diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
20 files changed, 263 insertions, 294 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu index dee993602c31..a531b208902f 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu @@ -472,16 +472,17 @@ Description: information about CPUs heterogeneity. cpu_capacity: capacity of cpu#. What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data Date: January 2018 Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..156cca9dbc96 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +What: /sys/kernel/oops_count +Date: November 2022 +KernelVersion: 6.2.0 +Contact: Linux Kernel Hardening List <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org> +Description: + Shows how many times the system has Oopsed since last boot. diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..90a029813717 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +What: /sys/kernel/warn_count +Date: November 2022 +KernelVersion: 6.2.0 +Contact: Linux Kernel Hardening List <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org> +Description: + Shows how many times the system has Warned since last boot. diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..264bfa937f7d --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +GDS - Gather Data Sampling +========================== + +Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged +speculative access to data which was previously stored in vector registers. + +Problem +------- +When a gather instruction performs loads from memory, different data elements +are merged into the destination vector register. However, when a gather +instruction that is transiently executed encounters a fault, stale data from +architectural or internal vector registers may get transiently forwarded to the +destination vector register instead. This will allow a malicious attacker to +infer stale data using typical side channel techniques like cache timing +attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack. + +The attacker uses gather instructions to infer the stale vector register data. +The victim does not need to do anything special other than use the vector +registers. The victim does not need to use gather instructions to be +vulnerable. + +Because the buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads cross Hyper-Thread attacks +are possible. + +Attack scenarios +---------------- +Without mitigation, GDS can infer stale data across virtually all +permission boundaries: + + Non-enclaves can infer SGX enclave data + Userspace can infer kernel data + Guests can infer data from hosts + Guest can infer guest from other guests + Users can infer data from other users + +Because of this, it is important to ensure that the mitigation stays enabled in +lower-privilege contexts like guests and when running outside SGX enclaves. + +The hardware enforces the mitigation for SGX. Likewise, VMMs should ensure +that guests are not allowed to disable the GDS mitigation. If a host erred and +allowed this, a guest could theoretically disable GDS mitigation, mount an +attack, and re-enable it. + +Mitigation mechanism +-------------------- +This issue is mitigated in microcode. The microcode defines the following new +bits: + + ================================ === ============================ + IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_CTRL] R/O Enumerates GDS vulnerability + and mitigation support. + IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_NO] R/O Processor is not vulnerable. + IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_DIS] R/W Disables the mitigation + 0 by default. + IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_LOCK] R/W Locks GDS_MITG_DIS=0. Writes + to GDS_MITG_DIS are ignored + Can't be cleared once set. + ================================ === ============================ + +GDS can also be mitigated on systems that don't have updated microcode by +disabling AVX. This can be done by setting gather_data_sampling="force" or +"clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel command-line. + +If used, these options will disable AVX use by turning off XSAVE YMM support. +However, the processor will still enumerate AVX support. Userspace that +does not follow proper AVX enumeration to check both AVX *and* XSAVE YMM +support will break. + +Mitigation control on the kernel command line +--------------------------------------------- +The mitigation can be disabled by setting "gather_data_sampling=off" or +"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will default +to the mitigation being enabled. Specifying "gather_data_sampling=force" will +use the microcode mitigation when available or disable AVX on affected systems +where the microcode hasn't been updated to include the mitigation. + +GDS System Information +------------------------ +The kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For +GDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file: + +/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling + +The possible values contained in this file are: + + ============================== ============================================= + Not affected Processor not vulnerable. + Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled. + Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing + mitigation. + Mitigation: AVX disabled, + no microcode Processor is vulnerable and microcode is missing + mitigation. AVX disabled as mitigation. + Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in + effect. + Mitigation: Microcode (locked) Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in + effect and cannot be disabled. + Unknown: Dependent on + hypervisor status Running on a virtual guest processor that is + affected but with no way to know if host + processor is mitigated or vulnerable. + ============================== ============================================= + +GDS Default mitigation +---------------------- +The updated microcode will enable the mitigation by default. The kernel's +default action is to leave the mitigation enabled. diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst index 2adec1e6520a..245468b0f2be 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst @@ -16,3 +16,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. multihit.rst special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst processor_mmio_stale_data.rst + gather_data_sampling.rst diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index 7e061ed449aa..0fba3758d0da 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -479,8 +479,16 @@ Spectre variant 2 On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all, cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details. - On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. Enhanced - IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time. + On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. IBRS + or enhanced IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time. + + Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at + boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against + Spectre v2 variant attacks, including cross-thread branch target injections + on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, eIBRS enables STIBP too. + + Legacy IBRS systems clear the IBRS bit on exit to userspace and + therefore explicitly enable STIBP for that The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator @@ -504,9 +512,12 @@ Spectre variant 2 For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, individual user programs can be compiled with return trampolines for indirect branches. This protects them from consuming poisoned entries in the branch - target buffer left by malicious software. Alternatively, the - programs can disable their indirect branch speculation via prctl() - (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`). + target buffer left by malicious software. + + On legacy IBRS systems, at return to userspace, implicit STIBP is disabled + because the kernel clears the IBRS bit. In this case, the userspace programs + can disable indirect branch speculation via prctl() (See + :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`). On x86, this will turn on STIBP to guard against attacks from the sibling thread when the user program is running, and use IBPB to flush the branch target buffer when switching to/from the program. diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 68f31b666032..84c34f7e8984 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -810,10 +810,6 @@ debugpat [X86] Enable PAT debugging - decnet.addr= [HW,NET] - Format: <area>[,<node>] - See also Documentation/networking/decnet.txt. - default_hugepagesz= [same as hugepagesz=] The size of the default HugeTLB page size. This is the size represented by @@ -1294,6 +1290,26 @@ Format: off | on default: on + gather_data_sampling= + [X86,INTEL] Control the Gather Data Sampling (GDS) + mitigation. + + Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which + allows unprivileged speculative access to data which was + previously stored in vector registers. + + This issue is mitigated by default in updated microcode. + The mitigation may have a performance impact but can be + disabled. On systems without the microcode mitigation + disabling AVX serves as a mitigation. + + force: Disable AVX to mitigate systems without + microcode mitigation. No effect if the microcode + mitigation is present. Known to cause crashes in + userspace with buggy AVX enumeration. + + off: Disable GDS mitigation. + gcov_persist= [GCOV] When non-zero (default), profiling data for kernel modules is saved and remains accessible via debugfs, even when the module is unloaded/reloaded. @@ -2559,22 +2575,23 @@ Disable all optional CPU mitigations. This improves system performance, but it may also expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities. - Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC] + Equivalent to: gather_data_sampling=off [X86] kpti=0 [ARM64] - nospectre_v1 [PPC] + kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86] + l1tf=off [X86] + mds=off [X86] + mmio_stale_data=off [X86] + no_entry_flush [PPC] + no_uaccess_flush [PPC] nobp=0 [S390] + nopti [X86,PPC] + nospectre_v1 [PPC] nospectre_v1 [X86] nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] - spectre_v2_user=off [X86] spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC] + spectre_v2_user=off [X86] ssbd=force-off [ARM64] - l1tf=off [X86] - mds=off [X86] tsx_async_abort=off [X86] - kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86] - no_entry_flush [PPC] - no_uaccess_flush [PPC] - mmio_stale_data=off [X86] Exceptions: This does not have any effect on diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst index 30187d49dc2c..67161e1b0f0b 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst @@ -56,31 +56,28 @@ information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been lifted, in perpetuity. -Coordination ------------- - -Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege -escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private -<linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors -are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the -upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and -will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update -publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate, -the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can -include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix -the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki: -<http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists> +Coordination with other groups +------------------------------ + +The kernel security team strongly recommends that reporters of potential +security issues NEVER contact the "linux-distros" mailing list until +AFTER discussing it with the kernel security team. Do not Cc: both +lists at once. You may contact the linux-distros mailing list after a +fix has been agreed on and you fully understand the requirements that +doing so will impose on you and the kernel community. + +The different lists have different goals and the linux-distros rules do +not contribute to actually fixing any potential security problems. CVE assignment -------------- -The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them -for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and -may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier -assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private -linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known -before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit -message if the reporter agrees. +The security team does not assign CVEs, nor do we require them for +reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and may +delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier +assigned, they should find one by themselves, for example by contacting +MITRE directly. However under no circumstances will a patch inclusion +be delayed to wait for a CVE identifier to arrive. Non-disclosure agreements ------------------------- diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/gdb-kernel-debugging.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/gdb-kernel-debugging.rst index 19df79286f00..afe4bc206486 100644 --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/gdb-kernel-debugging.rst +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/gdb-kernel-debugging.rst @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ Setup this mode. In this case, you should build the kernel with CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE disabled if the architecture supports KASLR. +- Build the gdb scripts (required on kernels v5.1 and above):: + + make scripts_gdb + - Enable the gdb stub of QEMU/KVM, either - at VM startup time by appending "-s" to the QEMU command line diff --git a/Documentation/driver-api/spi.rst b/Documentation/driver-api/spi.rst index f64cb666498a..f28887045049 100644 --- a/Documentation/driver-api/spi.rst +++ b/Documentation/driver-api/spi.rst @@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ hardware, which may be as simple as a set of GPIO pins or as complex as a pair of FIFOs connected to dual DMA engines on the other side of the SPI shift register (maximizing throughput). Such drivers bridge between whatever bus they sit on (often the platform bus) and SPI, and expose -the SPI side of their device as a :c:type:`struct spi_master -<spi_master>`. SPI devices are children of that master, +the SPI side of their device as a :c:type:`struct spi_controller +<spi_controller>`. SPI devices are children of that master, represented as a :c:type:`struct spi_device <spi_device>` and manufactured from :c:type:`struct spi_board_info <spi_board_info>` descriptors which are usually provided by diff --git a/Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.txt b/Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.txt index 4d1b7b4ccfaf..b2b86147bafe 100644 --- a/Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.txt +++ b/Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.txt @@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ configuration of fault-injection capabilities. - /sys/kernel/debug/fail*/times: - specifies how many times failures may happen at most. - A value of -1 means "no limit". + specifies how many times failures may happen at most. A value of -1 + means "no limit". - /sys/kernel/debug/fail*/space: diff --git a/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt b/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt index 13a7c999c04a..7ab4d71ec83d 100644 --- a/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt +++ b/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt @@ -290,7 +290,6 @@ Code Seq#(hex) Include File Comments 0x89 00-06 arch/x86/include/asm/sockios.h 0x89 0B-DF linux/sockios.h 0x89 E0-EF linux/sockios.h SIOCPROTOPRIVATE range -0x89 E0-EF linux/dn.h PROTOPRIVATE range 0x89 F0-FF linux/sockios.h SIOCDEVPRIVATE range 0x8B all linux/wireless.h 0x8C 00-3F WiNRADiO driver diff --git a/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/subdev-formats.rst b/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/subdev-formats.rst index 8e73fcfc6900..cc2ad8af51ea 100644 --- a/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/subdev-formats.rst +++ b/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/subdev-formats.rst @@ -7565,3 +7565,30 @@ formats. - 0x5001 - Interleaved raw UYVY and JPEG image format with embedded meta-data used by Samsung S3C73MX camera sensors. + +.. _v4l2-mbus-metadata-fmts: + +Metadata Formats +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +This section lists all metadata formats. + +The following table lists the existing metadata formats. + +.. tabularcolumns:: |p{8.0cm}|p{1.4cm}|p{7.7cm}| + +.. flat-table:: Metadata formats + :header-rows: 1 + :stub-columns: 0 + + * - Identifier + - Code + - Comments + * .. _MEDIA-BUS-FMT-METADATA-FIXED: + + - MEDIA_BUS_FMT_METADATA_FIXED + - 0x7001 + - This format should be used when the same driver handles + both sides of the link and the bus format is a fixed + metadata format that is not configurable from userspace. + Width and height will be set to 0 for this format. diff --git a/Documentation/networking/00-INDEX b/Documentation/networking/00-INDEX index 02a323c43261..2a9dbac38b4e 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/00-INDEX +++ b/Documentation/networking/00-INDEX @@ -94,8 +94,8 @@ gianfar.txt - Gianfar Ethernet Driver. i40e.txt - README for the Intel Ethernet Controller XL710 Driver (i40e). -i40evf.txt - - Short note on the Driver for the Intel(R) XL710 X710 Virtual Function +iavf.txt + - README for the Intel Ethernet Adaptive Virtual Function Driver (iavf). ieee802154.txt - Linux IEEE 802.15.4 implementation, API and drivers igb.txt diff --git a/Documentation/networking/decnet.txt b/Documentation/networking/decnet.txt deleted file mode 100644 index e12a4900cf72..000000000000 --- a/Documentation/networking/decnet.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,232 +0,0 @@ - Linux DECnet Networking Layer Information - =========================================== - -1) Other documentation.... - - o Project Home Pages - http://www.chygwyn.com/ - Kernel info - http://linux-decnet.sourceforge.net/ - Userland tools - http://www.sourceforge.net/projects/linux-decnet/ - Status page - -2) Configuring the kernel - -Be sure to turn on the following options: - - CONFIG_DECNET (obviously) - CONFIG_PROC_FS (to see what's going on) - CONFIG_SYSCTL (for easy configuration) - -if you want to try out router support (not properly debugged yet) -you'll need the following options as well... - - CONFIG_DECNET_ROUTER (to be able to add/delete routes) - CONFIG_NETFILTER (will be required for the DECnet routing daemon) - - CONFIG_DECNET_ROUTE_FWMARK is optional - -Don't turn on SIOCGIFCONF support for DECnet unless you are really sure -that you need it, in general you won't and it can cause ifconfig to -malfunction. - -Run time configuration has changed slightly from the 2.4 system. If you -want to configure an endnode, then the simplified procedure is as follows: - - o Set the MAC address on your ethernet card before starting _any_ other - network protocols. - -As soon as your network card is brought into the UP state, DECnet should -start working. If you need something more complicated or are unsure how -to set the MAC address, see the next section. Also all configurations which -worked with 2.4 will work under 2.5 with no change. - -3) Command line options - -You can set a DECnet address on the kernel command line for compatibility -with the 2.4 configuration procedure, but in general it's not needed any more. -If you do st a DECnet address on the command line, it has only one purpose -which is that its added to the addresses on the loopback device. - -With 2.4 kernels, DECnet would only recognise addresses as local if they -were added to the loopback device. In 2.5, any local interface address -can be used to loop back to the local machine. Of course this does not -prevent you adding further addresses to the loopback device if you -want to. - -N.B. Since the address list of an interface determines the addresses for -which "hello" messages are sent, if you don't set an address on the loopback -interface then you won't see any entries in /proc/net/neigh for the local -host until such time as you start a connection. This doesn't affect the -operation of the local communications in any other way though. - -The kernel command line takes options looking like the following: - - decnet.addr=1,2 - -the two numbers are the node address 1,2 = 1.2 For 2.2.xx kernels -and early 2.3.xx kernels, you must use a comma when specifying the -DECnet address like this. For more recent 2.3.xx kernels, you may -use almost any character except space, although a `.` would be the most -obvious choice :-) - -There used to be a third number specifying the node type. This option -has gone away in favour of a per interface node type. This is now set -using /proc/sys/net/decnet/conf/<dev>/forwarding. This file can be -set with a single digit, 0=EndNode, 1=L1 Router and 2=L2 Router. - -There are also equivalent options for modules. The node address can -also be set through the /proc/sys/net/decnet/ files, as can other system -parameters. - -Currently the only supported devices are ethernet and ip_gre. The -ethernet address of your ethernet card has to be set according to the DECnet -address of the node in order for it to be autoconfigured (and then appear in -/proc/net/decnet_dev). There is a utility available at the above -FTP sites called dn2ethaddr which can compute the correct ethernet -address to use. The address can be set by ifconfig either before or -at the time the device is brought up. If you are using RedHat you can -add the line: - - MACADDR=AA:00:04:00:03:04 - -or something similar, to /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-eth0 or -wherever your network card's configuration lives. Setting the MAC address -of your ethernet card to an address starting with "hi-ord" will cause a -DECnet address which matches to be added to the interface (which you can -verify with iproute2). - -The default device for routing can be set through the /proc filesystem -by setting /proc/sys/net/decnet/default_device to the -device you want DECnet to route packets out of when no specific route -is available. Usually this will be eth0, for example: - - echo -n "eth0" >/proc/sys/net/decnet/default_device - -If you don't set the default device, then it will default to the first -ethernet card which has been autoconfigured as described above. You can -confirm that by looking in the default_device file of course. - -There is a list of what the other files under /proc/sys/net/decnet/ do -on the kernel patch web site (shown above). - -4) Run time kernel configuration - -This is either done through the sysctl/proc interface (see the kernel web -pages for details on what the various options do) or through the iproute2 -package in the same way as IPv4/6 configuration is performed. - -Documentation for iproute2 is included with the package, although there is -as yet no specific section on DECnet, most of the features apply to both -IP and DECnet, albeit with DECnet addresses instead of IP addresses and -a reduced functionality. - -If you want to configure a DECnet router you'll need the iproute2 package -since its the _only_ way to add and delete routes currently. Eventually -there will be a routing daemon to send and receive routing messages for -each interface and update the kernel routing tables accordingly. The -routing daemon will use netfilter to listen to routing packets, and -rtnetlink to update the kernels routing tables. - -The DECnet raw socket layer has been removed since it was there purely -for use by the routing daemon which will now use netfilter (a much cleaner -and more generic solution) instead. - -5) How can I tell if its working ? - -Here is a quick guide of what to look for in order to know if your DECnet -kernel subsystem is working. - - - Is the node address set (see /proc/sys/net/decnet/node_address) - - Is the node of the correct type - (see /proc/sys/net/decnet/conf/<dev>/forwarding) - - Is the Ethernet MAC address of each Ethernet card set to match - the DECnet address. If in doubt use the dn2ethaddr utility available - at the ftp archive. - - If the previous two steps are satisfied, and the Ethernet card is up, - you should find that it is listed in /proc/net/decnet_dev and also - that it appears as a directory in /proc/sys/net/decnet/conf/. The - loopback device (lo) should also appear and is required to communicate - within a node. - - If you have any DECnet routers on your network, they should appear - in /proc/net/decnet_neigh, otherwise this file will only contain the - entry for the node itself (if it doesn't check to see if lo is up). - - If you want to send to any node which is not listed in the - /proc/net/decnet_neigh file, you'll need to set the default device - to point to an Ethernet card with connection to a router. This is - again done with the /proc/sys/net/decnet/default_device file. - - Try starting a simple server and client, like the dnping/dnmirror - over the loopback interface. With luck they should communicate. - For this step and those after, you'll need the DECnet library - which can be obtained from the above ftp sites as well as the - actual utilities themselves. - - If this seems to work, then try talking to a node on your local - network, and see if you can obtain the same results. - - At this point you are on your own... :-) - -6) How to send a bug report - -If you've found a bug and want to report it, then there are several things -you can do to help me work out exactly what it is that is wrong. Useful -information (_most_ of which _is_ _essential_) includes: - - - What kernel version are you running ? - - What version of the patch are you running ? - - How far though the above set of tests can you get ? - - What is in the /proc/decnet* files and /proc/sys/net/decnet/* files ? - - Which services are you running ? - - Which client caused the problem ? - - How much data was being transferred ? - - Was the network congested ? - - How can the problem be reproduced ? - - Can you use tcpdump to get a trace ? (N.B. Most (all?) versions of - tcpdump don't understand how to dump DECnet properly, so including - the hex listing of the packet contents is _essential_, usually the -x flag. - You may also need to increase the length grabbed with the -s flag. The - -e flag also provides very useful information (ethernet MAC addresses)) - -7) MAC FAQ - -A quick FAQ on ethernet MAC addresses to explain how Linux and DECnet -interact and how to get the best performance from your hardware. - -Ethernet cards are designed to normally only pass received network frames -to a host computer when they are addressed to it, or to the broadcast address. - -Linux has an interface which allows the setting of extra addresses for -an ethernet card to listen to. If the ethernet card supports it, the -filtering operation will be done in hardware, if not the extra unwanted packets -received will be discarded by the host computer. In the latter case, -significant processor time and bus bandwidth can be used up on a busy -network (see the NAPI documentation for a longer explanation of these -effects). - -DECnet makes use of this interface to allow running DECnet on an ethernet -card which has already been configured using TCP/IP (presumably using the -built in MAC address of the card, as usual) and/or to allow multiple DECnet -addresses on each physical interface. If you do this, be aware that if your -ethernet card doesn't support perfect hashing in its MAC address filter -then your computer will be doing more work than required. Some cards -will simply set themselves into promiscuous mode in order to receive -packets from the DECnet specified addresses. So if you have one of these -cards its better to set the MAC address of the card as described above -to gain the best efficiency. Better still is to use a card which supports -NAPI as well. - - -8) Mailing list - -If you are keen to get involved in development, or want to ask questions -about configuration, or even just report bugs, then there is a mailing -list that you can join, details are at: - -http://sourceforge.net/mail/?group_id=4993 - -9) Legal Info - -The Linux DECnet project team have placed their code under the GPL. The -software is provided "as is" and without warranty express or implied. -DECnet is a trademark of Compaq. This software is not a product of -Compaq. We acknowledge the help of people at Compaq in providing extra -documentation above and beyond what was previously publicly available. - -Steve Whitehouse <SteveW@ACM.org> - diff --git a/Documentation/networking/i40evf.txt b/Documentation/networking/iavf.txt index e9b3035b95d0..cc902a2369d6 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/i40evf.txt +++ b/Documentation/networking/iavf.txt @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Linux* Base Driver for Intel(R) Network Connection ================================================== Intel Ethernet Adaptive Virtual Function Linux driver. -Copyright(c) 2013-2017 Intel Corporation. +Copyright(c) 2013-2018 Intel Corporation. Contents ======== @@ -11,20 +11,21 @@ Contents - Known Issues/Troubleshooting - Support -This file describes the i40evf Linux* Base Driver. +This file describes the iavf Linux* Base Driver. This driver +was formerly called i40evf. -The i40evf driver supports the below mentioned virtual function +The iavf driver supports the below mentioned virtual function devices and can only be activated on kernels running the i40e or newer Physical Function (PF) driver compiled with CONFIG_PCI_IOV. -The i40evf driver requires CONFIG_PCI_MSI to be enabled. +The iavf driver requires CONFIG_PCI_MSI to be enabled. -The guest OS loading the i40evf driver must support MSI-X interrupts. +The guest OS loading the iavf driver must support MSI-X interrupts. Supported Hardware ================== Intel XL710 X710 Virtual Function -Intel Ethernet Adaptive Virtual Function Intel X722 Virtual Function +Intel Ethernet Adaptive Virtual Function Identifying Your Adapter ======================== @@ -32,7 +33,8 @@ Identifying Your Adapter For more information on how to identify your adapter, go to the Adapter & Driver ID Guide at: - http://support.intel.com/support/go/network/adapter/idguide.htm + https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/support/articles/000005584/network-and-i-o/ethernet-products.html + Known Issues/Troubleshooting ============================ diff --git a/Documentation/sound/hd-audio/models.rst b/Documentation/sound/hd-audio/models.rst index 8c0de54b5649..5aa24f7b78ed 100644 --- a/Documentation/sound/hd-audio/models.rst +++ b/Documentation/sound/hd-audio/models.rst @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ ref no-jd BIOS setup but without jack-detection intel - Intel DG45* mobos + Intel D*45* mobos dell-m6-amic Dell desktops/laptops with analog mics dell-m6-dmic diff --git a/Documentation/sphinx/load_config.py b/Documentation/sphinx/load_config.py index 301a21aa4f63..4c9cdcb71c2c 100644 --- a/Documentation/sphinx/load_config.py +++ b/Documentation/sphinx/load_config.py @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import os import sys -from sphinx.util.pycompat import execfile_ +from sphinx.util.osutil import fs_encoding # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ def loadConfig(namespace): @@ -25,7 +25,9 @@ def loadConfig(namespace): sys.stdout.write("load additional sphinx-config: %s\n" % config_file) config = namespace.copy() config['__file__'] = config_file - execfile_(config_file, config) + with open(config_file, 'rb') as f: + code = compile(f.read(), fs_encoding, 'exec') + exec(code, config) del config['__file__'] namespace.update(config) else: diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt index db1676525ca3..c8d3dbda3c1e 100644 --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel: - msgmnb - msgmni - nmi_watchdog +- oops_limit - osrelease - ostype - overflowgid @@ -96,6 +97,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel: - threads-max - unprivileged_bpf_disabled - unknown_nmi_panic +- warn_limit - watchdog - watchdog_thresh - version @@ -555,6 +557,15 @@ scanned for a given scan. ============================================================== +oops_limit: + +Number of kernel oopses after which the kernel should panic when +``panic_on_oops`` is not set. Setting this to 0 disables checking +the count. Setting this to 1 has the same effect as setting +``panic_on_oops=1``. The default value is 10000. + +============================================================== + osrelease, ostype & version: # cat osrelease @@ -1104,6 +1115,15 @@ example. If a system hangs up, try pressing the NMI switch. ============================================================== +warn_limit: + +Number of kernel warnings after which the kernel should panic when +``panic_on_warn`` is not set. Setting this to 0 disables checking +the warning count. Setting this to 1 has the same effect as setting +``panic_on_warn=1``. The default value is 0. + +============================================================== + watchdog: This parameter can be used to disable or enable the soft lockup detector diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/net.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/net.txt index 2793d4eac55f..57e08f16b4e3 100644 --- a/Documentation/sysctl/net.txt +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/net.txt @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ Table : Subdirectories in /proc/sys/net ethernet Ethernet protocol rose X.25 PLP layer ipv4 IP version 4 x25 X.25 protocol ipx IPX token-ring IBM token ring - bridge Bridging decnet DEC net ipv6 IP version 6 tipc TIPC .............................................................................. |