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-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c3
-rw-r--r--security/device_cgroup.c203
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c22
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c10
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c7
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c32
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c17
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c6
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c10
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c38
13 files changed, 284 insertions, 70 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index b9d613e0ef14..963dc5981661 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -421,6 +421,9 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable);
}
+ cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
+ cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index d3b6d2cd3a06..6e4e6eb732fe 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -308,57 +308,139 @@ static int devcgroup_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
}
/**
- * may_access - verifies if a new exception is part of what is allowed
- * by a dev cgroup based on the default policy +
- * exceptions. This is used to make sure a child cgroup
- * won't have more privileges than its parent or to
- * verify if a certain access is allowed.
- * @dev_cgroup: dev cgroup to be tested against
- * @refex: new exception
- * @behavior: behavior of the exception
+ * match_exception - iterates the exception list trying to match a rule
+ * based on type, major, minor and access type. It is
+ * considered a match if an exception is found that
+ * will contain the entire range of provided parameters.
+ * @exceptions: list of exceptions
+ * @type: device type (DEV_BLOCK or DEV_CHAR)
+ * @major: device file major number, ~0 to match all
+ * @minor: device file minor number, ~0 to match all
+ * @access: permission mask (ACC_READ, ACC_WRITE, ACC_MKNOD)
+ *
+ * returns: true in case it matches an exception completely
*/
-static bool may_access(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
- struct dev_exception_item *refex,
- enum devcg_behavior behavior)
+static bool match_exception(struct list_head *exceptions, short type,
+ u32 major, u32 minor, short access)
{
struct dev_exception_item *ex;
- bool match = false;
- rcu_lockdep_assert(rcu_read_lock_held() ||
- lockdep_is_held(&devcgroup_mutex),
- "device_cgroup::may_access() called without proper synchronization");
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, exceptions, list) {
+ if ((type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEV_BLOCK))
+ continue;
+ if ((type & DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEV_CHAR))
+ continue;
+ if (ex->major != ~0 && ex->major != major)
+ continue;
+ if (ex->minor != ~0 && ex->minor != minor)
+ continue;
+ /* provided access cannot have more than the exception rule */
+ if (access & (~ex->access))
+ continue;
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * match_exception_partial - iterates the exception list trying to match a rule
+ * based on type, major, minor and access type. It is
+ * considered a match if an exception's range is
+ * found to contain *any* of the devices specified by
+ * provided parameters. This is used to make sure no
+ * extra access is being granted that is forbidden by
+ * any of the exception list.
+ * @exceptions: list of exceptions
+ * @type: device type (DEV_BLOCK or DEV_CHAR)
+ * @major: device file major number, ~0 to match all
+ * @minor: device file minor number, ~0 to match all
+ * @access: permission mask (ACC_READ, ACC_WRITE, ACC_MKNOD)
+ *
+ * returns: true in case the provided range mat matches an exception completely
+ */
+static bool match_exception_partial(struct list_head *exceptions, short type,
+ u32 major, u32 minor, short access)
+{
+ struct dev_exception_item *ex;
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) {
- if ((refex->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEV_BLOCK))
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, exceptions, list) {
+ if ((type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEV_BLOCK))
continue;
- if ((refex->type & DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEV_CHAR))
+ if ((type & DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEV_CHAR))
continue;
- if (ex->major != ~0 && ex->major != refex->major)
+ /*
+ * We must be sure that both the exception and the provided
+ * range aren't masking all devices
+ */
+ if (ex->major != ~0 && major != ~0 && ex->major != major)
continue;
- if (ex->minor != ~0 && ex->minor != refex->minor)
+ if (ex->minor != ~0 && minor != ~0 && ex->minor != minor)
continue;
- if (refex->access & (~ex->access))
+ /*
+ * In order to make sure the provided range isn't matching
+ * an exception, all its access bits shouldn't match the
+ * exception's access bits
+ */
+ if (!(access & ex->access))
continue;
- match = true;
- break;
+ return true;
}
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_new_ex - verifies if a new exception is part of what is allowed
+ * by a dev cgroup based on the default policy +
+ * exceptions. This is used to make sure a child cgroup
+ * won't have more privileges than its parent
+ * @dev_cgroup: dev cgroup to be tested against
+ * @refex: new exception
+ * @behavior: behavior of the exception's dev_cgroup
+ */
+static bool verify_new_ex(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
+ struct dev_exception_item *refex,
+ enum devcg_behavior behavior)
+{
+ bool match = false;
+
+ rcu_lockdep_assert(rcu_read_lock_held() ||
+ lockdep_is_held(&devcgroup_mutex),
+ "device_cgroup:verify_new_ex called without proper synchronization");
if (dev_cgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
if (behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
- /* the exception will deny access to certain devices */
+ /*
+ * new exception in the child doesn't matter, only
+ * adding extra restrictions
+ */
return true;
} else {
- /* the exception will allow access to certain devices */
+ /*
+ * new exception in the child will add more devices
+ * that can be acessed, so it can't match any of
+ * parent's exceptions, even slightly
+ */
+ match = match_exception_partial(&dev_cgroup->exceptions,
+ refex->type,
+ refex->major,
+ refex->minor,
+ refex->access);
+
if (match)
- /*
- * a new exception allowing access shouldn't
- * match an parent's exception
- */
return false;
return true;
}
} else {
- /* only behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY allowed here */
+ /*
+ * Only behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY allowed here, therefore
+ * the new exception will add access to more devices and must
+ * be contained completely in an parent's exception to be
+ * allowed
+ */
+ match = match_exception(&dev_cgroup->exceptions, refex->type,
+ refex->major, refex->minor,
+ refex->access);
+
if (match)
/* parent has an exception that matches the proposed */
return true;
@@ -380,7 +462,38 @@ static int parent_has_perm(struct dev_cgroup *childcg,
if (!parent)
return 1;
- return may_access(parent, ex, childcg->behavior);
+ return verify_new_ex(parent, ex, childcg->behavior);
+}
+
+/**
+ * parent_allows_removal - verify if it's ok to remove an exception
+ * @childcg: child cgroup from where the exception will be removed
+ * @ex: exception being removed
+ *
+ * When removing an exception in cgroups with default ALLOW policy, it must
+ * be checked if removing it will give the child cgroup more access than the
+ * parent.
+ *
+ * Return: true if it's ok to remove exception, false otherwise
+ */
+static bool parent_allows_removal(struct dev_cgroup *childcg,
+ struct dev_exception_item *ex)
+{
+ struct dev_cgroup *parent = css_to_devcgroup(css_parent(&childcg->css));
+
+ if (!parent)
+ return true;
+
+ /* It's always allowed to remove access to devices */
+ if (childcg->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY)
+ return true;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure you're not removing part or a whole exception existing in
+ * the parent cgroup
+ */
+ return !match_exception_partial(&parent->exceptions, ex->type,
+ ex->major, ex->minor, ex->access);
}
/**
@@ -618,17 +731,21 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
switch (filetype) {
case DEVCG_ALLOW:
- if (!parent_has_perm(devcgroup, &ex))
- return -EPERM;
/*
* If the default policy is to allow by default, try to remove
* an matching exception instead. And be silent about it: we
* don't want to break compatibility
*/
if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
+ /* Check if the parent allows removing it first */
+ if (!parent_allows_removal(devcgroup, &ex))
+ return -EPERM;
dev_exception_rm(devcgroup, &ex);
- return 0;
+ break;
}
+
+ if (!parent_has_perm(devcgroup, &ex))
+ return -EPERM;
rc = dev_exception_add(devcgroup, &ex);
break;
case DEVCG_DENY:
@@ -708,18 +825,18 @@ static int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor,
short access)
{
struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
- struct dev_exception_item ex;
- int rc;
-
- memset(&ex, 0, sizeof(ex));
- ex.type = type;
- ex.major = major;
- ex.minor = minor;
- ex.access = access;
+ bool rc;
rcu_read_lock();
dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current);
- rc = may_access(dev_cgroup, &ex, dev_cgroup->behavior);
+ if (dev_cgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW)
+ /* Can't match any of the exceptions, even partially */
+ rc = !match_exception_partial(&dev_cgroup->exceptions,
+ type, major, minor, access);
+ else
+ /* Need to match completely one exception to be allowed */
+ rc = match_exception(&dev_cgroup->exceptions, type, major,
+ minor, access);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!rc)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 336b3ddfe63f..7e71e066198f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -269,6 +269,13 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
goto out;
}
evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+ if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+
+ iint = integrity_iint_find(dentry->d_inode);
+ if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
+ return 0;
+ }
out:
if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
@@ -285,12 +292,23 @@ out:
* @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
* @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
*
- * Updating 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
- * the current value is valid.
+ * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated,
+ * verify the existing value is valid. As only the kernel should have
+ * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent
+ * userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires
+ * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
*/
int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
+ const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
+
+ if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
+ if (!xattr_value_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 0356e1d437ca..f79fa8be203c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
#include "../integrity.h"
enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN,
- IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
+ IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT, IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
/* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c38bbce8c6a6..025824af08e0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
int *xattr_len)
{
+ const char *audit_cause = "failed";
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
int result = 0;
@@ -213,6 +214,12 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
+ if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
+ audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
+ result = -EACCES;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* use default hash algorithm */
hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
@@ -233,9 +240,10 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
result = -ENOMEM;
}
}
+out:
if (result)
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
- filename, "collect_data", "failed",
+ filename, "collect_data", audit_cause,
result, 0);
return result;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 734e9468aca0..6df1b2527d02 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -194,8 +194,11 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
goto out;
cause = "missing-hash";
- status =
- (inode->i_size == 0) ? INTEGRITY_PASS : INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
+ status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
+ if (inode->i_size == 0) {
+ iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
+ status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+ }
goto out;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index fdf60def52e9..b5c126fe0bd9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -25,6 +25,36 @@
static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm;
+/**
+ * ima_kernel_read - read file content
+ *
+ * This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read().
+ * It does not perform locking checks to ensure it cannot be blocked.
+ * It does not perform security checks because it is irrelevant for IMA.
+ *
+ */
+static int ima_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
+ char *addr, unsigned long count)
+{
+ mm_segment_t old_fs;
+ char __user *buf = addr;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
+ return -EBADF;
+ if (!file->f_op->read && !file->f_op->aio_read)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ old_fs = get_fs();
+ set_fs(get_ds());
+ if (file->f_op->read)
+ ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, &offset);
+ else
+ ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
+ set_fs(old_fs);
+ return ret;
+}
+
int ima_init_crypto(void)
{
long rc;
@@ -98,7 +128,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
while (offset < i_size) {
int rbuf_len;
- rbuf_len = kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
+ rbuf_len = ima_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
if (rbuf_len < 0) {
rc = rbuf_len;
break;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index db01125926bd..468a3ba3c539 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "d") == 0)
show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN;
+ if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "n") == 0)
+ show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT;
field->field_show(m, show, &e->template_data[i]);
}
return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 149ee1119f87..9f70efd08058 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -131,11 +131,13 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
return;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
- if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
- iint->version != inode->i_version) {
- iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
- if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
- ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
+ if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) {
+ if ((iint->version != inode->i_version) ||
+ (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) {
+ iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
+ ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
+ }
}
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
}
@@ -217,8 +219,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
- if (rc != 0)
+ if (rc != 0) {
+ if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
+ rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
goto out_digsig;
+ }
pathname = !filename ? ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf) : filename;
if (!pathname)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index a9c3d3cd1990..085c4964be99 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ enum {
Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner,
- Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid
+ Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio
};
static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -373,6 +373,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
+ {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
@@ -621,6 +622,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
else
result = -EINVAL;
break;
+ case Opt_permit_directio:
+ entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
+ break;
case Opt_err:
ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
result = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 1683bbf289a4..e8592e7bfc21 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -109,13 +109,16 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_binary(struct seq_file *m,
enum data_formats datafmt,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
+ u32 len = (show == IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT) ?
+ strlen(field_data->data) : field_data->len;
+
if (show != IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN)
- ima_putc(m, &field_data->len, sizeof(u32));
+ ima_putc(m, &len, sizeof(len));
- if (!field_data->len)
+ if (!len)
return;
- ima_putc(m, field_data->data, field_data->len);
+ ima_putc(m, field_data->data, len);
}
static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m,
@@ -129,6 +132,7 @@ static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m,
break;
case IMA_SHOW_BINARY:
case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN:
+ case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT:
ima_show_template_data_binary(m, show, datafmt, field_data);
break;
default:
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 2fb5e53e927f..2f8715d77a5a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
#define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000
#define IMA_DIGSIG 0x01000000
#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x02000000
+#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x04000000
+#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x08000000
#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b332e2cc0954..47b5c69e4605 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -470,6 +470,7 @@ next_inode:
list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
struct inode_security_struct, list);
struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
+ list_del_init(&isec->list);
spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
inode = igrab(inode);
if (inode) {
@@ -478,7 +479,6 @@ next_inode:
iput(inode);
}
spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
- list_del_init(&isec->list);
goto next_inode;
}
spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
@@ -1418,15 +1418,33 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
- if (opt_dentry) {
- isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
- rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
- isec->sclass,
- &sid);
- if (rc)
- goto out_unlock;
- isec->sid = sid;
- }
+ /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
+ * procfs inodes */
+ if (opt_dentry)
+ /* Called from d_instantiate or
+ * d_splice_alias. */
+ dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+ else
+ /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
+ * find a dentry. */
+ dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+ /*
+ * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+ * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
+ * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+ * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
+ * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
+ * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
+ * could be used again by userspace.
+ */
+ if (!dentry)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+ rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
+ dput(dentry);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ isec->sid = sid;
}
break;
}
generated by cgit 1.2.3-korg (git 2.39.0) at 2024-06-04 10:53:20 +0000