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From d2c868c6370bcc0d0a254e641907da2cdf992d62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yashpal Dutta <yashpal.dutta@freescale.com>
Date: Thu, 1 May 2014 06:35:45 +0545
Subject: [PATCH 16/26] Fixed DH keygen pair generator

Upstream-status: Pending

Wrong Padding results into keygen length error

Signed-off-by: Yashpal Dutta <yashpal.dutta@freescale.com>
Tested-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com>
---
 crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
index dab8fea..13d924f 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
@@ -3396,44 +3396,60 @@ sw_try:
 static int cryptodev_dh_keygen(DH *dh)
 {
 	struct crypt_kop kop;
-	int ret = 1, g_len;
-	unsigned char *g = NULL;
+	int ret = 1, q_len = 0;
+	unsigned char *q = NULL, *g = NULL, *s = NULL, *w = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+	int generate_new_key = 1;
 
-	if (dh->priv_key == NULL)	{
-		if ((dh->priv_key=BN_new()) == NULL)
-			goto sw_try;
-	}
+	if (dh->priv_key)
+		priv_key = dh->priv_key;
 
-	if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
-		if ((dh->pub_key=BN_new()) == NULL)
-			goto sw_try;
-	}
+	if (dh->pub_key)
+		pub_key = dh->pub_key;
 
-	g_len = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
+	q_len = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
 	/**
 	 * Get generator into a plain buffer. If length is less than
 	 * q_len then add leading padding bytes.
 	 */
-	if (spcf_bn2bin_ex(dh->g, &g, &g_len)) {
+	if (spcf_bn2bin_ex(dh->g, &g, &q_len)) {
+		DSAerr(DH_F_DH_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto sw_try;
+	}
+
+	if (spcf_bn2bin_ex(dh->p, &q, &q_len)) {
 		DSAerr(DH_F_DH_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 		goto sw_try;
 	}
 
 	memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
 	kop.crk_op = CRK_DH_GENERATE_KEY;
-	if (bn2crparam(dh->p, &kop.crk_param[0]))
-		goto sw_try;
+	kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = q;
+	kop.crk_param[0].crp_nbits = q_len * 8;
 	if (!dh->q || bn2crparam(dh->q, &kop.crk_param[1]))
 		goto sw_try;
 	kop.crk_param[2].crp_p = g;
-	kop.crk_param[2].crp_nbits = g_len * 8;
+	kop.crk_param[2].crp_nbits = q_len * 8;
 	kop.crk_iparams = 3;
 
+	s = OPENSSL_malloc (q_len);
+	if (!s) {
+		DSAerr(DH_F_DH_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto sw_try;
+	}
+
+	w = OPENSSL_malloc (q_len);
+	if (!w) {
+		DSAerr(DH_F_DH_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto sw_try;
+	}
+
 	/* pub_key is or prime length while priv key is of length of order */
-	if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(dh->p), dh->pub_key,
-	    BN_num_bytes(dh->q), dh->priv_key))
+	if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, q_len, w, q_len, s))
 	    goto sw_try;
 
+	dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(w, q_len, pub_key);
+	dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(s, q_len, priv_key);
 	return ret;
 sw_try:
 	{
-- 
2.3.5