1 files changed, 0 insertions, 85 deletions
diff --git a/meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0048-x86-efi-Access-EFI-data-as-encrypted-when-SEV-is-act.patch b/meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0048-x86-efi-Access-EFI-data-as-encrypted-when-SEV-is-act.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 91605218..00000000
--- a/meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0048-x86-efi-Access-EFI-data-as-encrypted-when-SEV-is-act.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-From 5738318ceb0dc0f9877ce766246fbae6759affd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
-Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2017 09:30:49 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH 48/95] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is
- active
-
-EFI data is encrypted when the kernel is run under SEV. Update the
-page table references to be sure the EFI memory areas are accessed
-encrypted.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
-Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
-Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
-Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
-Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
-Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
-Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
-Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
-Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
-Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
-Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-8-brijesh.singh@amd.com
-Signed-off-by: Sudheesh Mavila <sudheesh.mavila@amd.com>
----
- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
-index ae369c2..2833e66 100644
---- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
-@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
- #include <linux/reboot.h>
- #include <linux/slab.h>
- #include <linux/ucs2_string.h>
-+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
- 
- #include <asm/setup.h>
- #include <asm/page.h>
-@@ -375,7 +376,11 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
- 	 * as trim_bios_range() will reserve the first page and isolate it away
- 	 * from memory allocators anyway.
- 	 */
--	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, 0x0, 0x0, 1, _PAGE_RW)) {
-+	pf = _PAGE_RW;
-+	if (sev_active())
-+		pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
-+
-+	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, 0x0, 0x0, 1, pf)) {
- 		pr_err("Failed to create 1:1 mapping for the first page!\n");
- 		return 1;
- 	}
-@@ -418,6 +423,9 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
- 	if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
- 		flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
- 
-+	if (sev_active())
-+		flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
-+
- 	pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- 	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, va, md->num_pages, flags))
- 		pr_warn("Error mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
-@@ -544,6 +552,9 @@ static int __init efi_update_mem_attr(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *m
- 	if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO))
- 		pf |= _PAGE_RW;
- 
-+	if (sev_active())
-+		pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
-+
- 	return efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
- }
- 
-@@ -595,6 +606,9 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
- 			(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE))
- 			pf |= _PAGE_RW;
- 
-+		if (sev_active())
-+			pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
-+
- 		efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
- 	}
- }
--- 
-2.7.4
-