Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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2010-12-09:
* (mhatle) Add doc/program_flow to attempt to explain startup/running
* (mhatle) guts/* minor cleanup
* (mhatle) Reorganize into a new constructor for libpseudo ONLY
pseudo main() now manually calls the util init
new / revised init for client, wrappers and utils
* (mhatle) Add central "reinit" function
* (mhatle) Add manul execv* functions
* (mhatle) rename pseudo_populate_wrappers to pseudo_check_wrappers
Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@windriver.com>
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be out of sync in a very inconvenient way.
Changes include:
* Some whitespace fixes, also move the pseudo_variables definition
into pseudo_util.c since it's not used anywhere else.
* Further improvements in the fork() support:
We now recognize both positive and negative forms of PSEUDO_DISABLED,
so we can distinguish between "it was removed from the environment
by env -i" (restore the old value) and "it was intentionally turned
off" (the new value wins).
* clone(2) support. This is a little primitive, and programs might still
fail horribly due to clone's semantics, but at least it's there and
passes easy test cases.
Plus a big patch from Mark Hatle:
Cleanup fork/clone and PSEUDO_DISABLED
guts/fork.c:
* cleanup function and make it more robust
* be sure to call pseudo_setupenv prior to pseudo_client_reset
to match exec behavior
pseudo_wrappers.c:
* fix mismatched type in execl_to_v call via typecast
* Simplify fork call via single call to wrap_fork()
* be sure to save pseudo_disabled
* be sure to call pseudo_setupenv prior to pseudo_client_reset
to match exec behavior
tests:
* Add a test of whether pseudo can be disabled/enabled on a fork.
Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@windriver.com>
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Note that this replaces an existing getxattr() wrapper which canonicalized
pathnames for use in a chroot() environment. The need for that to work
in some possible future may require us to revisit this.
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Current versions of gnu coreutils 'cp' were attempting to set permissions
using fsetxattr. As a workaround, we need to return ENOTSUP so that it falls
back to using fchmod, which pseudo does know how to wrap.
Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@windriver.com>
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argument -- which turns out to be a problem, as this controls the
canonicalization. The upshot is that some invocations of symlinks
were corrupting $0.
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We wrap all of the execs so that we can ensure the environment is
properly configured prior to the exec running.
handle ... for the new execl* wrappers
Add a test for the new execl* ... handling.
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fgetxattr, since it doesn't use a path name.
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The *at() functions take a flags argument which, if set, says not
to follow symlinks. By default, this is passed to pseudo_root_path.
But the open() functions take a flags argument which is unrelated,
and should not be used by default.
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* Add lckpwdf/ulckpwdf to guts/README
* Remove arguments from function pointer arguments.
While in theory the compar function pointer has always taken
"const struct dirent **", some systems (many) have declared
it instead as taking "const void *". For now, just omit
the types; a pointer to function taking unknown arguments
is a compatible type, and we never call the functions, we
just pass them to something else.
* Handle readlinkat() on systems without *at functions
* Fix pseudo_etc_file (spotted by "fortify")
When O_CREAT can be a flag, 0600 mode is needed. While we're
at it, remove a bogus dummy open.
* Fix mkdtemp()
Was returning the address of the internal buffer rather than the
user-provided buffer. Also fixed a typo in an error message.
* Don't call fgetgrent_r() with a null FILE *.
* A couple of other typo-type fixes.
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It's not enough to rely on the usual chroot() stuff affecting the
file open, not least because these use the glibc-internal __open
which is not currently intercepted, but also because we want to
use the PSEUDO_PASSWD path when that's set but there's no chroot().
There's some extra magic in pseudo_etc_file to support these
operations, since they can legitimately create a file rather
than opening an existing one.
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This is a first pass at handling password/group calls, allowing
the use of custom password/group files. In particular, when
chroot()ed to a particular directory, pseudo picks files in
that directory by default, to improve support for the typical
use case where pseudo uses chroot() only to jump into a virtual
target filesystem.
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This allows us to track execution, although the tracking for it
requires some additional thought -- the basic assumption is that we
don't want to canonicalize names into the chroot() directory, but
since all the filename canonicalization assumes that we want this,
that will take some sneaking. It's a little useful as is, though,
so I'm running with it.
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Add chroot() and a large number of things needed to make it work.
The list of intercepted calls is large but not exhaustive.
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* Improve makewrappers handling of function pointer arguments.
* Regenerate wrappers when makewrappers is touched.
* Move path resolution from pseudo_client_op into wrapper
functions.
* Eliminate dependency on PATH_MAX.
* Related cleanup, such as tracking CWD better, and using
the tracked value for getcwd().
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