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Add PSEUDO_BINDIR, PSEUDO_LIBDIR, and PSEUDO_LOCALSTATEDIR to allow for more
easy customization of PSEUDO components at run-time. If these are not set
they will be automatically generated based on the existing PSEUDO_PREFIX path.
PSEUDO_BINDIR = PSEUDO_PREFIX /bin
PSEUDO_LIBDIR = PSEUDO_PREFIX /lib
PSEUDO_LOCALSTATEDIR = PSEUDO_PREFIX /var/pseudo
Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@windriver.com>
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The PSEUDO_DEBUG_FILE feature is enhanced, and is now also used by the
pseudo server.
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You can't use setenv() to modify the environment that will
be passed to a child process through execve()...
Also, fix the setupenv() to use PSEUDO_SUFFIX if defined.
Use execve() to spawn child processes, so we can use setupenv()
and dropenv().
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Send program name (program_invocation_name from glibc) along with the
tag.
Along the way, restructure the fds/pids/tags arrays to be an array
of client structures in pseudo_server, and add the message type
to the set of things logged -- logging that a message was a ping is
more useful than appending the text "ping" to it. Add support
for type and program to pseudolog.
Add deletion to pseudolog.
Handle usage message formatting when there's an odd number of known
specifiers for pseudolog.
Conflicts:
ChangeLog.txt
pseudo_server.c
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It's not enough to rely on the usual chroot() stuff affecting the
file open, not least because these use the glibc-internal __open
which is not currently intercepted, but also because we want to
use the PSEUDO_PASSWD path when that's set but there's no chroot().
There's some extra magic in pseudo_etc_file to support these
operations, since they can legitimately create a file rather
than opening an existing one.
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This is a first pass at handling password/group calls, allowing
the use of custom password/group files. In particular, when
chroot()ed to a particular directory, pseudo picks files in
that directory by default, to improve support for the typical
use case where pseudo uses chroot() only to jump into a virtual
target filesystem.
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This allows us to track execution, although the tracking for it
requires some additional thought -- the basic assumption is that we
don't want to canonicalize names into the chroot() directory, but
since all the filename canonicalization assumes that we want this,
that will take some sneaking. It's a little useful as is, though,
so I'm running with it.
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This patch adds support for checking whether a file was opened for
reading, writing, or both, as well as tracking append flags. It is
not very well tested. This is preparation for improved host
contamination checking.
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Add chroot() and a large number of things needed to make it work.
The list of intercepted calls is large but not exhaustive.
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* Improve makewrappers handling of function pointer arguments.
* Regenerate wrappers when makewrappers is touched.
* Move path resolution from pseudo_client_op into wrapper
functions.
* Eliminate dependency on PATH_MAX.
* Related cleanup, such as tracking CWD better, and using
the tracked value for getcwd().
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Mark Hatle
Peter Seebach
Peter Seebach