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2024-02-21Merge tag 'v4.19.300' into v4.19/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
This is the 4.19.300 stable release # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmVmGaYACgkQONu9yGCS # aT6nzRAApEttSs9XhWbu1hXqfcOUKBsq2BLss2+9zfp2jwhCVQFQOApU5xggjpww # 5ATVq2FQGEk1kMRpESeDdkW7fnFevwEgyZafYrBbbBk6/9bbWMyqMBhlGP7RWNY9 # KoEhpMOejOYfCc+Z/II+BDf3KK2roXnrO8L5rFnyOTeJxgmofAqWYe5WWtHlcDtK # z5KceJiXy0ddjgm6+nvpHrfStu9uDs+O63nf0XG6gmgFeRa/tI7hQg1mSUlpR8X3 # Ip5kk5pYjZ+T3gwepDJmhpOLW+xHeXKrbAb3nN38lPrRnnM/7lxp6FJkhkts6FqF # r/8MgWcKe2XpnxwiLvIFGV4jIG1GNC8ZYdVWYVNZxi+SdD6Jz9qLraAoTQDR6zSR # R60pond+MdjBzFeKsFvV6F5a4cDTY+REaVK92YV7y1U70IRR9UrsZipxmqcD0dxa # eRgLxM663DF0b1hjiP2WL4IxQSlVTPMJMj8U6eXtfdHebDOb+J/Qoq7mlQHd9ExL # S3snvJhAco0+SopK4v4GN1a5SHKx7a2Ua2OOG3CfHTRK3yoH5F/qE/cLpRR6vxxl # NVyB5N2s9zkgX4p+2rFi8XR2/DsBReTu2C8hzXQ6AGYLZ15qIvRIkXCSUBNZO3tt # r7h3+oUwmNQ478y7NWpAVGcczZQBel3NjHDZMIdWZJPLVffLP+A= # =B47s # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Tue 28 Nov 2023 11:47:34 AM EST # gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2024-02-21Merge tag 'v4.19.298' into v4.19/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
This is the 4.19.298 stable release # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmVLYWMACgkQONu9yGCS # aT7TWxAArWfLx5B55f2sGj/cDvs2xil315t1p/uhXCtgcstc/E+lxRipw3Bi3B0g # IwoBHoxteAhHVzscTJUypzi/lzNdKuIoNvtD/IxpIt/vcP2T/JMBVzrMTsClGkDI # xnaMq51lWT6Kpc3zt0k4EeAA9ifAeM45kIbZlPooJ15D6zuCLLMGdKiai8eYbOkM # X65dzw2FxtCvIP3FfBxr4opRsWmkXSxD7diRVe4XPE/RyLFePPMitFg/NvpK/QLW # +3aR6n0hhafvsYBE3T2+mb2A408uK7nT4aup25k9JF/RKhSzU2ZKTTZEtp92pZBr # pHiUGa2bitYryBvSt69wRRamqctonrwXcW0FCAX+JxxujcfBmSR/z1GudQEbKBm8 # ALY2vgoDHeilbVxUCVGqnBpvu8NgwBw7J3z5S5m913X2CtMpeotvGzgksEE+gzdV # Dw+l6bhj0vxAveYEgA5WVritymrh9NFNPQh32zeMG6FCcQCzuUd3gZPDECjcgFji # keK3e71vjVemvgsvwAyx1WPpD0KDwjqZCAUL39Zmc7gQUzLZx8E2ujTIabefwJIA # L3RQHFsVE141FojccKFpHhF/5ne6qAv74ZlXz0DBxstgx/acUCxqN7XJSVZw7OHN # bpF3F3KNv1xOpN28rh+4Qjzds4TKQ+de9OEVJA3ZG2QuUqoFWXE= # =013M # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Wed 08 Nov 2023 05:22:27 AM EST # gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2024-02-21Merge tag 'v4.19.297' into v4.19/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
This is the 4.19.297 stable release # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmU43RMACgkQONu9yGCS # aT6DURAAlNjp1I2Hi2sO/hvlYcY6vkZHAIDof1SXqJkthU4Chd8fvinjxbHTcuRd # vYGBB/u+fTjKiyRYFYiK2vLVQsD2YBIuP+bQtK3v1s+62qarGf+ahbFqRRlHIoRR # dE3rglx7SMITaZPdq4KFuC1etM206+JR0yU7lTcdLocNQRmZv9DEnVTq6SGLebUB # C0l+CaHy7F1yn1uuBVJi/gJH1+obTHyAViJzKY38E2Nevq8a0rUZd6V0xfGHUFue # x41NX+pjUkaAyH8qKahFxdIuabE/oNBjt6ZqEmceu2bOrjFI36a3r2/XYfqNxkD8 # HT9qEz+jY0ig2Zj4TdGcjrm58Ck3ZjTS9RBodeaYBYlqz/EnlR8Qk7kspfXGACF9 # iy5WcL0iSMbC3o5dy17k2Dhh6G9ZmhLlpzXuHlLvfM3U1dlO0aa48LhAO7MTNu6N # Abdyfqv1q4tSqsixUyVe2MQqAoZ7Px1FJRq5l24xvqKljNKFOgBnw9sjKfcRfG1K # O2F1dvEzLjFNxn7P+iZMfdoyg2Hf+GQ0gtLmq9fK04uAGW8UQRu51efJmujLZ42b # XVeAI4iw+uR1bFt9YI+WeAx3vg/lzP768+2YPf0zWUDf2k7RORvnP4XUZbddajet # fhqakuVIORwc53IM5m2XtMs7N88sWFrprbqjyoUPJYcgpzQyyOo= # =0+07 # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Wed 25 Oct 2023 05:17:07 AM EDT # gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2024-02-21Merge tag 'v4.19.295' into v4.19/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
This is the 4.19.295 stable release # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmUOpmEACgkQONu9yGCS # aT6vSQ/8D3yjJUYiUnHkiSzTMZHAtwR5qk0jCsqw1Xlr+XVouGCG/wpk8z7ckT6W # 4gsG5+QvuB4SfWXmbIn/rPApqQdQSiTicOfHrev705v0U+ib+kw1vgBKv38qkOlI # EZKuo7Ir1vZUnqghw9uIGperU3kEAt2EvWK37EBryukDoxbzDGIctOvAN7KMMbAJ # jPQciVOOAJrNNdgPOSrxs1OCdAkEYlDaNuBZ+9j/HjNQLB9KtdtsJ50gerCPA4rS # oKpZhnx9VJYXI9szor3T7q71iNfpJeL+mOrnpCSFVAFCPkesXQ+MG/GdgJJQDCMJ # 9VF12W6rpqVcKfYFdPX9WevkqMfHRpE4brotDQx36rpUwVFcP7HClJ2zE3p36QWV # Mfu4O31ZNkLUF8SmFXc3JXVyrwe/ARiha9nLH9VKZ7cSHoYUKlO4NeSGyHjz5J99 # RErBGpea7SgHTSLk30+sHaB3zhdUZyv8ej++zjTG9QA8bRbMp97I9psQ7FWhWDng # l6f87mdta1X76OJJPkL3yZfbiB/M58e514ptbDNhu4cnH/S6aB6I3K5IYVtfZI/9 # zESuavKEUks+Ng1vBUGsPGN/eHDaPWUkl7HewP7WXRDOQUjaIX/0saeaSiUFYNI7 # UYa72hD9fKMblkwxIl75ybI/WZRgw9fyrQeGG0DfX3t6kt6BhHM= # =bQT4 # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Sat 23 Sep 2023 04:48:33 AM EDT # gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2024-02-21Merge tag 'v4.19.292' into v4.19/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
This is the 4.19.292 stable release # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmTc9ZEACgkQONu9yGCS # aT7IMw/+LYTds5reVeXvYpOM3sVuLYTDcij7wC9lqkuGQ9Q3Qtx+joPLznWtMsIQ # 3GU6SV4IyB7clAckolxQBzcqAMDZ5yEl2qEKeQGMw2X5dR9svOsiTZCuRS4anCMZ # V1N99hmN7RYvnnSdqcixOyhsyF3GsOJaSjKwo4s306IabKqyi5LFj1FxIXzrP2bt # /hhJSgKtJ04CpcdlKdnXPGtjNwm6+K9H1IyJrzcqA0PUmIgmMVi4p+TL39H0o081 # hKuqvRZR/edek/DToNSpLltCFKPpy3PM7h/siWbJveqHpjim907ojxLbEzConDw8 # cVIOvevsf8W0mmly7B1jEW7yojWzUrfMY0DDMoBV3xT1EkIG7wtxfGoGVVIqlIft # qe657kMuFFYT3qS1SoCfBP6nKA/jCZsKxe9enaEm7cD3HHFE3vcjHmTA/4/qvRRc # mJ7M0X4qNosJ8YYxDeY63JWSB7JMOQJ65GmdobaJkTiHSca1prvPd8NBVuDBV2d4 # pMa1prMvPaAQZihasw/xKiiRc2/fMd8wCUxBzrlWxMtoeEhKEYXBiPby/GcMz2pp # HDW5m4vz35vgaAdYbGu1nFFWawc+2ielH3xedM9Mqvb7iU0xDPf9awragTFPjvbk # O7DOglpI5zOHsLjHBG7G7xKQuumUrErmJb/lQSKnTAVJaNbaIiY= # =WEWA # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Wed 16 Aug 2023 12:13:05 PM EDT # gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2024-02-21Merge tag 'v4.19.290' into v4.19/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
This is the 4.19.290 stable release # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmTSgNMACgkQONu9yGCS # aT7WJRAAne2EBFiKaxX9FLoGJ1+YTcx7QbG1kbxE3pVxSVRRmrGA+9D1L6p1bxlw # 6oi4l12999o+fL9IZMfKPESrkU2lGeFc9ifwOkDRc2JOpn/Ejq7HBQ6xijs9TTdz # X8HbHWUWevwGZXkcAbKXDJ7D1y6cVV6K7UxEe4eKbmbpHdaOfS1/KB1WDlfq2pIh # 32JVcO0+tVn/1HjZNvNRV7qbsnLVmLH6vFEsBhOfSlaDU6Wdi5iF2B3stg7+TMSz # AnVKT/Gv9LIHse2dmZlcTN1xeGYsmYXlN1JHqJ58X8Bsa/9FARxVDpOUxOlO4B2M # A4tWi6SguIMeseFBo9iwDFvRG84x7Ht1CoNiTeX5TeBNI+hkcuXMCxKlzdc5JGE/ # Pz7+ryyWreW67VSX4CZfd20Ppm757dZUQ95MacWhhcMcm7HpmQT5dbi0ijHcJbBM # wvcrU/XGGzAj44yFuhT2u6c0bFLjTn3AdsAnItadYdoIFI6J1akHXM8TC+p9TgW8 # T5D8M+6zDeHJQaQVwhp2Sp2Xjxbp/4L7Hh0tb3YfWcDbFrrWKazl9Bl0D6bvAg0g # UkPl/yoYPjWraw1SGCegWsHkUVxGaegCLCYRUITmZ+Z7Cajdm87G7MI5wrpl1H0g # YE8H7xyGevPMsIySdmkU1WGdnxPPE1dq89ZIKCJoi+lfeyI+xd0= # =GaK6 # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Tue 08 Aug 2023 01:52:19 PM EDT # gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2024-02-21Merge tag 'v4.19.289' into v4.19/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
This is the 4.19.289 stable release # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmS+sQgACgkQONu9yGCS # aT57rw/9EP/+Qt70LPLV8jzDPJRaWDjD9Tbr+b4vCL8TkU7gJK/9sIWafM3RlMM9 # 74wwP5J7Mmw+91tW2Gl89gapfAl9Ax5SSwWYXdAM/SFwLHaWMb1ylr+uFwxWLeQ4 # 3hqxXO/HhgrIDFQPi9fp1VUorlOcOaSUTPA4nB3PDVsvXOHODSdq08o7Er2Tps2L # lqy7JtAmo3cVbTP5C5foMBLJvRjk2pK8OpNVswXfe3Mc/KHlTLFe8gCJYJR7TCuH # mdGdkxGpsDdlQl5JQdekAFUATBFR5yl5iqBl1lo4yaULoRZP54yPDWDpDm+LG00d # nW6wfCpO3+GW+UszMHg0pGqkrYkZHQ6Tdj8fUvEf+Ykmv9aW/itVoT5BTruHItvi # 53JyurHTZhuVlToHZYRuJpfOnUzoTptOqQSYvgEDw+1mRu+VjhV3SmzVndf1DP1P # AgSc/87Y+aeC9Z0NtTNlMUQPlzyE6nIX13wduHnbOawdwhBCoXAA6aFPRPe+A7gr # 2s8qoajmdM7vE1h7O0JsiCLRk6CFQZpApnGSfjz1uYygDOIArKoEulA+bkBJSOUe # h2UTtjsWVY4VhjN682DG7J2wsfEMogy/ssFcKDGKHiORV0t73uOM87CW35wU4Vx7 # WSYONO5kuClhnoF+BctWgKOc7xAfnxkoxvV3hEdlBjR+/kOFjhQ= # =/2cy # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Mon 24 Jul 2023 01:12:40 PM EDT # gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2024-02-21Merge tag 'v4.19.284' into v4.19/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
This is the 4.19.284 stable release # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmR14SUACgkQONu9yGCS # aT5twA/9FzPtWeYCa9WdaW3YrlwXAwUSX+Q749XupcGbrXS1cljiB7XzvSQ48Ce9 # FrI+b4UNRmq1sjBq39GMVTCpVcis1PhI5uthvP/eNIazFvAb8Ksidsv10cGKtmi6 # dhe8+z6InAut46npKt+YHLTrgu+rkQ7nWk5thT52JLD2VsTf/AwNvy2wDVrtpwND # XldYW/jP6GErmPXVdy2nBzP5kFKWpd6DIVrnKrP0g+G1UF6mV1mg2Bt9aoMyWenK # TU9cv+FwAr40EmPSn6ooJbo0oOgJrkOidaoJEIgzOw4MWv/lNd6dijuKlkfKg56s # elIa+TAlQBkkfXWNDSg8RCT0Im6iw+qVMmuIUvn4Y6zyFhQS2kBPZHavOHrIdYK3 # HKkEjl1l24z/k7HSkPVS+FR7YxF9EeQunJBJjA3NGLx4woFVoqCgCp5C5cAyC1D1 # lVE8lAPq/R5oIPgsL7WwYCdwvlnoA4R8HFmS/53ySRxQ839A0Ea1vQB96ISPdoGk # AxU1DarM+BxLQbYVaW+HmDctox0wlhV9pmlSmRNzGDno0OsME9e7grUSxBC96ogf # GFFYs2zTKE8y9/1LzBQSrJdXHjofOrupIEVHHcb8Bit6tuQ/hAIYl4erzIrJUc1e # c0OuIcevfYbyUFYzYnWFkPWo0akRWcAIUKba5rzQV4lPpCGOfJc= # =0ViV # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Tue 30 May 2023 07:42:29 AM EDT # gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2024-02-21Merge tag 'v4.19.276' into v4.19/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
This is the 4.19.276 stable release # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmQMnvwACgkQONu9yGCS # aT7Wnw/8D4Y0jHf5hAU2MrVU+8aBdqdJ3CMUuqaq1/zi0yq3cWyDJo7sU5L3Tpdl # NBDdEtdAPDVK/jZ+BCtgtwccTG8Vnt8uXsVpcKJ50hBPnWfcJ9g+asrEOnIN4MI4 # 2ltYKfDxN/n/QB9j2V1s+Nj5+VT1oTJQ112ksvn354REMO14htiSZtX7Y9Av3qks # PhHf6R+482/a59zSKM4F3HMGhcSzvPz56FT736MPmd0hvfokDYzSmNRUWx5yKgHh # MRUmS//yc7Q24VSmrwz4PlOqolso0w2FiIxUz6i2/O/vZ/qQiZMTlanSC9cQ3gx1 # /zEGSxMRzCzTS/huPIbldSIfaLmfRY4zHpnIuKsqT6OSq4xg5BXO1p6MuUkhN9E0 # FB8Wl4xPIcqZ7BMHNYUQIp61tE57NPKzI/WiAaqgDLQPKLDsNp3YOj5aGvxFZ4lc # beeEIhv3nD7r4+7U1j+yGejdTigOU2LlBVyjjir93pDy0RsgjoGdvzp0pnjZqsPG # An0R/2PlGINwYX5oROPt/lr6tFbshYKB5QfcMxCJ1+MN5h4T5Nc3SJsuw/U92iH/ # MSUb6oDOsbM3FuqnHlVGJu96ttiKNO3hz6IjC1NtaWFUCTtImbsBxWNn51mJ5Svg # +YZhzyKFya40pXMQrT3dSV4NxPnUBqI65Il2Lq1LD5zLjZC2eRg= # =zwmc # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Sat 11 Mar 2023 10:32:12 AM EST # gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2024-02-21Merge tag 'v4.19.268' into v4.19/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
This is the 4.19.268 stable release # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmORulwACgkQONu9yGCS # aT7rlxAAqr6GK3Ei3JnP+/bWtrZxOZaMJ3v4d+o0x680B0MYPiCl8O2MGLOTFh5S # TLhYsYEddu+xAmLBLDFJzylIPr6EDKXBDS8i4w6/WWJA2Wqvk2vp2Mculm6OeIly # Np7NycSvqpxxfWCxqzilUqdu5pcTGbUB6fM+iCXIeDxLhFN+q4gztIBSBUwr2fHI # Okek8QOPHQGT2dQQvQLSo/41MQYm0g6d5U2/mvkRysz9esUKB5TqYBxBkla6hb8s # A83fZ/TGZwulwyJUhJVbEGsQ0Jbr/uzRS6LrRkAFYMp+FQN194w+2Xb/AN6xiKij # miVZxUgS+tLbuL2CZ+AjEVlkOdtQMLvzn3GNX+iYAMPnXvPiLq6cVhCvm77EM6Xs # gQ1fc42REvnLl03lIvYcIBNG6ESXCBzLaX+qHPqPzl3OPcOv9VYVMEzQ0DVXXp+I # +3fzLoQNLbtV7OSQ17d+Uxijw0U2aXMemoPlGGAxhntIs/Pn/NGhGSKmYed9aImp # 328YgGIBvaqINrAuenaXLckzEcxXRzfb+iM+V7yJ1gE5pam0eppbbuH2hTQTIzqS # PPqWdq6fPSjgB/RvRURj36bGgUIMdei8Jt0/GXDWgIe4qgstDJKAQ2fQuiVVOfI0 # arMRtQSW8wTB/gOTOSgGpNiEywqK8mj7EtutOFUdGa5IAdloMZY= # =+EDx # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Thu 08 Dec 2022 05:20:12 AM EST # gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2024-02-21Merge tag 'v4.19.267' into v4.19/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
This is the 4.19.267 stable release # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmOA8CAACgkQONu9yGCS # aT6V4BAAxRZAMCEAeeruu1tUNaZHWVmZkpsawlC9c4+lavSkniYbcXenkmgYBBcs # 4GCklhZawUnDFl9VqC9xrn39aRdLX8jTL5tFSNlN+qbQyZ1SkEgvM2eeXHBzBfWP # SALX15eLoCe4p4RzhwL5nlZZ9Z1siSnPUKO8og+j81X65DpYrIWRmimZthOY733a # u6emEYrC7wcpuO9DyEU6ZhkHrvrBRSeaSELeUcShwfK4vlAV5FKSRUgmcIDT7mTe # gtLSh/qlsEO3t0UxPckqG6tsgDofuK7o04YkLzV6y2TMgRoLSJdzn9bid65e3h2R # jT8FcnBBxJgA42i/0e1UIbYgIisnt2NG1Tq8OrrVXe6N5eF7KhoFOZXiZ+Qq0xam # WbxPe6jZu1cgrSh9tV1xOX09By31uzc3C6zAMwz/KQbXYcaDQeL/krl+IolDxab7 # 4fIHDGpmIS26aSr2GMWs9z+UDgIH5KOXEweLCsCquRIEwLcpvsPMnq7fnHlAspMX # O393TY53BtpGIHYGhHJuWuLFIH11Rb3RiTJxU2lsZzHrETR/THirf6T8a6yYWwCo # lY8tk1XuHQ89X2e+TAsQJ6LJqz2tnHPo01zqhsH7wJKCmnBE3VMzg1NeNxhW3q/i # CEpoZYF3NhHSRvg0Jcj/DyGI7zuMGRyxprzhtso348+rQ+lYhVQ= # =Ufv3 # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Fri 25 Nov 2022 11:41:04 AM EST # gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2024-02-21Merge tag 'v4.19.266' into v4.19/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
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2024-02-21Merge tag 'v4.19.262' into v4.19/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
This is the 4.19.262 stable release # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmNZGCIACgkQONu9yGCS # aT5dEQ//Q2YBvqn1WGhMJRRtIYeczfwvLh3b5duyt1nbf7KOA7yrjpmaQvszunLj # FanBKsf9QrekTxMUJ9++RlFQy/pxkexy39P3ddlE+QQnKeY+lBr5fc/XSBOmmvm+ # f1CInT4C6nRRn/r/vCumGfuhZ6o+BLwPPgkTCOs9ima6iaq7nLqgFquznVQ2XFJG # SCtS+OPjnoH7HMOw9vXefd53KJJj5kpE+2fMnEBjdW7x4mPM6nwY3ZxB8sIUdLXe # dtfDku6W1I8qnGSnI0B+I8/4psNYr/7j4UVTgEKSGmlKKzc78qypdX8YiOGExa84 # MWQrEcIGBOzOaMt5F5RWbGbQmwDtlZC2yuTc5YeJ1eSZ6WfZ42rRu+SkMgloRpjO # bCzKI8bZ6jmRFNeAPSuR9sF/fRrXlgPsszWYALwy9TTPMvG33jrJaiGwYCOuRxP/ # Fn9C1AshGI+Yy7pX5PR+yOWeII4fgwFBo3Oxritm0RG31KZoXKsrVdyb5CwAD0Sf # VMb4SNapWwjWKOqi39jAzxgmvkFAwv99HC77dLZhTzwsW+c0+8CH0ccpX/V9997v # i2IfCLEoOODlpjjoEgeoZ1lwOSX4/cSrlO4L7qcw+vkmXplEkOnD5Lj5Sdw+m9Hp # 1uwQGVZyngK/eMxInDLlrOFY9SOASCIs+XjJpzqimXp1cTLLEHM= # =2I2l # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Wed 26 Oct 2022 07:21:06 AM EDT # gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2024-02-21Merge tag 'v4.19.258' into v4.19/standard/baseBruce Ashfield
This is the 4.19.258 stable release # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmMi+60ACgkQONu9yGCS # aT5vGA/+KE+vkoWSnrIUxwdzned5iCqHJxX08335ZjPHlTu9IueQWr7GjV35EdGD # Q0JmavR9TcUpWBZgUS9oYSD9J9AVd6VdSJ33fyhvWotsewKrmrTmsVAWeTVb0r/K # JYCzd7wx5li7xBsjCJ4ofx9+ETCKhgf+QFXMx123IN+nPC+Xk0IFBb07o+j5htLE # 7N0wx6pWFjo8Wr8Uol6yx5AFIgg1CTWvpYfpgFa0uTodKobfu9qHU8j+GcHtM0YA # oJmEjRL1l7bX5ezizcOdot1m5v7SUOyYoJVHhbViCIHS14ZzwAwjdYfb5BxsfM+G # JdJI9TM59At+HGkL3CY1X8Z/mDZSGchEL1OOjqrM8H3xutg8XDg+thSgpQ0sJlB+ # ywfdjt4FXV0NESp9qWJMCpEYCgjZ0XNJgugBqtB2bhuPFjdCX1ZSjJ9bYOJQJPI0 # k+XsFbKzRJUV7EOWUZHBv4IetXnfRHqHW2il/776vf4h4D3S5EHg4qgz3MqyCMPL # mUhOhYWd9/CSU9Y/SXx150xCJ4qa6bRbD61/M5glBxkW+PkwgXRMk+1v/Iz/emyX # dUzjPmIn5xA1Cm/D4IZjBYfcY9XntyatB6aUC+vy4LeLaECjDXBwzu5ArQlH8cWY # b1RJS8dQcjF56hHGky6e4u6i6V8XPv+MiXuejOYhWFvUHD4q2Y8= # =Acx+ # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Thu 15 Sep 2022 06:17:17 AM EDT # gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2023-11-28KVM: x86: Ignore MSR_AMD64_TW_CFG accessMaciej S. Szmigiero
commit 2770d4722036d6bd24bcb78e9cd7f6e572077d03 upstream. Hyper-V enabled Windows Server 2022 KVM VM cannot be started on Zen1 Ryzen since it crashes at boot with SYSTEM_THREAD_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED + STATUS_PRIVILEGED_INSTRUCTION (in other words, because of an unexpected #GP in the guest kernel). This is because Windows tries to set bit 8 in MSR_AMD64_TW_CFG and can't handle receiving a #GP when doing so. Give this MSR the same treatment that commit 2e32b7190641 ("x86, kvm: Add MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2 to the list of ignored MSRs") gave MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2 under justification that this MSR is baremetal-relevant only. Although apparently it was then needed for Linux guests, not Windows as in this case. With this change, the aforementioned guest setup is able to finish booting successfully. This issue can be reproduced either on a Summit Ridge Ryzen (with just "-cpu host") or on a Naples EPYC (with "-cpu host,stepping=1" since EPYC is ordinarily stepping 2). Alternatively, userspace could solve the problem by using MSR filters, but forcing every userspace to define a filter isn't very friendly and doesn't add much, if any, value. The only potential hiccup is if one of these "baremetal-only" MSRs ever requires actual emulation and/or has F/M/S specific behavior. But if that happens, then KVM can still punt *that* handling to userspace since userspace MSR filters "win" over KVM's default handling. Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1ce85d9c7c9e9632393816cf19c902e0a3f411f1.1697731406.git.maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com [sean: call out MSR filtering alternative] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-11-28x86/mm: Drop the 4 MB restriction on minimal NUMA node memory sizeMike Rapoport (IBM)
[ Upstream commit a1e2b8b36820d8c91275f207e77e91645b7c6836 ] Qi Zheng reported crashes in a production environment and provided a simplified example as a reproducer: | For example, if we use Qemu to start a two NUMA node kernel, | one of the nodes has 2M memory (less than NODE_MIN_SIZE), | and the other node has 2G, then we will encounter the | following panic: | | BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 | <...> | RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x22/0x40 | <...> | Call Trace: | <TASK> | deactivate_slab() | bootstrap() | kmem_cache_init() | start_kernel() | secondary_startup_64_no_verify() The crashes happen because of inconsistency between the nodemask that has nodes with less than 4MB as memoryless, and the actual memory fed into the core mm. The commit: 9391a3f9c7f1 ("[PATCH] x86_64: Clear more state when ignoring empty node in SRAT parsing") ... that introduced minimal size of a NUMA node does not explain why a node size cannot be less than 4MB and what boot failures this restriction might fix. Fixes have been submitted to the core MM code to tighten up the memory topologies it accepts and to not crash on weird input: mm: page_alloc: skip memoryless nodes entirely mm: memory_hotplug: drop memoryless node from fallback lists Andrew has accepted them into the -mm tree, but there are no stable SHA1's yet. This patch drops the limitation for minimal node size on x86: - which works around the crash without the fixes to the core MM. - makes x86 topologies less weird, - removes an arbitrary and undocumented limitation on NUMA topologies. [ mingo: Improved changelog clarity. ] Reported-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com> Tested-by: Mario Casquero <mcasquer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZS+2qqjEO5/867br@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-11-08x86/mm: Fix RESERVE_BRK() for older binutilsJosh Poimboeuf
commit e32683c6f7d22ba624e0bfc58b02cf3348bdca63 upstream. With binutils 2.26, RESERVE_BRK() causes a build failure: /tmp/ccnGOKZ5.s: Assembler messages: /tmp/ccnGOKZ5.s:98: Error: missing ')' /tmp/ccnGOKZ5.s:98: Error: missing ')' /tmp/ccnGOKZ5.s:98: Error: missing ')' /tmp/ccnGOKZ5.s:98: Error: junk at end of line, first unrecognized character is `U' The problem is this line: RESERVE_BRK(early_pgt_alloc, INIT_PGT_BUF_SIZE) Specifically, the INIT_PGT_BUF_SIZE macro which (via PAGE_SIZE's use _AC()) has a "1UL", which makes older versions of the assembler unhappy. Unfortunately the _AC() macro doesn't work for inline asm. Inline asm was only needed here to convince the toolchain to add the STT_NOBITS flag. However, if a C variable is placed in a section whose name is prefixed with ".bss", GCC and Clang automatically set STT_NOBITS. In fact, ".bss..page_aligned" already relies on this trick. So fix the build failure (and simplify the macro) by allocating the variable in C. Also, add NOLOAD to the ".brk" output section clause in the linker script. This is a failsafe in case the ".bss" prefix magic trick ever stops working somehow. If there's a section type mismatch, the GNU linker will force the ".brk" output section to be STT_NOBITS. The LLVM linker will fail with a "section type mismatch" error. Note this also changes the name of the variable from .brk.##name to __brk_##name. The variable names aren't actually used anywhere, so it's harmless. Fixes: a1e2c031ec39 ("x86/mm: Simplify RESERVE_BRK()") Reported-by: Joe Damato <jdamato@fastly.com> Reported-by: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Joe Damato <jdamato@fastly.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/22d07a44c80d8e8e1e82b9a806ddc8c6bbb2606e.1654759036.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org [nathan: Fix conflict due to lack of 360db4ace311 and resolve silent conflict with 360db4ace3117] Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-11-08x86/mm: Simplify RESERVE_BRK()Josh Poimboeuf
commit a1e2c031ec3949b8c039b739c0b5bf9c30007b00 upstream. RESERVE_BRK() reserves data in the .brk_reservation section. The data is initialized to zero, like BSS, so the macro specifies 'nobits' to prevent the data from taking up space in the vmlinux binary. The only way to get the compiler to do that (without putting the variable in .bss proper) is to use inline asm. The macro also has a hack which encloses the inline asm in a discarded function, which allows the size to be passed (global inline asm doesn't allow inputs). Remove the need for the discarded function hack by just stringifying the size rather than supplying it as an input to the inline asm. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506121631.133110232@infradead.org [nathan: Fix conflict due to lack of 2b6ff7dea670 and 33def8498fdd] Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-11-08x86/i8259: Skip probing when ACPI/MADT advertises PCAT compatibilityThomas Gleixner
commit 128b0c9781c9f2651bea163cb85e52a6c7be0f9e upstream. David and a few others reported that on certain newer systems some legacy interrupts fail to work correctly. Debugging revealed that the BIOS of these systems leaves the legacy PIC in uninitialized state which makes the PIC detection fail and the kernel switches to a dummy implementation. Unfortunately this fallback causes quite some code to fail as it depends on checks for the number of legacy PIC interrupts or the availability of the real PIC. In theory there is no reason to use the PIC on any modern system when IO/APIC is available, but the dependencies on the related checks cannot be resolved trivially and on short notice. This needs lots of analysis and rework. The PIC detection has been added to avoid quirky checks and force selection of the dummy implementation all over the place, especially in VM guest scenarios. So it's not an option to revert the relevant commit as that would break a lot of other scenarios. One solution would be to try to initialize the PIC on detection fail and retry the detection, but that puts the burden on everything which does not have a PIC. Fortunately the ACPI/MADT table header has a flag field, which advertises in bit 0 that the system is PCAT compatible, which means it has a legacy 8259 PIC. Evaluate that bit and if set avoid the detection routine and keep the real PIC installed, which then gets initialized (for nothing) and makes the rest of the code with all the dependencies work again. Fixes: e179f6914152 ("x86, irq, pic: Probe for legacy PIC and set legacy_pic appropriately") Reported-by: David Lazar <dlazar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: David Lazar <dlazar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218003 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/875y2u5s8g.ffs@tglx Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-10-25x86/cpu: Fix AMD erratum #1485 on Zen4-based CPUsBorislav Petkov (AMD)
commit f454b18e07f518bcd0c05af17a2239138bff52de upstream. Fix erratum #1485 on Zen4 parts where running with STIBP disabled can cause an #UD exception. The performance impact of the fix is negligible. Reported-by: René Rebe <rene@exactcode.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Tested-by: René Rebe <rene@exactcode.de> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/D99589F4-BC5D-430B-87B2-72C20370CF57@exactcode.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-09-23x86/virt: Drop unnecessary check on extended CPUID level in cpu_has_svm()Sean Christopherson
[ Upstream commit 5df8ecfe3632d5879d1f154f7aa8de441b5d1c89 ] Drop the explicit check on the extended CPUID level in cpu_has_svm(), the kernel's cached CPUID info will leave the entire SVM leaf unset if said leaf is not supported by hardware. Prior to using cached information, the check was needed to avoid false positives due to Intel's rather crazy CPUID behavior of returning the values of the maximum supported leaf if the specified leaf is unsupported. Fixes: 682a8108872f ("x86/kvm/svm: Simplify cpu_has_svm()") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230721201859.2307736-13-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-16x86: Move gds_ucode_mitigated() declaration to headerArnd Bergmann
commit eb3515dc99c7c85f4170b50838136b2a193f8012 upstream. The declaration got placed in the .c file of the caller, but that causes a warning for the definition: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:682:6: error: no previous prototype for 'gds_ucode_mitigated' [-Werror=missing-prototypes] Move it to a header where both sides can observe it instead. Fixes: 81ac7e5d74174 ("KVM: Add GDS_NO support to KVM") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230809130530.1913368-2-arnd%40kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-08x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigationDaniel Sneddon
commit 8974eb588283b7d44a7c91fa09fcbaf380339f3a upstream Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in vector registers. Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical side channel techniques like cache timing attacks. This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons. First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it. This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control bit alone. Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX. It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be mitigated against GDS. The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-08x86/fpu: Remove cpuinfo argument from init functionsThomas Gleixner
commit 1f34bb2a24643e0087652d81078e4f616562738d upstream Nothing in the call chain requires it Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.783704297@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-08init, x86: Move mem_encrypt_init() into arch_cpu_finalize_init()Thomas Gleixner
commit 439e17576eb47f26b78c5bbc72e344d4206d2327 upstream Invoke the X86ism mem_encrypt_init() from X86 arch_cpu_finalize_init() and remove the weak fallback from the core code. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.670360645@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-08x86/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init()Thomas Gleixner
commit 7c7077a72674402654f3291354720cd73cdf649e upstream check_bugs() is a dumping ground for finalizing the CPU bringup. Only parts of it has to do with actual CPU bugs. Split it apart into arch_cpu_finalize_init() and cpu_select_mitigations(). Fixup the bogus 32bit comments while at it. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.019583869@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-24x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fixBorislav Petkov (AMD)
Upstream commit: 522b1d69219d8f083173819fde04f994aa051a98 Add a fix for the Zen2 VZEROUPPER data corruption bug where under certain circumstances executing VZEROUPPER can cause register corruption or leak data. The optimal fix is through microcode but in the case the proper microcode revision has not been applied, enable a fallback fix using a chicken bit. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-05-30x86/mm: Avoid incomplete Global INVLPG flushesDave Hansen
commit ce0b15d11ad837fbacc5356941712218e38a0a83 upstream. The INVLPG instruction is used to invalidate TLB entries for a specified virtual address. When PCIDs are enabled, INVLPG is supposed to invalidate TLB entries for the specified address for both the current PCID *and* Global entries. (Note: Only kernel mappings set Global=1.) Unfortunately, some INVLPG implementations can leave Global translations unflushed when PCIDs are enabled. As a workaround, never enable PCIDs on affected processors. I expect there to eventually be microcode mitigations to replace this software workaround. However, the exact version numbers where that will happen are not known today. Once the version numbers are set in stone, the processor list can be tweaked to only disable PCIDs on affected processors with affected microcode. Note: if anyone wants a quick fix that doesn't require patching, just stick 'nopcid' on your kernel command-line. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-03-11x86/microcode/AMD: Add a @cpu parameter to the reloading functionsBorislav Petkov (AMD)
commit a5ad92134bd153a9ccdcddf09a95b088f36c3cce upstream. Will be used in a subsequent change. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230130161709.11615-3-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-03-11x86/crash: Disable virt in core NMI crash handler to avoid double shootdownSean Christopherson
commit 26044aff37a5455b19a91785086914fd33053ef4 upstream. Disable virtualization in crash_nmi_callback() and rework the emergency_vmx_disable_all() path to do an NMI shootdown if and only if a shootdown has not already occurred. NMI crash shootdown fundamentally can't support multiple invocations as responding CPUs are deliberately put into halt state without unblocking NMIs. But, the emergency reboot path doesn't have any work of its own, it simply cares about disabling virtualization, i.e. so long as a shootdown occurred, emergency reboot doesn't care who initiated the shootdown, or when. If "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" is specified on the kernel command line, panic() will invoke crash_smp_send_stop() and result in a second call to nmi_shootdown_cpus() during native_machine_emergency_restart(). Invoke the callback _before_ disabling virtualization, as the current VMCS needs to be cleared before doing VMXOFF. Note, this results in a subtle change in ordering between disabling virtualization and stopping Intel PT on the responding CPUs. While VMX and Intel PT do interact, VMXOFF and writes to MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL do not induce faults between one another, which is all that matters when panicking. Harden nmi_shootdown_cpus() against multiple invocations to try and capture any such kernel bugs via a WARN instead of hanging the system during a crash/dump, e.g. prior to the recent hardening of register_nmi_handler(), re-registering the NMI handler would trigger a double list_add() and hang the system if CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=y. list_add double add: new=ffffffff82220800, prev=ffffffff8221cfe8, next=ffffffff82220800. WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1319 at lib/list_debug.c:29 __list_add_valid+0x67/0x70 Call Trace: __register_nmi_handler+0xcf/0x130 nmi_shootdown_cpus+0x39/0x90 native_machine_emergency_restart+0x1c9/0x1d0 panic+0x237/0x29b Extract the disabling logic to a common helper to deduplicate code, and to prepare for doing the shootdown in the emergency reboot path if SVM is supported. Note, prior to commit ed72736183c4 ("x86/reboot: Force all cpus to exit VMX root if VMX is supported"), nmi_shootdown_cpus() was subtly protected against a second invocation by a cpu_vmx_enabled() check as the kdump handler would disable VMX if it ran first. Fixes: ed72736183c4 ("x86/reboot: Force all cpus to exit VMX root if VMX is supported") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220427224924.592546-2-gpiccoli@igalia.com Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130233650.1404148-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-03-11x86/virt: Force GIF=1 prior to disabling SVM (for reboot flows)Sean Christopherson
commit 6a3236580b0b1accc3976345e723104f74f6f8e6 upstream. Set GIF=1 prior to disabling SVM to ensure that INIT is recognized if the kernel is disabling SVM in an emergency, e.g. if the kernel is about to jump into a crash kernel or may reboot without doing a full CPU RESET. If GIF is left cleared, the new kernel (or firmware) will be unabled to awaken APs. Eat faults on STGI (due to EFER.SVME=0) as it's possible that SVM could be disabled via NMI shootdown between reading EFER.SVME and executing STGI. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cbcb6f35-e5d7-c1c9-4db9-fe5cc4de579a@amd.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130233650.1404148-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-03-11x86/bugs: Reset speculation control settings on initBreno Leitao
[ Upstream commit 0125acda7d76b943ca55811df40ed6ec0ecf670f ] Currently, x86_spec_ctrl_base is read at boot time and speculative bits are set if Kconfig items are enabled. For example, IBRS is enabled if CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY is configured, etc. These MSR bits are not cleared if the mitigations are disabled. This is a problem when kexec-ing a kernel that has the mitigation disabled from a kernel that has the mitigation enabled. In this case, the MSR bits are not cleared during the new kernel boot. As a result, this might have some performance degradation that is hard to pinpoint. This problem does not happen if the machine is (hard) rebooted because the bit will be cleared by default. [ bp: Massage. ] Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221128153148.1129350-1-leitao@debian.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-08x86/tsx: Add a feature bit for TSX control MSR supportPawan Gupta
commit aaa65d17eec372c6a9756833f3964ba05b05ea14 upstream. Support for the TSX control MSR is enumerated in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. This is different from how other CPU features are enumerated i.e. via CPUID. Currently, a call to tsx_ctrl_is_supported() is required for enumerating the feature. In the absence of a feature bit for TSX control, any code that relies on checking feature bits directly will not work. In preparation for adding a feature bit check in MSR save/restore during suspend/resume, set a new feature bit X86_FEATURE_TSX_CTRL when MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is present. [ bp: Remove tsx_ctrl_is_supported()] [Pawan: Resolved conflicts in backport; Removed parts of commit message referring to removed function tsx_ctrl_is_supported()] Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/de619764e1d98afbb7a5fa58424f1278ede37b45.1668539735.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-12-08x86/bugs: Make sure MSR_SPEC_CTRL is updated properly upon resume from S3Pawan Gupta
commit 66065157420c5b9b3f078f43d313c153e1ff7f83 upstream. The "force" argument to write_spec_ctrl_current() is currently ambiguous as it does not guarantee the MSR write. This is due to the optimization that writes to the MSR happen only when the new value differs from the cached value. This is fine in most cases, but breaks for S3 resume when the cached MSR value gets out of sync with the hardware MSR value due to S3 resetting it. When x86_spec_ctrl_current is same as x86_spec_ctrl_base, the MSR write is skipped. Which results in SPEC_CTRL mitigations not getting restored. Move the MSR write from write_spec_ctrl_current() to a new function that unconditionally writes to the MSR. Update the callers accordingly and rename functions. [ bp: Rework a bit. ] Fixes: caa0ff24d5d0 ("x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value") Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/806d39b0bfec2fe8f50dc5446dff20f5bb24a959.1669821572.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-12-08Revert "x86/speculation: Change FILL_RETURN_BUFFER to work with objtool"Ben Hutchings
This reverts commit 9f3330d4930e034d84ee6561fbfb098433ff0ab9, which was commit 089dd8e53126ebaf506e2dc0bf89d652c36bfc12 upstream. The necessary changes to objtool have not been backported to 4.19. Backporting this commit alone only added build warnings. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-25x86/cpu: Restore AMD's DE_CFG MSR after resumeBorislav Petkov
commit 2632daebafd04746b4b96c2f26a6021bc38f6209 upstream. DE_CFG contains the LFENCE serializing bit, restore it on resume too. This is relevant to older families due to the way how they do S3. Unify and correct naming while at it. Fixes: e4d0e84e4907 ("x86/cpu/AMD: Make LFENCE a serializing instruction") Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com> Reported-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-23x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protectionsDaniel Sneddon
commit 2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3 upstream. tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE. == Background == Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e. Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires the MSR to be written on every privilege level change. To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change. When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests. == Problem == Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM: void run_kvm_guest(void) { // Prepare to run guest VMRESUME(); // Clean up after guest runs } The execution flow for that would look something like this to the processor: 1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest() 2. Host-side: VMRESUME 3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function" 4. VM exit, host runs again 5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls 6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest() Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code: * on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing. * on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff the last RSB entry "by hand". IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL instruction. However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem since the (untrusted) guest controls this address. Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected. == Solution == The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates PBRSB. Systems setting RSB_VMEXIT need no further mitigation - i.e., eIBRS systems which enable legacy IBRS explicitly. However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RSB_VMEXIT and most of them need a new mitigation. Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB_VMEXIT. The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline -- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET. Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an LFENCE. In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window with the LFENCE. There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB. Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB. Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO. [ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ] Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [ bp: Adjust patch to account for kvm entry being in c ] Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-23x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_currentNathan Chancellor
commit db886979683a8360ced9b24ab1125ad0c4d2cf76 upstream. Clang warns: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:58:21: error: section attribute is specified on redeclared variable [-Werror,-Wsection] DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current); ^ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h:283:12: note: previous declaration is here extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_current; ^ 1 error generated. The declaration should be using DECLARE_PER_CPU instead so all attributes stay in sync. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: fc02735b14ff ("KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-23x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behaviorPawan Gupta
commit 4ad3278df6fe2b0852b00d5757fc2ccd8e92c26e upstream. Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI. Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines, eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target may get influenced by branch history. A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2). For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [bwh: Backported to 5.15: adjust context in scattered.c] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> [sam: Fixed for missing X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB context] Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <samjonas@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-23x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NOAndrew Cooper
commit 26aae8ccbc1972233afd08fb3f368947c0314265 upstream. BTC_NO indicates that hardware is not susceptible to Branch Type Confusion. Zen3 CPUs don't suffer BTC. Hypervisors are expected to synthesise BTC_NO when it is appropriate given the migration pool, to prevent kernels using heuristics. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [ bp: Adjust context ] Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-23x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRSJosh Poimboeuf
commit 9756bba28470722dacb79ffce554336dd1f6a6cd upstream. Prevent RSB underflow/poisoning attacks with RSB. While at it, add a bunch of comments to attempt to document the current state of tribal knowledge about RSB attacks and what exactly is being mitigated. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [ bp: Adjust for the fact that vmexit is in inline assembly ] Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-23KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRSJosh Poimboeuf
commit fc02735b14fff8c6678b521d324ade27b1a3d4cf upstream. On eIBRS systems, the returns in the vmexit return path from __vmx_vcpu_run() to vmx_vcpu_run() are exposed to RSB poisoning attacks. Fix that by moving the post-vmexit spec_ctrl handling to immediately after the vmexit. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [ bp: Adjust for the fact that vmexit is in inline assembly ] Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-23x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handlingJosh Poimboeuf
commit e6aa13622ea8283cc699cac5d018cc40a2ba2010 upstream. The firmware entry code may accidentally clear STIBP or SSBD. Fix that. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-23x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=nJosh Poimboeuf
commit b2620facef4889fefcbf2e87284f34dcd4189bce upstream. If a kernel is built with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n, but the user still wants to mitigate Spectre v2 using IBRS or eIBRS, the RSB filling will be silently disabled. There's nothing retpoline-specific about RSB buffer filling. Remove the CONFIG_RETPOLINE guards around it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-23x86/speculation: Change FILL_RETURN_BUFFER to work with objtoolPeter Zijlstra
commit 089dd8e53126ebaf506e2dc0bf89d652c36bfc12 upstream. Change FILL_RETURN_BUFFER so that objtool groks it and can generate correct ORC unwind information. - Since ORC is alternative invariant; that is, all alternatives should have the same ORC entries, the __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER body can not be part of an alternative. Therefore, move it out of the alternative and keep the alternative as a sort of jump_label around it. - Use the ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL annotation to white-list these 'funny' call instructions to nowhere. - Use UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY to 'fill' the speculation traps, otherwise objtool will consider them unreachable. - Move the RSP adjustment into the loop, such that the loop has a deterministic stack layout. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200428191700.032079304@infradead.org [cascardo: fixup because of backport of ba6e31af2be96c4d0536f2152ed6f7b6c11bca47 ("x86/speculation: Add LFENCE to RSB fill sequence")] [cascardo: no intra-function call validation support] [cascardo: avoid UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY because of svm] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-23intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idlePeter Zijlstra
commit bf5835bcdb9635c97f85120dba9bfa21e111130f upstream. Having IBRS enabled while the SMT sibling is idle unnecessarily slows down the running sibling. OTOH, disabling IBRS around idle takes two MSR writes, which will increase the idle latency. Therefore, only disable IBRS around deeper idle states. Shallow idle states are bounded by the tick in duration, since NOHZ is not allowed for them by virtue of their short target residency. Only do this for mwait-driven idle, since that keeps interrupts disabled across idle, which makes disabling IBRS vs IRQ-entry a non-issue. Note: C6 is a random threshold, most importantly C1 probably shouldn't disable IBRS, benchmarking needed. Suggested-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: no CPUIDLE_FLAG_IRQ_ENABLE] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [cascardo: context adjustments] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-23x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerabilityPeter Zijlstra
commit 6ad0ad2bf8a67e27d1f9d006a1dabb0e1c360cc3 upstream. Skylake suffers from RSB underflow speculation issues; report this vulnerability and it's mitigation (spectre_v2=ibrs). [jpoimboe: cleanups, eibrs] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [suleiman: different processor names] Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-23x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRSPawan Gupta
commit 7c693f54c873691a4b7da05c7e0f74e67745d144 upstream. Extend spectre_v2= boot option with Kernel IBRS. [jpoimboe: no STIBP with IBRS] Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-23x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writesPeter Zijlstra
commit c779bc1a9002fa474175b80e72b85c9bf628abb0 upstream. When changing SPEC_CTRL for user control, the WRMSR can be delayed until return-to-user when KERNEL_IBRS has been enabled. This avoids an MSR write during context switch. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-23x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementationPeter Zijlstra
commit 2dbb887e875b1de3ca8f40ddf26bcfe55798c609 upstream. Implement Kernel IBRS - currently the only known option to mitigate RSB underflow speculation issues on Skylake hardware. Note: since IBRS_ENTER requires fuller context established than UNTRAIN_RET, it must be placed after it. However, since UNTRAIN_RET itself implies a RET, it must come after IBRS_ENTER. This means IBRS_ENTER needs to also move UNTRAIN_RET. Note 2: KERNEL_IBRS is sub-optimal for XenPV. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: conflict at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S, skip_r11rcx] [cascardo: conflict at arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S] [cascardo: conflict fixups, no ANNOTATE_NOENDBR] [cascardo: entry fixups because of missing UNTRAIN_RET] [cascardo: conflicts on fsgsbase] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
generated by cgit 1.2.3-korg (git 2.39.0) at 2024-06-23 19:16:50 +0000