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authorWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>2020-05-29 14:12:18 +0100
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2020-06-25 15:33:06 +0200
commita39340ab12b3234dc9b74cc878d1f6bc81dc97bd (patch)
tree38368f4ea06d492b1590ef8d0f7d967623c2cd88
parent49289b1fa5a67011c4010e4e9c801b9d565ce395 (diff)
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arm64: hw_breakpoint: Don't invoke overflow handler on uaccess watchpoints
[ Upstream commit 24ebec25fb270100e252b19c288e21bd7d8cc7f7 ] Unprivileged memory accesses generated by the so-called "translated" instructions (e.g. STTR) at EL1 can cause EL0 watchpoints to fire unexpectedly if kernel debugging is enabled. In such cases, the hw_breakpoint logic will invoke the user overflow handler which will typically raise a SIGTRAP back to the current task. This is futile when returning back to the kernel because (a) the signal won't have been delivered and (b) userspace can't handle the thing anyway. Avoid invoking the user overflow handler for watchpoints triggered by kernel uaccess routines, and instead single-step over the faulting instruction as we would if no overflow handler had been installed. (Fixes tag identifies the introduction of unprivileged memory accesses, which exposed this latent bug in the hw_breakpoint code) Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Fixes: 57f4959bad0a ("arm64: kernel: Add support for User Access Override") Reported-by: Luis Machado <luis.machado@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c44
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
index 7c0611f5d2ce..9f105fe58595 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
@@ -737,6 +737,27 @@ static u64 get_distance_from_watchpoint(unsigned long addr, u64 val,
return 0;
}
+static int watchpoint_report(struct perf_event *wp, unsigned long addr,
+ struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ int step = is_default_overflow_handler(wp);
+ struct arch_hw_breakpoint *info = counter_arch_bp(wp);
+
+ info->trigger = addr;
+
+ /*
+ * If we triggered a user watchpoint from a uaccess routine, then
+ * handle the stepping ourselves since userspace really can't help
+ * us with this.
+ */
+ if (!user_mode(regs) && info->ctrl.privilege == AARCH64_BREAKPOINT_EL0)
+ step = 1;
+ else
+ perf_bp_event(wp, regs);
+
+ return step;
+}
+
static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
@@ -746,7 +767,6 @@ static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
u64 val;
struct perf_event *wp, **slots;
struct debug_info *debug_info;
- struct arch_hw_breakpoint *info;
struct arch_hw_breakpoint_ctrl ctrl;
slots = this_cpu_ptr(wp_on_reg);
@@ -784,25 +804,13 @@ static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
if (dist != 0)
continue;
- info = counter_arch_bp(wp);
- info->trigger = addr;
- perf_bp_event(wp, regs);
-
- /* Do we need to handle the stepping? */
- if (is_default_overflow_handler(wp))
- step = 1;
+ step = watchpoint_report(wp, addr, regs);
}
- if (min_dist > 0 && min_dist != -1) {
- /* No exact match found. */
- wp = slots[closest_match];
- info = counter_arch_bp(wp);
- info->trigger = addr;
- perf_bp_event(wp, regs);
- /* Do we need to handle the stepping? */
- if (is_default_overflow_handler(wp))
- step = 1;
- }
+ /* No exact match found? */
+ if (min_dist > 0 && min_dist != -1)
+ step = watchpoint_report(slots[closest_match], addr, regs);
+
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!step)