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Pull documentation update from Jonathan Corbet:
"Another moderately busy cycle for documentation, including:
- The minimum Sphinx requirement has been raised to 2.4.4, following
a warning that was added in 6.2
- Some reworking of the Documentation/process front page to,
hopefully, make it more useful
- Various kernel-doc tweaks to, for example, make it deal properly
with __counted_by annotations
- We have also restored a warning for documentation of nonexistent
structure members that disappeared a while back. That had the
delightful consequence of adding some 600 warnings to the docs
build. A sustained effort by Randy, Vegard, and myself has
addressed almost all of those, bringing the documentation back into
sync with the code. The fixes are going through the appropriate
maintainer trees
- Various improvements to the HTML rendered docs, including automatic
links to Git revisions and a nice new pulldown to make translations
easy to access
- Speaking of translations, more of those for Spanish and Chinese
... plus the usual stream of documentation updates and typo fixes"
* tag 'docs-6.8' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (57 commits)
MAINTAINERS: use tabs for indent of CONFIDENTIAL COMPUTING THREAT MODEL
A reworked process/index.rst
ring-buffer/Documentation: Add documentation on buffer_percent file
Translated the RISC-V architecture boot documentation.
Docs: remove mentions of fdformat from util-linux
Docs/zh_CN: Fix the meaning of DEBUG to pr_debug()
Documentation: move driver-api/dcdbas to userspace-api/
Documentation: move driver-api/isapnp to userspace-api/
Documentation/core-api : fix typo in workqueue
Documentation/trace: Fixed typos in the ftrace FLAGS section
kernel-doc: handle a void function without producing a warning
scripts/get_abi.pl: ignore some temp files
docs: kernel_abi.py: fix command injection
scripts/get_abi: fix source path leak
CREDITS, MAINTAINERS, docs/process/howto: Update man-pages' maintainer
docs: translations: add translations links when they exist
kernel-doc: Align quick help and the code
MAINTAINERS: add reviewer for Spanish translations
docs: ignore __counted_by attribute in structure definitions
scripts: kernel-doc: Clarify missing struct member description
..
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This file documents a sysfs interface that is intended for systems
management software. It does NOT document any kind of kernel driver
API. It is also not meant to be used directly by system administrators
or users.
Cc: Stuart Hayes <stuart.w.hayes@gmail.com>
Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231221124816.2978000-3-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
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driver-api/isapnp documents /proc interfaces for interfacing directly
with ISA Plug & Play devices, not any kind of API for kernel developers,
and should thus also live under userspace-api/.
Also fix a few issues while we're at it.
Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Cc: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231221124816.2978000-2-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
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Add a separate documentation directory for TEE subsystem since it is a
standalone subsystem which already offers devices consumed by multiple
different subsystem drivers.
Split overall TEE subsystem documentation modularly where:
- The userspace API has been moved to Documentation/userspace-api/tee.rst.
- The driver API has been moved to Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst.
- The first module covers the overview of TEE subsystem.
- The further modules are dedicated to different TEE implementations like:
- OP-TEE
- AMD-TEE
- and so on for future TEE implementation support.
Acked-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com>
Acked-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231128072352.866859-1-sumit.garg@linaro.org
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Vegard Nossum writes:
This patch series replaces some instances of 'class:: toc-title' with
toctree's :caption: attribute, see the last patch in the series for some
more rationale/explanation.
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"class:: toc-title" was a workaround for older Sphinx versions that are
no longer supported.
The canonical way to add a heading to the ToC is to use :caption:.
Do that.
Cc: Rui Li <me@lirui.org>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Wu XiangCheng <bobwxc@email.cn>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027081830.195056-3-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
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Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux
Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the
module and an identifier associated with the security module. Change
the security_add_hooks() interface to use this structure. Change the
individual modules to maintain their own struct lsm_id and pass it to
security_add_hooks().
The values are for LSM identifiers are defined in a new UAPI
header file linux/lsm.h. Each existing LSM has been updated to
include it's LSMID in the lsm_id.
The LSM ID values are sequential, with the oldest module
LSM_ID_CAPABILITY being the lowest value and the existing modules
numbered in the order they were included in the main line kernel.
This is an arbitrary convention for assigning the values, but
none better presents itself. The value 0 is defined as being invalid.
The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may
arise in the future. This may include attributes of the LSM
infrastructure itself, possibly related to namespacing or network
attribute management. A special range is identified for such attributes
to help reduce confusion for developers unfamiliar with LSMs.
LSM attribute values are defined for the attributes presented by
modules that are available today. As with the LSM IDs, The value 0
is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any
special case uses which may arise in the future.
Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
[PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Since there's a lot of confusion around this, document both the rules
and the best practices around negotiating, allocating, importing, and
using buffers when crossing context/process/device/subsystem boundaries.
This ties up all of dma-buf, formats and modifiers, and their usage.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Simon Ser <contact@emersion.fr>
Reviewed-by: Simon Ser <contact@emersion.fr>
Reviewed-by: Sui Jingfeng <suijingfeng@loongson.cn>
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230803154908.105124-4-daniels@collabora.com
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Turns out rules about PT_INTERP, PT_GNU_STACK and PT_GNU_PROPERTY
program headers are slightly different.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/88d3f1bb-f4e0-4c40-9304-3843513a1262@p183
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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Add iommufd into the documentation tree, and supply initial documentation.
Much of this is linked from code comments by kdoc.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5-v6-a196d26f289e+11787-iommufd_jgg@nvidia.com
Reviewed-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
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Provide a bit of a brain dump of netlink related information
as documentation. Hopefully this will be useful to people
trying to navigate implementing YAML based parsing in languages
we won't be able to help with.
I started writing this doc while trying to figure out what
it'd take to widen the applicability of YAML to good old rtnl,
but the doc grew beyond that as it usually happens.
In all honesty a lot of this information is new to me as I usually
follow the "copy an existing example, drink to forget" process
of writing netlink user space, so reviews will be much appreciated.
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220819200221.422801-2-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Create userspace documentation for futex_waitv() syscall, detailing how
the arguments are used.
Signed-off-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210923171111.300673-23-andrealmeid@collabora.com
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VDUSE (vDPA Device in Userspace) is a framework to support
implementing software-emulated vDPA devices in userspace. This
document is intended to clarify the VDUSE design and usage.
Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210831103634.33-14-xieyongji@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
"Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.
Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.
From Mickaël's cover letter:
"The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
themselves.
Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
Pledge/Unveil.
In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"
The cover letter and v34 posting is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/
See also:
https://landlock.io/
This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
years"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]
* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
landlock: Add syscall implementations
arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
landlock: Support filesystem access-control
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
landlock: Add object management
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Add a first document describing userspace API: how to define and enforce
a Landlock security policy. This is explained with a simple example.
The Landlock system calls are described with their expected behavior and
current limitations.
Another document is dedicated to kernel developers, describing guiding
principles and some important kernel structures.
This documentation can be built with the Sphinx framework.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincent Dagonneau <vincent.dagonneau@ssi.gouv.fr>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-13-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
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Generate the syscall command reference from the UAPI header file and
include it in the main bpf docs page.
Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@cilium.io>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin@isovalent.com>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210302171947.2268128-15-joe@cilium.io
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On modern systems the platform performance, temperature, fan and other
hardware related characteristics are often dynamically configurable. The
profile is often automatically adjusted to the load by some
automatic-mechanism (which may very well live outside the kernel).
These auto platform-adjustment mechanisms often can be configured with
one of several 'platform-profiles', with either a bias towards low-power
consumption or towards performance (and higher power consumption and
thermals).
Introduce a new platform_profile sysfs API which offers a generic API for
selecting the performance-profile of these automatic-mechanisms.
Co-developed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Pearson <markpearson@lenovo.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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There's a new uAPI doc for IOMMU. Add it to the index file.
Should address this warning:
.../Documentation/userspace-api/iommu.rst: WARNING: document isn't included in any toctree
Fixes: d0023e3ee28d ("docs: IOMMU user API")
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cc55219a551e29848e2282cd8939a4115067234c.1603791716.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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Now that everything got moved, we can get rid of the
old media directory.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
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This is strictly user-space material at this point, so put it with the
other user-space API documentation.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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The content of this file is user-faced.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
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Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites
and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance
impacting mitigations.
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with
the following meaning:
Bit Define Description
0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
disabled
2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
enabled
If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is
available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
misfeature will fail.
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the
control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.
The common return values are:
EINVAL prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl()
arguments are not 0
ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values:
ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE
ENXIO prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled
The first supported controlable speculation misfeature is
PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between
architectures.
Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
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This updates no_new_privs documentation to ReST markup and adds it to
the user-space API documentation.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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This updates seccomp_filter.txt for ReST markup, and moves it under the
user-space API index, since it describes how application author can use
seccomp.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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This is a straightforward conversion, without any real textual changes.
Since this document has seen no substantive changes since its addition in
2006, some such changes are probably warranted.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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This is meant to be the place for documentation relevant to application
developers. It's empty for the moment, but at least we have a place now!
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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Linus Torvalds
Vegard Nossum
Sumit Garg
Jonathan Corbet
Casey Schaufler
Daniel Stone
Alexey Dobriyan
Kevin Tian
Jakub Kicinski
André Almeida
Xie Yongji
Mickaël Salaün
Joe Stringer
Mark Pearson
Mauro Carvalho Chehab
Mauro Carvalho Chehab
Thomas Gleixner
Kees Cook