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[ Upstream commit a8e911d13540487942d53137c156bd7707f66e5d ]
If the kernel is configured with KASAN_EXTRA, the stack size is
increasted significantly because this option sets "-fstack-reuse" to
"none" in GCC [1]. As a result, it triggers stack overrun quite often
with 32k stack size compiled using GCC 8. For example, this reproducer
https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp/blob/master/testcases/kernel/syscalls/madvise/madvise06.c
triggers a "corrupted stack end detected inside scheduler" very reliably
with CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK enabled.
There are just too many functions that could have a large stack with
KASAN_EXTRA due to large local variables that have been called over and
over again without being able to reuse the stacks. Some noticiable ones
are
size
7648 shrink_page_list
3584 xfs_rmap_convert
3312 migrate_page_move_mapping
3312 dev_ethtool
3200 migrate_misplaced_transhuge_page
3168 copy_process
There are other 49 functions are over 2k in size while compiling kernel
with "-Wframe-larger-than=" even with a related minimal config on this
machine. Hence, it is too much work to change Makefiles for each object
to compile without "-fsanitize-address-use-after-scope" individually.
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=81715#c23
Although there is a patch in GCC 9 to help the situation, GCC 9 probably
won't be released in a few months and then it probably take another
6-month to 1-year for all major distros to include it as a default.
Hence, the stack usage with KASAN_EXTRA can be revisited again in 2020
when GCC 9 is everywhere. Until then, this patch will help users avoid
stack overrun.
This has already been fixed for arm64 for the same reason via
6e8830674ea ("arm64: kasan: Increase stack size for KASAN_EXTRA").
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190109215209.2903-1-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit d52888aa2753e3063a9d3a0c9f72f94aa9809c15 upstream
On 5-level paging the LDT remap area is placed in the middle of the KASLR
randomization region and it can overlap with the direct mapping, the
vmalloc or the vmap area.
The LDT mapping is per mm, so it cannot be moved into the P4D page table
next to the CPU_ENTRY_AREA without complicating PGD table allocation for
5-level paging.
The 4 PGD slot gap just before the direct mapping is reserved for
hypervisors, so it cannot be used.
Move the direct mapping one slot deeper and use the resulting gap for the
LDT remap area. The resulting layout is the same for 4 and 5 level paging.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Fixes: f55f0501cbf6 ("x86/pti: Put the LDT in its own PGD if PTI is on")
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: willy@infradead.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181026122856.66224-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The first part of memory map (up to %esp fixup) simply scales existing
map for 4-level paging by factor of 9 -- number of bits addressed by
the additional page table level.
The rest of the map is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170330080731.65421-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Add the physical mapping in the list of randomized memory regions.
The physical memory mapping holds most allocations from boot and heap
allocators. Knowing the base address and physical memory size, an attacker
can deduce the PDE virtual address for the vDSO memory page. This attack
was demonstrated at CanSecWest 2016, in the following presentation:
"Getting Physical: Extreme Abuse of Intel Based Paged Systems":
https://github.com/n3k/CansecWest2016_Getting_Physical_Extreme_Abuse_of_Intel_Based_Paging_Systems/blob/master/Presentation/CanSec2016_Presentation.pdf
(See second part of the presentation).
The exploits used against Linux worked successfully against 4.6+ but
fail with KASLR memory enabled:
https://github.com/n3k/CansecWest2016_Getting_Physical_Extreme_Abuse_of_Intel_Based_Paging_Systems/tree/master/Demos/Linux/exploits
Similar research was done at Google leading to this patch proposal.
Variants exists to overwrite /proc or /sys objects ACLs leading to
elevation of privileges. These variants were tested against 4.6+.
The page offset used by the compressed kernel retains the static value
since it is not yet randomized during this boot stage.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Currently CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET is used to limit the maximum
offset for kernel randomization. This limit doesn't need to be a CONFIG
since it is tied completely to KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE, and will make no sense
once physical and virtual offsets are randomized separately. This patch
removes CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET and consolidates the Kconfig
help text.
[kees: rewrote changelog, dropped KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE_DEFAULT, rewrote help]
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1461185746-8017-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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PUD_SHIFT is defined according to a given kernel configuration, which
allows it be commonly used by any x86 kernels. However, PUD_PAGE_SIZE
and PUD_PAGE_MASK, which are set from PUD_SHIFT, are defined in
page_64_types.h, which can be used by 64-bit kernel only.
Move PUD_PAGE_SIZE and PUD_PAGE_MASK to page_types.h so that they can
be used by any x86 kernels as well.
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Robert Elliot <elliott@hpe.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1442514264-12475-3-git-send-email-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Stack instrumentation allows to detect out of bounds memory accesses for
variables allocated on stack. Compiler adds redzones around every
variable on stack and poisons redzones in function's prologue.
Such approach significantly increases stack usage, so all in-kernel stacks
size were doubled.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.
On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.
This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.
This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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While I play inhouse patches with much memory pressure on qemu-kvm,
3.14 kernel was randomly crashed. The reason was kernel stack overflow.
When I investigated the problem, the callstack was a little bit deeper
by involve with reclaim functions but not direct reclaim path.
I tried to diet stack size of some functions related with alloc/reclaim
so did a hundred of byte but overflow was't disappeard so that I encounter
overflow by another deeper callstack on reclaim/allocator path.
Of course, we might sweep every sites we have found for reducing
stack usage but I'm not sure how long it saves the world(surely,
lots of developer start to add nice features which will use stack
agains) and if we consider another more complex feature in I/O layer
and/or reclaim path, it might be better to increase stack size(
meanwhile, stack usage on 64bit machine was doubled compared to 32bit
while it have sticked to 8K. Hmm, it's not a fair to me and arm64
already expaned to 16K. )
So, my stupid idea is just let's expand stack size and keep an eye
toward stack consumption on each kernel functions via stacktrace of ftrace.
For example, we can have a bar like that each funcion shouldn't exceed 200K
and emit the warning when some function consumes more in runtime.
Of course, it could make false positive but at least, it could make a
chance to think over it.
I guess this topic was discussed several time so there might be
strong reason not to increase kernel stack size on x86_64, for me not
knowing so Ccing x86_64 maintainers, other MM guys and virtio
maintainers.
Here's an example call trace using up the kernel stack:
Depth Size Location (51 entries)
----- ---- --------
0) 7696 16 lookup_address
1) 7680 16 _lookup_address_cpa.isra.3
2) 7664 24 __change_page_attr_set_clr
3) 7640 392 kernel_map_pages
4) 7248 256 get_page_from_freelist
5) 6992 352 __alloc_pages_nodemask
6) 6640 8 alloc_pages_current
7) 6632 168 new_slab
8) 6464 8 __slab_alloc
9) 6456 80 __kmalloc
10) 6376 376 vring_add_indirect
11) 6000 144 virtqueue_add_sgs
12) 5856 288 __virtblk_add_req
13) 5568 96 virtio_queue_rq
14) 5472 128 __blk_mq_run_hw_queue
15) 5344 16 blk_mq_run_hw_queue
16) 5328 96 blk_mq_insert_requests
17) 5232 112 blk_mq_flush_plug_list
18) 5120 112 blk_flush_plug_list
19) 5008 64 io_schedule_timeout
20) 4944 128 mempool_alloc
21) 4816 96 bio_alloc_bioset
22) 4720 48 get_swap_bio
23) 4672 160 __swap_writepage
24) 4512 32 swap_writepage
25) 4480 320 shrink_page_list
26) 4160 208 shrink_inactive_list
27) 3952 304 shrink_lruvec
28) 3648 80 shrink_zone
29) 3568 128 do_try_to_free_pages
30) 3440 208 try_to_free_pages
31) 3232 352 __alloc_pages_nodemask
32) 2880 8 alloc_pages_current
33) 2872 200 __page_cache_alloc
34) 2672 80 find_or_create_page
35) 2592 80 ext4_mb_load_buddy
36) 2512 176 ext4_mb_regular_allocator
37) 2336 128 ext4_mb_new_blocks
38) 2208 256 ext4_ext_map_blocks
39) 1952 160 ext4_map_blocks
40) 1792 384 ext4_writepages
41) 1408 16 do_writepages
42) 1392 96 __writeback_single_inode
43) 1296 176 writeback_sb_inodes
44) 1120 80 __writeback_inodes_wb
45) 1040 160 wb_writeback
46) 880 208 bdi_writeback_workfn
47) 672 144 process_one_work
48) 528 112 worker_thread
49) 416 240 kthread
50) 176 176 ret_from_fork
[ Note: the problem is exacerbated by certain gcc versions that seem to
generate much bigger stack frames due to apparently bad coalescing of
temporaries and generating too many spills. Rusty saw gcc-4.6.4 using
35% more stack on the virtio path than 4.8.2 does, for example.
Minchan not only uses such a bad gcc version (4.6.3 in his case), but
some of the stack use is due to debugging (CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC is
what causes that kernel_map_pages() frame, for example). But we're
clearly getting too close.
The VM code also seems to have excessive stack frames partly for the
same compiler reason, triggered by excessive inlining and lots of
function arguments.
We need to improve on our stack use, but in the meantime let's do this
simple stack increase too. Unlike most earlier reports, there is
nothing simple that stands out as being really horribly wrong here,
apart from the fact that the stack frames are just bigger than they
should need to be. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Michael S Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: PJ Waskiewicz <pjwaskiewicz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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On 64-bit, this raises the maximum location to -1 GiB (from -1.5 GiB),
the upper limit currently, since the kernel fixmap page mappings need
to be moved to use the other 1 GiB (which would be the theoretical
limit when building with -mcmodel=kernel).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1381450698-28710-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
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Moves the relocation handling into C, after decompression. This requires
that the decompressed size is passed to the decompression routine as
well so that relocations can be found. Only kernels that need relocation
support will use the code (currently just x86_32), but this is laying
the ground work for 64-bit using it in support of KASLR.
Based on work by Neill Clift and Michael Davidson.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130708161517.GA4832@www.outflux.net
Acked-by: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
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We have KERNEL_IMAGE_START and __START_KERNEL_map which both contain the
start of the kernel text mapping's virtual address. Remove the prior one
which has been replicated a lot less times around the tree.
No functionality change.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1362428180-8865-3-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
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This patch is meant to clean-up the fact that we have several functions in
page_64_types.h which really don't belong there. I found this issue when I
had tried to replace __phys_addr with an inline function. It resulted in the
realmode bits generating compile warnings about types. In order to resolve
that I am relocating the address translation to page_64.h since this is in
keeping with where these functions are located in 32 bit.
In addtion I have relocated several functions defined in init_64.c to
pgtable_64.h as this seems to be where most of the functions related to
memory initialization were already located.
[ hpa: added missing #include <asm/pgtable.h> to apic_numachip.c,
as reported by Yinghai Lu. ]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20121116215244.8521.31505.stgit@ahduyck-cp1.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel J Blueman <daniel@numascale-asia.com>
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The only difference is the free_thread_info function, which frees
xstate.
Use the new arch_release_task_struct() function instead and switch
over to the core allocator.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120505150141.559556763@linutronix.de
Cc: x86@kernel.org
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The discussion about using "access_ok()" in get_user_pages_fast() (see
commit 7f8189068726492950bf1a2dcfd9b51314560abf: "x86: don't use
'access_ok()' as a range check in get_user_pages_fast()" for details and
end result), made us notice that x86-64 was really being very sloppy
about virtual address checking.
So be way more careful and straightforward about masking x86-64 virtual
addresses:
- All the VIRTUAL_MASK* variants now cover half of the address
space, it's not like we can use the full mask on a signed
integer, and the larger mask just invites mistakes when
applying it to either half of the 48-bit address space.
- /proc/kcore's kc_offset_to_vaddr() becomes a lot more
obvious when it transforms a file offset into a
(kernel-half) virtual address.
- Unify/simplify the 32-bit and 64-bit USER_DS definition to
be based on TASK_SIZE_MAX.
This cleanup and more careful/obvious user virtual address checking also
uncovered a buglet in the x86-64 implementation of strnlen_user(): it
would do an "access_ok()" check on the whole potential area, even if the
string itself was much shorter, and thus return an error even for valid
strings. Our sloppy checking had hidden this.
So this fixes 'strnlen_user()' to do this properly, the same way we
already handled user strings in 'strncpy_from_user()'. Namely by just
checking the first byte, and then relying on fault handling for the
rest. That always works, since we impose a guard page that cannot be
mapped at the end of the user space address space (and even if we
didn't, we'd have the address space hole).
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (22 commits)
x86: fix system without memory on node0
x86, mm: Fix node_possible_map logic
mm, x86: remove MEMORY_HOTPLUG_RESERVE related code
x86: make sparse mem work in non-NUMA mode
x86: process.c, remove useless headers
x86: merge process.c a bit
x86: use sparse_memory_present_with_active_regions() on UMA
x86: unify 64-bit UMA and NUMA paging_init()
x86: Allow 1MB of slack between the e820 map and SRAT, not 4GB
x86: Sanity check the e820 against the SRAT table using e820 map only
x86: clean up and and print out initial max_pfn_mapped
x86/pci: remove rounding quirk from e820_setup_gap()
x86, e820, pci: reserve extra free space near end of RAM
x86: fix typo in address space documentation
x86: 46 bit physical address support on 64 bits
x86, mm: fault.c, use printk_once() in is_errata93()
x86: move per-cpu mmu_gathers to mm/init.c
x86: move max_pfn_mapped and max_low_pfn_mapped to setup.c
x86: unify noexec handling
x86: remove (null) in /sys kernel_page_tables
...
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Handle the misconfiguration where CONFIG_PHYSICAL_START is
incompatible with CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN. This is a configuration
error, but one which arises easily since Kconfig doesn't have the
smarts to express the true relationship between these two variables.
Hence, align __PHYSICAL_START the same way we align LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR
in <asm/boot.h>.
For non-relocatable kernels, this would cause the boot to fail.
[ Impact: fix boot failures for non-relocatable kernels ]
Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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Extend the maximum addressable memory on x86-64 from 2^44 to
2^46 bytes. This requires some shuffling around of the vmalloc
and virtual memmap memory areas, to keep them away from the
direct mapping of up to 64TB of physical memory.
This patch also introduces a guard hole between the vmalloc
area and the virtual memory map space. There's really no
good reason why we wouldn't have a guard hole there.
[ Impact: future hardware enablement ]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
LKML-Reference: <20090505172856.6820db22@cuia.bos.redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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Impact: unification of declarations, cleanup
Unification of declarations:
moved init_memory_mapping, initmem_init and free_initmem from
page_XX_types.h to page_types.h
Signed-off-by: Jaswinder Singh Rajput <jaswinderrajput@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
LKML-Reference: <1239693869.3033.31.camel@ht.satnam>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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PAGETABLE_LEVELS and the PTE masks should be in pgtable*.h
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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pgtable*.h is intended for definitions relating to actual pagetables
and their entries, so move all the definitions for
(pte|pmd|pud|pgd)(val)?_t to the appropriate pgtable*.h headers.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
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