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commit c9e716eb9b3455a83ed7c5f5a81256a3da779a95 upstream.
Don't update the superblock s_rev_level during mount if it isn't
actually necessary, only if superblock features are being set by
the kernel. This was originally added for ext3 since it always
set the INCOMPAT_RECOVER and HAS_JOURNAL features during mount,
but this is not needed since no journal mode was added to ext4.
That will allow Geert to mount his 20-year-old ext2 rev 0.0 m68k
filesystem, as a testament of the backward compatibility of ext4.
Fixes: 0390131ba84f ("ext4: Allow ext4 to run without a journal")
Signed-off-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ddccb6dbe780d68133191477571cb7c69e17bb8c upstream.
Fix compile error below when using BUFFER_TRACE.
fs/ext4/inode.c: In function ‘ext4_expand_extra_isize’:
fs/ext4/inode.c:5979:19: error: request for member ‘bh’ in something not a structure or union
BUFFER_TRACE(iloc.bh, "get_write_access");
Fixes: c03b45b853f58 ("ext4, project: expand inode extra size if possible")
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 95047b0519c17a28e09df5f38750f5354e3db4c4 upstream.
This refactors compression initialization slightly to better handle
getting potentially called twice (via early pstore_register() calls
and later pstore_init()) and improves the comments and reporting to be
more verbose.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 416031653eb55f844e3547fb8f8576399a800da0 upstream.
ramoops's call of pstore_register() was recently moved to run during
late_initcall() because the crypto backend may not have been ready during
postcore_initcall(). This meant early-boot crash dumps were not getting
caught by pstore any more.
Instead, lets allow calls to pstore_register() earlier, and once crypto
is ready we can initialize the compression.
Reported-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan <saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Tested-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan <saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org>
Fixes: cb3bee0369bc ("pstore: Use crypto compress API")
[kees: trivial rebase]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cb095afd44768bf495894b9ad063bd078e4bb201 upstream.
In preparation for having additional actions during init/exit, this moves
the init/exit into platform.c, centralizing the logic to make call outs
to the fs init/exit.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6daef95b8c914866a46247232a048447fff97279 upstream.
Avoid cache line miss dereferencing struct page if we can.
page_copy_sane() mostly deals with order-0 pages.
Extra cache line miss is visible on TCP recvmsg() calls dealing
with GRO packets (typically 45 page frags are attached to one skb).
Bringing the 45 struct pages into cpu cache while copying the data
is not free, since the freeing of the skb (and associated
page frags put_page()) can happen after cache lines have been evicted.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c4703ce11c23423d4b46e3d59aef7979814fd608 upstream.
Users have reported intermittent occurrences of DIMM initialization
failures due to duplicate allocations of address capacity detected in
the labels, or errors of the form below, both have the same root cause.
nd namespace1.4: failed to track label: 0
WARNING: CPU: 17 PID: 1381 at drivers/nvdimm/label.c:863
RIP: 0010:__pmem_label_update+0x56c/0x590 [libnvdimm]
Call Trace:
? nd_pmem_namespace_label_update+0xd6/0x160 [libnvdimm]
nd_pmem_namespace_label_update+0xd6/0x160 [libnvdimm]
uuid_store+0x17e/0x190 [libnvdimm]
kernfs_fop_write+0xf0/0x1a0
vfs_write+0xb7/0x1b0
ksys_write+0x57/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x60/0x210
Unfortunately those reports were typically with a busy parallel
namespace creation / destruction loop making it difficult to see the
components of the bug. However, Jane provided a simple reproducer using
the work-in-progress sub-section implementation.
When ndctl is reconfiguring a namespace it may take an existing defunct
/ disabled namespace and reconfigure it with a new uuid and other
parameters. Critically namespace_update_uuid() takes existing address
resources and renames them for the new namespace to use / reconfigure as
it sees fit. The bug is that this rename only happens in the resource
tracking tree. Existing labels with the old uuid are not reaped leading
to a scenario where multiple active labels reference the same span of
address range.
Teach namespace_update_uuid() to flag any references to the old uuid for
reaping at the next label update attempt.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: bf9bccc14c05 ("libnvdimm: pmem label sets and namespace instantiation")
Link: https://github.com/pmem/ndctl/issues/91
Reported-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Erwin Tsaur <erwin.tsaur@oracle.com>
Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c9f804d64bb93c8dbf957df1d7e9de11380e522d upstream.
Or else xen_domain() returns false despite xen_pvh being set.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d2f8ae0e4c5c754f1b2a7b8388d19a1a977e698a upstream.
syncconfig is responsible for keeping auto.conf up-to-date, so if it
fails for any reason, the build must be terminated immediately.
However, since commit 9390dff66a52 ("kbuild: invoke syncconfig if
include/config/auto.conf.cmd is missing"), Kbuild continues running
even after syncconfig fails.
You can confirm this by intentionally making syncconfig error out:
# diff --git a/scripts/kconfig/confdata.c b/scripts/kconfig/confdata.c
# index 08ba146..307b9de 100644
# --- a/scripts/kconfig/confdata.c
# +++ b/scripts/kconfig/confdata.c
# @@ -1023,6 +1023,9 @@ int conf_write_autoconf(int overwrite)
# FILE *out, *tristate, *out_h;
# int i;
#
# + if (overwrite)
# + return 1;
# +
# if (!overwrite && is_present(autoconf_name))
# return 0;
Then, syncconfig fails, but Make would not stop:
$ make -s mrproper allyesconfig defconfig
$ make
scripts/kconfig/conf --syncconfig Kconfig
*** Error during sync of the configuration.
make[2]: *** [scripts/kconfig/Makefile;69: syncconfig] Error 1
make[1]: *** [Makefile;557: syncconfig] Error 2
make: *** [include/config/auto.conf.cmd] Deleting file 'include/config/tristate.conf'
make: Failed to remake makefile 'include/config/auto.conf'.
SYSTBL arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_32.h
SYSHDR arch/x86/include/generated/asm/unistd_32_ia32.h
SYSHDR arch/x86/include/generated/asm/unistd_64_x32.h
SYSTBL arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h
[ continue running ... ]
The reason is in the behavior of a pattern rule with multi-targets.
%/auto.conf %/auto.conf.cmd %/tristate.conf: $(KCONFIG_CONFIG)
$(Q)$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/Makefile syncconfig
GNU Make knows this rule is responsible for making all the three files
simultaneously. As far as examined, auto.conf.cmd is the target in
question when this rule is invoked. It is probably because auto.conf.cmd
is included below the inclusion of auto.conf.
The inclusion of auto.conf is mandatory, while that of auto.conf.cmd
is optional. GNU Make does not care about the failure in the process
of updating optional include files.
I filed this issue (https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?56301) in case this
behavior could be improved somehow in future releases of GNU Make.
Anyway, it is quite easy to fix our Makefile.
Given that auto.conf is already a mandatory include file, there is no
reason to stick auto.conf.cmd optional. Make it mandatory as well.
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0+
Fixes: 9390dff66a52 ("kbuild: invoke syncconfig if include/config/auto.conf.cmd is missing")
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
[commented out diff above to keep patch happy - gregkh]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ee66e453db13d4837a0dcf9d43efa7a88603161b upstream.
...now that VMX's preemption timer, i.e. the hv_timer, also adjusts its
programmed time based on lapic_timer_advance_ns. Without the delay, a
guest can see a timer interrupt arrive before the requested time when
KVM is using the hv_timer to emulate the guest's interrupt.
Fixes: c5ce8235cffa0 ("KVM: VMX: Optimize tscdeadline timer latency")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 11988499e62b310f3bf6f6d0a807a06d3f9ccc96 upstream.
KVM allows userspace to violate consistency checks related to the
guest's CPUID model to some degree. Generally speaking, userspace has
carte blanche when it comes to guest state so long as jamming invalid
state won't negatively affect the host.
Currently this is seems to be a non-issue as most of the interesting
EFER checks are missing, e.g. NX and LME, but those will be added
shortly. Proactively exempt userspace from the CPUID checks so as not
to break userspace.
Note, the efer_reserved_bits check still applies to userspace writes as
that mask reflects the host's capabilities, e.g. KVM shouldn't allow a
guest to run with NX=1 if it has been disabled in the host.
Fixes: d80174745ba39 ("KVM: SVM: Only allow setting of EFER_SVME when CPUID SVM is set")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0d52154bb0a700abb459a2cbce0a30fc2549b67e upstream.
When failing from creating cache jbd2_inode_cache, we will destroy the
previously created cache jbd2_handle_cache twice. This patch fixes
this by moving each cache initialization/destruction to its own
separate, individual function.
Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 56df90b631fc027fe28b70d41352d820797239bb upstream.
Add patch for realtek codec in Lenovo B50-70 that fixes inverted
internal microphone channel.
Device IdeaPad Y410P has the same PCI SSID as Lenovo B50-70,
but first one is about fix the noise and it didn't seem help in a
later kernel version.
So I replaced IdeaPad Y410P device description with B50-70 and apply
inverted microphone fix.
Bugzilla: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/alsa-driver/+bug/1524215
Signed-off-by: Michał Wadowski <wadosm@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit dad3197da7a3817f27bb24f7fd3c135ffa707202 upstream.
Dell platform with ALC298.
system enter to runtime suspend. Headphone had noise.
Let Headset Mic not shutup will solve this issue.
[ Fixed minor coding style issues by tiwai ]
Signed-off-by: Kailang Yang <kailang@realtek.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 891afcf2462d2cc4ef7caf94215358ca61fa32cb upstream.
A mistake was made in the identification of the four variants of the
System76 Gazelle (gaze14). This patch corrects the PCI ID of the
17-inch, GTX 1660 Ti variant from 0x8560 to 0x8551. This patch also
adds the correct fixups for the 15-inch and 17-inch GTX 1650 variants
with PCI IDs 0x8560 and 0x8561.
Tests were done on all four variants ensuring full audio capability.
Fixes: 80a5052db751 ("ALSA: hdea/realtek - Headset fixup for System76 Gazelle (gaze14)")
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Soller <jeremy@system76.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2c1d0e3631e5732dba98ef49ac0bec1388776793 upstream.
Handling of aborted journal is a special code path different from
standard ext4_error() one and it can call panic() as well. Commit
1dc1097ff60e ("ext4: avoid panic during forced reboot") forgot to update
this path so fix that omission.
Fixes: 1dc1097ff60e ("ext4: avoid panic during forced reboot")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 5.1
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 08fc98a4d6424af66eb3ac4e2cedd2fc927ed436 upstream.
The buffer_head (frames[0].bh) and it's corresping page can be
potentially free'd once brelse() is done inside the for loop
but before the for loop exits in dx_release(). It can be free'd
in another context, when the page cache is flushed via
drop_caches_sysctl_handler(). This results into below data abort
when accessing info->indirect_levels in dx_release().
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffc17ac3e01e
Call trace:
dx_release+0x70/0x90
ext4_htree_fill_tree+0x2d4/0x300
ext4_readdir+0x244/0x6f8
iterate_dir+0xbc/0x160
SyS_getdents64+0x94/0x174
Signed-off-by: Sahitya Tummala <stummala@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 57a0da28ced8707cb9f79f071a016b9d005caf5a upstream.
Unaligned AIO must be serialized because the zeroing of partial blocks
of unaligned AIO can result in data corruption in case it's overlapping
another in flight IO.
Currently we wait for all unwritten extents before we submit unaligned
AIO which protects data in case of unaligned AIO is following overlapping
IO. However if a unaligned AIO is followed by overlapping aligned AIO we
can still end up corrupting data.
To fix this, we must make sure that the unaligned AIO is the only IO in
flight by waiting for unwritten extents conversion not just before the
IO submission, but right after it as well.
This problem can be reproduced by xfstest generic/538
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 592acbf16821288ecdc4192c47e3774a4c48bb64 upstream.
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <sriramr@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f91253a3d005796404ae0e578b3394459b5f9b71 upstream.
The Linux kernel will auto-disables all boot consoles whenever it
gets a preferred real console.
Currently on RISC-V systems, if we have a real console which is not
RISCV SBI console then boot consoles (such as earlycon=sbi) are not
auto-disabled when a real console (ttyS0 or ttySIF0) is available.
This results in duplicate prints at boot-time after kernel starts
using real console (i.e. ttyS0 or ttySIF0) if "earlycon=" kernel
parameter was passed by bootloader.
The reason for above issue is that RISCV SBI console always adds
itself as preferred console which is causing other real consoles
to be not used as preferred console.
Ideally "console=" kernel parameter passed by bootloaders should
be the one selecting a preferred real console.
This patch fixes above issue by not forcing RISCV SBI console as
preferred console.
Fixes: afa6b1ccfad5 ("tty: New RISC-V SBI console driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup.patel@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atish.patra@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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into workqueue when umount
commit ec084de929e419e51bcdafaafe567d9e7d0273b7 upstream.
synchronize_rcu() didn't wait for call_rcu() callbacks, so inode wb
switch may not go to the workqueue after synchronize_rcu(). Thus
previous scheduled switches was not finished even flushing the
workqueue, which will cause a NULL pointer dereferenced followed below.
VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of vdd. Self-destruct in 5 seconds. Have a nice day...
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000278
evict+0xb3/0x180
iput+0x1b0/0x230
inode_switch_wbs_work_fn+0x3c0/0x6a0
worker_thread+0x4e/0x490
? process_one_work+0x410/0x410
kthread+0xe6/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x39/0x50
Replace the synchronize_rcu() call with a rcu_barrier() to wait for all
pending callbacks to finish. And inc isw_nr_in_flight after call_rcu()
in inode_switch_wbs() to make more sense.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190429024108.54150-1-jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Jiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6a1faa4a43f5fabf9cbeaa742d916e7b5e73120f upstream.
CCM instances can be created by either the "ccm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "ccm(aes)"; or by "ccm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and cbcmac implementations, e.g.
"ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
However, a "ccm_base" instance prevents a "ccm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "ccm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "ccm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "ccm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"ccm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "ccm" instances, e.g.
"ccm(aes)" instead of "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
and cbcmac algorithms. It also requires starting to verify that the
algorithms are really ctr and cbcmac using the same block cipher, not
something else entirely. But it would be bizarre if anyone were
actually using non-ccm-compatible algorithms with ccm_base, so this
shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: 4a49b499dfa0 ("[CRYPTO] ccm: Added CCM mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 55be8658c7e2feb11a5b5b33ee031791dbd23a69 upstream.
According to ipmi spec, block number is a number that is incremented,
starting with 0, for each new block of message data returned using the
middle transaction.
Here, the 'blocknum' is data[0] which always starts from zero(0) and
'ssif_info->multi_pos' starts from 1.
So, we need to add +1 to blocknum while comparing with multi_pos.
Fixes: 7d6380cd40f79 ("ipmi:ssif: Fix handling of multi-part return messages").
Reported-by: Kiran Kolukuluru <kirank@ami.com>
Signed-off-by: Kamlakant Patel <kamlakantp@marvell.com>
Message-Id: <1556106615-18722-1-git-send-email-kamlakantp@marvell.com>
[Also added a debug log if the block numbers don't match.]
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1bee2addc0c8470c8aaa65ef0599eeae96dd88bc upstream.
In journal_reclaim() ja->cur_idx of each cache will be update to
reclaim available journal buckets. Variable 'int n' is used to count how
many cache is successfully reclaimed, then n is set to c->journal.key
by SET_KEY_PTRS(). Later in journal_write_unlocked(), a for_each_cache()
loop will write the jset data onto each cache.
The problem is, if all jouranl buckets on each cache is full, the
following code in journal_reclaim(),
529 for_each_cache(ca, c, iter) {
530 struct journal_device *ja = &ca->journal;
531 unsigned int next = (ja->cur_idx + 1) % ca->sb.njournal_buckets;
532
533 /* No space available on this device */
534 if (next == ja->discard_idx)
535 continue;
536
537 ja->cur_idx = next;
538 k->ptr[n++] = MAKE_PTR(0,
539 bucket_to_sector(c, ca->sb.d[ja->cur_idx]),
540 ca->sb.nr_this_dev);
541 }
542
543 bkey_init(k);
544 SET_KEY_PTRS(k, n);
If there is no available bucket to reclaim, the if() condition at line
534 will always true, and n remains 0. Then at line 544, SET_KEY_PTRS()
will set KEY_PTRS field of c->journal.key to 0.
Setting KEY_PTRS field of c->journal.key to 0 is wrong. Because in
journal_write_unlocked() the journal data is written in following loop,
649 for (i = 0; i < KEY_PTRS(k); i++) {
650-671 submit journal data to cache device
672 }
If KEY_PTRS field is set to 0 in jouranl_reclaim(), the journal data
won't be written to cache device here. If system crahed or rebooted
before bkeys of the lost journal entries written into btree nodes, data
corruption will be reported during bcache reload after rebooting the
system.
Indeed there is only one cache in a cache set, there is no need to set
KEY_PTRS field in journal_reclaim() at all. But in order to keep the
for_each_cache() logic consistent for now, this patch fixes the above
problem by not setting 0 KEY_PTRS of journal key, if there is no bucket
available to reclaim.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit a4b732a248d12cbdb46999daf0bf288c011335eb upstream.
There is a race between cache device register and cache set unregister.
For an already registered cache device, register_bcache will call
bch_is_open to iterate through all cachesets and check every cache
there. The race occurs if cache_set_free executes at the same time and
clears the caches right before ca is dereferenced in bch_is_open_cache.
To close the race, let's make sure the clean up work is protected by
the bch_register_lock as well.
This issue can be reproduced as follows,
while true; do echo /dev/XXX> /sys/fs/bcache/register ; done&
while true; do echo 1> /sys/block/XXX/bcache/set/unregister ; done &
and results in the following oops,
[ +0.000053] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000998
[ +0.000457] #PF error: [normal kernel read fault]
[ +0.000464] PGD 800000003ca9d067 P4D 800000003ca9d067 PUD 3ca9c067 PMD 0
[ +0.000388] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ +0.000269] CPU: 1 PID: 3266 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.0.0+ #6
[ +0.000346] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.fc28 04/01/2014
[ +0.000472] RIP: 0010:register_bcache+0x1829/0x1990 [bcache]
[ +0.000344] Code: b0 48 83 e8 50 48 81 fa e0 e1 10 c0 0f 84 a9 00 00 00 48 89 c6 48 89 ca 0f b7 ba 54 04 00 00 4c 8b 82 60 0c 00 00 85 ff 74 2f <49> 3b a8 98 09 00 00 74 4e 44 8d 47 ff 31 ff 49 c1 e0 03 eb 0d
[ +0.000839] RSP: 0018:ffff92ee804cbd88 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ +0.000328] RAX: ffffffffc010e190 RBX: ffff918b5c6b5000 RCX: ffff918b7d8e0000
[ +0.000399] RDX: ffff918b7d8e0000 RSI: ffffffffc010e190 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ +0.000398] RBP: ffff918b7d318340 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffb9bd2d7a
[ +0.000385] R10: ffff918b7eb253c0 R11: ffffb95980f51200 R12: ffffffffc010e1a0
[ +0.000411] R13: fffffffffffffff2 R14: 000000000000000b R15: ffff918b7e232620
[ +0.000384] FS: 00007f955bec2740(0000) GS:ffff918b7eb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ +0.000420] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ +0.000801] CR2: 0000000000000998 CR3: 000000003cad6000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
[ +0.000837] Call Trace:
[ +0.000682] ? _cond_resched+0x10/0x20
[ +0.000691] ? __kmalloc+0x131/0x1b0
[ +0.000710] kernfs_fop_write+0xfa/0x170
[ +0.000733] __vfs_write+0x2e/0x190
[ +0.000688] ? inode_security+0x10/0x30
[ +0.000698] ? selinux_file_permission+0xd2/0x120
[ +0.000752] ? security_file_permission+0x2b/0x100
[ +0.000753] vfs_write+0xa8/0x1a0
[ +0.000676] ksys_write+0x4d/0xb0
[ +0.000699] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xf0
[ +0.000692] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Signed-off-by: Liang Chen <liangchen.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bfc61c36260ca990937539cd648ede3cd749bc10 upstream.
When finding out which inodes have references on a particular extent, done
by backref.c:iterate_extent_inodes(), from the BTRFS_IOC_LOGICAL_INO (both
v1 and v2) ioctl and from scrub we use the transaction join API to grab a
reference on the currently running transaction, since in order to give
accurate results we need to inspect the delayed references of the currently
running transaction.
However, if there is currently no running transaction, the join operation
will create a new transaction. This is inefficient as the transaction will
eventually be committed, doing unnecessary IO and introducing a potential
point of failure that will lead to a transaction abort due to -ENOSPC, as
recently reported [1].
That's because the join, creates the transaction but does not reserve any
space, so when attempting to update the root item of the root passed to
btrfs_join_transaction(), during the transaction commit, we can end up
failling with -ENOSPC. Users of a join operation are supposed to actually
do some filesystem changes and reserve space by some means, which is not
the case of iterate_extent_inodes(), it is a read-only operation for all
contextes from which it is called.
The reported [1] -ENOSPC failure stack trace is the following:
heisenberg kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------
heisenberg kernel: BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28)
heisenberg kernel: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7137 at fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:136 btrfs_update_root+0x22b/0x320 [btrfs]
(...)
heisenberg kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 7137 Comm: btrfs-transacti Not tainted 4.19.0-4-amd64 #1 Debian 4.19.28-2
heisenberg kernel: Hardware name: FUJITSU LIFEBOOK U757/FJNB2A5, BIOS Version 1.21 03/19/2018
heisenberg kernel: RIP: 0010:btrfs_update_root+0x22b/0x320 [btrfs]
(...)
heisenberg kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffb5448828bd40 EFLAGS: 00010286
heisenberg kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ed56bccef50 RCX: 0000000000000006
heisenberg kernel: RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000092 RDI: ffff8ed6bda166a0
heisenberg kernel: RBP: 00000000ffffffe4 R08: 00000000000003df R09: 0000000000000007
heisenberg kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8ed63396a078
heisenberg kernel: R13: ffff8ed092d7c800 R14: ffff8ed64f5db028 R15: ffff8ed6bd03d068
heisenberg kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ed6bda00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
heisenberg kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
heisenberg kernel: CR2: 00007f46f75f8000 CR3: 0000000310a0a002 CR4: 00000000003606f0
heisenberg kernel: DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
heisenberg kernel: DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
heisenberg kernel: Call Trace:
heisenberg kernel: commit_fs_roots+0x166/0x1d0 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
heisenberg kernel: ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xac/0x180 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: btrfs_commit_transaction+0x2bd/0x870 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? start_transaction+0x9d/0x3f0 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: transaction_kthread+0x147/0x180 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x530/0x530 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: kthread+0x112/0x130
heisenberg kernel: ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30
heisenberg kernel: ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
heisenberg kernel: ---[ end trace 05de912e30e012d9 ]---
So fix that by using the attach API, which does not create a transaction
when there is currently no running transaction.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/b2a668d7124f1d3e410367f587926f622b3f03a4.camel@scientia.net/
Reported-by: Zygo Blaxell <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 03628cdbc64db6262e50d0357960a4e9562676a1 upstream.
During fiemap, for regular extents (non inline) we need to check if they
are shared and if they are, set the shared bit. Checking if an extent is
shared requires checking the delayed references of the currently running
transaction, since some reference might have not yet hit the extent tree
and be only in the in-memory delayed references.
However we were using a transaction join for this, which creates a new
transaction when there is no transaction currently running. That means
that two more potential failures can happen: creating the transaction and
committing it. Further, if no write activity is currently happening in the
system, and fiemap calls keep being done, we end up creating and
committing transactions that do nothing.
In some extreme cases this can result in the commit of the transaction
created by fiemap to fail with ENOSPC when updating the root item of a
subvolume tree because a join does not reserve any space, leading to a
trace like the following:
heisenberg kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------
heisenberg kernel: BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28)
heisenberg kernel: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7137 at fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:136 btrfs_update_root+0x22b/0x320 [btrfs]
(...)
heisenberg kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 7137 Comm: btrfs-transacti Not tainted 4.19.0-4-amd64 #1 Debian 4.19.28-2
heisenberg kernel: Hardware name: FUJITSU LIFEBOOK U757/FJNB2A5, BIOS Version 1.21 03/19/2018
heisenberg kernel: RIP: 0010:btrfs_update_root+0x22b/0x320 [btrfs]
(...)
heisenberg kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffb5448828bd40 EFLAGS: 00010286
heisenberg kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ed56bccef50 RCX: 0000000000000006
heisenberg kernel: RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000092 RDI: ffff8ed6bda166a0
heisenberg kernel: RBP: 00000000ffffffe4 R08: 00000000000003df R09: 0000000000000007
heisenberg kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8ed63396a078
heisenberg kernel: R13: ffff8ed092d7c800 R14: ffff8ed64f5db028 R15: ffff8ed6bd03d068
heisenberg kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ed6bda00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
heisenberg kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
heisenberg kernel: CR2: 00007f46f75f8000 CR3: 0000000310a0a002 CR4: 00000000003606f0
heisenberg kernel: DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
heisenberg kernel: DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
heisenberg kernel: Call Trace:
heisenberg kernel: commit_fs_roots+0x166/0x1d0 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
heisenberg kernel: ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xac/0x180 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: btrfs_commit_transaction+0x2bd/0x870 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? start_transaction+0x9d/0x3f0 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: transaction_kthread+0x147/0x180 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x530/0x530 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: kthread+0x112/0x130
heisenberg kernel: ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30
heisenberg kernel: ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
heisenberg kernel: ---[ end trace 05de912e30e012d9 ]---
Since fiemap (and btrfs_check_shared()) is a read-only operation, do not do
a transaction join to avoid the overhead of creating a new transaction (if
there is currently no running transaction) and introducing a potential
point of failure when the new transaction gets committed, instead use a
transaction attach to grab a handle for the currently running transaction
if any.
Reported-by: Christoph Anton Mitterer <calestyo@scientia.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/b2a668d7124f1d3e410367f587926f622b3f03a4.camel@scientia.net/
Fixes: afce772e87c36c ("btrfs: fix check_shared for fiemap ioctl")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9f89d5de8631c7930898a601b6612e271aa2261c upstream.
When we set a subvolume to read-only mode we do not flush dellaloc for any
of its inodes (except if the filesystem is mounted with -o flushoncommit),
since it does not affect correctness for any subsequent operations - except
for a future send operation. The send operation will not be able to see the
delalloc data since the respective file extent items, inode item updates,
backreferences, etc, have not hit yet the subvolume and extent trees.
Effectively this means data loss, since the send stream will not contain
any data from existing delalloc. Another problem from this is that if the
writeback starts and finishes while the send operation is in progress, we
have the subvolume tree being being modified concurrently which can result
in send failing unexpectedly with EIO or hitting runtime errors, assertion
failures or hitting BUG_ONs, etc.
Simple reproducer:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
$ btrfs subvolume create /mnt/sv
$ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xea 0 108K" /mnt/sv/foo
$ btrfs property set /mnt/sv ro true
$ btrfs send -f /tmp/send.stream /mnt/sv
$ od -t x1 -A d /mnt/sv/foo
0000000 ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea
*
0110592
$ umount /mnt
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc
$ mount /dev/sdc /mnt
$ btrfs receive -f /tmp/send.stream /mnt
$ echo $?
0
$ od -t x1 -A d /mnt/sv/foo
0000000
# ---> empty file
Since this a problem that affects send only, fix it in send by flushing
dellaloc for all the roots used by the send operation before send starts
to process the commit roots.
This is a problem that affects send since it was introduced (commit
31db9f7c23fbf7 ("Btrfs: introduce BTRFS_IOC_SEND for btrfs send/receive"))
but backporting it to older kernels has some dependencies:
- For kernels between 3.19 and 4.20, it depends on commit 3cd24c698004d2
("btrfs: use tagged writepage to mitigate livelock of snapshot") because
the function btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot() does not exist before that
commit. So one has to either pick that commit or replace the calls to
btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot() in this patch with calls to
btrfs_start_delalloc_inodes().
- For kernels older than 3.19 it also requires commit e5fa8f865b3324
("Btrfs: ensure send always works on roots without orphans") because
it depends on the function ensure_commit_roots_uptodate() which that
commits introduced.
- No dependencies for 5.0+ kernels.
A test case for fstests follows soon.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.19+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c2d1b3aae33605a61cbab445d8ae1c708ccd2698 upstream.
Up until now trimming the freespace was done irrespective of what the
arguments of the FITRIM ioctl were. For example fstrim's -o/-l arguments
will be entirely ignored. Fix it by correctly handling those paramter.
This requires breaking if the found freespace extent is after the end of
the passed range as well as completing trim after trimming
fstrim_range::len bytes.
Fixes: 499f377f49f0 ("btrfs: iterate over unused chunk space in FITRIM")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 537f38f019fa0b762dbb4c0fc95d7fcce9db8e2d upstream.
If a an eb fails to be read for whatever reason - it's corrupted on disk
and parent transid/key validations fail or IO for eb pages fail then
this buffer must be removed from the buffer cache. Currently the code
calls free_extent_buffer if an error occurs. Unfortunately this doesn't
achieve the desired behavior since btrfs_find_create_tree_block returns
with eb->refs == 2.
On the other hand free_extent_buffer will only decrement the refs once
leaving it added to the buffer cache radix tree. This enables later
code to look up the buffer from the cache and utilize it potentially
leading to a crash.
The correct way to free the buffer is call free_extent_buffer_stale.
This function will correctly call atomic_dec explicitly for the buffer
and subsequently call release_extent_buffer which will decrement the
final reference thus correctly remove the invalid buffer from buffer
cache. This change affects only newly allocated buffers since they have
eb->refs == 2.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202755
Reported-by: Jungyeon <jungyeon@gatech.edu>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 448de471cd4cab0cedd15770082567a69a784a11 upstream.
[BUG]
When reading a file from a fuzzed image, kernel can panic like:
BTRFS warning (device loop0): csum failed root 5 ino 270 off 0 csum 0x98f94189 expected csum 0x00000000 mirror 1
assertion failed: !memcmp_extent_buffer(b, &disk_key, offsetof(struct btrfs_leaf, items[0].key), sizeof(disk_key)), file: fs/btrfs/ctree.c, line: 2544
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3500!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:btrfs_search_slot.cold.24+0x61/0x63 [btrfs]
Call Trace:
btrfs_lookup_csum+0x52/0x150 [btrfs]
__btrfs_lookup_bio_sums+0x209/0x640 [btrfs]
btrfs_submit_bio_hook+0x103/0x170 [btrfs]
submit_one_bio+0x59/0x80 [btrfs]
extent_read_full_page+0x58/0x80 [btrfs]
generic_file_read_iter+0x2f6/0x9d0
__vfs_read+0x14d/0x1a0
vfs_read+0x8d/0x140
ksys_read+0x52/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x60/0x210
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[CAUSE]
The fuzzed image has a corrupted leaf whose first key doesn't match its
parent:
checksum tree key (CSUM_TREE ROOT_ITEM 0)
node 29741056 level 1 items 14 free 107 generation 19 owner CSUM_TREE
fs uuid 3381d111-94a3-4ac7-8f39-611bbbdab7e6
chunk uuid 9af1c3c7-2af5-488b-8553-530bd515f14c
...
key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 79691776) block 29761536 gen 19
leaf 29761536 items 1 free space 1726 generation 19 owner CSUM_TREE
leaf 29761536 flags 0x1(WRITTEN) backref revision 1
fs uuid 3381d111-94a3-4ac7-8f39-611bbbdab7e6
chunk uuid 9af1c3c7-2af5-488b-8553-530bd515f14c
item 0 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 8798638964736) itemoff 1751 itemsize 2244
range start 8798638964736 end 8798641262592 length 2297856
When reading the above tree block, we have extent_buffer->refs = 2 in
the context:
- initial one from __alloc_extent_buffer()
alloc_extent_buffer()
|- __alloc_extent_buffer()
|- atomic_set(&eb->refs, 1)
- one being added to fs_info->buffer_radix
alloc_extent_buffer()
|- check_buffer_tree_ref()
|- atomic_inc(&eb->refs)
So if even we call free_extent_buffer() in read_tree_block or other
similar situation, we only decrease the refs by 1, it doesn't reach 0
and won't be freed right now.
The staled eb and its corrupted content will still be kept cached.
Furthermore, we have several extra cases where we either don't do first
key check or the check is not proper for all callers:
- scrub
We just don't have first key in this context.
- shared tree block
One tree block can be shared by several snapshot/subvolume trees.
In that case, the first key check for one subvolume doesn't apply to
another.
So for the above reasons, a corrupted extent buffer can sneak into the
buffer cache.
[FIX]
Call verify_level_key in read_block_for_search to do another
verification. For that purpose the function is exported.
Due to above reasons, although we can free corrupted extent buffer from
cache, we still need the check in read_block_for_search(), for scrub and
shared tree blocks.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202755
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202757
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202759
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202761
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202767
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202769
Reported-by: Yoon Jungyeon <jungyeon@gatech.edu>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 50b29d8f033a7c88c5bc011abc2068b1691ab755 upstream.
Instead of removing EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM from s_def_mount_opt as
I assume was intended, all other options were blown away leading to
_ext4_show_options() output being incorrect.
Fixes: 1e381f60dad9 ("ext4: do not allow journal_opts for fs w/o journal")
Signed-off-by: Debabrata Banerjee <dbanerje@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 310a997fd74de778b9a4848a64be9cda9f18764a upstream.
It is never possible, that number of block groups decreases,
since only online grow is supported.
But after a growing occured, we have to zero inode tables
for just created new block groups.
Fixes: 19c5246d2516 ("ext4: add new online resize interface")
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7bc04c5c2cc467c5b40f2b03ba08da174a0d5fa7 upstream.
When remounting with debug_want_extra_isize, we were not performing the
same checks that we do during a normal mount. That allowed us to set a
value for s_want_extra_isize that reached outside the s_inode_size.
Fixes: e2b911c53584 ("ext4: clean up feature test macros with predicate functions")
Reported-by: syzbot+f584efa0ac7213c226b7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8c380ab4b7b59c0c602743810be1b712514eaebc upstream.
The reference to iloc.bh has been dropped in ext4_mark_iloc_dirty.
However, the reference is dropped again if error occurs during
ext4_handle_dirty_metadata, which may result in use-after-free bugs.
Fixes: fb265c9cb49e("ext4: add ext4_sb_bread() to disambiguate ENOMEM cases")
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e5d01196c0428a206f307e9ee5f6842964098ff0 upstream.
In other places in fs/ext4/xattr.c, if e_value_inum is non-zero, the
code ignores the value in e_value_offs. The e_value_offs *should* be
zero, but we shouldn't depend upon it, since it might not be true in a
corrupted/fuzzed file system.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202897
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202877
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 31562b954b60f02acb91b7349dc6432d3f8c3c5f upstream.
The sanity check in mb_find_extent() only checked that returned extent
does not extend past blocksize * 8, however it should not extend past
EXT4_CLUSTERS_PER_GROUP(sb). This can happen when clusters_per_group <
blocksize * 8 and the tail of the bitmap is not properly filled by 1s
which happened e.g. when ancient kernels have grown the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 742b06b5628f2cd23cb51a034cb54dc33c6162c5 upstream.
We hit a BUG at fs/buffer.c:3057 if we detached the nbd device
before unmounting ext4 filesystem.
The typical chain of events leading to the BUG:
jbd2_write_superblock
submit_bh
submit_bh_wbc
BUG_ON(!buffer_mapped(bh));
The block device is removed and all the pages are invalidated. JBD2
was trying to write journal superblock to the block device which is
no longer present.
Fix this by checking the journal superblock's buffer head prior to
submitting.
Reported-by: Eric Ren <renzhen@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 46ca3f735f345c9d87383dd3a09fa5d43870770e upstream.
The bug manifests as an attempt to access deallocated memory:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff9c8735448000
#PF error: [PROT] [WRITE]
PGD 288a05067 P4D 288a05067 PUD 288a07067 PMD 7f60c2063 PTE 80000007f5448161
Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 6 PID: 388 Comm: loadkeys Tainted: G C 5.0.0-rc6-00153-g5ded5871030e #91
Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. To be filled by O.E.M./H77M-D3H, BIOS F12 11/14/2013
RIP: 0010:__memmove+0x81/0x1a0
Code: 4c 89 4f 10 4c 89 47 18 48 8d 7f 20 73 d4 48 83 c2 20 e9 a2 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 d1 4c 8b 5c 16 f8 4c 8d 54 17 f8 48 c1 e9 03 <f3> 48 a5 4d 89 1a e9 0c 01 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 d1 4c 8b 1e 49
RSP: 0018:ffffa1b9002d7d08 EFLAGS: 00010203
RAX: ffff9c873541af43 RBX: ffff9c873541af43 RCX: 00000c6f105cd6bf
RDX: 0000637882e986b6 RSI: ffff9c8735447ffb RDI: ffff9c8735447ffb
RBP: ffff9c8739cd3800 R08: ffff9c873b802f00 R09: 00000000fffff73b
R10: ffffffffb82b35f1 R11: 00505b1b004d5b1b R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff9c873541af3d R14: 000000000000000b R15: 000000000000000c
FS: 00007f450c390580(0000) GS:ffff9c873f180000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff9c8735448000 CR3: 00000007e213c002 CR4: 00000000000606e0
Call Trace:
vt_do_kdgkb_ioctl+0x34d/0x440
vt_ioctl+0xba3/0x1190
? __bpf_prog_run32+0x39/0x60
? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0x7b/0x4e0
tty_ioctl+0x23f/0x920
? preempt_count_sub+0x98/0xe0
? __seccomp_filter+0x67/0x600
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x6a0
? syscall_trace_enter+0x192/0x2d0
ksys_ioctl+0x3a/0x70
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x54/0xe0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The bug manifests on systemd systems with multiple vtcon devices:
# cat /sys/devices/virtual/vtconsole/vtcon0/name
(S) dummy device
# cat /sys/devices/virtual/vtconsole/vtcon1/name
(M) frame buffer device
There systemd runs 'loadkeys' tool in tapallel for each vtcon
instance. This causes two parallel ioctl(KDSKBSENT) calls to
race into adding the same entry into 'func_table' array at:
drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:vt_do_kdgkb_ioctl()
The function has no locking around writes to 'func_table'.
The simplest reproducer is to have initrams with the following
init on a 8-CPU machine x86_64:
#!/bin/sh
loadkeys -q windowkeys ru4 &
loadkeys -q windowkeys ru4 &
loadkeys -q windowkeys ru4 &
loadkeys -q windowkeys ru4 &
loadkeys -q windowkeys ru4 &
loadkeys -q windowkeys ru4 &
loadkeys -q windowkeys ru4 &
loadkeys -q windowkeys ru4 &
wait
The change adds lock on write path only. Reads are still racy.
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CC: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/2/17/256
Signed-off-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 75ddbc1fb11efac87b611d48e9802f6fe2bb2163 upstream.
Previously, in the userspace, it was possible to use the "setterm" command
from util-linux to blank the VT console by default, using the following
command.
According to the man page,
> The force option keeps the screen blank even if a key is pressed.
It was implemented by calling TIOCL_BLANKSCREEN.
case BLANKSCREEN:
ioctlarg = TIOCL_BLANKSCREEN;
if (ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCLINUX, &ioctlarg))
warn(_("cannot force blank"));
break;
However, after Linux 4.12, this command ceased to work anymore, which is
unexpected. By inspecting the kernel source, it shows that the issue was
triggered by the side-effect from commit a4199f5eb809 ("tty: Disable
default console blanking interval").
The console blanking is implemented by function do_blank_screen() in vt.c:
"blank_state" will be initialized to "blank_normal_wait" in con_init() if
AND ONLY IF ("blankinterval" > 0). If "blankinterval" is 0, "blank_state"
will be "blank_off" (== 0), and a call to do_blank_screen() will always
abort, even if a forced blanking is required from the user by calling
TIOCL_BLANKSCREEN, the console won't be blanked.
This behavior is unexpected from a user's point-of-view, since it's not
mentioned in any documentation. The setterm man page suggests it will
always work, and the kernel comments in uapi/linux/tiocl.h says
> /* keep screen blank even if a key is pressed */
> #define TIOCL_BLANKSCREEN 14
To fix it, we simply remove the "blank_state != blank_off" check, as
pointed out by Nicolas Pitre, this check doesn't logically make sense
and it's safe to remove.
Suggested-by: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Fixes: a4199f5eb809 ("tty: Disable default console blanking interval")
Signed-off-by: Yifeng Li <tomli@tomli.me>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2b75ebeea6f4937d4d05ec4982c471cef9a29b7f upstream.
It was observed that reads crossing 4K address boundary are failing.
This limitation is mentioned in Intel documents:
Intel(R) 9 Series Chipset Family Platform Controller Hub (PCH) Datasheet:
"5.26.3 Flash Access
Program Register Access:
* Program Register Accesses are not allowed to cross a 4 KB boundary..."
Enhanced Serial Peripheral Interface (eSPI)
Interface Base Specification (for Client and Server Platforms):
"5.1.4 Address
For other memory transactions, the address may start or end at any byte
boundary. However, the address and payload length combination must not
cross the naturally aligned address boundary of the corresponding Maximum
Payload Size. It must not cross a 4 KB address boundary."
Avoid this by splitting an operation crossing the boundary into two
operations.
Fixes: 8afda8b26d01 ("spi-nor: Add support for Intel SPI serial flash controller")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Romain Porte <romain.porte@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Pascal Fabreges <pascal.fabreges@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com>
Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ea611d1cc180fbb56982c83cd5142a2b34881f5c upstream.
The FPS_PERIOD_MAX_US definitions are swapped for MAX20024 and MAX77620,
fix it.
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6b4814a9451add06d457e198be418bf6a3e6a990 upstream.
Mismatch between what is found in the Datasheets for DA9063 and DA9063L
provided by Dialog Semiconductor, and the register names provided in the
MFD registers file. The changes are for the OTP (one-time-programming)
control registers. The two naming errors are OPT instead of OTP, and
COUNT instead of CONT (i.e. control).
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Twiss <stwiss.opensource@diasemi.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 2f844b61db8297a1f7a06adf2eb5c43381f2c183 upstream.
I noticed that recently multiple systems (chromebooks) couldn't wake
from S0ix using LID or Keyboard after updating to a newer kernel. I
bisected and it turned up commit f941d3e41da7 ("ACPI: EC / PM: Disable
non-wakeup GPEs for suspend-to-idle"). I checked that the issue got
fixed if that commit was reverted.
I debugged and found that although PNP0C0D:00 (representing the LID)
is wake capable and should wakeup the system per the code in
acpi_wakeup_gpe_init() and in drivers/acpi/button.c:
localhost /sys # cat /proc/acpi/wakeup
Device S-state Status Sysfs node
LID0 S4 *enabled platform:PNP0C0D:00
CREC S5 *disabled platform:GOOG0004:00
*disabled platform:cros-ec-dev.1.auto
*disabled platform:cros-ec-accel.0
*disabled platform:cros-ec-accel.1
*disabled platform:cros-ec-gyro.0
*disabled platform:cros-ec-ring.0
*disabled platform:cros-usbpd-charger.2.auto
*disabled platform:cros-usbpd-logger.3.auto
D015 S3 *enabled i2c:i2c-ELAN0000:00
PENH S3 *enabled platform:PRP0001:00
XHCI S3 *enabled pci:0000:00:14.0
GLAN S4 *disabled
WIFI S3 *disabled pci:0000:00:14.3
localhost /sys #
On debugging, I found that its corresponding GPE is not being enabled.
The particular GPE's "gpe_register_info->enable_for_wake" does not
have any bits set when acpi_enable_all_wakeup_gpes() comes around to
use it. I looked at code and could not find any other code path that
should set the bits in "enable_for_wake" bitmask for the wake enabled
devices for s2idle. [I do see that it happens for S3 in
acpi_sleep_prepare()].
Thus I used the same call to enable the GPEs for wake enabled devices,
and verified that this fixes the regression I was seeing on multiple
of my devices.
[ rjw: The problem is that commit f941d3e41da7 ("ACPI: EC / PM:
Disable non-wakeup GPEs for suspend-to-idle") forgot to add
the acpi_enable_wakeup_devices() call for s2idle along with
acpi_enable_all_wakeup_gpes(). ]
Fixes: f941d3e41da7 ("ACPI: EC / PM: Disable non-wakeup GPEs for suspend-to-idle")
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203579
Signed-off-by: Rajat Jain <rajatja@google.com>
[ rjw: Subject & changelog ]
Cc: 5.0+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit c3f3ce049f7d97cc7ec9c01cb51d9ec74e0f37c2 upstream.
The task structure is freed while get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() holds
rcu_read_lock() and dereferences mm->owner.
get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() failing fork()
---- ---
task = mm->owner
mm->owner = NULL;
free(task)
if (task) *task; /* use after free */
The fix consists in freeing the task with RCU also in the fork failure
case, exactly like it always happens for the regular exit(2) path. That
is enough to make the rcu_read_lock hold in get_mem_cgroup_from_mm()
(left side above) effective to avoid a use after free when dereferencing
the task structure.
An alternate possible fix would be to defer the delivery of the
userfaultfd contexts to the monitor until after fork() is guaranteed to
succeed. Such a change would require more changes because it would
create a strict ordering dependency where the uffd methods would need to
be called beyond the last potentially failing branch in order to be
safe. This solution as opposed only adds the dependency to common code
to set mm->owner to NULL and to free the task struct that was pointed by
mm->owner with RCU, if fork ends up failing. The userfaultfd methods
can still be called anywhere during the fork runtime and the monitor
will keep discarding orphaned "mm" coming from failed forks in userland.
This race condition couldn't trigger if CONFIG_MEMCG was set =n at build
time.
[aarcange@redhat.com: improve changelog, reduce #ifdefs per Michal]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190429035752.4508-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325225636.11635-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 893e26e61d04 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Tested-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e091eab028f9253eac5c04f9141bbc9d170acab3 upstream.
In some cases, ocfs2_iget() reads the data of inode, which has been
deleted for some reason. That will make the system panic. So We should
judge whether this inode has been deleted, and tell the caller that the
inode is a bad inode.
For example, the ocfs2 is used as the backed of nfs, and the client is
nfsv3. This issue can be reproduced by the following steps.
on the nfs server side,
..../patha/pathb
Step 1: The process A was scheduled before calling the function fh_verify.
Step 2: The process B is removing the 'pathb', and just completed the call
to function dput. Then the dentry of 'pathb' has been deleted from the
dcache, and all ancestors have been deleted also. The relationship of
dentry and inode was deleted through the function hlist_del_init. The
following is the call stack.
dentry_iput->hlist_del_init(&dentry->d_u.d_alias)
At this time, the inode is still in the dcache.
Step 3: The process A call the function ocfs2_get_dentry, which get the
inode from dcache. Then the refcount of inode is 1. The following is the
call stack.
nfsd3_proc_getacl->fh_verify->exportfs_decode_fh->fh_to_dentry(ocfs2_get_dentry)
Step 4: Dirty pages are flushed by bdi threads. So the inode of 'patha'
is evicted, and this directory was deleted. But the inode of 'pathb'
can't be evicted, because the refcount of the inode was 1.
Step 5: The process A keep running, and call the function
reconnect_path(in exportfs_decode_fh), which call function
ocfs2_get_parent of ocfs2. Get the block number of parent
directory(patha) by the name of ... Then read the data from disk by the
block number. But this inode has been deleted, so the system panic.
Process A Process B
1. in nfsd3_proc_getacl |
2. | dput
3. fh_to_dentry(ocfs2_get_dentry) |
4. bdi flush dirty cache |
5. ocfs2_iget |
[283465.542049] OCFS2: ERROR (device sdp): ocfs2_validate_inode_block:
Invalid dinode #580640: OCFS2_VALID_FL not set
[283465.545490] Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device sdp): panic forced
after error
[283465.546889] CPU: 5 PID: 12416 Comm: nfsd Tainted: G W
4.1.12-124.18.6.el6uek.bug28762940v3.x86_64 #2
[283465.548382] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX
Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 09/21/2015
[283465.549657] 0000000000000000 ffff8800a56fb7b8 ffffffff816e839c
ffffffffa0514758
[283465.550392] 000000000008dc20 ffff8800a56fb838 ffffffff816e62d3
0000000000000008
[283465.551056] ffff880000000010 ffff8800a56fb848 ffff8800a56fb7e8
ffff88005df9f000
[283465.551710] Call Trace:
[283465.552516] [<ffffffff816e839c>] dump_stack+0x63/0x81
[283465.553291] [<ffffffff816e62d3>] panic+0xcb/0x21b
[283465.554037] [<ffffffffa04e66b0>] ocfs2_handle_error+0xf0/0xf0 [ocfs2]
[283465.554882] [<ffffffffa04e7737>] __ocfs2_error+0x67/0x70 [ocfs2]
[283465.555768] [<ffffffffa049c0f9>] ocfs2_validate_inode_block+0x229/0x230
[ocfs2]
[283465.556683] [<ffffffffa047bcbc>] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x46c/0x7b0 [ocfs2]
[283465.557408] [<ffffffffa049bed0>] ? ocfs2_inode_cache_io_unlock+0x20/0x20
[ocfs2]
[283465.557973] [<ffffffffa049f0eb>] ocfs2_read_inode_block_full+0x3b/0x60
[ocfs2]
[283465.558525] [<ffffffffa049f5ba>] ocfs2_iget+0x4aa/0x880 [ocfs2]
[283465.559082] [<ffffffffa049146e>] ocfs2_get_parent+0x9e/0x220 [ocfs2]
[283465.559622] [<ffffffff81297c05>] reconnect_path+0xb5/0x300
[283465.560156] [<ffffffff81297f46>] exportfs_decode_fh+0xf6/0x2b0
[283465.560708] [<ffffffffa062faf0>] ? nfsd_proc_getattr+0xa0/0xa0 [nfsd]
[283465.561262] [<ffffffff810a8196>] ? prepare_creds+0x26/0x110
[283465.561932] [<ffffffffa0630860>] fh_verify+0x350/0x660 [nfsd]
[283465.562862] [<ffffffffa0637804>] ? nfsd_cache_lookup+0x44/0x630 [nfsd]
[283465.563697] [<ffffffffa063a8b9>] nfsd3_proc_getattr+0x69/0xf0 [nfsd]
[283465.564510] [<ffffffffa062cf60>] nfsd_dispatch+0xe0/0x290 [nfsd]
[283465.565358] [<ffffffffa05eb892>] ? svc_tcp_adjust_wspace+0x12/0x30
[sunrpc]
[283465.566272] [<ffffffffa05ea652>] svc_process_common+0x412/0x6a0 [sunrpc]
[283465.567155] [<ffffffffa05eaa03>] svc_process+0x123/0x210 [sunrpc]
[283465.568020] [<ffffffffa062c90f>] nfsd+0xff/0x170 [nfsd]
[283465.568962] [<ffffffffa062c810>] ? nfsd_destroy+0x80/0x80 [nfsd]
[283465.570112] [<ffffffff810a622b>] kthread+0xcb/0xf0
[283465.571099] [<ffffffff810a6160>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x180/0x180
[283465.572114] [<ffffffff816f11b8>] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90
[283465.573156] [<ffffffff810a6160>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x180/0x180
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1554185919-3010-1-git-send-email-sunny.s.zhang@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Shuning Zhang <sunny.s.zhang@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: piaojun <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: "Gang He" <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 1b426bac66e6cc83c9f2d92b96e4e72acf43419a upstream.
hugetlb uses a fault mutex hash table to prevent page faults of the
same pages concurrently. The key for shared and private mappings is
different. Shared keys off address_space and file index. Private keys
off mm and virtual address. Consider a private mappings of a populated
hugetlbfs file. A fault will map the page from the file and if needed
do a COW to map a writable page.
Hugetlbfs hole punch uses the fault mutex to prevent mappings of file
pages. It uses the address_space file index key. However, private
mappings will use a different key and could race with this code to map
the file page. This causes problems (BUG) for the page cache remove
code as it expects the page to be unmapped. A sample stack is:
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_mapped(page))
kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:169!
...
RIP: 0010:unaccount_page_cache_page+0x1b8/0x200
...
Call Trace:
__delete_from_page_cache+0x39/0x220
delete_from_page_cache+0x45/0x70
remove_inode_hugepages+0x13c/0x380
? __add_to_page_cache_locked+0x162/0x380
hugetlbfs_fallocate+0x403/0x540
? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
? __inode_security_revalidate+0x5d/0x70
? selinux_file_permission+0x100/0x130
vfs_fallocate+0x13f/0x270
ksys_fallocate+0x3c/0x80
__x64_sys_fallocate+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
There seems to be another potential COW issue/race with this approach
of different private and shared keys as noted in commit 8382d914ebf7
("mm, hugetlb: improve page-fault scalability").
Since every hugetlb mapping (even anon and private) is actually a file
mapping, just use the address_space index key for all mappings. This
results in potentially more hash collisions. However, this should not
be the common case.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190328234704.27083-3-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412165235.t4sscoujczfhuiyt@linux-r8p5
Fixes: b5cec28d36f5 ("hugetlbfs: truncate_hugepages() takes a range of pages")
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2bf753e64b4a702e27ce26ff520c59563c62f96b upstream.
spinlock recursion happened when do LTP test:
#!/bin/bash
./runltp -p -f hugetlb &
./runltp -p -f hugetlb &
./runltp -p -f hugetlb &
./runltp -p -f hugetlb &
./runltp -p -f hugetlb &
The dtor returned by get_compound_page_dtor in __put_compound_page may be
the function of free_huge_page which will lock the hugetlb_lock, so don't
put_page in lock of hugetlb_lock.
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#0, hugemmap05/1079
lock: hugetlb_lock+0x0/0x18, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: hugemmap05/1079, .owner_cpu: 0
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x198
show_stack+0x24/0x30
dump_stack+0xa4/0xcc
spin_dump+0x84/0xa8
do_raw_spin_lock+0xd0/0x108
_raw_spin_lock+0x20/0x30
free_huge_page+0x9c/0x260
__put_compound_page+0x44/0x50
__put_page+0x2c/0x60
alloc_surplus_huge_page.constprop.19+0xf0/0x140
hugetlb_acct_memory+0x104/0x378
hugetlb_reserve_pages+0xe0/0x250
hugetlbfs_file_mmap+0xc0/0x140
mmap_region+0x3e8/0x5b0
do_mmap+0x280/0x460
vm_mmap_pgoff+0xf4/0x128
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0xb4/0x258
__arm64_sys_mmap+0x34/0x48
el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130
el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
el0_svc+0x8/0xc
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b8ade452-2d6b-0372-32c2-703644032b47@huawei.com
Fixes: 9980d744a0 ("mm, hugetlb: get rid of surplus page accounting tricks")
Signed-off-by: Kai Shen <shenkai8@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Feilong Lin <linfeilong@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Wang Wang <wangwang2@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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addresses
commit fce86ff5802bac3a7b19db171aa1949ef9caac31 upstream.
Starting with c6f3c5ee40c1 ("mm/huge_memory.c: fix modifying of page
protection by insert_pfn_pmd()") vmf_insert_pfn_pmd() internally calls
pmdp_set_access_flags(). That helper enforces a pmd aligned @address
argument via VM_BUG_ON() assertion.
Update the implementation to take a 'struct vm_fault' argument directly
and apply the address alignment fixup internally to fix crash signatures
like:
kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:515!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 51 PID: 43713 Comm: java Tainted: G OE 4.19.35 #1
[..]
RIP: 0010:pmdp_set_access_flags+0x48/0x50
[..]
Call Trace:
vmf_insert_pfn_pmd+0x198/0x350
dax_iomap_fault+0xe82/0x1190
ext4_dax_huge_fault+0x103/0x1f0
? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
__handle_mm_fault+0x3f6/0x1370
? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
handle_mm_fault+0xda/0x200
__do_page_fault+0x249/0x4f0
do_page_fault+0x32/0x110
? page_fault+0x8/0x30
page_fault+0x1e/0x30
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155741946350.372037.11148198430068238140.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Fixes: c6f3c5ee40c1 ("mm/huge_memory.c: fix modifying of page protection by insert_pfn_pmd()")
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reported-by: Piotr Balcer <piotr.balcer@intel.com>
Tested-by: Yan Ma <yan.ma@intel.com>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pagupta@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Chandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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