#!/bin/sh # # Loads IMA policy into the kernel. ima_enabled() { if [ "$bootparam_no_ima" = "true" ]; then return 1 fi return 0 } ima_run() { info "Initializing IMA (can be skipped with no_ima boot parameter)." if ! grep -w securityfs /proc/mounts >/dev/null; then if ! mount -t securityfs securityfs /sys/kernel/security; then fatal "Could not mount securityfs." fi fi if [ ! -d /sys/kernel/security/ima ]; then fatal "No /sys/kernel/security/ima. Cannot proceed without IMA enabled in the kernel." fi # Instead of depending on the kernel to load the IMA X.509 certificate, # use keyctl. This avoids a bug in certain kernels (https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/9/10/492) # where the loaded key was not checked sufficiently. We use keyctl here because it is # slightly smaller than evmctl and is needed anyway. # (see http://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/ima-evm-utils/ci/v0.9/tree/README#l349). for kind in ima evm; do key=/etc/keys/x509_$kind.der if [ -s $key ]; then id=$(grep -w -e "\.$kind" /proc/keys | cut -d ' ' -f1 | head -n 1) if [ "$id" ]; then id=$(printf "%d" 0x$id) fi if [ -z "$id" ]; then id=`keyctl search @u keyring _$kind 2>/dev/null` if [ -z "$id" ]; then id=`keyctl newring _$kind @u` fi fi info "Loading $key into $kind keyring $id" keyctl padd asymmetric "" $id <$key fi done # In theory, a simple "cat" should be enough. In practice, loading sometimes fails randomly # ("[Linux-ima-user] IMA policy loading via cat") and we get better error reporting when # checking the write of each line. To minimize the risk of policy loading going wrong we # also remove comments and blank lines ourselves. if ! (set -e; while read i; do if echo "$i" | grep -q -e '^#' -e '^ *$'; then debug "Skipping IMA policy: $i"; else debug "Writing IMA policy: $i"; if echo $i; then sleep ${bootparam_ima_delay:-0}; else fatal "Invalid line in IMA policy: $i"; exit 1; fi; fi; done) /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy; then fatal "Could not load IMA policy." fi }