1fb588924a3519c36e upstream.
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures are required to be the same length as the RSA
key size. RFC8017 specifically requires the verifier to check this
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8017#section-8.2.2).
Commit a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") changed the
kernel to allow longer signatures, but didn't explain this part of the
change; it seems to be unrelated to the rest of the commit.
Revert this change, since it doesn't appear to be correct.
We can be pretty sure that no one is relying on overly-long signatures
(which would have to be front-padded with zeroes) being supported, given
that they would have been broken since commit c7381b012872
("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms").
Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+
Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e316f7179be22912281ce6331d96d7c121fb2b17 upstream.
Commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key
algorithms") changed akcipher_alg::verify to take in both the signature
and the actual hash and do the signature verification, rather than just
return the hash expected by the signature as was the case before. To do
this, it implemented a hack where the signature and hash are
concatenated with each other in one scatterlist.
Obviously, for this to work correctly, akcipher_alg::verify needs to
correctly extract the two items from the scatterlist it is given.
Unfortunately, it doesn't correctly extract the hash in the case where
the signature is longer than the RSA key size, as it assumes that the
signature's length is equal to the RSA key size. This causes a prefix
of the hash, or even the entire hash, to be taken from the *signature*.
(Note, the case of a signature longer than the RSA key size should not
be allowed in the first place; a separate patch will fix that.)
It is unclear whether the resulting scheme has any useful security
properties.
Fix this by correctly extracting the hash from the scatterlist.
Fixes: c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.2+
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9b30430ea356f237945e52f8a3a42158877bd5a9 upstream.
The pkcs1pad template can be instantiated with an arbitrary akcipher
algorithm, which doesn't make sense; it is specifically an RSA padding
scheme. Make it check that the underlying algorithm really is RSA.
Fixes: 3d5b1ecdea6f ("crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.5+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 590bfb57b2328951d5833979e7ca1d5fde2e609a upstream.
It is insecure to allow arbitrary hash algorithms and signature
encodings to be used with arbitrary signature algorithms. Notably,
ECDSA, ECRDSA, and SM2 all sign/verify raw hash values and don't
disambiguate between different hash algorithms like RSA PKCS#1 v1.5
padding does. Therefore, they need to be restricted to certain sets of
hash algorithms (ideally just one, but in practice small sets are used).
Additionally, the encoding is an integral part of modern signature
algorithms, and is not supposed to vary.
Therefore, tighten the checks of hash_algo and encoding done by
software_key_determine_akcipher().
Also rearrange the parameters to software_key_determine_akcipher() to
put the public_key first, as this is the most important parameter and it
often determines everything else.
Fixes: 299f561a6693 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys")
Fixes: 215525639631 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verification")
Fixes: 0d7a78643f69 ("crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2abc9c246e0548e52985b10440c9ea3e9f65f793 upstream.
Most callers of public_key_verify_signature(), including most indirect
callers via verify_signature() as well as pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(),
don't check that public_key_signature::pkey_algo matches
public_key::pkey_algo. These should always match. However, a malicious
signature could intentionally declare an unintended algorithm. It is
essential that such signatures be rejected outright, or that the
algorithm of the *key* be used -- not the algorithm of the signature as
that would allow attackers to choose the algorithm used.
Currently, public_key_verify_signature() correctly uses the key's
algorithm when deciding which akcipher to allocate. That's good.
However, it uses the signature's algorithm when deciding whether to do
the first step of SM2, which is incorrect. Also, v4.19 and older
kernels used the signature's algorithm for the entire process.
Prevent such errors by making public_key_verify_signature() enforce that
the signature's algorithm (if given) matches the key's algorithm.
Also remove two checks of this done by callers, which are now redundant.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c6ce9c5831cae515d375a01b97ae1778689acf19 upstream.
The soft dependency on cryptomgr is only needed in algapi because
if algapi isn't present then no algorithms can be loaded. This
also fixes the case where api is built-in but algapi is built as
a module as the soft dependency would otherwise get lost.
Fixes: 8ab23d547f65 ("crypto: api - Add softdep on cryptomgr")
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 552d03a223eda3df84526ab2c1f4d82e15eaee7a ]
The APT compares the current time stamp with a pre-set value. The
current code only considered the 4 LSB only. Yet, after reviews by
mathematicians of the user space Jitter RNG version >= 3.1.0, it was
concluded that the APT can be calculated on the 32 LSB of the time
delta. Thi change is applied to the kernel.
This fixes a bug where an AMD EPYC fails this test as its RDTSC value
contains zeros in the LSB. The most appropriate fix would have been to
apply a GCD calculation and divide the time stamp by the GCD. Yet, this
is a significant code change that will be considered for a future
update. Note, tests showed that constantly the GCD always was 32 on
these systems, i.e. the 5 LSB were always zero (thus failing the APT
since it only considered the 4 LSB for its calculation).
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 68b6dea802cea0dbdd8bd7ccc60716b5a32a5d8a ]
These three events can race when pcrypt is used multiple times in a
template ("pcrypt(pcrypt(...))"):
1. [taskA] The caller makes the crypto request via crypto_aead_encrypt()
2. [kworkerB] padata serializes the inner pcrypt request
3. [kworkerC] padata serializes the outer pcrypt request
3 might finish before the call to crypto_aead_encrypt() returns in 1,
resulting in two possible issues.
First, a use-after-free of the crypto request's memory when, for
example, taskA writes to the outer pcrypt request's padata->info in
pcrypt_aead_enc() after kworkerC completes the request.
Second, the outer pcrypt request overwrites the inner pcrypt request's
return code with -EINPROGRESS, making a successful request appear to
fail. For instance, kworkerB writes the outer pcrypt request's
padata->info in pcrypt_aead_done() and then taskA overwrites it
in pcrypt_aead_enc().
Avoid both situations by delaying the write of padata->info until after
the inner crypto request's return code is checked. This prevents the
use-after-free by not touching the crypto request's memory after the
next-inner crypto request is made, and stops padata->info from being
overwritten.
Fixes: 5068c7a883d16 ("crypto: pcrypt - Add pcrypt crypto parallelization wrapper")
Reported-by: syzbot+b187b77c8474f9648fae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Eric W. Biederman
Herbert Xu
Chengming Zhou
Lu Jialin
Azeem Shaikh
Thore Sommer
Roberto Sassu
Olivier Bacon
Corentin Labbe
Nicolai Stange
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
Robbie Harwood
Denis Kenzior
Zhang Yiqun
Ignat Korchagin
Tianjia Zhang
Jason A. Donenfeld
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
Vitaly Chikunov
Justin M. Forbes
Eric Biggers
Stephan Müller
Daniel Jordan