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commit ddba91801aeb5c160b660caed1800eb3aef403f8 upstream.
KVM's API requires thats ioctls must be issued from the same process
that created the VM. In other words, userspace can play games with a
VM's file descriptors, e.g. fork(), SCM_RIGHTS, etc..., but only the
creator can do anything useful. Explicitly reject device ioctls that
are issued by a process other than the VM's creator, and update KVM's
API documentation to extend its requirements to device ioctls.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a41e8f25fa8f8f67360d88eb0eebbabe95a64bdf upstream.
The networking maintainer keeps a public list of the patches being
queued up for the next round of stable releases. Be sure to check there
before asking for a patch to be applied so that you do not waste
people's time.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c950ca8c35eeb32224a63adc47e12f9e226da241 upstream.
The Allwinner A64 SoC is known[1] to have an unstable architectural
timer, which manifests itself most obviously in the time jumping forward
a multiple of 95 years[2][3]. This coincides with 2^56 cycles at a
timer frequency of 24 MHz, implying that the time went slightly backward
(and this was interpreted by the kernel as it jumping forward and
wrapping around past the epoch).
Investigation revealed instability in the low bits of CNTVCT at the
point a high bit rolls over. This leads to power-of-two cycle forward
and backward jumps. (Testing shows that forward jumps are about twice as
likely as backward jumps.) Since the counter value returns to normal
after an indeterminate read, each "jump" really consists of both a
forward and backward jump from the software perspective.
Unless the kernel is trapping CNTVCT reads, a userspace program is able
to read the register in a loop faster than it changes. A test program
running on all 4 CPU cores that reported jumps larger than 100 ms was
run for 13.6 hours and reported the following:
Count | Event
-------+---------------------------
9940 | jumped backward 699ms
268 | jumped backward 1398ms
1 | jumped backward 2097ms
16020 | jumped forward 175ms
6443 | jumped forward 699ms
2976 | jumped forward 1398ms
9 | jumped forward 356516ms
9 | jumped forward 357215ms
4 | jumped forward 714430ms
1 | jumped forward 3578440ms
This works out to a jump larger than 100 ms about every 5.5 seconds on
each CPU core.
The largest jump (almost an hour!) was the following sequence of reads:
0x0000007fffffffff → 0x00000093feffffff → 0x0000008000000000
Note that the middle bits don't necessarily all read as all zeroes or
all ones during the anomalous behavior; however the low 10 bits checked
by the function in this patch have never been observed with any other
value.
Also note that smaller jumps are much more common, with backward jumps
of 2048 (2^11) cycles observed over 400 times per second on each core.
(Of course, this is partially explained by lower bits rolling over more
frequently.) Any one of these could have caused the 95 year time skip.
Similar anomalies were observed while reading CNTPCT (after patching the
kernel to allow reads from userspace). However, the CNTPCT jumps are
much less frequent, and only small jumps were observed. The same program
as before (except now reading CNTPCT) observed after 72 hours:
Count | Event
-------+---------------------------
17 | jumped backward 699ms
52 | jumped forward 175ms
2831 | jumped forward 699ms
5 | jumped forward 1398ms
Further investigation showed that the instability in CNTPCT/CNTVCT also
affected the respective timer's TVAL register. The following values were
observed immediately after writing CNVT_TVAL to 0x10000000:
CNTVCT | CNTV_TVAL | CNTV_CVAL | CNTV_TVAL Error
--------------------+------------+--------------------+-----------------
0x000000d4a2d8bfff | 0x10003fff | 0x000000d4b2d8bfff | +0x00004000
0x000000d4a2d94000 | 0x0fffffff | 0x000000d4b2d97fff | -0x00004000
0x000000d4a2d97fff | 0x10003fff | 0x000000d4b2d97fff | +0x00004000
0x000000d4a2d9c000 | 0x0fffffff | 0x000000d4b2d9ffff | -0x00004000
The pattern of errors in CNTV_TVAL seemed to depend on exactly which
value was written to it. For example, after writing 0x10101010:
CNTVCT | CNTV_TVAL | CNTV_CVAL | CNTV_TVAL Error
--------------------+------------+--------------------+-----------------
0x000001ac3effffff | 0x1110100f | 0x000001ac4f10100f | +0x1000000
0x000001ac40000000 | 0x1010100f | 0x000001ac5110100f | -0x1000000
0x000001ac58ffffff | 0x1110100f | 0x000001ac6910100f | +0x1000000
0x000001ac66000000 | 0x1010100f | 0x000001ac7710100f | -0x1000000
0x000001ac6affffff | 0x1110100f | 0x000001ac7b10100f | +0x1000000
0x000001ac6e000000 | 0x1010100f | 0x000001ac7f10100f | -0x1000000
I was also twice able to reproduce the issue covered by Allwinner's
workaround[4], that writing to TVAL sometimes fails, and both CVAL and
TVAL are left with entirely bogus values. One was the following values:
CNTVCT | CNTV_TVAL | CNTV_CVAL
--------------------+------------+--------------------------------------
0x000000d4a2d6014c | 0x8fbd5721 | 0x000000d132935fff (615s in the past)
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
========================================================================
Because the CPU can read the CNTPCT/CNTVCT registers faster than they
change, performing two reads of the register and comparing the high bits
(like other workarounds) is not a workable solution. And because the
timer can jump both forward and backward, no pair of reads can
distinguish a good value from a bad one. The only way to guarantee a
good value from consecutive reads would be to read _three_ times, and
take the middle value only if the three values are 1) each unique and
2) increasing. This takes at minimum 3 counter cycles (125 ns), or more
if an anomaly is detected.
However, since there is a distinct pattern to the bad values, we can
optimize the common case (1022/1024 of the time) to a single read by
simply ignoring values that match the error pattern. This still takes no
more than 3 cycles in the worst case, and requires much less code. As an
additional safety check, we still limit the loop iteration to the number
of max-frequency (1.2 GHz) CPU cycles in three 24 MHz counter periods.
For the TVAL registers, the simple solution is to not use them. Instead,
read or write the CVAL and calculate the TVAL value in software.
Although the manufacturer is aware of at least part of the erratum[4],
there is no official name for it. For now, use the kernel-internal name
"UNKNOWN1".
[1]: https://github.com/armbian/build/commit/a08cd6fe7ae9
[2]: https://forum.armbian.com/topic/3458-a64-datetime-clock-issue/
[3]: https://irclog.whitequark.org/linux-sunxi/2018-01-26
[4]: https://github.com/Allwinner-Homlet/H6-BSP4.9-linux/blob/master/drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c#L272
Acked-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@bootlin.com>
Tested-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel@sholland.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6c0c5dc33ff42af49243e94842d0ebdb153189ea ]
Add new compatible to the device tree bindings.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <brgl@bgdev.pl>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7550c6079846a24f30d15ac75a941c8515dbedfb ]
Patch series "THP eligibility reporting via proc".
This series of three patches aims at making THP eligibility reporting much
more robust and long term sustainable. The trigger for the change is a
regression report [2] and the long follow up discussion. In short the
specific application didn't have good API to query whether a particular
mapping can be backed by THP so it has used VMA flags to workaround that.
These flags represent a deep internal state of VMAs and as such they
should be used by userspace with a great deal of caution.
A similar has happened for [3] when users complained that VM_MIXEDMAP is
no longer set on DAX mappings. Again a lack of a proper API led to an
abuse.
The first patch in the series tries to emphasise that that the semantic of
flags might change and any application consuming those should be really
careful.
The remaining two patches provide a more suitable interface to address [2]
and provide a consistent API to query the THP status both for each VMA and
process wide as well. [1]
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181120103515.25280-1-mhocko@kernel.org [2]
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1809241054050.224429@chino.kir.corp.google.com
[3] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002100531.GC4135@quack2.suse.cz
This patch (of 3):
Even though vma flags exported via /proc/<pid>/smaps are explicitly
documented to be not guaranteed for future compatibility the warning
doesn't go far enough because it doesn't mention semantic changes to those
flags. And they are important as well because these flags are a deep
implementation internal to the MM code and the semantic might change at
any time.
Let's consider two recent examples:
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002100531.GC4135@quack2.suse.cz
: commit e1fb4a086495 "dax: remove VM_MIXEDMAP for fsdax and device dax" has
: removed VM_MIXEDMAP flag from DAX VMAs. Now our testing shows that in the
: mean time certain customer of ours started poking into /proc/<pid>/smaps
: and looks at VMA flags there and if VM_MIXEDMAP is missing among the VMA
: flags, the application just fails to start complaining that DAX support is
: missing in the kernel.
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1809241054050.224429@chino.kir.corp.google.com
: Commit 1860033237d4 ("mm: make PR_SET_THP_DISABLE immediately active")
: introduced a regression in that userspace cannot always determine the set
: of vmas where thp is ineligible.
: Userspace relies on the "nh" flag being emitted as part of /proc/pid/smaps
: to determine if a vma is eligible to be backed by hugepages.
: Previous to this commit, prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE, 1) would cause thp to
: be disabled and emit "nh" as a flag for the corresponding vmas as part of
: /proc/pid/smaps. After the commit, thp is disabled by means of an mm
: flag and "nh" is not emitted.
: This causes smaps parsing libraries to assume a vma is eligible for thp
: and ends up puzzling the user on why its memory is not backed by thp.
In both cases userspace was relying on a semantic of a specific VMA flag.
The primary reason why that happened is a lack of a proper interface.
While this has been worked on and it will be fixed properly, it seems that
our wording could see some refinement and be more vocal about semantic
aspect of these flags as well.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181211143641.3503-2-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Paul Oppenheimer <bepvte@gmail.com>
Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 5b5e4d623ec8a34689df98e42d038a3b594d2ff9 upstream.
Swap storage is restricted to max_swapfile_size (~16TB on x86_64) whenever
the system is deemed affected by L1TF vulnerability. Even though the limit
is quite high for most deployments it seems to be too restrictive for
deployments which are willing to live with the mitigation disabled.
We have a customer to deploy 8x 6,4TB PCIe/NVMe SSD swap devices which is
clearly out of the limit.
Drop the swap restriction when l1tf=off is specified. It also doesn't make
much sense to warn about too much memory for the l1tf mitigation when it is
forcefully disabled by the administrator.
[ tglx: Folded the documentation delta change ]
Fixes: 377eeaa8e11f ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2")
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181113184910.26697-1-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 55a974021ec952ee460dc31ca08722158639de72 upstream
Provide the possibility to enable IBPB always in combination with 'prctl'
and 'seccomp'.
Add the extra command line options and rework the IBPB selection to
evaluate the command instead of the mode selected by the STIPB switch case.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.144047038@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6b3e64c237c072797a9ec918654a60e3a46488e2 upstream
If 'prctl' mode of user space protection from spectre v2 is selected
on the kernel command-line, STIBP and IBPB are applied on tasks which
restrict their indirect branch speculation via prctl.
SECCOMP enables the SSBD mitigation for sandboxed tasks already, so it
makes sense to prevent spectre v2 user space to user space attacks as
well.
The Intel mitigation guide documents how STIPB works:
Setting bit 1 (STIBP) of the IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR on a logical processor
prevents the predicted targets of indirect branches on any logical
processor of that core from being controlled by software that executes
(or executed previously) on another logical processor of the same core.
Ergo setting STIBP protects the task itself from being attacked from a task
running on a different hyper-thread and protects the tasks running on
different hyper-threads from being attacked.
While the document suggests that the branch predictors are shielded between
the logical processors, the observed performance regressions suggest that
STIBP simply disables the branch predictor more or less completely. Of
course the document wording is vague, but the fact that there is also no
requirement for issuing IBPB when STIBP is used points clearly in that
direction. The kernel still issues IBPB even when STIBP is used until Intel
clarifies the whole mechanism.
IBPB is issued when the task switches out, so malicious sandbox code cannot
mistrain the branch predictor for the next user space task on the same
logical processor.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.051663132@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7cc765a67d8e04ef7d772425ca5a2a1e2b894c15 upstream
Now that all prerequisites are in place:
- Add the prctl command line option
- Default the 'auto' mode to 'prctl'
- When SMT state changes, update the static key which controls the
conditional STIBP evaluation on context switch.
- At init update the static key which controls the conditional IBPB
evaluation on context switch.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.958421388@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9137bb27e60e554dab694eafa4cca241fa3a694f upstream
Add the PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH option for the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL and
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL prctls to allow fine grained per task control of
indirect branch speculation via STIBP and IBPB.
Invocations:
Check indirect branch speculation status with
- prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);
Enable indirect branch speculation with
- prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
Disable indirect branch speculation with
- prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
Force disable indirect branch speculation with
- prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
See Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.866780996@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fa1202ef224391b6f5b26cdd44cc50495e8fab54 upstream
Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation
mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user=
The initial options are:
- on: Unconditionally enabled
- off: Unconditionally disabled
-auto: Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now)
When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this
implies that the application to application control follows that state even
if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied.
Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.082720373@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f164d0204b1156a7e0d8d1622c1a8d25752befec upstream.
If the hi3110 shares the SPI bus with another traffic-intensive device
and packets are received in high volume (by a separate machine sending
with "cangen -g 0 -i -x"), reception stops after a few minutes and the
counter in /proc/interrupts stops incrementing. Bus state is "active".
Bringing the interface down and back up reconvenes the reception. The
issue is not observed when the hi3110 is the sole device on the SPI bus.
Using a level-triggered interrupt makes the issue go away and lets the
hi3110 successfully receive 2 GByte over the course of 5 days while a
ks8851 Ethernet chip on the same SPI bus handles 6 GByte of traffic.
Unfortunately the hi3110 datasheet is mum on the trigger type. The pin
description on page 3 only specifies the polarity (active high):
http://www.holtic.com/documents/371-hi-3110_v-rev-kpdf.do
Cc: Mathias Duckeck <m.duckeck@kunbus.de>
Cc: Akshay Bhat <akshay.bhat@timesys.com>
Cc: Casey Fitzpatrick <casey.fitzpatrick@timesys.com>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 544b03da39e2d7b4961d3163976ed4bfb1fac509 upstream.
At the request of the reporter, the Linux kernel security team offers to
postpone the publishing of a fix for up to 5 business days from the date
of a report.
While it is generally undesirable to keep a fix private after it has
been developed, this short window is intended to allow distributions to
package the fix into their kernel builds and permits early inclusion of
the security team in the case of a co-ordinated disclosure with other
parties. Unfortunately, discussions with major Linux distributions and
cloud providers has revealed that 5 business days is not sufficient to
achieve either of these two goals.
As an example, cloud providers need to roll out KVM security fixes to a
global fleet of hosts with sufficient early ramp-up and monitoring. An
end-to-end timeline of less than two weeks dramatically cuts into the
amount of early validation and increases the chance of guest-visible
regressions.
The consequence of this timeline mismatch is that security issues are
commonly fixed without the involvement of the Linux kernel security team
and are instead analysed and addressed by an ad-hoc group of developers
across companies contributing to Linux. In some cases, mainline (and
therefore the official stable kernels) can be left to languish for
extended periods of time. This undermines the Linux kernel security
process and puts upstream developers in a difficult position should they
find themselves involved with an undisclosed security problem that they
are unable to report due to restrictions from their employer.
To accommodate the needs of these users of the Linux kernel and
encourage them to engage with the Linux security team when security
issues are first uncovered, extend the maximum period for which fixes
may be delayed to 7 calendar days, or 14 calendar days in exceptional
cases, where the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts specifically
need to be accommodated. This brings parity with the linux-distros@
maximum embargo period of 14 calendar days.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Amit Shah <aams@amazon.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Co-developed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Co-developed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 14fdc2c5318ae420e68496975f48dc1dbef52649 upstream.
The Linux kernel security team has been accused of rejecting the idea of
security embargoes. This is incorrect, and could dissuade people from
reporting security issues to us under the false assumption that the
issue would leak prematurely.
Clarify the handling of embargoed information in our process
documentation.
Co-developed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 781f0766cc41a9dd2e5d118ef4b1d5d89430257b upstream.
Devices connected under Terminus Technology Inc. Hub (1a40:0101) may
fail to work after the system resumes from suspend:
[ 206.063325] usb 3-2.4: reset full-speed USB device number 4 using xhci_hcd
[ 206.143691] usb 3-2.4: device descriptor read/64, error -32
[ 206.351671] usb 3-2.4: device descriptor read/64, error -32
Info for this hub:
T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=01 Cnt=01 Dev#= 2 Spd=480 MxCh= 4
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=09(hub ) Sub=00 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=1a40 ProdID=0101 Rev=01.11
S: Product=USB 2.0 Hub
C: #Ifs= 1 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=100mA
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=09(hub ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=hub
Some expirements indicate that the USB devices connected to the hub are
innocent, it's the hub itself is to blame. The hub needs extra delay
time after it resets its port.
Hence wait for extra delay, if the device is connected to this quirky
hub.
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d52888aa2753e3063a9d3a0c9f72f94aa9809c15 upstream
On 5-level paging the LDT remap area is placed in the middle of the KASLR
randomization region and it can overlap with the direct mapping, the
vmalloc or the vmap area.
The LDT mapping is per mm, so it cannot be moved into the P4D page table
next to the CPU_ENTRY_AREA without complicating PGD table allocation for
5-level paging.
The 4 PGD slot gap just before the direct mapping is reserved for
hypervisors, so it cannot be used.
Move the direct mapping one slot deeper and use the resulting gap for the
LDT remap area. The resulting layout is the same for 4 and 5 level paging.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Fixes: f55f0501cbf6 ("x86/pti: Put the LDT in its own PGD if PTI is on")
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: willy@infradead.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181026122856.66224-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d2266bbfa9e3e32e3b642965088ca461bd24a94f ]
The "pciserial" earlyprintk variant helps much on many modern x86
platforms, but unfortunately there are still some platforms with PCI
UART devices which have the wrong PCI class code. In that case, the
current class code check does not allow for them to be used for logging.
Add a sub-option "force" which overrides the class code check and thus
the use of such device can be enforced.
[ bp: massage formulations. ]
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Stuart R . Anderson" <stuart.r.anderson@intel.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thymo van Beers <thymovanbeers@gmail.com>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002164921.25833-1-feng.tang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit d47748e5ae5af6572e520cc9767bbe70c22ea498 upstream.
Current behavior is to automatically disable metacopy if redirect_dir is
not enabled and proceed with the mount.
If "metacopy=on" mount option was given, then this behavior can confuse the
user: no mount failure, yet metacopy is disabled.
This patch makes metacopy=on imply redirect_dir=on.
The converse is also true: turning off full redirect with redirect_dir=
{off|follow|nofollow} will disable metacopy.
If both metacopy=on and redirect_dir={off|follow|nofollow} is specified,
then mount will fail, since there's no way to correctly resolve the
conflict.
Reported-by: Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Fixes: d5791044d2e5 ("ovl: Provide a mount option metacopy=on/off...")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit db0340182444612bcadb98bdec22f651aa42266c upstream.
The CTA-861 standards have been updated to refer to opRGB instead
of AdobeRGB. The official standard is in fact named opRGB, so
switch to that.
The two old defines referring to ADOBERGB in the public API are
put under #ifndef __KERNEL__ and a comment mentions that they are
deprecated.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a58c37978cf02f6d35d05ee4e9288cb8455f1401 upstream.
Drop all Adobe references and use the official opRGB standard
instead.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7ec2b3b941a666a942859684281b5f6460a0c234 upstream.
If the HDMI cable is disconnected or the CEC adapter is manually
unconfigured, then all pending transmits and wait-for-replies are
aborted. Signal this with new status bits (CEC_RX/TX_STATUS_ABORTED).
If due to (usually) a driver bug a transmit never ends (i.e. the
transmit_done was never called by the driver), then when this times
out the message is marked with CEC_TX_STATUS_TIMEOUT.
This should not happen and is an indication of a driver bug.
Without a separate status bit for this it was impossible to detect
this from userspace.
The 'transmit timed out' kernel message is now a warning, so this
should be more prominent in the kernel log as well.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # for v4.18 and up
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 578bdaabd015b9b164842c3e8ace9802f38e7ecc upstream.
These are unused, undesired, and have never actually been used by
anybody. The original authors of this code have changed their mind about
its inclusion. While originally proposed for disk encryption on low-end
devices, the idea was discarded [1] in favor of something else before
that could really get going. Therefore, this patch removes Speck.
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=153359499015659
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The contact point for the kernel's Code of Conduct should now be the
Code of Conduct Committee, not the full TAB. Change the email address
in the file to properly reflect this.
Acked-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Acked-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Acked-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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There was a blank <URL> reference for how to find the Code of Conduct
Committee. Fix that up by pointing it to the correct kernel.org website
page location.
Acked-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Acked-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Acked-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Create a link between the Code of Conduct and the Code of Conduct
Interpretation so that people can see that they are related.
Acked-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Acked-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Acked-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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We use the term "TAB" before defining it later in the document. Fix
that up by defining it at the first location.
Reported-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
Acked-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Acked-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Acked-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Conduct is to be interpreted
The Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct is a general document meant to
provide a set of rules for almost any open source community. Every
open-source community is unique and the Linux kernel is no exception.
Because of this, this document describes how we in the Linux kernel
community will interpret it. We also do not expect this interpretation
to be static over time, and will adjust it as needed.
This document was created with the input and feedback of the TAB as well
as many current kernel maintainers.
Co-Developed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Co-Developed-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Acked-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Acked-by: Christian Lütke-Stetzkamp <christian@lkamp.de>
Acked-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Acked-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Acked-by: David Sterba <kdave@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Grant Likely <grant.likely@secretlab.ca>
Acked-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Acked-by: Hans de Goede <j.w.r.degoede@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: James Smart <jsmart2021@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Acked-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Acked-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jth@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Acked-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
Acked-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Acked-by: Lina Iyer <ilina@codeaurora.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Acked-by: Matias Bjørling <mb@lightnvm.io>
Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Mishi Choudhary <mishi@linux.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Borisov <n.borisov.lkml@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Acked-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Acked-by: Sean Paul <sean@poorly.run>
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Sebastian Reichel <sre@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Sergio Paracuellos <sergio.paracuellos@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Acked-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Todd Poynor <toddpoynor@google.com>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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As it was originally worded, this paragraph requires maintainers to
enforce the code of conduct, or face potential repercussions. It sends
the wrong message, when really we just want maintainers to be part of
the solution and not violate the code of conduct themselves.
Removing it doesn't limit our ability to enforce the code of conduct,
and we can still encourage maintainers to help maintain high standards
for the level of discourse in their subsystem.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Acked-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Lütke-Stetzkamp <christian@lkamp.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Acked-by: David Sterba <kdave@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Grant Likely <grant.likely@secretlab.ca>
Acked-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Acked-by: Hans de Goede <j.w.r.degoede@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: James Smart <jsmart2021@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Acked-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jth@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Acked-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
Acked-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Acked-by: Lina Iyer <ilina@codeaurora.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Acked-by: Matias Bjørling <mb@lightnvm.io>
Acked-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Borisov <n.borisov.lkml@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Acked-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Sebastian Reichel <sre@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Sergio Paracuellos <sergio.paracuellos@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Acked-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Tim Bird <tim.bird@sony.com>
Acked-by: Todd Poynor <toddpoynor@google.com>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
This documentation was inadvertently released under the CC-BY-SA-4.0
license. It was intended to be released under GPL-2.0 or later.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
|
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
I wrote:
"Char/Misc fixes for 4.19-rc7
Here are 8 small fixes for some char/misc driver issues
Included here are:
- fpga driver fixes
- thunderbolt bugfixes
- firmware core revert/fix
- hv core fix
- hv tool fix
All of these have been in linux-next with no reported issues."
* tag 'char-misc-4.19-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc:
thunderbolt: Initialize after IOMMUs
thunderbolt: Do not handle ICM events after domain is stopped
firmware: Always initialize the fw_priv list object
docs: fpga: document fpga manager flags
fpga: bridge: fix obvious function documentation error
tools: hv: fcopy: set 'error' in case an unknown operation was requested
fpga: do not access region struct after fpga_region_unregister
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Use get/put_cpu() in vmbus_connect()
|
|
David writes:
"Networking fixes:
1) Prefix length validation in xfrm layer, from Steffen Klassert.
2) TX status reporting fix in mac80211, from Andrei Otcheretianski.
3) Fix hangs due to TX_DROP in mac80211, from Bob Copeland.
4) Fix DMA error regression in b43, from Larry Finger.
5) Add input validation to xenvif_set_hash_mapping(), from Jan Beulich.
6) SMMU unmapping fix in hns driver, from Yunsheng Lin.
7) Bluetooh crash in unpairing on SMP, from Matias Karhumaa.
8) WoL handling fixes in the phy layer, from Heiner Kallweit.
9) Fix deadlock in bonding, from Mahesh Bandewar.
10) Fill ttl inherit infor in vxlan driver, from Hangbin Liu.
11) Fix TX timeouts during netpoll, from Michael Chan.
12) RXRPC layer fixes from David Howells.
13) Another batch of ndo_poll_controller() removals to deal with
excessive resource consumption during load. From Eric Dumazet.
14) Fix a specific TIPC failure secnario, from LUU Duc Canh.
15) Really disable clocks in r8169 during suspend so that low
power states can actually be reached.
16) Fix SYN backlog lockdep issue in tcp and dccp, from Eric Dumazet.
17) Fix RCU locking in netpoll SKB send, which shows up in bonding,
from Dave Jones.
18) Fix TX stalls in r8169, from Heiner Kallweit.
19) Fix locksup in nfp due to control message storms, from Jakub
Kicinski.
20) Various rmnet bug fixes from Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan and
Sean Tranchetti.
21) Fix use after free in ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(), from Eric Dumazet."
* gitolite.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (122 commits)
ixgbe: check return value of napi_complete_done()
sctp: fix fall-through annotation
r8169: always autoneg on resume
ipv4: fix use-after-free in ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr()
net: qualcomm: rmnet: Fix incorrect allocation flag in receive path
net: qualcomm: rmnet: Fix incorrect allocation flag in transmit
net: qualcomm: rmnet: Skip processing loopback packets
net: systemport: Fix wake-up interrupt race during resume
rtnl: limit IFLA_NUM_TX_QUEUES and IFLA_NUM_RX_QUEUES to 4096
bonding: fix warning message
inet: make sure to grab rcu_read_lock before using ireq->ireq_opt
nfp: avoid soft lockups under control message storm
declance: Fix continuation with the adapter identification message
net: fec: fix rare tx timeout
r8169: fix network stalls due to missing bit TXCFG_AUTO_FIFO
tun: napi flags belong to tfile
tun: initialize napi_mutex unconditionally
tun: remove unused parameters
bond: take rcu lock in netpoll_send_skb_on_dev
rtnetlink: Fail dump if target netnsid is invalid
...
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Bartlomiej writes:
"fbdev fixes for v4.19-rc7:
- fix OMAPFB_MEMORY_READ ioctl to not leak kernel memory in omapfb driver
(Tomi Valkeinen)
- add missing prepare/unprepare clock operations in pxa168fb driver
(Lubomir Rintel)
- add nobgrt option in efifb driver to disable ACPI BGRT logo restore
(Hans de Goede)
- fix spelling mistake in fall-through annotation in stifb driver
(Gustavo A. R. Silva)
- fix URL for uvesafb repository in the documentation (Adam Jackson)"
* tag 'fbdev-v4.19-rc7' of https://github.com/bzolnier/linux:
video/fbdev/stifb: Fix spelling mistake in fall-through annotation
uvesafb: Fix URLs in the documentation
efifb: BGRT: Add nobgrt option
fbdev/omapfb: fix omapfb_memory_read infoleak
pxa168fb: prepare the clock
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Add flags #defines to kerneldoc documentation in a
useful place.
Signed-off-by: Alan Tull <atull@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Moritz Fischer <mdf@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dtor/input
Dmitry writes:
"Input updates for v4.19-rc5
Just a few driver fixes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dtor/input:
Input: uinput - allow for max == min during input_absinfo validation
Input: elantech - enable middle button of touchpad on ThinkPad P72
Input: atakbd - fix Atari CapsLock behaviour
Input: atakbd - fix Atari keymap
Input: egalax_ts - add system wakeup support
Input: gpio-keys - fix a documentation index issue
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|
(fix documentation and sysctl access to treat it as such)
Tested:
# zcat /proc/config.gz | egrep ^CONFIG_HZ
CONFIG_HZ_1000=y
CONFIG_HZ=1000
# echo $[(1<<32)/1000 + 1] | tee /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_probe_interval
4294968
tee: /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_probe_interval: Invalid argument
# echo $[(1<<32)/1000] | tee /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_probe_interval
4294967
# echo 0 | tee /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_probe_interval
# echo -1 | tee /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_probe_interval
-1
tee: /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_probe_interval: Invalid argument
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
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Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mchehab/linux-media
Mauro briefly writes:
"media fixes for v4.19-rc5
some drivers and Kbuild fixes"
* tag 'media/v4.19-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mchehab/linux-media:
media: platform: fix cros-ec-cec build error
media: staging/media/mt9t031/Kconfig: remove bogus entry
media: i2c: mt9v111: Fix v4l2-ctrl error handling
media: camss: add missing includes
media: camss: Use managed memory allocations
media: camss: mark PM functions as __maybe_unused
media: af9035: prevent buffer overflow on write
media: video_function_calls.rst: drop obsolete video-set-attributes reference
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Paolo writes:
"It's mostly small bugfixes and cleanups, mostly around x86 nested
virtualization. One important change, not related to nested
virtualization, is that the ability for the guest kernel to trap
CPUID instructions (in Linux that's the ARCH_SET_CPUID arch_prctl) is
now masked by default. This is because the feature is detected
through an MSR; a very bad idea that Intel seems to like more and
more. Some applications choke if the other fields of that MSR are
not initialized as on real hardware, hence we have to disable the
whole MSR by default, as was the case before Linux 4.12."
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (23 commits)
KVM: nVMX: Fix bad cleanup on error of get/set nested state IOCTLs
kvm: selftests: Add platform_info_test
KVM: x86: Control guest reads of MSR_PLATFORM_INFO
KVM: x86: Turbo bits in MSR_PLATFORM_INFO
nVMX x86: Check VPID value on vmentry of L2 guests
nVMX x86: check posted-interrupt descriptor addresss on vmentry of L2
KVM: nVMX: Wake blocked vCPU in guest-mode if pending interrupt in virtual APICv
KVM: VMX: check nested state and CR4.VMXE against SMM
kvm: x86: make kvm_{load|put}_guest_fpu() static
x86/hyper-v: rename ipi_arg_{ex,non_ex} structures
KVM: VMX: use preemption timer to force immediate VMExit
KVM: VMX: modify preemption timer bit only when arming timer
KVM: VMX: immediately mark preemption timer expired only for zero value
KVM: SVM: Switch to bitmap_zalloc()
KVM/MMU: Fix comment in walk_shadow_page_lockless_end()
kvm: selftests: use -pthread instead of -lpthread
KVM: x86: don't reset root in kvm_mmu_setup()
kvm: mmu: Don't read PDPTEs when paging is not enabled
x86/kvm/lapic: always disable MMIO interface in x2APIC mode
KVM: s390: Make huge pages unavailable in ucontrol VMs
...
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Add KVM_CAP_MSR_PLATFORM_INFO so that userspace can disable guest access
to reads of MSR_PLATFORM_INFO.
Disabling access to reads of this MSR gives userspace the control to "expose"
this platform-dependent information to guests in a clear way. As it exists
today, guests that read this MSR would get unpopulated information if userspace
hadn't already set it (and prior to this patch series, only the CPUID faulting
information could have been populated). This existing interface could be
confusing if guests don't handle the potential for incorrect/incomplete
information gracefully (e.g. zero reported for base frequency).
Signed-off-by: Drew Schmitt <dasch@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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gpio_keys.c now exists in the drivers/input/keyboard/ rather than
drivers/input/.
Signed-off-by: Song Qiang <songqiang.1304521@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvms390/linux into HEAD
KVM: s390: Fixes for 4.19
- more fallout from the hugetlbfs enablement
- bugfix for vma handling
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Dave writes:
"Various fixes, all over the place:
1) OOB data generation fix in bluetooth, from Matias Karhumaa.
2) BPF BTF boundary calculation fix, from Martin KaFai Lau.
3) Don't bug on excessive frags, to be compatible in situations mixing
older and newer kernels on each end. From Juergen Gross.
4) Scheduling in RCU fix in hv_netvsc, from Stephen Hemminger.
5) Zero keying information in TLS layer before freeing copies
of them, from Sabrina Dubroca.
6) Fix NULL deref in act_sample, from Davide Caratti.
7) Orphan SKB before GRO in veth to prevent crashes with XDP,
from Toshiaki Makita.
8) Fix use after free in ip6_xmit, from Eric Dumazet.
9) Fix VF mac address regression in bnxt_en, from Micahel Chan.
10) Fix MSG_PEEK behavior in TLS layer, from Daniel Borkmann.
11) Programming adjustments to r8169 which fix not being to enter deep
sleep states on some machines, from Kai-Heng Feng and Hans de
Goede.
12) Fix DST_NOCOUNT flag handling for ipv6 routes, from Peter
Oskolkov."
* gitolite.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (45 commits)
net/ipv6: do not copy dst flags on rt init
qmi_wwan: set DTR for modems in forced USB2 mode
clk: x86: Stop marking clocks as CLK_IS_CRITICAL
r8169: Get and enable optional ether_clk clock
clk: x86: add "ether_clk" alias for Bay Trail / Cherry Trail
r8169: enable ASPM on RTL8106E
r8169: Align ASPM/CLKREQ setting function with vendor driver
Revert "kcm: remove any offset before parsing messages"
kcm: remove any offset before parsing messages
net: ethernet: Fix a unused function warning.
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix ATU Miss Violation
tls: fix currently broken MSG_PEEK behavior
hv_netvsc: pair VF based on serial number
PCI: hv: support reporting serial number as slot information
bnxt_en: Fix VF mac address regression.
ipv6: fix possible use-after-free in ip6_xmit()
net: hp100: fix always-true check for link up state
ARM: dts: at91: add new compatibility string for macb on sama5d3
net: macb: disable scatter-gather for macb on sama5d3
net: mvpp2: let phylink manage the carrier state
...
|
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We need this new compatibility string as we experienced different behavior
for this 10/100Mbits/s macb interface on this particular SoC.
Backward compatibility is preserved as we keep the alternative strings.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
The Code of Conflict is not achieving its implicit goal of fostering
civility and the spirit of 'be excellent to each other'. Explicit
guidelines have demonstrated success in other projects and other areas
of the kernel.
Here is a Code of Conduct statement for the wider kernel. It is based
on the Contributor Covenant as described at www.contributor-covenant.org
From this point forward, we should abide by these rules in order to help
make the kernel community a welcoming environment to participate in.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lxom.net>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingol Molnar:
"Misc fixes:
- EFI crash fix
- Xen PV fixes
- do not allow PTI on 2-level 32-bit kernels for now
- documentation fix"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/APM: Fix build warning when PROC_FS is not enabled
Revert "x86/mm/legacy: Populate the user page-table with user pgd's"
x86/efi: Load fixmap GDT in efi_call_phys_epilog() before setting %cr3
x86/xen: Disable CPU0 hotplug for Xen PV
x86/EISA: Don't probe EISA bus for Xen PV guests
x86/doc: Fix Documentation/x86/earlyprintk.txt
|
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip
Pull xen fixes from Juergen Gross:
"This contains some minor cleanups and fixes:
- a new knob for controlling scrubbing of pages returned by the Xen
balloon driver to the Xen hypervisor to address a boot performance
issue seen in large guests booted pre-ballooned
- a fix of a regression in the gntdev driver which made it impossible
to use fully virtualized guests (HVM guests) with a 4.19 based dom0
- a fix in Xen cpu hotplug functionality which could be triggered by
wrong admin commands (setting number of active vcpus to 0)
One further note: the patches have all been under test for several
days in another branch. This branch has been rebased in order to avoid
merge conflicts"
* tag 'for-linus-4.19c-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
xen/gntdev: fix up blockable calls to mn_invl_range_start
xen: fix GCC warning and remove duplicate EVTCHN_ROW/EVTCHN_COL usage
xen: avoid crash in disable_hotplug_cpu
xen/balloon: add runtime control for scrubbing ballooned out pages
xen/manage: don't complain about an empty value in control/sysrq node
|
|
Scrubbing pages on initial balloon down can take some time, especially
in nested virtualization case (nested EPT is slow). When HVM/PVH guest is
started with memory= significantly lower than maxmem=, all the extra
pages will be scrubbed before returning to Xen. But since most of them
weren't used at all at that point, Xen needs to populate them first
(from populate-on-demand pool). In nested virt case (Xen inside KVM)
this slows down the guest boot by 15-30s with just 1.5GB needed to be
returned to Xen.
Add runtime parameter to enable/disable it, to allow initially disabling
scrubbing, then enable it back during boot (for example in initramfs).
Such usage relies on assumption that a) most pages ballooned out during
initial boot weren't used at all, and b) even if they were, very few
secrets are in the guest at that time (before any serious userspace
kicks in).
Convert CONFIG_XEN_SCRUB_PAGES to CONFIG_XEN_SCRUB_PAGES_DEFAULT (also
enabled by default), controlling default value for the new runtime
switch.
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
|
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs
Pull overlayfs fixes from Miklos Szeredi:
"This fixes a regression in the recent file stacking update, reported
and fixed by Amir Goldstein. The fix is fairly trivial, but involves
adding a fadvise() f_op and the associated churn in the vfs. As
discussed on -fsdevel, there are other possible uses for this method,
than allowing proper stacking for overlays.
And there's one other fix for a syzkaller detected oops"
* tag 'ovl-fixes-4.19-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs:
ovl: fix oopses in ovl_fill_super() failure paths
ovl: add ovl_fadvise()
vfs: implement readahead(2) using POSIX_FADV_WILLNEED
vfs: add the fadvise() file operation
Documentation/filesystems: update documentation of file_operations
ovl: fix GPF in swapfile_activate of file from overlayfs over xfs
ovl: respect FIEMAP_FLAG_SYNC flag
|
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm
Pull device mapper fixes from Mike Snitzer:
- DM verity fix for crash due to using vmalloc'd buffers with the
asynchronous crypto hadsh API.
- Fix to both DM crypt and DM integrity targets to discontinue using
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP because its use of GFP_KERNEL can lead to
deadlock by recursing back into a filesystem.
- Various DM raid fixes related to reshape and rebuild races.
- Fix for DM thin-provisioning to avoid data corruption that was a
side-effect of needing to abort DM thin metadata transaction due to
running out of metadata space. Fix is to reserve a small amount of
metadata space so that once it is used the DM thin-pool can finish
its active transaction before switching to read-only mode.
* tag 'for-4.19/dm-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm:
dm thin metadata: try to avoid ever aborting transactions
dm raid: bump target version, update comments and documentation
dm raid: fix RAID leg rebuild errors
dm raid: fix rebuild of specific devices by updating superblock
dm raid: fix stripe adding reshape deadlock
dm raid: fix reshape race on small devices
dm: disable CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP to fix a GFP_KERNEL recursion deadlock
dm verity: fix crash on bufio buffer that was allocated with vmalloc
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We currently do not notify all gmaps when using gmap_pmdp_xchg(), due
to locking constraints. This makes ucontrol VMs, which is the only VM
type that creates multiple gmaps, incompatible with huge pages. Also
we would need to hold the guest_table_lock of all gmaps that have this
vmaddr maped to synchronize access to the pmd.
ucontrol VMs are rather exotic and creating a new locking concept is
no easy task. Hence we return EINVAL when trying to active
KVM_CAP_S390_HPAGE_1M and report it as being not available when
checking for it.
Fixes: a4499382 ("KVM: s390: Add huge page enablement control")
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20180801112508.138159-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
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Sean Christopherson
Greg Kroah-Hartman
Samuel Holland
Adrian Bunk
Michal Hocko
Thomas Gleixner
Lukas Wunner
Will Deacon
Kai-Heng Feng
Kirill A. Shutemov
Feng Tang
Miklos Szeredi
Hans Verkuil
Hans Verkuil
Hans Verkuil
Jason A. Donenfeld
Chris Mason
Matthew Wilcox
Alan Tull
Maciej Żenczykowski
Adam Jackson
Drew Schmitt
Song Qiang
Paolo Bonzini
Nicolas Ferre
Linus Torvalds
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Janosch Frank