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same issue as with selinux...
[fix by Andrei Vagin folded in]
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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smack_add_opt() adds an already matched option to growing smack_mnt_options
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Adding options to growing mnt_opts. NFS kludge with passing
context= down into non-text-options mount switched to it, and
with that the last use of ->sb_parse_opts_str() is gone.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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make it use selinux_add_opt() and avoid separate copies - gather
non-LSM options by memmove() in place
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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It's not a good fit, unfortunately, and the next step will make it
even less so. Open-code what we need here.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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the guts of the loop in selinux_parse_opts_str() - takes one
(already recognized) option and adds it to growing selinux_mnt_opts.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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none of the convolutions needed, just 4 strings, TYVM...
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the
moment). Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off
with private structures with several strings in those, rather than
this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays"
ugliness. This commit allows to do that at leisure, without
disrupting anything outside of given module.
Changes:
* instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer
initialized to NULL.
* security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and
security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **);
call sites are unchanged.
* security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take
it by value (i.e. as void *).
* new method: ->sb_free_mnt_opts(). Takes void *, does
whatever freeing that needs to be done.
* ->sb_set_mnt_opts() and ->sb_remount() might get NULL as
mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty".
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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it's much easier to just do the right thing in ->sb_show_options(),
without bothering with allocating and populating arrays, etc.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Kill ->sb_copy_data() - it's used only in combination with immediately
following ->sb_parse_opts_str(). Turn that combination into a new
method.
This is just a mechanical move - cleanups will be the next step.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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1) keeping a copy in btrfs_fs_info is completely pointless - we never
use it for anything. Getting rid of that allows for simpler calling
conventions for setup_security_options() (caller is responsible for
freeing mnt_opts in all cases).
2) on remount we want to use ->sb_remount(), not ->sb_set_mnt_opts(),
same as we would if not for FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA. Behaviours *are*
close (in fact, selinux sb_set_mnt_opts() ought to punt to
sb_remount() in "already initialized" case), but let's handle
that uniformly. And the only reason why the original btrfs changes
didn't go for security_sb_remount() in btrfs_remount() case is that
it hadn't been exported. Let's export it for a while - it'll be
going away soon anyway.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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... leaving the "is it kernel-internal" logics in the caller.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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combination of alloc_secdata(), security_sb_copy_data(),
security_sb_parse_opt_str() and free_secdata().
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem
mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior
to actual mount/reconfiguration actions.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem
mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior
to actual mount/reconfiguration actions.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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fixes e.g. a btrfs leak...
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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The Kconfig lexer supports special characters such as '.' and '/' in
the parameter context. In my understanding, the reason is just to
support bare file paths in the source statement.
I do not see a good reason to complicate Kconfig for the room of
ambiguity.
The majority of code already surrounds file paths with double quotes,
and it makes sense since file paths are constant string literals.
Make it treewide consistent now.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Lots of conflicts, by happily all cases of overlapping
changes, parallel adds, things of that nature.
Thanks to Stephen Rothwell, Saeed Mahameed, and others
for their guidance in these resolutions.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In commit 4f83d5ea643a ("security: integrity: make ima_main explicitly
non-modular") I'd removed <linux/module.h> after assuming that the
function is_module_sig_enforced() was an LSM function and not a core
kernel module function.
Unfortunately the typical .config selections used in build testing
provide an implicit <linux/module.h> presence, and so normal/typical
build testing did not immediately reveal my incorrect assumption.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Only the mount namespace code that implements mount(2) should be using the
MS_* flags. Suppress them inside the kernel unless uapi/linux/mount.h is
included.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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skb_sec_path gains 'const' qualifier to avoid
xt_policy.c: 'skb_sec_path' discards 'const' qualifier from pointer target type
same reasoning as previous conversions: Won't need to touch these
spots anymore when skb->sp is removed.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Start the policy_tokens and the associated enumeration from zero,
simplifying the pt macro.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The code uses a bitmap to check for duplicate tokens during parsing, and
that doesn't work at all for the negative Opt_err token case.
There is absolutely no reason to make Opt_err be negative, and in fact
it only confuses things, since some of the affected functions actually
return a positive Opt_xyz enum _or_ a regular negative error code (eg
-EINVAL), and using -1 for Opt_err makes no sense.
There are similar problems in ima_policy.c and key encryption, but they
don't have the immediate bug wrt bitmap handing, and ima_policy.c in
particular needs a different patch to make the enum values match the
token array index. Mimi is sending that separately.
Reported-by: syzbot+a22e0dc07567662c50bc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Fixes: 5208cc83423d ("keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options")
Fixes: 00d60fd3b932 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]")
Cc: James Morris James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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From what I can tell, it has never been used.
Mimi: This was introduced prior to Rusty's decision to use appended
signatures for kernel modules.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd into next-tpm
tpmdd updates for Linux v4.21
From Jarkko:
v4.21 updates:
* Support for partial reads of /dev/tpm0.
* Clean up for TPM 1.x code: move the commands to tpm1-cmd.c and make
everything to use the same data structure for building TPM commands
i.e. struct tpm_buf.
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next-integrity
From Mimi:
In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was
upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load
syscall. Different signature verification methods exist for verifying
the kexec'ed kernel image. This pull request adds additional support
in IMA to prevent loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load
syscall, independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime
"secure boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included.
In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named
".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying
the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA
kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring.
(David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the
preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different
use case scenario, are included here.)
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Sync with Linux 4.20-rc7, to pick up: Revert "ovl: relax permission checking on underlying layers"
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into next-smack
From Casey.
"I have two Smack patches for 4.21. One Jose's patch adds
missing documentation and Zoran's fleshes out the access checks
on keyrings."
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Adding nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys in order to limit the size
of the key to 32bytes.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Export lookup_user_key() symbol in order to allow nvdimm passphrase
update to retrieve user injected keys.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Use the aptly named function rather than open coding the check. No
functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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On secure boot enabled systems, the bootloader verifies the kernel
image and possibly the initramfs signatures based on a set of keys. A
soft reboot(kexec) of the system, with the same kernel image and
initramfs, requires access to the original keys to verify the
signatures.
This patch allows IMA-appraisal access to those original keys, now
loaded on the platform keyring, needed for verifying the kernel image
and initramfs signatures.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: only use platform keyring if it's enabled (Thiago)]
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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If a user tells shim to not use the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable
for verification purposes, shim will set a UEFI variable called
MokIgnoreDB. Have the uefi import code look for this and ignore the db
variable if it is found.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: removed reference to "secondary" keyring comment]
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
This patch imports those certificates into the platform keyring. The shim
UEFI bootloader has a similar certificate list stored in the 'MokListRT'
variable. We import those as well.
Secure Boot also maintains a list of disallowed certificates in the 'dbx'
variable. We load those certificates into the system blacklist keyring
and forbid any kernel signed with those from loading.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: dropped Josh's original patch description]
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Add a function to parse an EFI signature blob looking for elements of
interest. A list is made up of a series of sublists, where all the
elements in a sublist are of the same type, but sublists can be of
different types.
For each sublist encountered, the function pointed to by the
get_handler_for_guid argument is called with the type specifier GUID and
returns either a pointer to a function to handle elements of that type or
NULL if the type is not of interest.
If the sublist is of interest, each element is passed to the handler
function in turn.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The patch refactors integrity_load_x509(), making it a wrapper for a new
function named integrity_add_key(). This patch also defines a new
function named integrity_load_cert() for loading the platform keys.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec
additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing
to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. In
such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel
image.
It is further possible that the kernel image is signed with third party
keys which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable.
The kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an
administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage.
In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the
necessary separation of trust, the kernel needs an additional keyring to
store platform keys.
This patch creates the new keyring called ".platform" to isolate keys
provided by platform from keys by kernel. These keys are used to
facilitate signature verification during kexec. Since the scope of this
keyring is only the platform/firmware keys, it cannot be updated from
userspace.
This keyring can be enabled by setting CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The Makefile/Kconfig entry controlling compilation of this code is:
security/Makefile:obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS) += inode.o
security/Kconfig:config SECURITYFS
security/Kconfig: bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the couple traces of modular infrastructure use, so that
when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only.
We also delete the MODULE_LICENSE tag etc. since all that information
is already contained at the top of the file in the comments.
The removal of module.h uncovered a couple previously hidden implicit
header requirements which are now included explicitly.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends. That changed
when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.
This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig.
The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself
sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed
cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using.
Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h
(for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each
instance for the presence of either and replace as needed.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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The Makefile/Kconfig entry controlling compilation of this code is:
obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm.o
evm-y := evm_main.o evm_crypto.o evm_secfs.o
security/integrity/evm/Kconfig:config EVM
security/integrity/evm/Kconfig: bool "EVM support"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the couple traces of modular infrastructure use, so that
when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only.
We also delete the MODULE_LICENSE tag etc. since all that information
is already contained at the top of the file in the comments.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Even though the support can be modular, only one file needs to use
all the macros like MODULE_AUTHOR, MODULE_LICENSE etc. Only the one
responsible for registering/removal with module_init/module_exit
needs to declare these. In this case, that file is "encrypted.c"
and it already has the MODULE_LICENSE that we are removing here.
Since the file does EXPORT_SYMBOL, we add export.h - and build tests
show that module.h (which includes everything) was hiding an implicit
use of string.h - so that is added as well.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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The Makefile/Kconfig entry controlling compilation of this code is:
obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig:config IMA
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig- bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the couple traces of modular infrastructure use, so that
when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only.
We also delete the MODULE_LICENSE tag etc. since all that information
is already contained at the top of the file in the comments.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Update the builtin IMA policies specified on the boot command line
(eg. ima_policy="tcb|appraise_tcb") to permit accessing efivar files.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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On x86, there are two methods of verifying a kexec'ed kernel image
signature being loaded via the kexec_file_load syscall - an architecture
specific implementaton or a IMA KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraisal rule. Neither
of these methods verify the kexec'ed kernel image signature being loaded
via the kexec_load syscall.
Secure boot enabled systems require kexec images to be signed. Therefore,
this patch loads an IMA KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK policy rule on secure boot
enabled systems not configured with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled.
When IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM is configured, different IMA appraise modes
(eg. fix, log) can be specified on the boot command line, allowing unsigned
or invalidly signed kernel images to be kexec'ed. This patch permits
enabling IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM or IMA_ARCH_POLICY, but not both.
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Builtin IMA policies can be enabled on the boot command line, and replaced
with a custom policy, normally during early boot in the initramfs. Build
time IMA policy rules were recently added. These rules are automatically
enabled on boot and persist after loading a custom policy.
There is a need for yet another type of policy, an architecture specific
policy, which is derived at runtime during kernel boot, based on the
runtime secure boot flags. Like the build time policy rules, these rules
persist after loading a custom policy.
This patch adds support for loading an architecture specific IMA policy.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Co-Developed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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This patch removes the code duplication in ima_init_policy() by defining
a new function named add_rules(). The new function adds the rules to the
initial IMA policy, the custom policy or both based on the policy mask
(IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY).
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Al Viro
Masahiro Yamada
David S. Miller
Paul Gortmaker
David Howells
Florian Westphal
Mimi Zohar
Linus Torvalds
Thiago Jung Bauermann
James Morris
Dave Jiang
Nikolay Borisov
Nayna Jain
Josh Boyer
Eric Richter