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-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0023-don-t-pass-AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW-flag-to-faccessat.patch99
1 files changed, 99 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0023-don-t-pass-AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW-flag-to-faccessat.patch b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0023-don-t-pass-AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW-flag-to-faccessat.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..09c2b5c109
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0023-don-t-pass-AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW-flag-to-faccessat.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+From 7b802ada1207ed00ed3867b9804dd0f316641b9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andre McCurdy <armccurdy@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2017 14:33:30 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 23/31] don't pass AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flag to faccessat()
+
+Avoid using AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flag. It doesn't seem like the right
+thing to do and it's not portable (not supported by musl). See:
+
+ http://lists.landley.net/pipermail/toybox-landley.net/2014-September/003610.html
+ http://www.openwall.com/lists/musl/2015/02/05/2
+
+Note that laccess() is never passing AT_EACCESS so a lot of the
+discussion in the links above doesn't apply. Note also that
+(currently) all systemd callers of laccess() pass mode as F_OK, so
+only check for existence of a file, not access permissions.
+Therefore, in this case, the only distiction between faccessat()
+with (flag == 0) and (flag == AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) is the behaviour
+for broken symlinks; laccess() on a broken symlink will succeed with
+(flag == AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) and fail (flag == 0).
+
+The laccess() macros was added to systemd some time ago and it's not
+clear if or why it needs to return success for broken symlinks. Maybe
+just historical and not actually necessary or desired behaviour?
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+Signed-off-by: Andre McCurdy <armccurdy@gmail.com>
+---
+ src/basic/fs-util.h | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
+ src/shared/base-filesystem.c | 6 +++---
+ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/fs-util.h b/src/basic/fs-util.h
+index 4dba1ea56..9c4b02ecc 100644
+--- a/src/basic/fs-util.h
++++ b/src/basic/fs-util.h
+@@ -50,7 +50,27 @@ int fchmod_umask(int fd, mode_t mode);
+
+ int fd_warn_permissions(const char *path, int fd);
+
+-#define laccess(path, mode) faccessat(AT_FDCWD, (path), (mode), AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
++/*
++ Avoid using AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flag. It doesn't seem like the right thing to
++ do and it's not portable (not supported by musl). See:
++
++ http://lists.landley.net/pipermail/toybox-landley.net/2014-September/003610.html
++ http://www.openwall.com/lists/musl/2015/02/05/2
++
++ Note that laccess() is never passing AT_EACCESS so a lot of the discussion in
++ the links above doesn't apply. Note also that (currently) all systemd callers
++ of laccess() pass mode as F_OK, so only check for existence of a file, not
++ access permissions. Therefore, in this case, the only distiction between
++ faccessat() with (flag == 0) and (flag == AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) is the
++ behaviour for broken symlinks; laccess() on a broken symlink will succeed
++ with (flag == AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) and fail (flag == 0).
++
++ The laccess() macros was added to systemd some time ago and it's not clear if
++ or why it needs to return success for broken symlinks. Maybe just historical
++ and not actually necessary or desired behaviour?
++*/
++
++#define laccess(path, mode) faccessat(AT_FDCWD, (path), (mode), 0)
+
+ int touch_file(const char *path, bool parents, usec_t stamp, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode);
+ int touch(const char *path);
+diff --git a/src/shared/base-filesystem.c b/src/shared/base-filesystem.c
+index 3c25aa534..574ca71c7 100644
+--- a/src/shared/base-filesystem.c
++++ b/src/shared/base-filesystem.c
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ int base_filesystem_create(const char *root, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open root file system: %m");
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(table); i ++) {
+- if (faccessat(fd, table[i].dir, F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) >= 0)
++ if (faccessat(fd, table[i].dir, F_OK, 0) >= 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (table[i].target) {
+@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ int base_filesystem_create(const char *root, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
+
+ /* check if one of the targets exists */
+ NULSTR_FOREACH(s, table[i].target) {
+- if (faccessat(fd, s, F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) < 0)
++ if (faccessat(fd, s, F_OK, 0) < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /* check if a specific file exists at the target path */
+@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ int base_filesystem_create(const char *root, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
+ if (!p)
+ return log_oom();
+
+- if (faccessat(fd, p, F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) < 0)
++ if (faccessat(fd, p, F_OK, 0) < 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+--
+2.13.0
+