diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-xilinx-core/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu-xilinx-7.1.0/CVE-2022-3165.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | meta-xilinx-core/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu-xilinx-7.1.0/CVE-2022-3165.patch | 59 |
1 files changed, 59 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-xilinx-core/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu-xilinx-7.1.0/CVE-2022-3165.patch b/meta-xilinx-core/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu-xilinx-7.1.0/CVE-2022-3165.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3b4a6694 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-xilinx-core/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu-xilinx-7.1.0/CVE-2022-3165.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +CVE: CVE-2022-3165 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com> + +From d307040b18bfcb1393b910f1bae753d5c12a4dc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com> +Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2022 22:45:11 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] ui/vnc-clipboard: fix integer underflow in + vnc_client_cut_text_ext + +Extended ClientCutText messages start with a 4-byte header. If len < 4, +an integer underflow occurs in vnc_client_cut_text_ext. The result is +used to decompress data in a while loop in inflate_buffer, leading to +CPU consumption and denial of service. Prevent this by checking dlen in +protocol_client_msg. + +Fixes: CVE-2022-3165 +Fixes: 0bf41cab93e5 ("ui/vnc: clipboard support") +Reported-by: TangPeng <tangpeng@qianxin.com> +Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com> +Message-Id: <20220925204511.1103214-1-mcascell@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> +--- + ui/vnc.c | 11 ++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c +index 6a05d06147..acb3629cd8 100644 +--- a/ui/vnc.c ++++ b/ui/vnc.c +@@ -2442,8 +2442,8 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len) + if (len == 1) { + return 8; + } ++ uint32_t dlen = abs(read_s32(data, 4)); + if (len == 8) { +- uint32_t dlen = abs(read_s32(data, 4)); + if (dlen > (1 << 20)) { + error_report("vnc: client_cut_text msg payload has %u bytes" + " which exceeds our limit of 1MB.", dlen); +@@ -2456,8 +2456,13 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len) + } + + if (read_s32(data, 4) < 0) { +- vnc_client_cut_text_ext(vs, abs(read_s32(data, 4)), +- read_u32(data, 8), data + 12); ++ if (dlen < 4) { ++ error_report("vnc: malformed payload (header less than 4 bytes)" ++ " in extended clipboard pseudo-encoding."); ++ vnc_client_error(vs); ++ break; ++ } ++ vnc_client_cut_text_ext(vs, dlen, read_u32(data, 8), data + 12); + break; + } + vnc_client_cut_text(vs, read_u32(data, 4), data + 8); +-- +GitLab + |