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Diffstat (limited to 'meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0080-KVM-SVM-Add-support-for-SEV-LAUNCH_SECRET-command.patch')
-rw-r--r--meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0080-KVM-SVM-Add-support-for-SEV-LAUNCH_SECRET-command.patch117
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 117 deletions
diff --git a/meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0080-KVM-SVM-Add-support-for-SEV-LAUNCH_SECRET-command.patch b/meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0080-KVM-SVM-Add-support-for-SEV-LAUNCH_SECRET-command.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fa17dc72..00000000
--- a/meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0080-KVM-SVM-Add-support-for-SEV-LAUNCH_SECRET-command.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-From df27d409eaaf9275190905f8714ca2c1ae2c19b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
-Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 10:57:38 -0600
-Subject: [PATCH 80/95] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_SECRET command
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The command is used for injecting a secret into the guest memory region.
-
-Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
-Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
-Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
-Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
-Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
-Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
-Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
-Cc: x86@kernel.org
-Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
-Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
-Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Sudheesh Mavila <sudheesh.mavila@amd.com>
----
- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
-index 94461e3..83a4dfe 100755
---- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
-@@ -6503,6 +6503,71 @@ static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec)
- return ret;
- }
-
-+static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
-+{
-+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
-+ struct sev_data_launch_secret *data;
-+ struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params;
-+ struct page **pages;
-+ void *blob, *hdr;
-+ unsigned long n;
-+ int ret;
-+
-+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
-+ return -ENOTTY;
-+
-+ if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
-+ return -EFAULT;
-+
-+ pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1);
-+ if (!pages)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify
-+ * that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command.
-+ */
-+ if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) {
-+ ret = -EINVAL;
-+ goto e_unpin_memory;
-+ }
-+
-+ ret = -ENOMEM;
-+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
-+ if (!data)
-+ goto e_unpin_memory;
-+
-+ blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
-+ if (IS_ERR(blob)) {
-+ ret = PTR_ERR(blob);
-+ goto e_free;
-+ }
-+
-+ data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
-+ data->trans_len = params.trans_len;
-+
-+ hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
-+ if (IS_ERR(hdr)) {
-+ ret = PTR_ERR(hdr);
-+ goto e_free_blob;
-+ }
-+ data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
-+ data->trans_len = params.trans_len;
-+
-+ data->handle = sev->handle;
-+ ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, data, &argp->error);
-+
-+ kfree(hdr);
-+
-+e_free_blob:
-+ kfree(blob);
-+e_free:
-+ kfree(data);
-+e_unpin_memory:
-+ sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n);
-+ return ret;
-+}
-+
- static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
- {
- struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
-@@ -6541,6 +6606,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
- case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT:
- r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false);
- break;
-+ case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
-+ r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
-+ break;
- default:
- r = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
---
-2.7.4
-