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Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c')
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c51
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
index befab857a39b..1d08f7b78fa0 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
@@ -430,7 +430,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *create_monitor_event(struct hci_dev *hdev, int event)
ni->type = hdev->dev_type;
ni->bus = hdev->bus;
bacpy(&ni->bdaddr, &hdev->bdaddr);
- memcpy(ni->name, hdev->name, 8);
+ memcpy_and_pad(ni->name, sizeof(ni->name), hdev->name,
+ strnlen(hdev->name, sizeof(ni->name)), '\0');
opcode = cpu_to_le16(HCI_MON_NEW_INDEX);
break;
@@ -881,10 +882,6 @@ static int hci_sock_release(struct socket *sock)
}
sock_orphan(sk);
-
- skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
- skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);
-
release_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
return 0;
@@ -977,6 +974,34 @@ static int hci_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd,
BT_DBG("cmd %x arg %lx", cmd, arg);
+ /* Make sure the cmd is valid before doing anything */
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case HCIGETDEVLIST:
+ case HCIGETDEVINFO:
+ case HCIGETCONNLIST:
+ case HCIDEVUP:
+ case HCIDEVDOWN:
+ case HCIDEVRESET:
+ case HCIDEVRESTAT:
+ case HCISETSCAN:
+ case HCISETAUTH:
+ case HCISETENCRYPT:
+ case HCISETPTYPE:
+ case HCISETLINKPOL:
+ case HCISETLINKMODE:
+ case HCISETACLMTU:
+ case HCISETSCOMTU:
+ case HCIINQUIRY:
+ case HCISETRAW:
+ case HCIGETCONNINFO:
+ case HCIGETAUTHINFO:
+ case HCIBLOCKADDR:
+ case HCIUNBLOCKADDR:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
+ }
+
lock_sock(sk);
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel != HCI_CHANNEL_RAW) {
@@ -993,7 +1018,14 @@ static int hci_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd,
if (hci_sock_gen_cookie(sk)) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
- if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ /* Perform careful checks before setting the HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED
+ * flag. Make sure that not only the current task but also
+ * the socket opener has the required capability, since
+ * privileged programs can be tricked into making ioctl calls
+ * on HCI sockets, and the socket should not be marked as
+ * trusted simply because the ioctl caller is privileged.
+ */
+ if (sk_capable(sk, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
hci_sock_set_flag(sk, HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED);
/* Send event to monitor */
@@ -1985,6 +2017,12 @@ done:
return err;
}
+static void hci_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
+ skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);
+}
+
static const struct proto_ops hci_sock_ops = {
.family = PF_BLUETOOTH,
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
@@ -2035,6 +2073,7 @@ static int hci_sock_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
sk->sk_state = BT_OPEN;
+ sk->sk_destruct = hci_sock_destruct;
bt_sock_link(&hci_sk_list, sk);
return 0;