19 files changed, 196 insertions, 58 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 8868c475205f..80012d21f038 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -869,8 +869,10 @@ static struct multi_transaction *multi_transaction_new(struct file *file,
 	if (!t)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	kref_init(&t->count);
-	if (copy_from_user(t->data, buf, size))
+	if (copy_from_user(t->data, buf, size)) {
+		put_multi_transaction(t);
 		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+	}
 
 	return t;
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 3a4293c46ad5..c4b5d5e3a721 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -1125,7 +1125,7 @@ ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *subj,
 
 	if (!name) {
 		/* remove namespace - can only happen if fqname[0] == ':' */
-		mutex_lock_nested(&ns->parent->lock, ns->level);
+		mutex_lock_nested(&ns->parent->lock, ns->parent->level);
 		__aa_bump_ns_revision(ns);
 		__aa_remove_ns(ns);
 		mutex_unlock(&ns->parent->lock);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 612f737cee83..683f551ec33b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -635,6 +635,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
 
 	tmpname = aa_splitn_fqname(name, strlen(name), &tmpns, &ns_len);
 	if (tmpns) {
+		if (!tmpname) {
+			info = "empty profile name";
+			goto fail;
+		}
 		*ns_name = kstrndup(tmpns, ns_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!*ns_name) {
 			info = "out of memory";
@@ -892,7 +896,7 @@ static int verify_header(struct aa_ext *e, int required, const char **ns)
 	 * if not specified use previous version
 	 * Mask off everything that is not kernel abi version
 	 */
-	if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v5) || VERSION_GT(e->version, v7)) {
+	if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v5) || VERSION_GT(e->version, v8)) {
 		audit_iface(NULL, NULL, NULL, "unsupported interface version",
 			    e, error);
 		return error;
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index dc28914fa72e..5ff31eeea68c 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -79,6 +79,17 @@ free_and_exit:
 	return -ENOMEM;
 }
 
+static void dev_exceptions_move(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig)
+{
+	struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&devcgroup_mutex);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(ex, tmp, orig, list) {
+		list_move_tail(&ex->list, dest);
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * called under devcgroup_mutex
  */
@@ -600,11 +611,13 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
 	int count, rc = 0;
 	struct dev_exception_item ex;
 	struct dev_cgroup *parent = css_to_devcgroup(devcgroup->css.parent);
+	struct dev_cgroup tmp_devcgrp;
 
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	memset(&ex, 0, sizeof(ex));
+	memset(&tmp_devcgrp, 0, sizeof(tmp_devcgrp));
 	b = buffer;
 
 	switch (*b) {
@@ -616,15 +629,27 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
 
 			if (!may_allow_all(parent))
 				return -EPERM;
-			dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
-			devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
-			if (!parent)
+			if (!parent) {
+				devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
+				dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
 				break;
+			}
 
+			INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tmp_devcgrp.exceptions);
+			rc = dev_exceptions_copy(&tmp_devcgrp.exceptions,
+						 &devcgroup->exceptions);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
 			rc = dev_exceptions_copy(&devcgroup->exceptions,
 						 &parent->exceptions);
-			if (rc)
+			if (rc) {
+				dev_exceptions_move(&devcgroup->exceptions,
+						    &tmp_devcgrp.exceptions);
 				return rc;
+			}
+			devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
+			dev_exception_clean(&tmp_devcgrp);
 			break;
 		case DEVCG_DENY:
 			if (css_has_online_children(&devcgroup->css))
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 6d1efe1359f1..9c036a41e734 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -474,7 +474,9 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 
 /**
  * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @attr: iattr structure containing the new file attributes
  *
  * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
  * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 5a6810041e5c..7c751c23e7e6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -46,12 +46,10 @@ static struct integrity_iint_cache *__integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
 		else if (inode > iint->inode)
 			n = n->rb_right;
 		else
-			break;
+			return iint;
 	}
-	if (!n)
-		return NULL;
 
-	return iint;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -71,9 +69,32 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
 	return iint;
 }
 
-static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+#define IMA_MAX_NESTING (FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH+1)
+
+/*
+ * It is not clear that IMA should be nested at all, but as long is it measures
+ * files both on overlayfs and on underlying fs, we need to annotate the iint
+ * mutex to avoid lockdep false positives related to IMA + overlayfs.
+ * See ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() for more details.
+ */
+static inline void iint_lockdep_annotate(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+					 struct inode *inode)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
+	static struct lock_class_key iint_mutex_key[IMA_MAX_NESTING];
+
+	int depth = inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(depth < 0 || depth >= IMA_MAX_NESTING))
+		depth = 0;
+
+	lockdep_set_class(&iint->mutex, &iint_mutex_key[depth]);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void iint_init_always(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			     struct inode *inode)
 {
-	kfree(iint->ima_hash);
 	iint->ima_hash = NULL;
 	iint->version = 0;
 	iint->flags = 0UL;
@@ -85,6 +106,14 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 	iint->ima_creds_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+	mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
+	iint_lockdep_annotate(iint, inode);
+}
+
+static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	kfree(iint->ima_hash);
+	mutex_destroy(&iint->mutex);
 	kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
 }
 
@@ -109,6 +138,8 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
 	if (!iint)
 		return NULL;
 
+	iint_init_always(iint, inode);
+
 	write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
 
 	p = &integrity_iint_tree.rb_node;
@@ -116,10 +147,15 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
 		parent = *p;
 		test_iint = rb_entry(parent, struct integrity_iint_cache,
 				     rb_node);
-		if (inode < test_iint->inode)
+		if (inode < test_iint->inode) {
 			p = &(*p)->rb_left;
-		else
+		} else if (inode > test_iint->inode) {
 			p = &(*p)->rb_right;
+		} else {
+			write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
+			kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
+			return test_iint;
+		}
 	}
 
 	iint->inode = inode;
@@ -153,25 +189,18 @@ void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 	iint_free(iint);
 }
 
-static void init_once(void *foo)
+static void iint_init_once(void *foo)
 {
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo;
 
 	memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
-	iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->ima_creds_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
 }
 
 static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
 {
 	iint_cache =
 	    kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache),
-			      0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
+			      0, SLAB_PANIC, iint_init_once);
 	return 0;
 }
 security_initcall(integrity_iintcache_init);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 3ec45028a8c5..cd32fe3311af 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ config IMA
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
 	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
-	select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML
+	select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM
 	select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
 	select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI
 	select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC_PSERIES
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index a02c5acfd403..377a6f7cd3c7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 {
 	const char *audit_cause = "failed";
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct inode *real_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file));
 	const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
 	int result = 0;
 	int length;
@@ -243,6 +244,10 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
 	memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
 	iint->version = i_version;
+	if (real_inode != inode) {
+		iint->real_ino = real_inode->i_ino;
+		iint->real_dev = real_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+	}
 
 	/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
 	if (!result)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2d31921fbda4..d9a33d433b9f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/iversion.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/iversion.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 			       u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
 			       enum ima_hooks func)
 {
-	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct inode *backing_inode, *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
@@ -242,6 +243,19 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 		iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
 	}
 
+	/* Detect and re-evaluate changes made to the backing file. */
+	backing_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file));
+	if (backing_inode != inode &&
+	    (action & IMA_DO_MASK) && (iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK)) {
+		if (!IS_I_VERSION(backing_inode) ||
+		    backing_inode->i_sb->s_dev != iint->real_dev ||
+		    backing_inode->i_ino != iint->real_ino ||
+		    !inode_eq_iversion(backing_inode, iint->version)) {
+			iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
+			iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+		}
+	}
+
 	/* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
 	 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
 	 *  IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
@@ -323,7 +337,9 @@ out:
 /**
  * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
  * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
- * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @reqprot: protection requested by the application
+ * @prot: protection that will be applied by the kernel
+ * @flags: operational flags
  *
  * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
  * policy decision.
@@ -331,7 +347,8 @@ out:
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
+int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+		  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
 	u32 secid;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 4dfdccce497b..ec814cbdae99 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -196,11 +196,11 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
 	}
 
 	if (fields && num_fields) {
-		*fields = kmalloc_array(i, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
+		*fields = kmalloc_array(i, sizeof(**fields), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (*fields == NULL)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
-		memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(*fields));
+		memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(**fields));
 		*num_fields = i;
 	}
 
@@ -266,8 +266,11 @@ static struct ima_template_desc *restore_template_fmt(char *template_name)
 
 	template_desc->name = "";
 	template_desc->fmt = kstrdup(template_name, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!template_desc->fmt)
+	if (!template_desc->fmt) {
+		kfree(template_desc);
+		template_desc = NULL;
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	spin_lock(&template_list);
 	list_add_tail_rcu(&template_desc->list, &defined_templates);
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index e60473b13a8d..b0264ba45ddd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	unsigned long measured_pcrs;
 	unsigned long atomic_flags;
+	unsigned long real_ino;
+	dev_t real_dev;
 	enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 9394d72a77e8..9e52a3e0fc67 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -922,14 +922,19 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
 	ret = -EACCES;
 	down_write(&key->sem);
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+	{
+		bool is_privileged_op = false;
+
 		/* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
 		if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(key->uid, uid))
-			goto error_put;
+			is_privileged_op = true;
 
 		/* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
 		 * than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
 		if (group != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(gid, key->gid) && !in_group_p(gid))
+			is_privileged_op = true;
+
+		if (is_privileged_op && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			goto error_put;
 	}
 
@@ -1029,7 +1034,7 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
 	down_write(&key->sem);
 
 	/* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
-	if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid())) {
+	if (uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid()) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
 		key->perm = perm;
 		ret = 0;
 	}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index fc1410550b79..21c27424a44b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -926,12 +926,13 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 			unsigned long flags)
 {
+	unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot);
 	int ret;
-	ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot,
-					mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
+
+	ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
-	return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
+	return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
 }
 
 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index c7161f8792b2..89c67a814566 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -19,8 +19,12 @@ ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include
 $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h
 
 quiet_cmd_flask = GEN     $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
-      cmd_flask = scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
+      cmd_flask = $< $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
 
 targets += flask.h av_permissions.h
-$(obj)/flask.h: $(src)/include/classmap.h FORCE
+# once make >= 4.3 is required, we can use grouped targets in the rule below,
+# which basically involves adding both headers and a '&' before the colon, see
+# the example below:
+#   $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h &: scripts/selinux/...
+$(obj)/flask.h: scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,flask)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 41e24df986eb..749dbf9f2cfc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4700,6 +4700,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 				return -EINVAL;
 			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
 			if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
+				if (family == PF_INET6) {
+					/* Length check from inet6_bind_sk() */
+					if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+						return -EINVAL;
+					/* Family check from __inet6_bind() */
+					goto err_af;
+				}
 				/* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
 				 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
 				 */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index f7db791fb566..62aa4bc25426 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ struct inode_smack {
 struct task_smack {
 	struct smack_known	*smk_task;	/* label for access control */
 	struct smack_known	*smk_forked;	/* label when forked */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_transmuted;/* label when transmuted */
 	struct list_head	smk_rules;	/* per task access rules */
 	struct mutex		smk_rules_lock;	/* lock for the rules */
 	struct list_head	smk_relabel;	/* transit allowed labels */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 4f65d953fe31..266eb8ca3381 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1032,8 +1032,9 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 				     const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
 				     void **value, size_t *len)
 {
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
 	struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
-	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
 	struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
 	struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
 	int may;
@@ -1042,20 +1043,34 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 		*name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
 
 	if (value && len) {
-		rcu_read_lock();
-		may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
-				       &skp->smk_rules);
-		rcu_read_unlock();
+		/*
+		 * If equal, transmuting already occurred in
+		 * smack_dentry_create_files_as(). No need to check again.
+		 */
+		if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted) {
+			rcu_read_lock();
+			may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
+					       &skp->smk_rules);
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+		}
 
 		/*
-		 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
-		 * the directory requests transmutation then
-		 * by all means transmute.
+		 * In addition to having smk_task equal to smk_transmuted,
+		 * if the access rule allows transmutation and the directory
+		 * requests transmutation then by all means transmute.
 		 * Mark the inode as changed.
 		 */
-		if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
-		    smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) {
-			isp = dsp;
+		if ((tsp->smk_task == tsp->smk_transmuted) ||
+		    (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
+		     smk_inode_transmutable(dir))) {
+			/*
+			 * The caller of smack_dentry_create_files_as()
+			 * should have overridden the current cred, so the
+			 * inode label was already set correctly in
+			 * smack_inode_alloc_security().
+			 */
+			if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted)
+				isp = dsp;
 			issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
 		}
 
@@ -1490,10 +1505,19 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
 	struct super_block *sbp;
 	struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
 	struct smack_known *isp;
+	struct inode_smack *ispp;
+	size_t label_len;
+	char *label = NULL;
 
-	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0)
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
 		isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
-	else {
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+		ispp = inode->i_security;
+		if (ispp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE)
+			label = TRANS_TRUE;
+		else
+			label = "";
+	} else {
 		/*
 		 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
 		 */
@@ -1515,13 +1539,18 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
 			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
 
+	if (!label)
+		label = isp->smk_known;
+
+	label_len = strlen(label);
+
 	if (alloc) {
-		*buffer = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+		*buffer = kstrdup(label, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (*buffer == NULL)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	return strlen(isp->smk_known);
+	return label_len;
 }
 
 
@@ -4612,7 +4641,7 @@ static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new)
 	/*
 	 * Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid
 	 */
-	isp = d_inode(dentry->d_parent)->i_security;
+	isp = d_inode(dentry)->i_security;
 	skp = isp->smk_inode;
 	tsp->smk_task = skp;
 	*new = new_creds;
@@ -4663,8 +4692,10 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 		 * providing access is transmuting use the containing
 		 * directory label instead of the process label.
 		 */
-		if (may > 0 && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE))
+		if (may > 0 && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE)) {
 			ntsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
+			ntsp->smk_transmuted = ntsp->smk_task;
+		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index a9c516362170..61e734baa332 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	}
 
 	ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &catlen);
-	if (ret != 1 || catlen > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM)
+	if (ret != 1 || catlen < 0 || catlen > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM)
 		goto out;
 
 	if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT &&
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Makefile b/security/tomoyo/Makefile
index cca5a3012fee..221eaadffb09 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/Makefile
+++ b/security/tomoyo/Makefile
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ endef
 quiet_cmd_policy  = POLICY  $@
       cmd_policy  = ($(call do_policy,profile); $(call do_policy,exception_policy); $(call do_policy,domain_policy); $(call do_policy,manager); $(call do_policy,stat)) >$@
 
-$(obj)/builtin-policy.h: $(wildcard $(obj)/policy/*.conf $(src)/policy/*.conf.default) FORCE
+$(obj)/builtin-policy.h: $(wildcard $(obj)/policy/*.conf $(srctree)/$(src)/policy/*.conf.default) FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,policy)
 
 $(obj)/common.o: $(obj)/builtin-policy.h