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This is the 5.4.208 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Fri 29 Jul 2022 11:14:24 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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This is the 5.4.207 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Thu 21 Jul 2022 02:59:38 PM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit 1df931d95f4dc1c11db1123e85d4e08156e46ef9 upstream.
As noted (and fixed) a couple of times in the past, "=@cc<cond>" outputs
and clobbering of "cc" don't work well together. The compiler appears to
mean to reject such, but doesn't - in its upstream form - quite manage
to yet for "cc". Furthermore two similar macros don't clobber "cc", and
clobbering "cc" is pointless in asm()-s for x86 anyway - the compiler
always assumes status flags to be clobbered there.
Fixes: 989b5db215a2 ("x86/uaccess: Implement macros for CMPXCHG on user addresses")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Message-Id: <485c0c0b-a3a7-0b7c-5264-7d00c01de032@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e42404afc4ca856c48f1e05752541faa3587c472 ]
Prepare code for further simplification. No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210908132525.096452100@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 989b5db215a2f22f89d730b607b071d964780f10 ]
Add support for CMPXCHG loops on userspace addresses. Provide both an
"unsafe" version for tight loops that do their own uaccess begin/end, as
well as a "safe" version for use cases where the CMPXCHG is not buried in
a loop, e.g. KVM will resume the guest instead of looping when emulation
of a guest atomic accesses fails the CMPXCHG.
Provide 8-byte versions for 32-bit kernels so that KVM can do CMPXCHG on
guest PAE PTEs, which are accessed via userspace addresses.
Guard the asm_volatile_goto() variation with CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_TIED_OUTPUT,
the "+m" constraint fails on some compilers that otherwise support
CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220202004945.2540433-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4b842e4e25b12951fa10dedb4bc16bc47e3b850c ]
Very few call sites where that would be triggered remain, and none
of those is anywhere near hot enough to bother.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit fb041bb7c0a918b95c6889fc965cdc4a75b4c0ca ]
The generic implementation of refcount_t should be good enough for
everybody, so remove ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT and REFCOUNT_FULL entirely,
leaving the generic implementation enabled unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191121115902.2551-9-will@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 38fa5479b41376dc9d7f57e71c83514285a25ca0 ]
The .brk section has the same properties as .bss: it is an alloc-only
section and should be cleared before being used.
Not doing so is especially a problem for Xen PV guests, as the
hypervisor will validate page tables (check for writable page tables
and hypervisor private bits) before accepting them to be used.
Make sure .brk is initially zero by letting clear_bss() clear the brk
area, too.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630071441.28576-3-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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This is the 5.4.203 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Sat 02 Jul 2022 10:29:04 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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This is the 5.4.200 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Wed 22 Jun 2022 08:11:28 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit 3e35142ef99fe6b4fe5d834ad43ee13cca10a2dc upstream.
Since commit d1bcae833b32f1 ("ELF: Don't generate unused section
symbols") [1], binutils (v2.36+) started dropping section symbols that
it thought were unused. This isn't an issue in general, but with
kexec_file.c, gcc is placing kexec_arch_apply_relocations[_add] into a
separate .text.unlikely section and the section symbol ".text.unlikely"
is being dropped. Due to this, recordmcount is unable to find a non-weak
symbol in .text.unlikely to generate a relocation record against.
Address this by dropping the weak attribute from these functions.
Instead, follow the existing pattern of having architectures #define the
name of the function they want to override in their headers.
[1] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=d1bcae833b32f1
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: arch/s390/include/asm/kexec.h needs linux/module.h]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220519091237.676736-1-naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3bd4abc07a267e6a8b33d7f8717136e18f921c53 upstream.
In the event that random_get_entropy() can't access a cycle counter or
similar, falling back to returning 0 is suboptimal. Instead, fallback
to calling random_get_entropy_fallback(), which isn't extremely high
precision or guaranteed to be entropic, but is certainly better than
returning zero all the time.
If CONFIG_X86_TSC=n, then it's possible for the kernel to run on systems
without RDTSC, such as 486 and certain 586, so the fallback code is only
required for that case.
As well, fix up both the new function and the get_cycles() function from
which it was derived to use cpu_feature_enabled() rather than
boot_cpu_has(), and use !IS_ENABLED() instead of #ifndef.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 703f7066f40599c290babdb79dd61319264987e9 upstream.
Since commit
ee3e00e9e7101 ("random: use registers from interrupted code for CPU's w/o a cycle counter")
the irq_flags argument is no longer used.
Remove unused irq_flags.
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5f2ed7f5b99b54389b74e53309677831ac9cb9d7 upstream.
Use the expansion of these macros directly in arch_get_random_*.
These symbols are currently part of the generic archrandom.h
interface, but are currently unused and can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110145422.49141-2-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is the 5.4.199 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Thu 16 Jun 2022 07:23:36 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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This is the 5.4.198 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Tue 14 Jun 2022 12:12:20 PM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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This is the 5.4.197 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Mon 06 Jun 2022 02:33:55 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit 1dc6ff02c8bf77d71b9b5d11cbc9df77cfb28626 upstream
Similar to MDS and TAA, print a warning if SMT is enabled for the MMIO
Stale Data vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 027bbb884be006b05d9c577d6401686053aa789e upstream
The enumeration of MD_CLEAR in CPUID(EAX=7,ECX=0).EDX{bit 10} is not an
accurate indicator on all CPUs of whether the VERW instruction will
overwrite fill buffers. FB_CLEAR enumeration in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES{bit 17} covers the case of CPUs that are not
vulnerable to MDS/TAA, indicating that microcode does overwrite fill
buffers.
Guests running in VMM environments may not be aware of all the
capabilities/vulnerabilities of the host CPU. Specifically, a guest may
apply MDS/TAA mitigations when a virtual CPU is enumerated as vulnerable
to MDS/TAA even when the physical CPU is not. On CPUs that enumerate
FB_CLEAR_CTRL the VMM may set FB_CLEAR_DIS to skip overwriting of fill
buffers by the VERW instruction. This is done by setting FB_CLEAR_DIS
during VMENTER and resetting on VMEXIT. For guests that enumerate
FB_CLEAR (explicitly asking for fill buffer clear capability) the VMM
will not use FB_CLEAR_DIS.
Irrespective of guest state, host overwrites CPU buffers before VMENTER
to protect itself from an MMIO capable guest, as part of mitigation for
MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a992b8a4682f119ae035a01b40d4d0665c4a2875 upstream
The Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS) variant of Processor MMIO Stale
Data vulnerabilities may expose RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY data.
Mitigation for this is added by a microcode update.
As some of the implications of SBDS are similar to SRBDS, SRBDS mitigation
infrastructure can be leveraged by SBDS. Set X86_BUG_SRBDS and use SRBDS
mitigation.
Mitigation is enabled by default; use srbds=off to opt-out. Mitigation
status can be checked from below file:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 22cac9c677c95f3ac5c9244f8ca0afdc7c8afb19 upstream
Currently, Linux disables SRBDS mitigation on CPUs not affected by
MDS and have the TSX feature disabled. On such CPUs, secrets cannot
be extracted from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. Without SRBDS
mitigation, Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities can be used to
extract RDRAND, RDSEED, and EGETKEY data.
Do not disable SRBDS mitigation by default when CPU is also affected by
Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8d50cdf8b8341770bc6367bce40c0c1bb0e1d5b3 upstream
Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data
vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar
to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 99a83db5a605137424e1efe29dc0573d6a5b6316 upstream
When the CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities,
Fill Buffer Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP) can propagate stale data out
of Fill buffer to uncore buffer when CPU goes idle. Stale data can then
be exploited with other variants using MMIO operations.
Mitigate it by clearing the Fill buffer before entering idle state.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e5925fb867290ee924fcf2fe3ca887b792714366 upstream
MDS, TAA and Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigations rely on clearing CPU
buffers. Moreover, status of these mitigations affects each other.
During boot, it is important to maintain the order in which these
mitigations are selected. This is especially true for
md_clear_update_mitigation() that needs to be called after MDS, TAA and
Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigation selection is done.
Introduce md_clear_select_mitigation(), and select all these mitigations
from there. This reflects relationships between these mitigations and
ensures proper ordering.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8cb861e9e3c9a55099ad3d08e1a3b653d29c33ca upstream
Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may
expose data after an MMIO operation. For details please refer to
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst.
These vulnerabilities are broadly categorized as:
Device Register Partial Write (DRPW):
Some endpoint MMIO registers incorrectly handle writes that are
smaller than the register size. Instead of aborting the write or only
copying the correct subset of bytes (for example, 2 bytes for a 2-byte
write), more bytes than specified by the write transaction may be
written to the register. On some processors, this may expose stale
data from the fill buffers of the core that created the write
transaction.
Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS):
After propagators may have moved data around the uncore and copied
stale data into client core fill buffers, processors affected by MFBDS
can leak data from the fill buffer.
Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR):
It is similar to Shared Buffer Data Sampling (SBDS) except that the
data is directly read into the architectural software-visible state.
An attacker can use these vulnerabilities to extract data from CPU fill
buffers using MDS and TAA methods. Mitigate it by clearing the CPU fill
buffers using the VERW instruction before returning to a user or a
guest.
On CPUs not affected by MDS and TAA, user application cannot sample data
from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. A guest with MMIO access can
still use DRPW or SBDR to extract data architecturally. Mitigate it with
VERW instruction to clear fill buffers before VMENTER for MMIO capable
guests.
Add a kernel parameter mmio_stale_data={off|full|full,nosmt} to control
the mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f52ea6c26953fed339aa4eae717ee5c2133c7ff2 upstream
Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigation uses similar mitigation as MDS and
TAA. In preparation for adding its mitigation, add a common function to
update all mitigations that depend on MD_CLEAR.
[ bp: Add a newline in md_clear_update_mitigation() to separate
statements better. ]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 51802186158c74a0304f51ab963e7c2b3a2b046f upstream
Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may
expose data after an MMIO operation. For more details please refer to
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
Add the Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration. A microcode update
adds new bits to the MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, define them.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6e1239c13953f3c2a76e70031f74ddca9ae57cd3 upstream.
Add Alder Lake mobile CPU model number to Intel family.
Signed-off-by: Gayatri Kammela <gayatri.kammela@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210121215004.11618-1-tony.luck@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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CPU family
commit e00b62f0b06d0ae2b844049f216807617aff0cdb upstream.
Add three new Intel CPU models.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721043749.31567-1-tony.luck@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b2d32af0bff402b4c1fce28311759dd1f6af058a upstream.
Japser Lake is an Atom family processor.
It uses Tremont cores and is targeted at mobile platforms.
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a6a5eb269f6f3a2fe392f725a8d9052190c731e2 ]
As x86 uses the <asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-*.h> headers, the
regular forms of all bitops are instrumented with explicit calls to
KASAN and KCSAN checks. As these are explicit calls, these are not
suppressed by the noinstr function attribute.
This can result in calls to those check functions in noinstr code, which
objtool warns about:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: enter_from_user_mode+0x24: call to __kcsan_check_access() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x28: call to __kcsan_check_access() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode_prepare+0x24: call to __kcsan_check_access() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: irqentry_enter_from_user_mode+0x24: call to __kcsan_check_access() leaves .noinstr.text section
Prevent this by using the arch_*() bitops, which are the underlying
bitops without explciit instrumentation.
[null: Changelog]
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220502111216.290518605@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 2a4a62a14be1947fa945c5c11ebf67326381a568 upstream.
syscall_stub_data() expects the data_count parameter to be the number of
longs, not bytes.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in syscall_stub_data+0x70/0xe0
Read of size 128 at addr 000000006411f6f0 by task swapper/1
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0+ #18
Call Trace:
show_stack.cold+0x166/0x2a7
__dump_stack+0x3a/0x43
dump_stack_lvl+0x1f/0x27
print_report.cold+0xdb/0xf81
kasan_report+0x119/0x1f0
kasan_check_range+0x3a3/0x440
memcpy+0x52/0x140
syscall_stub_data+0x70/0xe0
write_ldt_entry+0xac/0x190
init_new_ldt+0x515/0x960
init_new_context+0x2c4/0x4d0
mm_init.constprop.0+0x5ed/0x760
mm_alloc+0x118/0x170
0x60033f48
do_one_initcall+0x1d7/0x860
0x60003e7b
kernel_init+0x6e/0x3d4
new_thread_handler+0x1e7/0x2c0
The buggy address belongs to stack of task swapper/1
and is located at offset 64 in frame:
init_new_ldt+0x0/0x960
This frame has 2 objects:
[32, 40) 'addr'
[64, 80) 'desc'
==================================================================
Fixes: 858259cf7d1c443c83 ("uml: maintain own LDT entries")
Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c3634d25fbee88e2368a8e0903ae0d0670eb9e71 ]
Don't modify vmcs12 exit fields except EXIT_REASON and EXIT_QUALIFICATION
when performing a nested VM-Exit due to failed VM-Entry. Per the SDM,
only the two aformentioned fields are filled and "All other VM-exit
information fields are unmodified".
Fixes: 4704d0befb07 ("KVM: nVMX: Exiting from L2 to L1")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220407002315.78092-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3d47083b9ff46863e8374ad3bb5edb5e464c75f8 ]
IbsOpRip is recorded when IBS interrupt is triggered. But there is
a skid from the time IBS interrupt gets triggered to the time the
interrupt is presented to the core. Meanwhile processor would have
moved ahead and thus IbsOpRip will be inconsistent with rsp and rbp
recorded as part of the interrupt regs. This causes issues while
unwinding stack using the ORC unwinder as it needs consistent rip,
rsp and rbp. Fix this by using rip from interrupt regs instead of
IbsOpRip for stack unwinding.
Fixes: ee9f8fce99640 ("x86/unwind: Add the ORC unwinder")
Reported-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmtrmonakhov@yandex-team.ru>
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220429051441.14251-1-ravi.bangoria@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1ef64b1e89e6d4018da46e08ffc32779a31160c7 ]
Clean up control_va_addr_alignment():
a. Make '=' required instead of optional (as documented).
b. Print a warning if an invalid option value is used.
c. Return 1 from the __setup handler when an invalid option value is
used. This prevents the kernel from polluting init's (limited)
environment space with the entire string.
Fixes: dfb09f9b7ab0 ("x86, amd: Avoid cache aliasing penalties on AMD family 15h")
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220315001045.7680-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 12441ccdf5e2f5a01a46e344976cbbd3d46845c9 ]
__setup() handlers should return 1 to obsolete_checksetup() in
init/main.c to indicate that the boot option has been handled. A return
of 0 causes the boot option/value to be listed as an Unknown kernel
parameter and added to init's (limited) argument (no '=') or environment
(with '=') strings. So return 1 from these x86 __setup handlers.
Examples:
Unknown kernel command line parameters "apicpmtimer
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc8 vdso=1 ring3mwait=disable", will be
passed to user space.
Run /sbin/init as init process
with arguments:
/sbin/init
apicpmtimer
with environment:
HOME=/
TERM=linux
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc8
vdso=1
ring3mwait=disable
Fixes: 2aae950b21e4 ("x86_64: Add vDSO for x86-64 with gettimeofday/clock_gettime/getcpu")
Fixes: 77b52b4c5c66 ("x86: add "debugpat" boot option")
Fixes: e16fd002afe2 ("x86/cpufeature: Enable RING3MWAIT for Knights Landing")
Fixes: b8ce33590687 ("x86_64: convert to clock events")
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220314012725.26661-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b0b592cf08367719e1d1ef07c9f136e8c17f7ec3 ]
Since
e2a1256b17b1 ("x86/speculation: Restore speculation related MSRs during S3 resume")
kmemleak reports this issue:
unreferenced object 0xffff888009cedc00 (size 256):
comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294693823 (age 73.764s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........H.......
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
msr_build_context (include/linux/slab.h:621)
pm_check_save_msr (arch/x86/power/cpu.c:520)
do_one_initcall (init/main.c:1298)
kernel_init_freeable (init/main.c:1370)
kernel_init (init/main.c:1504)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304)
Reproducer:
- boot the VM with a debug kernel config (see
https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/268)
- wait ~1 minute
- start a kmemleak scan
The root cause here is alignment within the packed struct saved_context
(from suspend_64.h). Kmemleak only searches for pointers that are
aligned (see how pointers are scanned in kmemleak.c), but pahole shows
that the saved_msrs struct member and all members after it in the
structure are unaligned:
struct saved_context {
struct pt_regs regs; /* 0 168 */
/* --- cacheline 2 boundary (128 bytes) was 40 bytes ago --- */
u16 ds; /* 168 2 */
...
u64 misc_enable; /* 232 8 */
bool misc_enable_saved; /* 240 1 */
/* Note below odd offset values for the remainder of this struct */
struct saved_msrs saved_msrs; /* 241 16 */
/* --- cacheline 4 boundary (256 bytes) was 1 bytes ago --- */
long unsigned int efer; /* 257 8 */
u16 gdt_pad; /* 265 2 */
struct desc_ptr gdt_desc; /* 267 10 */
u16 idt_pad; /* 277 2 */
struct desc_ptr idt; /* 279 10 */
u16 ldt; /* 289 2 */
u16 tss; /* 291 2 */
long unsigned int tr; /* 293 8 */
long unsigned int safety; /* 301 8 */
long unsigned int return_address; /* 309 8 */
/* size: 317, cachelines: 5, members: 25 */
/* last cacheline: 61 bytes */
} __attribute__((__packed__));
Move misc_enable_saved to the end of the struct declaration so that
saved_msrs fits in before the cacheline 4 boundary.
The comment above the saved_context declaration says to fix wakeup_64.S
file and __save/__restore_processor_state() if the struct is modified:
it looks like all the accesses in wakeup_64.S are done through offsets
which are computed at build-time. Update that comment accordingly.
At the end, the false positive kmemleak report is due to a limitation
from kmemleak but it is always good to avoid unaligned members for
optimisation purposes.
Please note that it looks like this issue is not new, e.g.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/9f1bb619-c4ee-21c4-a251-870bd4db04fa@lwfinger.net/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/94e48fcd-1dbd-ebd2-4c91-f39941735909@molgen.mpg.de/
[ bp: Massage + cleanup commit message. ]
Fixes: 7a9c2dd08ead ("x86/pm: Introduce quirk framework to save/restore extra MSR registers around suspend/resume")
Suggested-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426202138.498310-1-matthieu.baerts@tessares.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b86eb74098a92afd789da02699b4b0dd3f73b889 ]
The asm constraint does not reflect the fact that the asm statement can
modify the value of the local variable loops. Which it does.
Specifying the wrong constraint may lead to undefined behavior, it may
clobber random stuff (e.g. local variable, important temporary value in
regs, etc.). This is especially dangerous when the compiler decides to
inline the function and since it doesn't know that the value gets
modified, it might decide to use it from a register directly without
reloading it.
Change the constraint to "+a" to denote that the first argument is an
input and an output argument.
[ bp: Fix typo, massage commit message. ]
Fixes: e01b70ef3eb3 ("x86: fix bug in arch/i386/lib/delay.c file, delay_loop function")
Signed-off-by: Ammar Faizi <ammarfaizi2@gnuweeb.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220329104705.65256-2-ammarfaizi2@gnuweeb.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e2efb6359e620521d1e13f69b2257de8ceaa9475 ]
While running inside virtual machine, the kernel can bypass cache
flushing. Changing sleep state in a virtual machine doesn't affect the
host system sleep state and cannot lead to data loss.
Before entering sleep states, the ACPI code flushes caches to prevent
data loss using the WBINVD instruction. This mechanism is required on
bare metal.
But, any use WBINVD inside of a guest is worthless. Changing sleep
state in a virtual machine doesn't affect the host system sleep state
and cannot lead to data loss, so most hypervisors simply ignore it.
Despite this, the ACPI code calls WBINVD unconditionally anyway.
It's useless, but also normally harmless.
In TDX guests, though, WBINVD stops being harmless; it triggers a
virtualization exception (#VE). If the ACPI cache-flushing WBINVD
were left in place, TDX guests would need handling to recover from
the exception.
Avoid using WBINVD whenever running under a hypervisor. This both
removes the useless WBINVDs and saves TDX from implementing WBINVD
handling.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220405232939.73860-30-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 6a2d90ba027adba528509ffa27097cffd3879257 upstream.
The current implementation of PTRACE_KILL is buggy and has been for
many years as it assumes it's target has stopped in ptrace_stop. At a
quick skim it looks like this assumption has existed since ptrace
support was added in linux v1.0.
While PTRACE_KILL has been deprecated we can not remove it as
a quick search with google code search reveals many existing
programs calling it.
When the ptracee is not stopped at ptrace_stop some fields would be
set that are ignored except in ptrace_stop. Making the userspace
visible behavior of PTRACE_KILL a noop in those case.
As the usual rules are not obeyed it is not clear what the
consequences are of calling PTRACE_KILL on a running process.
Presumably userspace does not do this as it achieves nothing.
Replace the implementation of PTRACE_KILL with a simple
send_sig_info(SIGKILL) followed by a return 0. This changes the
observable user space behavior only in that PTRACE_KILL on a process
not stopped in ptrace_stop will also kill it. As that has always
been the intent of the code this seems like a reasonable change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220505182645.497868-7-ebiederm@xmission.com
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 86dca369075b3e310c3c0adb0f81e513c562b5e4 upstream.
According to the latest event list, the event encoding 0x55
INST_DECODED.DECODERS and 0x56 UOPS_DECODED.DEC0 are only available on
the first 4 counters. Add them into the event constraints table.
Fixes: 6017608936c1 ("perf/x86/intel: Add Icelake support")
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220525133952.1660658-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7e0815b3e09986d2fe651199363e135b9358132a upstream.
When a XEN_HVM guest uses the XEN PIRQ/Eventchannel mechanism, then
PCI/MSI[-X] masking is solely controlled by the hypervisor, but contrary to
XEN_PV guests this does not disable PCI/MSI[-X] masking in the PCI/MSI
layer.
This can lead to a situation where the PCI/MSI layer masks an MSI[-X]
interrupt and the hypervisor grants the write despite the fact that it
already requested the interrupt. As a consequence interrupt delivery on the
affected device is not happening ever.
Set pci_msi_ignore_mask to prevent that like it's done for XEN_PV guests
already.
Fixes: 809f9267bbab ("xen: map MSIs into pirqs")
Reported-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Reported-by: Dusty Mabe <dustymabe@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Noah Meyerhans <noahm@debian.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87tuaduxj5.ffs@tglx
[nmeyerha@amazon.com: backported to 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Noah Meyerhans <nmeyerha@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is the 5.4.196 stable release
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
# gpg: Signature made Wed 25 May 2022 03:14:43 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
# Conflicts:
# fs/file_table.c
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This is the 5.4.194 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Sun 15 May 2022 01:55:08 PM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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This is the 5.4.193 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Thu 12 May 2022 06:24:08 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit d6f34f4c6b4a962eb7a86c923fea206f866a40be upstream.
Commit 2f62f36e62daec ("x86/xen: Make the boot CPU idle task reliable")
introduced a regression for booting 32 bit Xen PV guests: the address
of the initial stack needs to be a virtual one.
Fixes: 2f62f36e62daec ("x86/xen: Make the boot CPU idle task reliable")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200409070001.16675-1-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b28cb0cd2c5e80a8c0feb408a0e4b0dbb6d132c5 upstream.
When zapping obsolete pages, update the running count of zapped pages
regardless of whether or not the list has become unstable due to zapping
a shadow page with its own child shadow pages. If the VM is backed by
mostly 4kb pages, KVM can zap an absurd number of SPTEs without bumping
the batch count and thus without yielding. In the worst case scenario,
this can cause a soft lokcup.
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#12 stuck for 22s! [dirty_log_perf_:13020]
RIP: 0010:workingset_activation+0x19/0x130
mark_page_accessed+0x266/0x2e0
kvm_set_pfn_accessed+0x31/0x40
mmu_spte_clear_track_bits+0x136/0x1c0
drop_spte+0x1a/0xc0
mmu_page_zap_pte+0xef/0x120
__kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page+0x205/0x5e0
kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast+0xd7/0x190
kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_pages_in_memslot+0xe/0x10
kvm_page_track_flush_slot+0x5c/0x80
kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot+0xe/0x10
kvm_set_memslot+0x1a8/0x5d0
__kvm_set_memory_region+0x337/0x590
kvm_vm_ioctl+0xb08/0x1040
Fixes: fbb158cb88b6 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Revert "Revert "KVM: MMU: zap pages in batch""")
Reported-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220511145122.3133334-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4327d168515fd8b5b92fa1efdf1d219fb6514460 ]
The chacha_Nblock_xor_avx512vl() functions all have their own,
identical, .LdoneN label, however in one particular spot {2,4} jump to
the 8 version instead of their own. Resulting in:
arch/x86/crypto/chacha-x86_64.o: warning: objtool: chacha_2block_xor_avx512vl() falls through to next function chacha_8block_xor_avx512vl()
arch/x86/crypto/chacha-x86_64.o: warning: objtool: chacha_4block_xor_avx512vl() falls through to next function chacha_8block_xor_avx512vl()
Make each function consistently use its own done label.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f4f03f299a56ce4d73c5431e0327b3b6cb55ebb9 ]
The syscall_handler_t type for x86_64 was defined as 'long (*)(void)',
but always cast to 'long (*)(long, long, long, long, long, long)' before
use. This now triggers a warning (see below).
Define syscall_handler_t as the latter instead, and remove the cast.
This simplifies the code, and fixes the warning.
Warning:
In file included from ../arch/um/include/asm/processor-generic.h:13
from ../arch/x86/um/asm/processor.h:41
from ../include/linux/rcupdate.h:30
from ../include/linux/rculist.h:11
from ../include/linux/pid.h:5
from ../include/linux/sched.h:14
from ../include/linux/ptrace.h:6
from ../arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c:7:
../arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c: In function ‘handle_syscall’:
../arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/syscalls_64.h:18:11: warning: cast between incompatible function types from ‘long int (*)(void)’ to ‘long int (*)(long int, long int, long int, long int, long int, long int)’ [
-Wcast-function-type]
18 | (((long (*)(long, long, long, long, long, long)) \
| ^
../arch/x86/um/asm/ptrace.h:36:62: note: in definition of macro ‘PT_REGS_SET_SYSCALL_RETURN’
36 | #define PT_REGS_SET_SYSCALL_RETURN(r, res) (PT_REGS_AX(r) = (res))
| ^~~
../arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c:46:33: note: in expansion of macro ‘EXECUTE_SYSCALL’
46 | EXECUTE_SYSCALL(syscall, regs));
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Signed-off-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit c3881eb58d56116c79ac4ee4f40fd15ead124c4b upstream.
The unwinder reports the secondary CPU idle tasks' stack on XEN PV as
unreliable, which affects at least live patching.
cpu_initialize_context() sets up the context of the CPU through
VCPUOP_initialise hypercall. After it is woken up, the idle task starts
in cpu_bringup_and_idle() function and its stack starts at the offset
right below pt_regs. The unwinder correctly detects the end of stack
there but it is confused by NULL return address in the last frame.
Introduce a wrapper in assembly, which just calls
cpu_bringup_and_idle(). The return address is thus pushed on the stack
and the wrapper contains the annotation hint for the unwinder regarding
the stack state.
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Boehme <markubo@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Bruce Ashfield
Jan Beulich
Thomas Gleixner
Peter Zijlstra
Al Viro
Will Deacon
Juergen Gross
Naveen N. Rao
Jason A. Donenfeld
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
Richard Henderson
Josh Poimboeuf
Pawan Gupta
Gayatri Kammela
Tony Luck
Zhang Rui
Vincent Whitchurch
Sean Christopherson
Ravi Bangoria
Randy Dunlap
Matthieu Baerts
Ammar Faizi
Kirill A. Shutemov
Eric W. Biederman
Kan Liang
David Gow
Miroslav Benes