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Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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There are spelling mistakes in the thunderbolt sysfs documentation.
Fix them.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
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Creating a symlink pointing to the correct USB Type-C
connector for the on-board USB4 ports when they are created.
The link will be created only if the firmware is able to
describe the connection between the port and its connector.
Signed-off-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Won Chung <wonchung@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
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Various pdx86 docs under Documentation/ABI/testing still use Mario's
old, now defunct, <mario.limonciello@dell.com> address.
Update the docs to point to either the new Dell.Client.Kernel@dell.com
email alias for Dell specific drivers, or to Mario's new @outlook.com
address for other drivers.
Cc: Dell.Client.Kernel@dell.com
Cc: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210810160900.106512-1-hdegoede@redhat.com
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The same way we support these two operations for USB4 routers we can
extend the retimer NVM operations to support retimers also.
Signed-off-by: Rajmohan Mani <rajmohan.mani@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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It may be useful if the actual NVM authentication can be delayed to be
run later, for instance when the user logs out. For this reason add a
new NVM operation (AUHENTICATE_ONLY) that just triggers the authentication
procedure over whatever was written to the NVM storage.
This is not supported with Thunderbolt 1-3 devices, though.
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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With help from platform firmware (ACPI) it is possible to power on
retimers even when there is no USB4 link (e.g nothing is connected to
the USB4 ports). This allows us to bring the USB4 sideband up so that we
can access retimers and upgrade their NVM firmware.
If the platform has support for this, we expose two additional
attributes under USB4 ports: offline and rescan. These can be used to
bring the port offline, rescan for the retimers and put the port online
again. The retimer NVM upgrade itself works the same way than with cable
connected.
Signed-off-by: Rajmohan Mani <rajmohan.mani@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Create devices for each USB4 port. This is needed when we add retimer
access when there is no device connected but may be useful for other
purposes too following what USB subsystem does. This exports a single
attribute "link" that shows the type of the USB4 link (or "none" if
there is no cable connected).
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Align the "What" entries along with the rest and move
nvm_authenticate_on_disconnect to correct place.
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
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USB4 inter-domain spec mandates that the compatible hosts expose a new
property "maxhopid" that tells the connection manager on the other side
what is the maximum supported input HopID over the connection. Since
this is depend on the lane adapter the cable is connected it needs to be
filled in dynamically.
For this reason we take a copy of the global properties and fill then
for each XDomain connection upon first connect, and then keep updating
it if the generation changes as services are being added/removed. We
also take advantage of this copy to fill in the hostname.
We also expose this maxhopid as an attribute under each XDomain device.
While there drop kernel-doc entry for property_lock which seems to be
left there when the structure was originally introduced.
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
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These are actually not needed as we already have similar entries that
apply to all devices on the Thunderbolt bus.
Cc: Isaac Hazan <isaac.hazan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
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Recent Intel Thunderbolt firmware connection manager has support for
another security level, SL5, that disables PCIe tunneling. This option
can be turned on from the BIOS.
When this is set the driver exposes a new security level "nopcie" to the
userspace and hides the authorized attribute under connected devices.
While there we also hide it when "dponly" security level is enabled
since it is not really usable in that case anyway.
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@gmail.com>
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In some cases it is useful to be able de-authorize devices. For example
if user logs out the userspace can have a policy that disconnects PCIe
devices until logged in again. This is only possible for software based
connection manager as it directly controls the tunnels.
For this reason make the authorized attribute accept writing 0 which
makes the software connection manager to tear down the corresponding
PCIe tunnel. Userspace can check if this is supported by reading a new
domain attribute deauthorization, that holds 1 in that case.
While there correct tb_domain_approve_switch() kernel-doc and
description of authorized attribute to mention that it is only about
PCIe tunnels.
Cc: Christian Kellner <christian@kellner.me>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@gmail.com>
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Link speed and link width are needed for checking expected values in
case of using a loopback service.
Signed-off-by: Isaac Hazan <isaac.hazan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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There are some ABI documents that, while they don't generate
any warnings, they have issues when parsed by get_abi.pl script
on its output result.
Address them, in order to provide a clean output.
Reviewed-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> # for fpga-manager
Reviewed-By: Kajol Jain<kjain@linux.ibm.com> # for sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-hv_gpci and sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-hv_24x7
Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> #for IIO
Acked-by: Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@gmail.com> # for Habanalabs
Acked-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.ibm.com> # for sysfs-bus-papr-pmem
Acked-by: Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@intel.com> # for catpt
Acked-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Acked-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> # for rbd
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5bc78e5b68ed1e9e39135173857cb2e753be868f.1604042072.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Some files over there won't parse well by Sphinx.
Fix them.
Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> # for IIO
Acked-by: Fabrice Gasnier <fabrice.gasnier@st.com>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/58cf3c2d611e0197fb215652719ebd82ca2658db.1604042072.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Some external devices can support completing thunderbolt authentication
when they are unplugged. For this to work though, the link controller must
remain operational.
The only device known to support this right now is the Dell WD19TB, so add
a quirk for this.
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@dell.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
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This allows userspace to have a shorter period of time that the device
is unusable and to call it at a more convenient time.
For example flushing the image may happen while the user is using the
machine and authenticating/rebooting may happen while logging out.
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@dell.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
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USB4 spec specifies standard access to retimers (both on-board and
cable) through USB4 port sideband access. This makes it possible to
upgrade their firmware in the same way than we already do with the
routers.
This enumerates on-board retimers under each USB4 port when the link
comes up and adds them to the bus under the router the retimer belongs
to. Retimers are exposed in sysfs with name like <device>:<port>.<index>
where device is the router the retimer belongs to, port is the USB4 port
the retimer is connected to and index is the retimer index under that
port (starting from 1). This applies to the upstream USB4 port as well
so if there is on-board retimer between the port and the router it is
also added accordingly.
At this time we do not add cable retimers but there is no techincal
restriction to do so in the future if needed. It is not clear whether it
makes sense to upgrade their firmwares and at least Thunderbolt 3 cables
it has not been done outside of lab environments.
The sysfs interface is made to follow the router NVM upgrade to make it
easy to extend the existing userspace (fwupd) to handle these as well.
Signed-off-by: Kranthi Kuntala <kranthi.kuntala@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
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Lane bonding allows aggregating two 10/20 Gb/s (depending on the
generation) lanes into a single 20/40 Gb/s bonded link. This allows
sharing the full bandwidth more efficiently. In order to establish lane
bonding we need to check that lane bonding is possible through link
controller and that both ends of the link actually supports 2x widths.
This also means that all the paths should be established through the
primary port so update tb_path_alloc() to handle this as well.
Lane bonding is supported starting from Falcon Ridge (2nd generation)
controllers.
We also expose the current speed and number of lanes under each device
except the host router following similar attribute naming than USB bus.
Expose speed and number of lanes for both directions to allow possibility
of asymmetric link in the future.
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
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The Thunderbolt standard went through several major iterations, here
called generation. USB4, which will be based on Thunderbolt, will be
generation 4. Let userspace know the generation of the controller in
the devices in order to distinguish between Thunderbolt and USB4, so
it can be shown in various user interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Christian Kellner <christian@kellner.me>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
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Recent systems with Thunderbolt ports may support IOMMU natively. In
practice this means that Thunderbolt connected devices are placed behind
an IOMMU during the whole time it is connected (including during boot)
making Thunderbolt security levels redundant. This is called Kernel DMA
protection [1] by Microsoft.
Some of these systems still have Thunderbolt security level set to
"user" in order to support OS downgrade (the older version of the OS
might not support IOMMU based DMA protection so connecting a device
still relies on user approval).
Export this information to userspace by introducing a new sysfs
attribute (iommu_dma_protection). Based on it userspace tools can make
more accurate decision whether or not authorize the connected device.
In addition update Thunderbolt documentation regarding IOMMU based DMA
protection.
[1] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@gmail.com>
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This new security level works so that it creates one PCIe tunnel to the
connected Thunderbolt dock, removing PCIe links downstream of the dock.
This leaves only the internal USB controller visible.
Display Port tunnels are created normally.
While there make sure security sysfs attribute returns "unknown" for any
future security level.
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
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Preboot ACL is a mechanism that allows connecting Thunderbolt devices
boot time in more secure way than the legacy Thunderbolt boot support.
As with the legacy boot option, this also needs to be enabled from the
BIOS before booting is allowed. Difference to the legacy mode is that
the userspace software explicitly adds device UUIDs by sending a special
message to the ICM firmware. Only the devices listed in the boot ACL are
connected automatically during the boot. This works in both "user" and
"secure" security levels.
We implement this in Linux by exposing a new sysfs attribute (boot_acl)
below each Thunderbolt domain. The userspace software can then update
the full list as needed.
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
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In various cases, Thunderbolt device can be connected by ICM on boot
without waiting for approval from user. Most cases are related to
OEM-specific BIOS configurations. This information is interesting for
user-space as if the device isn't in SW ACL, it may create a friction in
the user experience where the device is automatically authorized if it's
connected on boot but requires an explicit user action if connected
after OS is up. User-space can use this information to suggest adding
the device to SW ACL for auto-authorization on later connections.
Signed-off-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
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When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a
protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host.
The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel
(ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using
special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol.
The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties
used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more
directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities.
Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can
setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using
whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software
protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service
specific.
This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the
Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain
device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain
device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt
service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification
information retrieved from the property directory describing the
service.
This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet.
Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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If secure authentication of a devices fails, either because the device
already has another key uploaded, or there is some other error sending
challenge to the device, and the user only wants to approve the device
just once (without a new key being uploaded to the device) the current
implementation does not allow this because the key cannot be cleared
once set even if we allow it to be changed.
Make this scenario possible and allow clearing the key by writing
empty string to the key sysfs file.
Signed-off-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by
using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the
host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the
DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the
userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and
nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which
firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the
device identification strings are not enough.
The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be
written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right
NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware
itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it
is not what is expected.
We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and
nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and
start the upgrade process.
We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does
not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only
accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image
and triggering power cycle.
This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet.
Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running
on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security
levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow
connecting devices the user trusts.
The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting
Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on
Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0
(control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add
support for the ICM messages to the control channel.
The security levels are as follows:
none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically
user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created
secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created.
The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able
to verify it is actually the approved device.
dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those
are created automatically.
The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and
by default it is set to "user" on many systems.
In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new
sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices
that support secure connect.
In order to identify the device the user can read identication
information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based
on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is
authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This
is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure
connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the
"authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been
stored to the NVM of the device.
Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing
functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with
Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM.
This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet.
Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The device DROM contains name of the vendor and device among other
things. Extract this information and expose it to the userspace via two
new attributes.
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Thunderbolt domain consists of switches that are connected to each
other, forming a bus. This will convert each switch into a real Linux
device structure and adds them to the domain. The advantage here is
that we get all the goodies from the driver core, like reference
counting and sysfs hierarchy for free.
Also expose device identification information to the userspace via new
sysfs attributes.
In order to support internal connection manager (ICM) we separate switch
configuration into its own function (tb_switch_configure()) which is
only called by the existing native connection manager implementation
used on Macs.
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Bruce Ashfield
Colin Ian King
Heikki Krogerus
Hans de Goede
Rajmohan Mani
Mika Westerberg
Isaac Hazan
Mauro Carvalho Chehab
Mario Limonciello
Kranthi Kuntala
Christian Kellner
Yehezkel Bernat