// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* Converted from tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/search_pruning.c */ #include #include #include "bpf_misc.h" #define MAX_ENTRIES 11 struct test_val { unsigned int index; int foo[MAX_ENTRIES]; }; struct { __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH); __uint(max_entries, 1); __type(key, long long); __type(value, struct test_val); } map_hash_48b SEC(".maps"); struct { __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH); __uint(max_entries, 1); __type(key, long long); __type(value, long long); } map_hash_8b SEC(".maps"); SEC("socket") __description("pointer/scalar confusion in state equality check (way 1)") __success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 leaks addr as return value") __retval(POINTER_VALUE) __naked void state_equality_check_way_1(void) { asm volatile (" \ r1 = 0; \ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \ r2 = r10; \ r2 += -8; \ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \ r0 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \ goto l1_%=; \ l0_%=: r0 = r10; \ l1_%=: goto l2_%=; \ l2_%=: exit; \ " : : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem), __imm_addr(map_hash_8b) : __clobber_all); } SEC("socket") __description("pointer/scalar confusion in state equality check (way 2)") __success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 leaks addr as return value") __retval(POINTER_VALUE) __naked void state_equality_check_way_2(void) { asm volatile (" \ r1 = 0; \ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \ r2 = r10; \ r2 += -8; \ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \ if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=; \ r0 = r10; \ goto l1_%=; \ l0_%=: r0 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \ l1_%=: exit; \ " : : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem), __imm_addr(map_hash_8b) : __clobber_all); } SEC("lwt_in") __description("liveness pruning and write screening") __failure __msg("R0 !read_ok") __naked void liveness_pruning_and_write_screening(void) { asm volatile (" \ /* Get an unknown value */ \ r2 = *(u32*)(r1 + 0); \ /* branch conditions teach us nothing about R2 */\ if r2 >= 0 goto l0_%=; \ r0 = 0; \ l0_%=: if r2 >= 0 goto l1_%=; \ r0 = 0; \ l1_%=: exit; \ " ::: __clobber_all); } SEC("socket") __description("varlen_map_value_access pruning") __failure __msg("R0 unbounded memory access") __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 leaks addr") __flag(BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT) __naked void varlen_map_value_access_pruning(void) { asm volatile (" \ r1 = 0; \ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \ r2 = r10; \ r2 += -8; \ r1 = %[map_hash_48b] ll; \ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \ r1 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \ w2 = %[max_entries]; \ if r2 s> r1 goto l1_%=; \ w1 = 0; \ l1_%=: w1 <<= 2; \ r0 += r1; \ goto l2_%=; \ l2_%=: r1 = %[test_val_foo]; \ *(u64*)(r0 + 0) = r1; \ l0_%=: exit; \ " : : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem), __imm_addr(map_hash_48b), __imm_const(max_entries, MAX_ENTRIES), __imm_const(test_val_foo, offsetof(struct test_val, foo)) : __clobber_all); } SEC("tracepoint") __description("search pruning: all branches should be verified (nop operation)") __failure __msg("R6 invalid mem access 'scalar'") __naked void should_be_verified_nop_operation(void) { asm volatile (" \ r2 = r10; \ r2 += -8; \ r1 = 0; \ *(u64*)(r2 + 0) = r1; \ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \ r3 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \ if r3 == 0xbeef goto l1_%=; \ r4 = 0; \ goto l2_%=; \ l1_%=: r4 = 1; \ l2_%=: *(u64*)(r10 - 16) = r4; \ call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns]; \ r5 = *(u64*)(r10 - 16); \ if r5 == 0 goto l0_%=; \ r6 = 0; \ r1 = 0xdead; \ *(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r1; \ l0_%=: exit; \ " : : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns), __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem), __imm_addr(map_hash_8b) : __clobber_all); } SEC("socket") __description("search pruning: all branches should be verified (invalid stack access)") /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */ __success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("invalid read from stack off -16+0 size 8") __retval(0) __naked void be_verified_invalid_stack_access(void) { asm volatile (" \ r2 = r10; \ r2 += -8; \ r1 = 0; \ *(u64*)(r2 + 0) = r1; \ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \ r3 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \ r4 = 0; \ if r3 == 0xbeef goto l1_%=; \ *(u64*)(r10 - 16) = r4; \ goto l2_%=; \ l1_%=: *(u64*)(r10 - 24) = r4; \ l2_%=: call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns]; \ r5 = *(u64*)(r10 - 16); \ l0_%=: exit; \ " : : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns), __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem), __imm_addr(map_hash_8b) : __clobber_all); } SEC("tracepoint") __description("precision tracking for u32 spill/fill") __failure __msg("R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range") __naked void tracking_for_u32_spill_fill(void) { asm volatile (" \ r7 = r1; \ call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \ w6 = 32; \ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \ w6 = 4; \ l0_%=: /* Additional insns to introduce a pruning point. */\ call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \ r3 = 0; \ r3 = 0; \ if r0 == 0 goto l1_%=; \ r3 = 0; \ l1_%=: /* u32 spill/fill */ \ *(u32*)(r10 - 8) = r6; \ r8 = *(u32*)(r10 - 8); \ /* out-of-bound map value access for r6=32 */ \ r1 = 0; \ *(u64*)(r10 - 16) = r1; \ r2 = r10; \ r2 += -16; \ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \ if r0 == 0 goto l2_%=; \ r0 += r8; \ r1 = *(u32*)(r0 + 0); \ l2_%=: r0 = 0; \ exit; \ " : : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32), __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem), __imm_addr(map_hash_8b) : __clobber_all); } SEC("tracepoint") __description("precision tracking for u32 spills, u64 fill") __failure __msg("div by zero") __naked void for_u32_spills_u64_fill(void) { asm volatile (" \ call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \ r6 = r0; \ w7 = 0xffffffff; \ /* Additional insns to introduce a pruning point. */\ r3 = 1; \ r3 = 1; \ r3 = 1; \ r3 = 1; \ call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \ r3 = 1; \ l0_%=: w3 /= 0; \ /* u32 spills, u64 fill */ \ *(u32*)(r10 - 4) = r6; \ *(u32*)(r10 - 8) = r7; \ r8 = *(u64*)(r10 - 8); \ /* if r8 != X goto pc+1 r8 known in fallthrough branch */\ if r8 != 0xffffffff goto l1_%=; \ r3 = 1; \ l1_%=: /* if r8 == X goto pc+1 condition always true on first\ * traversal, so starts backtracking to mark r8 as requiring\ * precision. r7 marked as needing precision. r6 not marked\ * since it's not tracked. \ */ \ if r8 == 0xffffffff goto l2_%=; \ /* fails if r8 correctly marked unknown after fill. */\ w3 /= 0; \ l2_%=: r0 = 0; \ exit; \ " : : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32) : __clobber_all); } SEC("socket") __description("allocated_stack") __success __msg("processed 15 insns") __success_unpriv __msg_unpriv("") __log_level(1) __retval(0) __naked void allocated_stack(void) { asm volatile (" \ r6 = r1; \ call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \ r7 = r0; \ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \ r0 = 0; \ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r6; \ r6 = *(u64*)(r10 - 8); \ *(u8*)(r10 - 9) = r7; \ r7 = *(u8*)(r10 - 9); \ l0_%=: if r0 != 0 goto l1_%=; \ l1_%=: if r0 != 0 goto l2_%=; \ l2_%=: if r0 != 0 goto l3_%=; \ l3_%=: if r0 != 0 goto l4_%=; \ l4_%=: exit; \ " : : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32) : __clobber_all); } /* The test performs a conditional 64-bit write to a stack location * fp[-8], this is followed by an unconditional 8-bit write to fp[-8], * then data is read from fp[-8]. This sequence is unsafe. * * The test would be mistakenly marked as safe w/o dst register parent * preservation in verifier.c:copy_register_state() function. * * Note the usage of BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ to force creation of the * checkpoint state after conditional 64-bit assignment. */ SEC("socket") __description("write tracking and register parent chain bug") /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */ __success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("invalid read from stack off -8+1 size 8") __retval(0) __flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ) __naked void and_register_parent_chain_bug(void) { asm volatile (" \ /* r6 = ktime_get_ns() */ \ call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns]; \ r6 = r0; \ /* r0 = ktime_get_ns() */ \ call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns]; \ /* if r0 > r6 goto +1 */ \ if r0 > r6 goto l0_%=; \ /* *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0xdeadbeef */ \ r0 = 0xdeadbeef; \ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r0; \ l0_%=: r1 = 42; \ *(u8*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \ r2 = *(u64*)(r10 - 8); \ /* exit(0) */ \ r0 = 0; \ exit; \ " : : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns) : __clobber_all); } char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";