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-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Kconfig15
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h5
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c5
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c24
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c23
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c7
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c24
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c19
10 files changed, 82 insertions, 45 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 13b446328dda..cd32fe3311af 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -5,10 +5,9 @@ config IMA
select SECURITYFS
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_HMAC
- select CRYPTO_MD5
select CRYPTO_SHA1
select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
- select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML
+ select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM
select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI
select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC_PSERIES
@@ -69,10 +68,9 @@ choice
hash, defined as 20 bytes, and a null terminated pathname,
limited to 255 characters. The 'ima-ng' measurement list
template permits both larger hash digests and longer
- pathnames.
+ pathnames. The configured default template can be replaced
+ by specifying "ima_template=" on the boot command line.
- config IMA_TEMPLATE
- bool "ima"
config IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
bool "ima-ng (default)"
config IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
@@ -82,7 +80,6 @@ endchoice
config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE
string
depends on IMA
- default "ima" if IMA_TEMPLATE
default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
default "ima-sig" if IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
@@ -102,15 +99,15 @@ choice
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256
bool "SHA256"
- depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE
+ depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512
bool "SHA512"
- depends on CRYPTO_SHA512=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE
+ depends on CRYPTO_SHA512=y
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512
bool "WP512"
- depends on CRYPTO_WP512=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE
+ depends on CRYPTO_WP512=y
endchoice
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d12b07eb3a58..e2916b115b93 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -298,6 +298,7 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
#define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
+#define security_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
#define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
#else
@@ -308,6 +309,10 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
return -EINVAL;
}
+static inline void security_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+}
+
static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
void *lsmrule,
struct audit_context *actx)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index a02c5acfd403..377a6f7cd3c7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
{
const char *audit_cause = "failed";
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct inode *real_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file));
const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
int result = 0;
int length;
@@ -243,6 +244,10 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
iint->version = i_version;
+ if (real_inode != inode) {
+ iint->real_ino = real_inode->i_ino;
+ iint->real_dev = real_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+ }
/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
if (!result)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index c5dd05ace28c..f0b244989734 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
loff_t i_size;
int rc;
struct file *f = file;
- bool new_file_instance = false, modified_mode = false;
+ bool new_file_instance = false;
/*
* For consistency, fail file's opened with the O_DIRECT flag on
@@ -433,18 +433,10 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
O_TRUNC | O_CREAT | O_NOCTTY | O_EXCL);
flags |= O_RDONLY;
f = dentry_open(&file->f_path, flags, file->f_cred);
- if (IS_ERR(f)) {
- /*
- * Cannot open the file again, lets modify f_mode
- * of original and continue
- */
- pr_info_ratelimited("Unable to reopen file for reading.\n");
- f = file;
- f->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
- modified_mode = true;
- } else {
- new_file_instance = true;
- }
+ if (IS_ERR(f))
+ return PTR_ERR(f);
+
+ new_file_instance = true;
}
i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(f));
@@ -459,8 +451,6 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
out:
if (new_file_instance)
fput(f);
- else if (modified_mode)
- f->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
return rc;
}
@@ -651,7 +641,7 @@ int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
return calc_buffer_shash(buf, len, hash);
}
-static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
+static void ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
{
if (!ima_tpm_chip)
return;
@@ -682,6 +672,8 @@ static int ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(char *digest,
ima_pcrread(i, pcr_i);
/* now accumulate with current aggregate */
rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, pcr_i, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
}
if (!rc)
crypto_shash_final(shash, digest);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 604cdac63d84..38bd565b9da9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -497,12 +497,12 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
return 0;
out:
+ securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
securityfs_remove(violations);
securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
securityfs_remove(ima_symlink);
securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
- securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
return -1;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
index 16bd18747cfa..6a10d4d8b6e1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Error passing over kexec measurement buffer.\n");
+ vfree(kexec_buffer);
return;
}
@@ -133,6 +134,8 @@ void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
return;
}
+ image->ima_buffer = kexec_buffer;
+
pr_debug("kexec measurement buffer for the loaded kernel at 0x%lx.\n",
kbuf.mem);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2d31921fbda4..d9a33d433b9f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/iversion.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/iversion.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
enum ima_hooks func)
{
- struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct inode *backing_inode, *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
char *pathbuf = NULL;
@@ -242,6 +243,19 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
}
+ /* Detect and re-evaluate changes made to the backing file. */
+ backing_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file));
+ if (backing_inode != inode &&
+ (action & IMA_DO_MASK) && (iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK)) {
+ if (!IS_I_VERSION(backing_inode) ||
+ backing_inode->i_sb->s_dev != iint->real_dev ||
+ backing_inode->i_ino != iint->real_ino ||
+ !inode_eq_iversion(backing_inode, iint->version)) {
+ iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
+ iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
* (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
* IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
@@ -323,7 +337,9 @@ out:
/**
* ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
* @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
- * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @reqprot: protection requested by the application
+ * @prot: protection that will be applied by the kernel
+ * @flags: operational flags
*
* Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
* policy decision.
@@ -331,7 +347,8 @@ out:
* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
+int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
{
u32 secid;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
index 073ddc9bce5b..daad75ee74d9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring;
/*
* Allocate the IMA blacklist keyring
*/
-__init int ima_mok_init(void)
+static __init int ima_mok_init(void)
{
struct key_restriction *restriction;
@@ -43,13 +43,12 @@ __init int ima_mok_init(void)
(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH,
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+ KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP,
restriction, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(ima_blacklist_keyring))
panic("Can't allocate IMA blacklist keyring.");
-
- set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &ima_blacklist_keyring->flags);
return 0;
}
device_initcall(ima_mok_init);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 2d5a3daa02f9..b2dadff3626b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -241,6 +241,21 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
+static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (!entry)
+ return;
+
+ kfree(entry->fsname);
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
+ security_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+ kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+ }
+ kfree(entry);
+}
+
/*
* The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
* to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
@@ -647,6 +662,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
&entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
+ entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -1019,7 +1035,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
if (result) {
- kfree(entry);
+ ima_free_rule(entry);
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result,
audit_info);
@@ -1040,15 +1056,11 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
void ima_delete_rules(void)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
- int i;
temp_ima_appraise = 0;
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) {
- for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
- kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
-
list_del(&entry->list);
- kfree(entry);
+ ima_free_rule(entry);
}
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 30db39b23804..ec814cbdae99 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ static struct ima_template_desc builtin_templates[] = {
static LIST_HEAD(defined_templates);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(template_list);
+static int template_setup_done;
static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
{.field_id = "d", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
@@ -57,10 +58,11 @@ static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
int template_len = strlen(str);
- if (ima_template)
+ if (template_setup_done)
return 1;
- ima_init_template_list();
+ if (!ima_template)
+ ima_init_template_list();
/*
* Verify that a template with the supplied name exists.
@@ -84,6 +86,7 @@ static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
}
ima_template = template_desc;
+ template_setup_done = 1;
return 1;
}
__setup("ima_template=", ima_template_setup);
@@ -92,7 +95,7 @@ static int __init ima_template_fmt_setup(char *str)
{
int num_templates = ARRAY_SIZE(builtin_templates);
- if (ima_template)
+ if (template_setup_done)
return 1;
if (template_desc_init_fields(str, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
@@ -103,6 +106,7 @@ static int __init ima_template_fmt_setup(char *str)
builtin_templates[num_templates - 1].fmt = str;
ima_template = builtin_templates + num_templates - 1;
+ template_setup_done = 1;
return 1;
}
@@ -192,11 +196,11 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
}
if (fields && num_fields) {
- *fields = kmalloc_array(i, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
+ *fields = kmalloc_array(i, sizeof(**fields), GFP_KERNEL);
if (*fields == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(*fields));
+ memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(**fields));
*num_fields = i;
}
@@ -262,8 +266,11 @@ static struct ima_template_desc *restore_template_fmt(char *template_name)
template_desc->name = "";
template_desc->fmt = kstrdup(template_name, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!template_desc->fmt)
+ if (!template_desc->fmt) {
+ kfree(template_desc);
+ template_desc = NULL;
goto out;
+ }
spin_lock(&template_list);
list_add_tail_rcu(&template_desc->list, &defined_templates);
generated by cgit 1.2.3-korg (git 2.39.0) at 2024-06-18 14:59:43 +0000