1 files changed, 0 insertions, 202 deletions
diff --git a/meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0078-KVM-SVM-Add-support-for-SEV-DEBUG_DECRYPT-command.patch b/meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0078-KVM-SVM-Add-support-for-SEV-DEBUG_DECRYPT-command.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5f7419db..00000000
--- a/meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0078-KVM-SVM-Add-support-for-SEV-DEBUG_DECRYPT-command.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
-From b087a322574fc94f760c1150b344191996543733 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
-Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 10:57:37 -0600
-Subject: [PATCH 78/95] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The command is used for decrypting a guest memory region for debug
-purposes.
-
-Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
-Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
-Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
-Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
-Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
-Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
-Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
-Cc: x86@kernel.org
-Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
-Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
-Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Sudheesh Mavila <sudheesh.mavila@amd.com>
----
- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 152 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 152 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
-index f9eb8fa..9c5962a 100755
---- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
-@@ -6269,6 +6269,155 @@ static int sev_guest_status(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-+static int __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src,
-+			       unsigned long dst, int size,
-+			       int *error, bool enc)
-+{
-+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
-+	struct sev_data_dbg *data;
-+	int ret;
-+
-+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!data)
-+		return -ENOMEM;
-+
-+	data->handle = sev->handle;
-+	data->dst_addr = dst;
-+	data->src_addr = src;
-+	data->len = size;
-+
-+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm,
-+			    enc ? SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT : SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT,
-+			    data, error);
-+	kfree(data);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+static int __sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src_paddr,
-+			     unsigned long dst_paddr, int sz, int *err)
-+{
-+	int offset;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Its safe to read more than we are asked, caller should ensure that
-+	 * destination has enough space.
-+	 */
-+	src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16);
-+	offset = src_paddr & 15;
-+	sz = round_up(sz + offset, 16);
-+
-+	return __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, src_paddr, dst_paddr, sz, err, false);
-+}
-+
-+static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
-+				  unsigned long __user dst_uaddr,
-+				  unsigned long dst_paddr,
-+				  int size, int *err)
-+{
-+	struct page *tpage = NULL;
-+	int ret, offset;
-+
-+	/* if inputs are not 16-byte then use intermediate buffer */
-+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) ||
-+	    !IS_ALIGNED(paddr,     16) ||
-+	    !IS_ALIGNED(size,      16)) {
-+		tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-+		if (!tpage)
-+			return -ENOMEM;
-+
-+		dst_paddr = __sme_page_pa(tpage);
-+	}
-+
-+	ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, size, err);
-+	if (ret)
-+		goto e_free;
-+
-+	if (tpage) {
-+		offset = paddr & 15;
-+		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)dst_uaddr,
-+				 page_address(tpage) + offset, size))
-+			ret = -EFAULT;
-+	}
-+
-+e_free:
-+	if (tpage)
-+		__free_page(tpage);
-+
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec)
-+{
-+	unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
-+	unsigned long dst_vaddr, dst_vaddr_end;
-+	struct page **src_p, **dst_p;
-+	struct kvm_sev_dbg debug;
-+	unsigned long n;
-+	int ret, size;
-+
-+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
-+		return -ENOTTY;
-+
-+	if (copy_from_user(&debug, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(debug)))
-+		return -EFAULT;
-+
-+	vaddr = debug.src_uaddr;
-+	size = debug.len;
-+	vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
-+	dst_vaddr = debug.dst_uaddr;
-+	dst_vaddr_end = dst_vaddr + size;
-+
-+	for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr) {
-+		int len, s_off, d_off;
-+
-+		/* lock userspace source and destination page */
-+		src_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
-+		if (!src_p)
-+			return -EFAULT;
-+
-+		dst_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, dst_vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
-+		if (!dst_p) {
-+			sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
-+			return -EFAULT;
-+		}
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * The DBG_{DE,EN}CRYPT commands will perform {dec,en}cryption of the
-+		 * memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region with C=1).
-+		 * It's possible that the cache may contain the data with C=0, i.e.,
-+		 * unencrypted so invalidate it first.
-+		 */
-+		sev_clflush_pages(src_p, 1);
-+		sev_clflush_pages(dst_p, 1);
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * Since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
-+		 * offset within the page.
-+		 */
-+		s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
-+		d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
-+		len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
-+
-+		ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,
-+					     __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
-+					     dst_vaddr,
-+					     __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
-+					     len, &argp->error);
-+
-+		sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, 1);
-+		sev_unpin_memory(kvm, dst_p, 1);
-+
-+		if (ret)
-+			goto err;
-+
-+		next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
-+		dst_vaddr = dst_vaddr + len;
-+		size -= len;
-+	}
-+err:
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
- static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
- {
- 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
-@@ -6301,6 +6450,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
- 	case KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS:
- 		r = sev_guest_status(kvm, &sev_cmd);
- 		break;
-+	case KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT:
-+		r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, true);
-+		break;
- 	default:
- 		r = -EINVAL;
- 		goto out;
--- 
-2.7.4
-