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-rw-r--r--common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0055-seccomp-Move-speculation-migitation-control-to-arch-.patch121
1 files changed, 121 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0055-seccomp-Move-speculation-migitation-control-to-arch-.patch b/common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0055-seccomp-Move-speculation-migitation-control-to-arch-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ca98b862
--- /dev/null
+++ b/common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0055-seccomp-Move-speculation-migitation-control-to-arch-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+From 2a4ae48837c977605ea36a01ed63fa8638e4c881 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Date: Fri, 4 May 2018 15:12:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 55/93] seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch
+ code
+
+commit 8bf37d8c067bb7eb8e7c381bdadf9bd89182b6bc upstream
+
+The migitation control is simpler to implement in architecture code as it
+avoids the extra function call to check the mode. Aside of that having an
+explicit seccomp enabled mode in the architecture mitigations would require
+even more workarounds.
+
+Move it into architecture code and provide a weak function in the seccomp
+code. Remove the 'which' argument as this allows the architecture to decide
+which mitigations are relevant for seccomp.
+
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ include/linux/nospec.h | 2 ++
+ kernel/seccomp.c | 15 ++-------------
+ 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+index fdbd8e5..131617d 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+@@ -568,6 +568,24 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
++ unsigned long ctrl)
++{
++ switch (which) {
++ case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
++ return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
++ default:
++ return -ENODEV;
++ }
++}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
++void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++ ssb_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
++}
++#endif
++
+ static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
+ {
+ switch (ssb_mode) {
+@@ -586,17 +604,6 @@ static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
+ }
+ }
+
+-int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
+- unsigned long ctrl)
+-{
+- switch (which) {
+- case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+- return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
+- default:
+- return -ENODEV;
+- }
+-}
+-
+ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
+ {
+ switch (which) {
+diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h
+index a908c95..0c5ef54 100644
+--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
++++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
+@@ -62,5 +62,7 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
+ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which);
+ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
+ unsigned long ctrl);
++/* Speculation control for seccomp enforced mitigation */
++void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task);
+
+ #endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */
+diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
+index 62a60e7..3975856 100644
+--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
++++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
+@@ -216,18 +216,7 @@ static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
+ return true;
+ }
+
+-/*
+- * If a given speculation mitigation is opt-in (prctl()-controlled),
+- * select it, by disabling speculation (enabling mitigation).
+- */
+-static inline void spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task,
+- unsigned long which)
+-{
+- int state = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(task, which);
+-
+- if (state > 0 && (state & PR_SPEC_PRCTL))
+- arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(task, which, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
+-}
++void __weak arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task) { }
+
+ static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
+ unsigned long seccomp_mode,
+@@ -243,7 +232,7 @@ static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
+ smp_mb__before_atomic();
+ /* Assume default seccomp processes want spec flaw mitigation. */
+ if ((flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW) == 0)
+- spec_mitigate(task, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
++ arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(task);
+ set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP);
+ }
+
+--
+2.7.4
+