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-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/Kconfig16
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-gru-chromebook.dtsi8
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts2
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma.dtsi1
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h3
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kernel/cacheinfo.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c41
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c52
9 files changed, 113 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index a101f5d2fbed..e16f0d45b47a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -515,6 +515,22 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_1542419
If unsure, say Y.
+config ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098
+ bool "Cortex-A57/A72: 1742098: ELR recorded incorrectly on interrupt taken between cryptographic instructions in a sequence"
+ depends on COMPAT
+ default y
+ help
+ This option removes the AES hwcap for aarch32 user-space to
+ workaround erratum 1742098 on Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72.
+
+ Affected parts may corrupt the AES state if an interrupt is
+ taken between a pair of AES instructions. These instructions
+ are only present if the cryptography extensions are present.
+ All software should have a fallback implementation for CPUs
+ that don't implement the cryptography extensions.
+
+ If unsure, say Y.
+
config CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375
bool "Cavium erratum 22375, 24313"
default y
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-gru-chromebook.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-gru-chromebook.dtsi
index ff81dfda3b95..3ba927f30347 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-gru-chromebook.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-gru-chromebook.dtsi
@@ -232,6 +232,14 @@
&edp {
status = "okay";
+ /*
+ * eDP PHY/clk don't sync reliably at anything other than 24 MHz. Only
+ * set this here, because rk3399-gru.dtsi ensures we can generate this
+ * off GPLL=600MHz, whereas some other RK3399 boards may not.
+ */
+ assigned-clocks = <&cru PCLK_EDP>;
+ assigned-clock-rates = <24000000>;
+
ports {
edp_out: port@1 {
reg = <1>;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts
index 1e6a71066c16..ea990543d929 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@
cap-sd-highspeed;
cd-gpios = <&gpio0 RK_PA7 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
disable-wp;
- max-frequency = <150000000>;
+ max-frequency = <40000000>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&sdmmc_clk &sdmmc_cmd &sdmmc_cd &sdmmc_bus4>;
vmmc-supply = <&vcc3v3_baseboard>;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma.dtsi
index ce1320e4c106..6750b8100421 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma.dtsi
@@ -102,7 +102,6 @@
vcc5v0_host: vcc5v0-host-regulator {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
gpio = <&gpio4 RK_PA3 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
- enable-active-low;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&vcc5v0_host_en>;
regulator-name = "vcc5v0_host";
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
index 64ae14371cae..61fd28522d74 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
@@ -55,7 +55,8 @@
#define ARM64_SSBS 34
#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_1542419 35
#define ARM64_SPECTRE_BHB 36
+#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_1742098 37
-#define ARM64_NCAPS 37
+#define ARM64_NCAPS 38
#endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cacheinfo.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cacheinfo.c
index d17414cbb89a..473935695efb 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cacheinfo.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cacheinfo.c
@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ static void ci_leaf_init(struct cacheinfo *this_leaf,
int init_cache_level(unsigned int cpu)
{
- unsigned int ctype, level, leaves, fw_level;
+ unsigned int ctype, level, leaves;
+ int fw_level;
struct cpu_cacheinfo *this_cpu_ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(cpu);
for (level = 1, leaves = 0; level <= MAX_CACHE_LEVEL; level++) {
@@ -65,6 +66,9 @@ int init_cache_level(unsigned int cpu)
else
fw_level = acpi_find_last_cache_level(cpu);
+ if (fw_level < 0)
+ return fw_level;
+
if (level < fw_level) {
/*
* some external caches not specified in CLIDR_EL1
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index d0b7dd60861b..7edb587fec55 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -142,9 +142,12 @@ static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
__copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
}
- __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
- __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
- __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start, hyp_vecs_start);
+ if (fn != __this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.fn)) {
+ __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
+ __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
+ __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start,
+ hyp_vecs_start);
+ }
spin_unlock(&bp_lock);
}
#else
@@ -683,6 +686,15 @@ static const struct midr_range arm64_harden_el2_vectors[] = {
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098
+static struct midr_range broken_aarch32_aes[] = {
+ MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A57, 0, 1, 0xf, 0xf),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
+ {},
+};
+#endif
+
+
const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_826319) || \
defined(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_827319) || \
@@ -884,6 +896,14 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access,
},
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098
+ {
+ .desc = "ARM erratum 1742098",
+ .capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_1742098,
+ CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(broken_aarch32_aes),
+ .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
+ },
+#endif
{
}
};
@@ -1186,8 +1206,11 @@ static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start)
__copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
}
- __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
- __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start, hyp_vecs_start);
+ if (hyp_vecs_start != __this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.template_start)) {
+ __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
+ __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start,
+ hyp_vecs_start);
+ }
spin_unlock(&bp_lock);
}
#else
@@ -1223,7 +1246,13 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
} else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
switch (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_SYSTEM)) {
case 8:
- kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start);
+ /*
+ * A57/A72-r0 will already have selected the
+ * spectre-indirect vector, which is sufficient
+ * for BHB too.
+ */
+ if (!__this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.fn))
+ kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start);
break;
case 24:
kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
index 03b0fdccaf05..d7e73a7963d1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
#include <asm/fpsimd.h>
+#include <asm/hwcap.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/sysreg.h>
@@ -1154,6 +1155,14 @@ static void cpu_enable_ssbs(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
+static void elf_hwcap_fixup(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098
+ if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_1742098))
+ compat_elf_hwcap2 &= ~COMPAT_HWCAP2_AES;
+#endif /* ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098 */
+}
+
static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
{
.desc = "GIC system register CPU interface",
@@ -1802,8 +1811,10 @@ void __init setup_cpu_features(void)
mark_const_caps_ready();
setup_elf_hwcaps(arm64_elf_hwcaps);
- if (system_supports_32bit_el0())
+ if (system_supports_32bit_el0()) {
setup_elf_hwcaps(compat_elf_hwcaps);
+ elf_hwcap_fixup();
+ }
if (system_uses_ttbr0_pan())
pr_info("emulated: Privileged Access Never (PAN) using TTBR0_EL1 switching\n");
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
index 4f9acb5fbe97..5b425ed9cd82 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
@@ -16,6 +16,14 @@
#include <asm/efi.h>
+static bool region_is_misaligned(const efi_memory_desc_t *md)
+{
+ if (PAGE_SIZE == EFI_PAGE_SIZE)
+ return false;
+ return !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr) ||
+ !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
/*
* Only regions of type EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE need to be
* executable, everything else can be mapped with the XN bits
@@ -29,14 +37,22 @@ static __init pteval_t create_mapping_protection(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
if (type == EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
return PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE;
- if (WARN_ONCE(!PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr),
- "UEFI Runtime regions are not aligned to 64 KB -- buggy firmware?"))
+ if (region_is_misaligned(md)) {
+ static bool __initdata code_is_misaligned;
+
/*
- * If the region is not aligned to the page size of the OS, we
- * can not use strict permissions, since that would also affect
- * the mapping attributes of the adjacent regions.
+ * Regions that are not aligned to the OS page size cannot be
+ * mapped with strict permissions, as those might interfere
+ * with the permissions that are needed by the adjacent
+ * region's mapping. However, if we haven't encountered any
+ * misaligned runtime code regions so far, we can safely use
+ * non-executable permissions for non-code regions.
*/
- return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
+ code_is_misaligned |= (type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE);
+
+ return code_is_misaligned ? pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC)
+ : pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);
+ }
/* R-- */
if ((attr & (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO)) ==
@@ -66,19 +82,16 @@ int __init efi_create_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md)
bool page_mappings_only = (md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE ||
md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA);
- if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr) ||
- !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT)) {
- /*
- * If the end address of this region is not aligned to page
- * size, the mapping is rounded up, and may end up sharing a
- * page frame with the next UEFI memory region. If we create
- * a block entry now, we may need to split it again when mapping
- * the next region, and support for that is going to be removed
- * from the MMU routines. So avoid block mappings altogether in
- * that case.
- */
+ /*
+ * If this region is not aligned to the page size used by the OS, the
+ * mapping will be rounded outwards, and may end up sharing a page
+ * frame with an adjacent runtime memory region. Given that the page
+ * table descriptor covering the shared page will be rewritten when the
+ * adjacent region gets mapped, we must avoid block mappings here so we
+ * don't have to worry about splitting them when that happens.
+ */
+ if (region_is_misaligned(md))
page_mappings_only = true;
- }
create_pgd_mapping(mm, md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr,
md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT,
@@ -106,6 +119,9 @@ int __init efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm,
BUG_ON(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE &&
md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA);
+ if (region_is_misaligned(md))
+ return 0;
+
/*
* Calling apply_to_page_range() is only safe on regions that are
* guaranteed to be mapped down to pages. Since we are only called