From df27d409eaaf9275190905f8714ca2c1ae2c19b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brijesh Singh Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 10:57:38 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 80/95] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_SECRET command MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The command is used for injecting a secret into the guest memory region. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: "Radim Krčmář" Cc: Joerg Roedel Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Sudheesh Mavila --- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 94461e3..83a4dfe 100755 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -6503,6 +6503,71 @@ static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec) return ret; } +static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info; + struct sev_data_launch_secret *data; + struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params; + struct page **pages; + void *blob, *hdr; + unsigned long n; + int ret; + + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return -ENOTTY; + + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params))) + return -EFAULT; + + pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1); + if (!pages) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* + * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify + * that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command. + */ + if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto e_unpin_memory; + } + + ret = -ENOMEM; + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + goto e_unpin_memory; + + blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len); + if (IS_ERR(blob)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(blob); + goto e_free; + } + + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob); + data->trans_len = params.trans_len; + + hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len); + if (IS_ERR(hdr)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(hdr); + goto e_free_blob; + } + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob); + data->trans_len = params.trans_len; + + data->handle = sev->handle; + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, data, &argp->error); + + kfree(hdr); + +e_free_blob: + kfree(blob); +e_free: + kfree(data); +e_unpin_memory: + sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n); + return ret; +} + static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -6541,6 +6606,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT: r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false); break; + case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET: + r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out; -- 2.7.4