Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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commit ef3e40a7ea8dbe2abd0a345032cd7d5023b9684f upstream.
When using the PtrAuth feature in a guest, we need to save the host's
keys before allowing the guest to program them. For that, we dump
them in a per-CPU data structure (the so called host context).
But both call sites that do this are in preemptible context,
which may end up in disaster should the vcpu thread get preempted
before reentering the guest.
Instead, save the keys eagerly on each vcpu_load(). This has an
increased overhead, but is at least safe.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0370964dd3ff7d3d406f292cb443a927952cbd05 upstream.
On a VHE system, the EL1 state is left in the CPU most of the time,
and only syncronized back to memory when vcpu_put() is called (most
of the time on preemption).
Which means that when injecting an exception, we'd better have a way
to either:
(1) write directly to the EL1 sysregs
(2) synchronize the state back to memory, and do the changes there
For an AArch64, we already do (1), so we are safe. Unfortunately,
doing the same thing for AArch32 would be pretty invasive. Instead,
we can easily implement (2) by calling the put/load architectural
backends, and keep preemption disabled. We can then reload the
state back into EL1.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a1af7f36c70369b971ee1cf679dd68368dad23f0 upstream.
Remove non-removable and mmc-ddr-1_8v properties from the sdmmc0
node which come probably from an unchecked copy/paste.
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Desroches <ludovic.desroches@microchip.com>
Fixes:42ed535595ec "ARM: dts: at91: introduce the sama5d2 ptc ek board"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19 and later
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200401221504.41196-1-ludovic.desroches@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3204be4109ad681523e3461ce64454c79278450a upstream.
AArch32 CP1x registers are overlayed on their AArch64 counterparts
in the vcpu struct. This leads to an interesting problem as they
are stored in their CPU-local format, and thus a CP1x register
doesn't "hit" the lower 32bit portion of the AArch64 register on
a BE host.
To workaround this unfortunate situation, introduce a bias trick
in the vcpu_cp1x() accessors which picks the correct half of the
64bit register.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Tested-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Acked-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7c582bf4ed84f3eb58bdd1f63024a14c17551e7d upstream.
aarch32 has pairs of registers to access the high and low parts of 64bit
registers. KVM has a union of 64bit sys_regs[] and 32bit copro[]. The
32bit accessors read the high or low part of the 64bit sys_reg[] value
through the union.
Both sys_reg_descs[] and cp15_regs[] list access_csselr() as the accessor
for CSSELR{,_EL1}. access_csselr() is only aware of the 64bit sys_regs[],
and expects r->reg to be 'CSSELR_EL1' in the enum, index 2 of the 64bit
array.
cp15_regs[] uses the 32bit copro[] alias of sys_regs[]. Here CSSELR is
c0_CSSELR which is the same location in sys_reg[]. r->reg is 'c0_CSSELR',
index 4 in the 32bit array.
access_csselr() uses the 32bit r->reg value to access the 64bit array,
so reads and write the wrong value. sys_regs[4], is ACTLR_EL1, which
is subsequently save/restored when we enter the guest.
ACTLR_EL1 is supposed to be read-only for the guest. This register
only affects execution at EL1, and the host's value is restored before
we return to host EL1.
Convert the 32bit register index back to the 64bit version.
Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200529150656.7339-2-james.morse@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5816c76dea116a458f1932eefe064e35403248eb upstream.
If a CPU support more than 32bit vmbits (which is true for 64bit CPUs),
VPN2_MASK set to fixed 0xffffe000 will lead to a wrong EntryHi in some
functions such as _kvm_mips_host_tlb_inv().
The cpu_vmbits definition of 32bit CPU in cpu-features.h is 31, so we
still use the old definition.
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Aleksandar Markovic <aleksandar.qemu.devel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xing Li <lixing@loongson.cn>
[Huacai: Improve commit messages]
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
Message-Id: <1590220602-3547-3-git-send-email-chenhc@lemote.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fe2b73dba47fb6d6922df1ad44e83b1754d5ed4d upstream.
The code in decode_config4() of arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c
asid_mask = MIPS_ENTRYHI_ASID;
if (config4 & MIPS_CONF4_AE)
asid_mask |= MIPS_ENTRYHI_ASIDX;
set_cpu_asid_mask(c, asid_mask);
set asid_mask to cpuinfo->asid_mask.
So in order to support variable ASID_MASK, KVM_ENTRYHI_ASID should also
be changed to cpu_asid_mask(&boot_cpu_data).
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> #4.9+
Reviewed-by: Aleksandar Markovic <aleksandar.qemu.devel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xing Li <lixing@loongson.cn>
[Huacai: Change current_cpu_data to boot_cpu_data for optimization]
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
Message-Id: <1590220602-3547-2-git-send-email-chenhc@lemote.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2ebac8bb3c2d35f5135466490fc8eeaf3f3e2d37 upstream.
Consult only the basic exit reason, i.e. bits 15:0 of vmcs.EXIT_REASON,
when determining whether a nested VM-Exit should be reflected into L1 or
handled by KVM in L0.
For better or worse, the switch statement in nested_vmx_exit_reflected()
currently defaults to "true", i.e. reflects any nested VM-Exit without
dedicated logic. Because the case statements only contain the basic
exit reason, any VM-Exit with modifier bits set will be reflected to L1,
even if KVM intended to handle it in L0.
Practically speaking, this only affects EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY,
i.e. a #MC that occurs on nested VM-Enter would be incorrectly routed to
L1, as "failed VM-Entry" is the only modifier that KVM can currently
encounter. The SMM modifiers will never be generated as KVM doesn't
support/employ a SMI Transfer Monitor. Ditto for "exit from enclave",
as KVM doesn't yet support virtualizing SGX, i.e. it's impossible to
enter an enclave in a KVM guest (L1 or L2).
Fixes: 644d711aa0e1 ("KVM: nVMX: Deciding if L0 or L1 should handle an L2 exit")
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200227174430.26371-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6c0238c4a62b3a0b1201aeb7e33a4636d552a436 upstream.
Restoring the ASID from the hsave area on VMEXIT is wrong, because its
value depends on the handling of TLB flushes. Just skipping the field in
copy_vmcb_control_area will do.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a3535be731c2a343912578465021f50937f7b099 upstream.
Async page faults have to be trapped in the host (L1 in this case),
since the APF reason was passed from L0 to L1 and stored in the L1 APF
data page. This was completely reversed: the page faults were passed
to the guest, a L2 hypervisor.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5c911beff20aa8639e7a1f28988736c13e03ed54 upstream.
Skip the Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier that is triggered on a VMCS
switch when running with spectre_v2_user=on/auto if the switch is
between two VMCSes in the same guest, i.e. between vmcs01 and vmcs02.
The IBPB is intended to prevent one guest from attacking another, which
is unnecessary in the nested case as it's the same guest from KVM's
perspective.
This all but eliminates the overhead observed for nested VMX transitions
when running with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y and spectre_v2_user=on/auto, which
can be significant, e.g. roughly 3x on current systems.
Reported-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Cc: KarimAllah Raslan <karahmed@amazon.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 15d45071523d ("KVM/x86: Add IBPB support")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200501163117.4655-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
[Invert direction of bool argument. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 17fae1294ad9d711b2c3dd0edef479d40c76a5e8 upstream.
An interesting thing happened when a guest Linux instance took a machine
check. The VMM unmapped the bad page from guest physical space and
passed the machine check to the guest.
Linux took all the normal actions to offline the page from the process
that was using it. But then guest Linux crashed because it said there
was a second machine check inside the kernel with this stack trace:
do_memory_failure
set_mce_nospec
set_memory_uc
_set_memory_uc
change_page_attr_set_clr
cpa_flush
clflush_cache_range_opt
This was odd, because a CLFLUSH instruction shouldn't raise a machine
check (it isn't consuming the data). Further investigation showed that
the VMM had passed in another machine check because is appeared that the
guest was accessing the bad page.
Fix is to check the scope of the poison by checking the MCi_MISC register.
If the entire page is affected, then unmap the page. If only part of the
page is affected, then mark the page as uncacheable.
This assumes that VMMs will do the logical thing and pass in the "whole
page scope" via the MCi_MISC register (since they unmapped the entire
page).
[ bp: Adjust to x86/entry changes. ]
Fixes: 284ce4011ba6 ("x86/memory_failure: Introduce {set, clear}_mce_nospec()")
Reported-by: Jue Wang <juew@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jue Wang <juew@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520163546.GA7977@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a194c33f45f83068ef13bf1d16e26d4ca3ecc098 upstream.
Will reported a UBSAN warning:
UBSAN: null-ptr-deref in arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c:596:6
member access within null pointer of type 'struct acpi_madt_generic_interrupt'
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-00124-g96bc42ff0a82 #1
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x384
show_stack+0x28/0x38
dump_stack+0xec/0x174
handle_null_ptr_deref+0x134/0x174
__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1+0x84/0xa4
acpi_parse_gic_cpu_interface+0x60/0xe8
acpi_parse_entries_array+0x288/0x498
acpi_table_parse_entries_array+0x178/0x1b4
acpi_table_parse_madt+0xa4/0x110
acpi_parse_and_init_cpus+0x38/0x100
smp_init_cpus+0x74/0x258
setup_arch+0x350/0x3ec
start_kernel+0x98/0x6f4
This is from the use of the ACPI_OFFSET in
arch/arm64/include/asm/acpi.h. Replace its use with offsetof from
include/linux/stddef.h which should implement the same logic using
__builtin_offsetof, so that UBSAN wont warn.
Reported-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200521100952.GA5360@willie-the-truck/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200608203818.189423-1-ndesaulniers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b00ff6d8c1c3898b0f768cbb38ef722d25bd2f39 upstream.
In order to properly display information regardless of the page size,
it is necessary to take into account real page size.
Fixes: cabe8138b23c ("powerpc: dump as a single line areas mapping a single physical page.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a53b2a0ffd042a8d85464bf90d55bc5b970e00a1.1589866984.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e649b3f0188f8fd34dd0dde8d43fd3312b902fb2 upstream.
Commit b1394e745b94 ("KVM: x86: fix APIC page invalidation") tried
to fix inappropriate APIC page invalidation by re-introducing arch
specific kvm_arch_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range() and calling it from
kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start. However, the patch left a
possible race where the VMCS APIC address cache is updated *before*
it is unmapped:
(Invalidator) kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start()
(Invalidator) kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD)
(KVM VCPU) vcpu_enter_guest()
(KVM VCPU) kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page()
(Invalidator) actually unmap page
Because of the above race, there can be a mismatch between the
host physical address stored in the APIC_ACCESS_PAGE VMCS field and
the host physical address stored in the EPT entry for the APIC GPA
(0xfee0000). When this happens, the processor will not trap APIC
accesses, and will instead show the raw contents of the APIC-access page.
Because Windows OS periodically checks for unexpected modifications to
the LAPIC register, this will show up as a BSOD crash with BugCheck
CRITICAL_STRUCTURE_CORRUPTION (109) we are currently seeing in
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1751017.
The root cause of the issue is that kvm_arch_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range()
cannot guarantee that no additional references are taken to the pages in
the range before kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(). Fortunately,
this case is supported by the MMU notifier API, as documented in
include/linux/mmu_notifier.h:
* If the subsystem
* can't guarantee that no additional references are taken to
* the pages in the range, it has to implement the
* invalidate_range() notifier to remove any references taken
* after invalidate_range_start().
The fix therefore is to reload the APIC-access page field in the VMCS
from kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range() instead of ..._range_start().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b1394e745b94 ("KVM: x86: fix APIC page invalidation")
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=197951
Signed-off-by: Eiichi Tsukata <eiichi.tsukata@nutanix.com>
Message-Id: <20200606042627.61070-1-eiichi.tsukata@nutanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 384dea1c9183880be183cfaae161d99aafd16df6 upstream.
When userspace configures KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP, KVM will manage the
presence of X86_EFLAGS_TF via kvm_set/get_rflags on vcpus. The actual
rflag bit is therefore hidden from callers.
That includes init_emulate_ctxt() which uses the value returned from
kvm_get_flags() to set ctxt->tf. As a result, x86_emulate_instruction()
will skip a single step, leaving singlestep_rip stale and not returning
to userspace.
This resolves the issue by observing the vcpu guest_debug configuration
alongside ctxt->tf in x86_emulate_instruction(), performing the single
step if set.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felipe Franciosi <felipe@nutanix.com>
Message-Id: <20200519081048.8204-1-felipe@nutanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6129ed877d409037b79866327102c9dc59a302fe upstream.
Set the mmio_value to '0' instead of simply clearing the present bit to
squash a benign warning in kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask() that complains
about the mmio_value overlapping the lower GFN mask on systems with 52
bits of PA space.
Opportunistically clean up the code and comments.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d43e2675e96fc ("KVM: x86: only do L1TF workaround on affected processors")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200527084909.23492-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit df2a69af85bef169ab6810cc57f6b6b943941e7e upstream.
The migration functionality was left incomplete in commit 5ef8acbdd687
("KVM: nVMX: Emulate MTF when performing instruction emulation", 2020-02-23),
fix it.
Fixes: 5ef8acbdd687 ("KVM: nVMX: Emulate MTF when performing instruction emulation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0813c40556fce1eeefb996e020cc5339e0b84137 upstream.
The mask in the extra_regs for Intel Tremont need to be extended to
allow more defined bits.
"Outstanding Requests" (bit 63) is only available on MSR_OFFCORE_RSP0;
Fixes: 6daeb8737f8a ("perf/x86/intel: Add Tremont core PMU support")
Reported-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200501125442.7030-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 140fd4ac78d385e6c8e6a5757585f6c707085f87 upstream.
On MacBook6,1 reboot would hang unless parameter reboot=pci is added.
Make it automatic.
Signed-off-by: Hill Ma <maahiuzeon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200425200641.GA1554@cslab.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4d8df8cbb9156b0a0ab3f802b80cb5db57acc0bf upstream.
Currently, it is possible to enable indirect branch speculation even after
it was force-disabled using the PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE option. Moreover, the
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL command gives afterwards an incorrect result
(force-disabled when it is in fact enabled). This also is inconsistent
vs. STIBP and the documention which cleary states that
PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE cannot be undone.
Fix this by actually enforcing force-disabled indirect branch
speculation. PR_SPEC_ENABLE called after PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE now fails
with -EPERM as described in the documentation.
Fixes: 9137bb27e60e ("x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 21998a351512eba4ed5969006f0c55882d995ada upstream.
When STIBP is unavailable or enhanced IBRS is available, Linux
force-disables the IBPB mitigation of Spectre-BTB even when simultaneous
multithreading is disabled. While attempts to enable IBPB using
prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, ...) fail with
EPERM, the seccomp syscall (or its prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...) equivalent)
which are used e.g. by Chromium or OpenSSH succeed with no errors but the
application remains silently vulnerable to cross-process Spectre v2 attacks
(classical BTB poisoning). At the same time the SYSFS reporting
(/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2) displays that IBPB is
conditionally enabled when in fact it is unconditionally disabled.
STIBP is useful only when SMT is enabled. When SMT is disabled and STIBP is
unavailable, it makes no sense to force-disable also IBPB, because IBPB
protects against cross-process Spectre-BTB attacks regardless of the SMT
state. At the same time since missing STIBP was only observed on AMD CPUs,
AMD does not recommend using STIBP, but recommends using IBPB, so disabling
IBPB because of missing STIBP goes directly against AMD's advice:
https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf
Similarly, enhanced IBRS is designed to protect cross-core BTB poisoning
and BTB-poisoning attacks from user space against kernel (and
BTB-poisoning attacks from guest against hypervisor), it is not designed
to prevent cross-process (or cross-VM) BTB poisoning between processes (or
VMs) running on the same core. Therefore, even with enhanced IBRS it is
necessary to flush the BTB during context-switches, so there is no reason
to force disable IBPB when enhanced IBRS is available.
Enable the prctl control of IBPB even when STIBP is unavailable or enhanced
IBRS is available.
Fixes: 7cc765a67d8e ("x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit dbbe2ad02e9df26e372f38cc3e70dab9222c832e upstream.
On context switch the change of TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB are evaluated
to adjust the mitigations accordingly. This is optimized to avoid the
expensive MSR write if not needed.
This optimization is buggy and allows an attacker to shutdown the SSBD
protection of a victim process.
The update logic reads the cached base value for the speculation control
MSR which has neither the SSBD nor the STIBP bit set. It then OR's the
SSBD bit only when TIF_SSBD is different and requests the MSR update.
That means if TIF_SSBD of the previous and next task are the same, then
the base value is not updated, even if TIF_SSBD is set. The MSR write is
not requested.
Subsequently if the TIF_STIBP bit differs then the STIBP bit is updated
in the base value and the MSR is written with a wrong SSBD value.
This was introduced when the per task/process conditional STIPB
switching was added on top of the existing SSBD switching.
It is exploitable if the attacker creates a process which enforces SSBD
and has the contrary value of STIBP than the victim process (i.e. if the
victim process enforces STIBP, the attacker process must not enforce it;
if the victim process does not enforce STIBP, the attacker process must
enforce it) and schedule it on the same core as the victim process. If
the victim runs after the attacker the victim becomes vulnerable to
Spectre V4.
To fix this, update the MSR value independent of the TIF_SSBD difference
and dependent on the SSBD mitigation method available. This ensures that
a subsequent STIPB initiated MSR write has the correct state of SSBD.
[ tglx: Handle X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD & X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD correctly
and massaged changelog ]
Fixes: 5bfbe3ad5840 ("x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1574051e52cb4b5b7f7509cfd729b76ca1117808 upstream.
The Intel C620 Platform Controller Hub has MROM functions that have non-PCI
registers (undocumented in the public spec) where BAR 0 is supposed to be,
which results in messages like this:
pci 0000:00:11.0: [Firmware Bug]: reg 0x30: invalid BAR (can't size)
Mark these MROM functions as having non-compliant BARs so we don't try to
probe any of them. There are no other BARs on these devices.
See the Intel C620 Series Chipset Platform Controller Hub Datasheet,
May 2019, Document Number 336067-007US, sec 2.1, 35.5, 35.6.
[bhelgaas: commit log, add 0xa26d]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1589513467-17070-1-git-send-email-lixiaochun.2888@163.com
Signed-off-by: Xiaochun Lee <lixc17@lenovo.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1494e0c38ee903e83aefb58caf54a9217273d49a upstream.
Patch series "Fix W+X debug feature on x86"
Jan alerted me[1] that the W+X detection debug feature was broken in x86
by my change[2] to switch x86 to use the generic ptdump infrastructure.
Fundamentally the approach of trying to move the calculation of
effective permissions into note_page() was broken because note_page() is
only called for 'leaf' entries and the effective permissions are passed
down via the internal nodes of the page tree. The solution I've taken
here is to create a new (optional) callback which is called for all
nodes of the page tree and therefore can calculate the effective
permissions.
Secondly on some configurations (32 bit with PAE) "unsigned long" is not
large enough to store the table entries. The fix here is simple - let's
just use a u64.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/d573dc7e-e742-84de-473d-f971142fa319@suse.com/
[2] 2ae27137b2db ("x86: mm: convert dump_pagetables to use walk_page_range")
This patch (of 2):
By switching the x86 page table dump code to use the generic code the
effective permissions are no longer calculated correctly because the
note_page() function is only called for *leaf* entries. To calculate
the actual effective permissions it is necessary to observe the full
hierarchy of the page tree.
Introduce a new callback for ptdump which is called for every entry and
can therefore update the prot_levels array correctly. note_page() can
then simply access the appropriate element in the array.
[steven.price@arm.com: make the assignment conditional on val != 0]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/430c8ab4-e7cd-6933-dde6-087fac6db872@arm.com
Fixes: 2ae27137b2db ("x86: mm: convert dump_pagetables to use walk_page_range")
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152308.33096-1-steven.price@arm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152308.33096-2-steven.price@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d8ad6d39c35d2b44b3d48b787df7f3359381dcbf upstream.
'jiffies' and 'jiffies_64' are meant to alias (two different symbols that
share the same address). Most architectures make the symbols alias to the
same address via a linker script assignment in their
arch/<arch>/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S:
jiffies = jiffies_64;
which is effectively a definition of jiffies.
jiffies and jiffies_64 are both forward declared for all architectures in
include/linux/jiffies.h. jiffies_64 is defined in kernel/time/timer.c.
x86_64 was peculiar in that it wasn't doing the above linker script
assignment, but rather was:
1. defining jiffies in arch/x86/kernel/time.c instead via the linker script.
2. overriding the symbol jiffies_64 from kernel/time/timer.c in
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.s via 'jiffies_64 = jiffies;'.
As Fangrui notes:
In LLD, symbol assignments in linker scripts override definitions in
object files. GNU ld appears to have the same behavior. It would
probably make sense for LLD to error "duplicate symbol" but GNU ld
is unlikely to adopt for compatibility reasons.
This results in an ODR violation (UB), which seems to have survived
thus far. Where it becomes harmful is when;
1. -fno-semantic-interposition is used:
As Fangrui notes:
Clang after LLVM commit 5b22bcc2b70d
("[X86][ELF] Prefer to lower MC_GlobalAddress operands to .Lfoo$local")
defaults to -fno-semantic-interposition similar semantics which help
-fpic/-fPIC code avoid GOT/PLT when the referenced symbol is defined
within the same translation unit. Unlike GCC
-fno-semantic-interposition, Clang emits such relocations referencing
local symbols for non-pic code as well.
This causes references to jiffies to refer to '.Ljiffies$local' when
jiffies is defined in the same translation unit. Likewise, references to
jiffies_64 become references to '.Ljiffies_64$local' in translation units
that define jiffies_64. Because these differ from the names used in the
linker script, they will not be rewritten to alias one another.
2. Full LTO
Full LTO effectively treats all source files as one translation
unit, causing these local references to be produced everywhere. When
the linker processes the linker script, there are no longer any
references to jiffies_64' anywhere to replace with 'jiffies'. And
thus '.Ljiffies$local' and '.Ljiffies_64$local' no longer alias
at all.
In the process of porting patches enabling Full LTO from arm64 to x86_64,
spooky bugs have been observed where the kernel appeared to boot, but init
doesn't get scheduled.
Avoid the ODR violation by matching other architectures and define jiffies
only by linker script. For -fno-semantic-interposition + Full LTO, there
is no longer a global definition of jiffies for the compiler to produce a
local symbol which the linker script won't ensure aliases to jiffies_64.
Fixes: 40747ffa5aa8 ("asmlinkage: Make jiffies visible")
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Alistair Delva <adelva@google.com>
Debugged-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Debugged-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Suggested-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Haarman <inglorion@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> # build+boot on
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/852
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200602193100.229287-1-inglorion@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d43e2675e96fc6ae1a633b6a69d296394448cc32 ]
KVM stores the gfn in MMIO SPTEs as a caching optimization. These are split
in two parts, as in "[high 11111 low]", to thwart any attempt to use these bits
in an L1TF attack. This works as long as there are 5 free bits between
MAXPHYADDR and bit 50 (inclusive), leaving bit 51 free so that the MMIO
access triggers a reserved-bit-set page fault.
The bit positions however were computed wrongly for AMD processors that have
encryption support. In this case, x86_phys_bits is reduced (for example
from 48 to 43, to account for the C bit at position 47 and four bits used
internally to store the SEV ASID and other stuff) while x86_cache_bits in
would remain set to 48, and _all_ bits between the reduced MAXPHYADDR
and bit 51 are set. Then low_phys_bits would also cover some of the
bits that are set in the shadow_mmio_value, terribly confusing the gfn
caching mechanism.
To fix this, avoid splitting gfns as long as the processor does not have
the L1TF bug (which includes all AMD processors). When there is no
splitting, low_phys_bits can be set to the reduced MAXPHYADDR removing
the overlap. This fixes "npt=0" operation on EPYC processors.
Thanks to Maxim Levitsky for bisecting this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 52918ed5fcf0 ("KVM: SVM: Override default MMIO mask if memory encryption is enabled")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e2abfc0448a46d8a137505aa180caf14070ec535 ]
Commit
21b5ee59ef18 ("x86/cpu/amd: Enable the fixed Instructions Retired
counter IRPERF")
mistakenly added erratum #1054 as an OS Visible Workaround (OSVW) ID 0.
Erratum #1054 is not OSVW ID 0 [1], so make it a legacy erratum.
There would never have been a false positive on older hardware that
has OSVW bit 0 set, since the IRPERF feature was not available.
However, save a couple of RDMSR executions per thread, on modern
system configurations that correctly set non-zero values in their
OSVW_ID_Length MSRs.
[1] Revision Guide for AMD Family 17h Models 00h-0Fh Processors. The
revision guide is available from the bugzilla link below.
Fixes: 21b5ee59ef18 ("x86/cpu/amd: Enable the fixed Instructions Retired counter IRPERF")
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200417143356.26054-1-kim.phillips@amd.com
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e1750a3d9abbea2ece29cac8dc5a6f5bc19c1492 ]
After disabling a function, the original handle is logged instead of
the disabled handle.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200522183922.5253-1-ptesarik@suse.com
Fixes: 17cdec960cf7 ("s390/pci: Recover handle in clp_set_pci_fn()")
Reviewed-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a101950fcb78b0ba20cd487be6627dea58d55c2b ]
Commit 1ca3dec2b2df ("powerpc/xive: Prevent page fault issues in the
machine crash handler") fixed an issue in the FW assisted dump of
machines using hash MMU and the XIVE interrupt mode under the POWER
hypervisor. It forced the mapping of the ESB page of interrupts being
mapped in the Linux IRQ number space to make sure the 'crash kexec'
sequence worked during such an event. But it didn't handle the
un-mapping.
This mapping is now blocking the removal of a passthrough IO adapter
under the POWER hypervisor because it expects the guest OS to have
cleared all page table entries related to the adapter. If some are
still present, the RTAS call which isolates the PCI slot returns error
9001 "valid outstanding translations".
Remove these mapping in the IRQ data cleanup routine.
Under KVM, this cleanup is not required because the ESB pages for the
adapter interrupts are un-mapped from the guest by the hypervisor in
the KVM XIVE native device. This is now redundant but it's harmless.
Fixes: 1ca3dec2b2df ("powerpc/xive: Prevent page fault issues in the machine crash handler")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5+
Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200429075122.1216388-2-clg@kaod.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e0bbb53843b5fdfe464b099217e3b9d97e8a75d7 ]
Current implementation could destory a4 & a5 when strace, so we need to get them
from pt_regs by SAVE_ALL.
Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3866f217aaa81bf7165c7f27362eee5d7919c496 ]
call_undef_hook() in traps.c applies the same instr_mask for both 16-bit
and 32-bit thumb instructions. If instr_mask then is only 16 bits wide
(0xffff as opposed to 0xffffffff), the first half-word of 32-bit thumb
instructions will be masked out. This makes the function match 32-bit
thumb instructions where the second half-word is equal to instr_val,
regardless of the first half-word.
The result in this case is that all undefined 32-bit thumb instructions
with the second half-word equal to 0xde01 (udf #1) work as breakpoints
and will raise a SIGTRAP instead of a SIGILL, instead of just the one
intended 16-bit instruction. An example of such an instruction is
0xeaa0de01, which is unallocated according to Arm ARM and should raise a
SIGILL, but instead raises a SIGTRAP.
This patch fixes the issue by setting all the bits in instr_mask, which
will still match the intended 16-bit thumb instruction (where the
upper half is always 0), but not any 32-bit thumb instructions.
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fredrik Strupe <fredrik@strupe.net>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 90ceddcb495008ac8ba7a3dce297841efcd7d584 upstream.
Simplify gen_btf logic to make it work with llvm-objcopy. The existing
'file format' and 'architecture' parsing logic is brittle and does not
work with llvm-objcopy/llvm-objdump.
'file format' output of llvm-objdump>=11 will match GNU objdump, but
'architecture' (bfdarch) may not.
.BTF in .tmp_vmlinux.btf is non-SHF_ALLOC. Add the SHF_ALLOC flag
because it is part of vmlinux image used for introspection. C code
can reference the section via linker script defined __start_BTF and
__stop_BTF. This fixes a small problem that previous .BTF had the
SHF_WRITE flag (objcopy -I binary -O elf* synthesized .data).
Additionally, `objcopy -I binary` synthesized symbols
_binary__btf_vmlinux_bin_start and _binary__btf_vmlinux_bin_stop (not
used elsewhere) are replaced with more commonplace __start_BTF and
__stop_BTF.
Add 2>/dev/null because GNU objcopy (but not llvm-objcopy) warns
"empty loadable segment detected at vaddr=0xffffffff81000000, is this intentional?"
We use a dd command to change the e_type field in the ELF header from
ET_EXEC to ET_REL so that lld will accept .btf.vmlinux.bin.o. Accepting
ET_EXEC as an input file is an extremely rare GNU ld feature that lld
does not intend to support, because this is error-prone.
The output section description .BTF in include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
avoids potential subtle orphan section placement issues and suppresses
--orphan-handling=warn warnings.
Fixes: df786c9b9476 ("bpf: Force .BTF section start to zero when dumping from vmlinux")
Fixes: cb0cc635c7a9 ("powerpc: Include .BTF section")
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/871
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200318222746.173648-1-maskray@google.com
Signed-off-by: Maria Teguiani <teguiani@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb upstream
SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.
While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.
The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.
* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
either mitigations=off or srbds=off.
* Export vulnerability status via sysfs
* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.
[ bp: Massage,
- s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
- do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
- flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
- reflow comments.
jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
]
Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 93920f61c2ad7edb01e63323832585796af75fc9 upstream
To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a
pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument.
[ bp: Flip arguments order. ]
Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e9d7144597b10ff13ff2264c059f7d4a7fbc89ac upstream
Intel uses the same family/model for several CPUs. Sometimes the
stepping must be checked to tell them apart.
On x86 there can be at most 16 steppings. Add a steppings bitmask to
x86_cpu_id and a X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAMILY_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE macro
and support for matching against family/model/stepping.
[ bp: Massage.
tglx: Lightweight variant for backporting ]
Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5bfea2d9b17f1034a68147a8b03b9789af5700f9 upstream.
The original code in mm/mremap.c checks huge pmd by:
if (is_swap_pmd(*old_pmd) || pmd_trans_huge(*old_pmd)) {
However, a DAX mapped nvdimm is mapped as huge page (by default) but it
is not transparent huge page (_PAGE_PSE | PAGE_DEVMAP). This commit
changes the condition to include the case.
This addresses CVE-2020-10757.
Fixes: 5c7fb56e5e3f ("mm, dax: dax-pmd vs thp-pmd vs hugetlbfs-pmd")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Fan Yang <Fan_Yang@sjtu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Fan Yang <Fan_Yang@sjtu.edu.cn>
Tested-by: Fan Yang <Fan_Yang@sjtu.edu.cn>
Tested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8fa3cdff05f009855a6a99a7d77a41004009bbab ]
arch/riscv/mm/init.c: In function ‘print_vm_layout’:
arch/riscv/mm/init.c:68:37: error: ‘FIXADDR_START’ undeclared (first use in this function);
arch/riscv/mm/init.c:69:20: error: ‘FIXADDR_TOP’ undeclared
arch/riscv/mm/init.c:70:37: error: ‘PCI_IO_START’ undeclared
arch/riscv/mm/init.c:71:20: error: ‘PCI_IO_END’ undeclared
arch/riscv/mm/init.c:72:38: error: ‘VMEMMAP_START’ undeclared
arch/riscv/mm/init.c:73:20: error: ‘VMEMMAP_END’ undeclared (first use in this function);
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ac8372f3b4e41015549b331a4f350224661e7fc6 ]
On s390, the layout of normal and large ptes (i.e. pmds/puds) differs.
Therefore, set_huge_pte_at() does a conversion from a normal pte to
the corresponding large pmd/pud. So, when converting an empty pte, this
should result in an empty pmd/pud, which would return true for
pmd/pud_none().
However, after conversion we also mark the pmd/pud as large, and
therefore present. For empty ptes, this will result in an empty pmd/pud
that is also marked as large, and pmd/pud_none() would not return true.
There is currently no issue with this behaviour, as set_huge_pte_at()
does not seem to be called for empty ptes. It would be valid though, so
let's fix this by not marking empty ptes as large in set_huge_pte_at().
This was found by testing a patch from from Anshuman Khandual, which is
currently discussed on LKML ("mm/debug: Add more arch page table helper
tests").
Signed-off-by: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d7110a26e5905ec2fe3fc88bc6a538901accb72b ]
When building with Clang + -Wtautological-compare and
CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK unset:
arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c:375:6: warning: comparison of array 'downed_cpus'
equal to a null pointer is always false [-Wtautological-pointer-compare]
if (downed_cpus == NULL &&
^~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~
arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c:405:6: warning: comparison of array 'downed_cpus'
equal to a null pointer is always false [-Wtautological-pointer-compare]
if (downed_cpus == NULL || cpumask_weight(downed_cpus) == 0)
^~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~
2 warnings generated.
Commit
f7e30f01a9e2 ("cpumask: Add helper cpumask_available()")
added cpumask_available() to fix warnings of this nature. Use that here
so that clang does not warn regardless of CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK's
value.
Reported-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/982
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200408205323.44490-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 38dce4195f0daefb566279fd9fd51e1fbd62ae1b ]
Errors during hibernation with reenlightenment notifications enabled were
reported:
[ 51.730435] PM: hibernation entry
[ 51.737435] PM: Syncing filesystems ...
...
[ 54.102216] Disabling non-boot CPUs ...
[ 54.106633] smpboot: CPU 1 is now offline
[ 54.110006] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x40000106 (tried to
write 0x47c72780000100ee) at rIP: 0xffffffff90062f24
native_write_msr+0x4/0x20)
[ 54.110006] Call Trace:
[ 54.110006] hv_cpu_die+0xd9/0xf0
...
Normally, hv_cpu_die() just reassigns reenlightenment notifications to some
other CPU when the CPU receiving them goes offline. Upon hibernation, there
is no other CPU which is still online so cpumask_any_but(cpu_online_mask)
returns >= nr_cpu_ids and using it as hv_vp_index index is incorrect.
Disable the feature when cpumask_any_but() fails.
Also, as we now disable reenlightenment notifications upon hibernation we
need to restore them on resume. Check if hv_reenlightenment_cb was
previously set and restore from hv_resume().
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200512160153.134467-1-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 799587d5731db9dcdafaac4002463aa7d9cd6cf7 ]
Elide invalid configuration EZNPS + ARCv2, triggered by a
make allyesconfig build.
Granted the root cause is in source code (asm/barrier.h) where we check
for ARCv2 before PLAT_EZNPS, but it is better to avoid such combinations
at onset rather then baking subtle nuances into code.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 43900edf67d7ef3ac8909854d75b8a1fba2d570c ]
As of today the ICCM and DCCM size checks are incorrectly using
mismatched units (KiB checked against bytes). The CONFIG_ARC_DCCM_SZ
and CONFIG_ARC_ICCM_SZ are in KiB, but the size calculated in
runtime and stored in cpu->dccm.sz and cpu->iccm.sz is in bytes.
Fix that.
Reported-by: Paul Greco <pmgreco@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eugeniy Paltsev <Eugeniy.Paltsev@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 700d3a5a664df267f01ec8887fd2d8ff98f67e7f ]
Revert
45e29d119e99 ("x86/syscalls: Make __X32_SYSCALL_BIT be unsigned long")
and add a comment to discourage someone else from making the same
mistake again.
It turns out that some user code fails to compile if __X32_SYSCALL_BIT
is unsigned long. See, for example [1] below.
[ bp: Massage and do the same thing in the respective tools/ header. ]
Fixes: 45e29d119e99 ("x86/syscalls: Make __X32_SYSCALL_BIT be unsigned long")
Reported-by: Thorsten Glaser <t.glaser@tarent.de>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: [1] https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=954294
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/92e55442b744a5951fdc9cfee10badd0a5f7f828.1588983892.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit d195b1d1d1196681ac4775e0361e9cca70f740c2 upstream.
The commit 0ebeea8ca8a4d1d453a ("bpf: Restrict bpf_probe_read{, str}() only
to archs where they work") caused that bpf_probe_read{, str}() functions
were not longer available on architectures where the same logical address
might have different content in kernel and user memory mapping. These
architectures should use probe_read_{user,kernel}_str helpers.
For backward compatibility, the problematic functions are still available
on architectures where the user and kernel address spaces are not
overlapping. This is defined CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE.
At the moment, these backward compatible functions are enabled only on x86_64,
arm, and arm64. Let's do it also on powerpc that has the non overlapping
address space as well.
Fixes: 0ebeea8ca8a4 ("bpf: Restrict bpf_probe_read{, str}() only to archs where they work")
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200527122844.19524-1-pmladek@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4bfe6cce133cad82cea04490c308795275857782 upstream.
In the copy_process() routine called by _do_fork(), failure to allocate
a PID (or further along in the function) will trigger an invocation to
exit_thread(). This is done to clean up from an earlier call to
copy_thread_tls(). Naturally, the child task is passed into exit_thread(),
however during the process, io_bitmap_exit() nullifies the parent's
io_bitmap rather than the child's.
As copy_thread_tls() has been called ahead of the failure, the reference
count on the calling thread's io_bitmap is incremented as we would expect.
However, io_bitmap_exit() doesn't accept any arguments, and thus assumes
it should trash the current thread's io_bitmap reference rather than the
child's. This is pretty sneaky in practice, because in all instances but
this one, exit_thread() is called with respect to the current task and
everything works out.
A determined attacker can issue an appropriate ioctl (i.e. KDENABIO) to
get a bitmap allocated, and force a clone3() syscall to fail by passing
in a zeroed clone_args structure. The kernel handles the erroneous struct
and the buggy code path is followed, and even though the parent's reference
to the io_bitmap is trashed, the child still holds a reference and thus
the structure will never be freed.
Fix this by tweaking io_bitmap_exit() and its subroutines to accept a
task_struct argument which to operate on.
Fixes: ea5f1cd7ab49 ("x86/ioperm: Remove bitmap if all permissions dropped")
Signed-off-by: Jay Lang <jaytlang@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable#@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200524162742.253727-1-jaytlang@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9e4636545933131de15e1ecd06733538ae939b2f upstream.
copy the corresponding pieces of init_fpstate into the gaps instead.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 88743470668ef5eb6b7ba9e0f99888e5999bf172 upstream.
The intermediate result of the old term (4UL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024) is
4 294 967 296 or 0x100000000 which is no problem on 64 bit systems.
The patch does not change the later overall result of 0x100000 for
MAX_DMA32_PFN (after it has been shifted by PAGE_SHIFT). The new
calculation yields the same result, but does not require 64 bit
arithmetic.
On 32 bit systems the old calculation suffers from an arithmetic
overflow in that intermediate term in braces: 4UL aka unsigned long int
is 4 byte wide and an arithmetic overflow happens (the 0x100000000 does
not fit in 4 bytes), the in braces result is truncated to zero, the
following right shift does not alter that, so MAX_DMA32_PFN evaluates to
0 on 32 bit systems.
That wrong value is a problem in a comparision against MAX_DMA32_PFN in
the init code for swiotlb in pci_swiotlb_detect_4gb() to decide if
swiotlb should be active. That comparison yields the opposite result,
when compiling on 32 bit systems.
This was not possible before
1b7e03ef7570 ("x86, NUMA: Enable emulation on 32bit too")
when that MAX_DMA32_PFN was first made visible to x86_32 (and which
landed in v3.0).
In practice this wasn't a problem, unless CONFIG_SWIOTLB is active on
x86-32.
However if one has set CONFIG_IOMMU_INTEL, since
c5a5dc4cbbf4 ("iommu/vt-d: Don't switch off swiotlb if bounce page is used")
there's a dependency on CONFIG_SWIOTLB, which was not necessarily
active before. That landed in v5.4, where we noticed it in the fli4l
Linux distribution. We have CONFIG_IOMMU_INTEL active on both 32 and 64
bit kernel configs there (I could not find out why, so let's just say
historical reasons).
The effect is at boot time 64 MiB (default size) were allocated for
bounce buffers now, which is a noticeable amount of memory on small
systems like pcengines ALIX 2D3 with 256 MiB memory, which are still
frequently used as home routers.
We noticed this effect when migrating from kernel v4.19 (LTS) to v5.4
(LTS) in fli4l and got that kernel messages for example:
Linux version 5.4.22 (buildroot@buildroot) (gcc version 7.3.0 (Buildroot 2018.02.8)) #1 SMP Mon Nov 26 23:40:00 CET 2018
…
Memory: 183484K/261756K available (4594K kernel code, 393K rwdata, 1660K rodata, 536K init, 456K bss , 78272K reserved, 0K cma-reserved, 0K highmem)
…
PCI-DMA: Using software bounce buffering for IO (SWIOTLB)
software IO TLB: mapped [mem 0x0bb78000-0x0fb78000] (64MB)
The initial analysis and the suggested fix was done by user 'sourcejedi'
at stackoverflow and explicitly marked as GPLv2 for inclusion in the
Linux kernel:
https://unix.stackexchange.com/a/520525/50007
The new calculation, which does not suffer from that overflow, is the
same as for arch/mips now as suggested by Robin Murphy.
The fix was tested by fli4l users on round about two dozen different
systems, including both 32 and 64 bit archs, bare metal and virtualized
machines.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Fixes: 1b7e03ef7570 ("x86, NUMA: Enable emulation on 32bit too")
Reported-by: Alan Jenkins <alan.christopher.jenkins@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Dahl <post@lespocky.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://unix.stackexchange.com/q/520065/50007
Link: https://web.nettworks.org/bugs/browse/FFL-2560
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200526175749.20742-1-post@lespocky.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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