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This is the 5.4.42 stable release
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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This is the 5.4.41 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Thu 14 May 2020 01:58:30 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit 0a8e7b7d08466b5fc52f8e96070acc116d82a8bb upstream.
I've noticed that when krb5i or krb5p security is in use,
retransmitted requests are missing the server's duplicate reply
cache. The computed checksum on the retransmitted request does not
match the cached checksum, resulting in the server performing the
retransmitted request again instead of returning the cached reply.
The assumptions made when removing xdr_buf_trim() were not correct.
In the send paths, the upper layer has already set the segment
lengths correctly, and shorting the buffer's content is simply a
matter of reducing buf->len.
xdr_buf_trim() is the right answer in the receive/unwrap path on
both the client and the server. The buffer segment lengths have to
be shortened one-by-one.
On the server side in particular, head.iov_len needs to be updated
correctly to enable nfsd_cache_csum() to work correctly. The simple
buf->len computation doesn't do that, and that results in
checksumming stale data in the buffer.
The problem isn't noticed until there's significant instability of
the RPC transport. At that point, the reliability of retransmit
detection on the server becomes crucial.
Fixes: 241b1f419f0e ("SUNRPC: Remove xdr_buf_trim()")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a9a3ed1eff3601b63aea4fb462d8b3b92c7c1e7e upstream.
... or the odyssey of trying to disable the stack protector for the
function which generates the stack canary value.
The whole story started with Sergei reporting a boot crash with a kernel
built with gcc-10:
Kernel panic — not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: start_secondary
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc5—00235—gfffb08b37df9 #139
Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. To be filled by O.E.M./H77M—D3H, BIOS F12 11/14/2013
Call Trace:
dump_stack
panic
? start_secondary
__stack_chk_fail
start_secondary
secondary_startup_64
-—-[ end Kernel panic — not syncing: stack—protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: start_secondary
This happens because gcc-10 tail-call optimizes the last function call
in start_secondary() - cpu_startup_entry() - and thus emits a stack
canary check which fails because the canary value changes after the
boot_init_stack_canary() call.
To fix that, the initial attempt was to mark the one function which
generates the stack canary with:
__attribute__((optimize("-fno-stack-protector"))) ... start_secondary(void *unused)
however, using the optimize attribute doesn't work cumulatively
as the attribute does not add to but rather replaces previously
supplied optimization options - roughly all -fxxx options.
The key one among them being -fno-omit-frame-pointer and thus leading to
not present frame pointer - frame pointer which the kernel needs.
The next attempt to prevent compilers from tail-call optimizing
the last function call cpu_startup_entry(), shy of carving out
start_secondary() into a separate compilation unit and building it with
-fno-stack-protector, was to add an empty asm("").
This current solution was short and sweet, and reportedly, is supported
by both compilers but we didn't get very far this time: future (LTO?)
optimization passes could potentially eliminate this, which leads us
to the third attempt: having an actual memory barrier there which the
compiler cannot ignore or move around etc.
That should hold for a long time, but hey we said that about the other
two solutions too so...
Reported-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200314164451.346497-1-slyfox@gentoo.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c1f6e3c818dd734c30f6a7eeebf232ba2cf3181d upstream.
The rawmidi core allows user to resize the runtime buffer via ioctl,
and this may lead to UAF when performed during concurrent reads or
writes: the read/write functions unlock the runtime lock temporarily
during copying form/to user-space, and that's the race window.
This patch fixes the hole by introducing a reference counter for the
runtime buffer read/write access and returns -EBUSY error when the
resize is performed concurrently against read/write.
Note that the ref count field is a simple integer instead of
refcount_t here, since the all contexts accessing the buffer is
basically protected with a spinlock, hence we need no expensive atomic
ops. Also, note that this busy check is needed only against read /
write functions, and not in receive/transmit callbacks; the race can
happen only at the spinlock hole mentioned in the above, while the
whole function is protected for receive / transmit callbacks.
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAFcO6XMWpUVK_yzzCpp8_XP7+=oUpQvuBeCbMffEDkpe8jWrfg@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5heerw3r5z.wl-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9d82973e032e246ff5663c9805fbb5407ae932e3 upstream.
Due to a bug-report that was compiler-dependent, I updated one of my
machines to gcc-10. That shows a lot of new warnings. Happily they
seem to be mostly the valid kind, but it's going to cause a round of
churn for getting rid of them..
This is the really low-hanging fruit of removing a couple of zero-sized
arrays in some core code. We have had a round of these patches before,
and we'll have many more coming, and there is nothing special about
these except that they were particularly trivial, and triggered more
warnings than most.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 01b2bafe57b19d9119413f138765ef57990921ce upstream.
Aside from good practice, this avoids a warning from gcc 10:
./include/linux/kernel.h:997:3: warning: array subscript -31 is outside array bounds of ‘struct list_head[1]’ [-Warray-bounds]
997 | ((type *)(__mptr - offsetof(type, member))); })
| ~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./include/linux/list.h:493:2: note: in expansion of macro ‘container_of’
493 | container_of(ptr, type, member)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~
./include/linux/pnp.h:275:30: note: in expansion of macro ‘list_entry’
275 | #define global_to_pnp_dev(n) list_entry(n, struct pnp_dev, global_list)
| ^~~~~~~~~~
./include/linux/pnp.h:281:11: note: in expansion of macro ‘global_to_pnp_dev’
281 | (dev) != global_to_pnp_dev(&pnp_global); \
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/x86/kernel/rtc.c:189:2: note: in expansion of macro ‘pnp_for_each_dev’
189 | pnp_for_each_dev(dev) {
Because the common code doesn't cast the starting list_head to the
containing struct.
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
[ rjw: Whitespace adjustments ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 04fd61a4e01028210a91f0efc408c8bc61a3018c ]
A recent commit 9852ae3fe529 ("mm, memcg: consider subtrees in
memory.events") changed the behavior of memcg events, which will now
consider subtrees in memory.events.
But oom_kill event is a special one as it is used in both cgroup1 and
cgroup2. In cgroup1, it is displayed in memory.oom_control. The file
memory.oom_control is in both root memcg and non root memcg, that is
different with memory.event as it only in non-root memcg. That commit
is okay for cgroup2, but it is not okay for cgroup1 as it will cause
inconsistent behavior between root memcg and non-root memcg.
Here's an example on why this behavior is inconsistent in cgroup1.
root memcg
/
memcg foo
/
memcg bar
Suppose there's an oom_kill in memcg bar, then the oon_kill will be
root memcg : memory.oom_control(oom_kill) 0
/
memcg foo : memory.oom_control(oom_kill) 1
/
memcg bar : memory.oom_control(oom_kill) 1
For the non-root memcg, its memory.oom_control(oom_kill) includes its
descendants' oom_kill, but for root memcg, it doesn't include its
descendants' oom_kill. That means, memory.oom_control(oom_kill) has
different meanings in different memcgs. That is inconsistent. Then the
user has to know whether the memcg is root or not.
If we can't fully support it in cgroup1, for example by adding
memory.events.local into cgroup1 as well, then let's don't touch its
original behavior.
Fixes: 9852ae3fe529 ("mm, memcg: consider subtrees in memory.events")
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200502141055.7378-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2c407aca64977ede9b9f35158e919773cae2082f ]
gcc-10 warns around a suspicious access to an empty struct member:
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: In function '__nf_conntrack_alloc':
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:1522:9: warning: array subscript 0 is outside the bounds of an interior zero-length array 'u8[0]' {aka 'unsigned char[0]'} [-Wzero-length-bounds]
1522 | memset(&ct->__nfct_init_offset[0], 0,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:37:
include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h:90:5: note: while referencing '__nfct_init_offset'
90 | u8 __nfct_init_offset[0];
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The code is correct but a bit unusual. Rework it slightly in a way that
does not trigger the warning, using an empty struct instead of an empty
array. There are probably more elegant ways to do this, but this is the
smallest change.
Fixes: c41884ce0562 ("netfilter: conntrack: avoid zeroing timer")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 81aabbb9fb7b4b1efd073b62f0505d3adad442f3 ]
In bpf_tcp_ingress we used apply_bytes to subtract bytes from sg.size
which is used to track total bytes in a message. But this is not
correct because apply_bytes is itself modified in the main loop doing
the mem_charge.
Then at the end of this we have sg.size incorrectly set and out of
sync with actual sk values. Then we can get a splat if we try to
cork the data later and again try to redirect the msg to ingress. To
fix instead of trying to track msg.size do the easy thing and include
it as part of the sk_msg_xfer logic so that when the msg is moved the
sg.size is always correct.
To reproduce the below users will need ingress + cork and hit an
error path that will then try to 'free' the skmsg.
[ 173.699981] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in sk_msg_free_elem+0xdd/0x120
[ 173.699987] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000008 by task test_sockmap/5317
[ 173.700000] CPU: 2 PID: 5317 Comm: test_sockmap Tainted: G I 5.7.0-rc1+ #43
[ 173.700005] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 5820 Tower/002KVM, BIOS 1.9.2 01/24/2019
[ 173.700009] Call Trace:
[ 173.700021] dump_stack+0x8e/0xcb
[ 173.700029] ? sk_msg_free_elem+0xdd/0x120
[ 173.700034] ? sk_msg_free_elem+0xdd/0x120
[ 173.700042] __kasan_report+0x102/0x15f
[ 173.700052] ? sk_msg_free_elem+0xdd/0x120
[ 173.700060] kasan_report+0x32/0x50
[ 173.700070] sk_msg_free_elem+0xdd/0x120
[ 173.700080] __sk_msg_free+0x87/0x150
[ 173.700094] tcp_bpf_send_verdict+0x179/0x4f0
[ 173.700109] tcp_bpf_sendpage+0x3ce/0x5d0
Fixes: 604326b41a6fb ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158861290407.14306.5327773422227552482.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 24adbc1676af4e134e709ddc7f34cf2adc2131e4 ]
We autotune rcvbuf whenever SO_RCVLOWAT is set to account for 100%
overhead in tcp_set_rcvlowat()
This works well when skb->len/skb->truesize ratio is bigger than 0.5
But if we receive packets with small MSS, we can end up in a situation
where not enough bytes are available in the receive queue to satisfy
RCVLOWAT setting.
As our sk_rcvbuf limit is hit, we send zero windows in ACK packets,
preventing remote peer from sending more data.
Even autotuning does not help, because it only triggers at the time
user process drains the queue. If no EPOLLIN is generated, this
can not happen.
Note poll() has a similar issue, after commit
c7004482e8dc ("tcp: Respect SO_RCVLOWAT in tcp_poll().")
Fixes: 03f45c883c6f ("tcp: avoid extra wakeups for SO_RCVLOWAT users")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a7df4870d79b00742da6cc93ca2f336a71db77f7 ]
When we tell kernel to dump filters from root (ffff:ffff),
those filters on ingress (ffff:0000) are matched, but their
true parents must be dumped as they are. However, kernel
dumps just whatever we tell it, that is either ffff:ffff
or ffff:0000:
$ nl-cls-list --dev=dummy0 --parent=root
cls basic dev dummy0 id none parent root prio 49152 protocol ip match-all
cls basic dev dummy0 id :1 parent root prio 49152 protocol ip match-all
$ nl-cls-list --dev=dummy0 --parent=ffff:
cls basic dev dummy0 id none parent ffff: prio 49152 protocol ip match-all
cls basic dev dummy0 id :1 parent ffff: prio 49152 protocol ip match-all
This is confusing and misleading, more importantly this is
a regression since 4.15, so the old behavior must be restored.
And, when tc filters are installed on a tc class, the parent
should be the classid, rather than the qdisc handle. Commit
edf6711c9840 ("net: sched: remove classid and q fields from tcf_proto")
removed the classid we save for filters, we can just restore
this classid in tcf_block.
Steps to reproduce this:
ip li set dev dummy0 up
tc qd add dev dummy0 ingress
tc filter add dev dummy0 parent ffff: protocol arp basic action pass
tc filter show dev dummy0 root
Before this patch:
filter protocol arp pref 49152 basic
filter protocol arp pref 49152 basic handle 0x1
action order 1: gact action pass
random type none pass val 0
index 1 ref 1 bind 1
After this patch:
filter parent ffff: protocol arp pref 49152 basic
filter parent ffff: protocol arp pref 49152 basic handle 0x1
action order 1: gact action pass
random type none pass val 0
index 1 ref 1 bind 1
Fixes: a10fa20101ae ("net: sched: propagate q and parent from caller down to tcf_fill_node")
Fixes: edf6711c9840 ("net: sched: remove classid and q fields from tcf_proto")
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a7e429a6fa6d612d1dacde96c885dc1bb4a9f400 ]
When the au_ralign field was added to gss_unwrap_resp_priv, the
wrong calculation was used. Setting au_rslack == au_ralign is
probably correct for kerberos_v1 privacy, but kerberos_v2 privacy
adds additional GSS data after the clear text RPC message.
au_ralign needs to be smaller than au_rslack in that fairly common
case.
When xdr_buf_trim() is restored to gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(), it does
exactly what I feared it would: it trims off part of the clear text
RPC message. However, that's because rpc_prepare_reply_pages() does
not set up the rq_rcv_buf's tail correctly because au_ralign is too
large.
Fixing the au_ralign computation also corrects the alignment of
rq_rcv_buf->pages so that the client does not have to shift reply
data payloads after they are received.
Fixes: 35e77d21baa0 ("SUNRPC: Add rpc_auth::au_ralign field")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 31c9590ae468478fe47dc0f5f0d3562b2f69450e ]
Refactor: This is a pre-requisite to fixing the client-side ralign
computation in gss_unwrap_resp_priv().
The length value is passed in explicitly rather that as the value
of buf->len. This will subsequently allow gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1()
to compute a slack and align value, instead of computing it in
gss_unwrap_resp_priv().
Fixes: 35e77d21baa0 ("SUNRPC: Add rpc_auth::au_ralign field")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit dfc2d2594e4a79204a3967585245f00644b8f838 ]
The event inode field is used only for comparison in queue merges and
cannot be dereferenced after handle_event(), because it does not hold a
refcount on the inode.
Replace it with an abstract id to do the same thing.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200319151022.31456-8-amir73il@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6bd87eec23cbc9ed222bed0f5b5b02bf300e9a8d ]
Cache a copy of the name for the life time of the backing_dev_info
structure so that we can reference it even after unregistering.
Fixes: 68f23b89067f ("memcg: fix a crash in wb_workfn when a device disappears")
Reported-by: Yufen Yu <yuyufen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit eb7ae5e06bb6e6ac6bb86872d27c43ebab92f6b2 ]
bdi_dev_name is not a fast path function, move it out of line. This
prepares for using it from modular callers without having to export
an implementation detail like bdi_unknown_name.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b723748750ece7d844cdf2f52c01d37f83387208 ]
RFC 6040 recommends propagating an ECT(1) mark from an outer tunnel header
to the inner header if that inner header is already marked as ECT(0). When
RFC 6040 decapsulation was implemented, this case of propagation was not
added. This simply appears to be an oversight, so let's fix that.
Fixes: eccc1bb8d4b4 ("tunnel: drop packet if ECN present with not-ECT")
Reported-by: Bob Briscoe <ietf@bobbriscoe.net>
Reported-by: Olivier Tilmans <olivier.tilmans@nokia-bell-labs.com>
Cc: Dave Taht <dave.taht@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9274124f023b5c56dc4326637d4f787968b03607 ]
Syzkaller again found a path to a kernel crash through bad gso input:
a packet with transport header extending beyond skb_headlen(skb).
Tighten validation at kernel entry:
- Verify that the transport header lies within the linear section.
To avoid pulling linux/tcp.h, verify just sizeof tcphdr.
tcp_gso_segment will call pskb_may_pull (th->doff * 4) before use.
- Match the gso_type against the ip_proto found by the flow dissector.
Fixes: bfd5f4a3d605 ("packet: Add GSO/csum offload support.")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8f34e53b60b337e559f1ea19e2780ff95ab2fa65 ]
Nik reported a bug with pcpu dst cache when nexthop objects are
used illustrated by the following:
$ ip netns add foo
$ ip -netns foo li set lo up
$ ip -netns foo addr add 2001:db8:11::1/128 dev lo
$ ip netns exec foo sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=1
$ ip li add veth1 type veth peer name veth2
$ ip li set veth1 up
$ ip addr add 2001:db8:10::1/64 dev veth1
$ ip li set dev veth2 netns foo
$ ip -netns foo li set veth2 up
$ ip -netns foo addr add 2001:db8:10::2/64 dev veth2
$ ip -6 nexthop add id 100 via 2001:db8:10::2 dev veth1
$ ip -6 route add 2001:db8:11::1/128 nhid 100
Create a pcpu entry on cpu 0:
$ taskset -a -c 0 ip -6 route get 2001:db8:11::1
Re-add the route entry:
$ ip -6 ro del 2001:db8:11::1
$ ip -6 route add 2001:db8:11::1/128 nhid 100
Route get on cpu 0 returns the stale pcpu:
$ taskset -a -c 0 ip -6 route get 2001:db8:11::1
RTNETLINK answers: Network is unreachable
While cpu 1 works:
$ taskset -a -c 1 ip -6 route get 2001:db8:11::1
2001:db8:11::1 from :: via 2001:db8:10::2 dev veth1 src 2001:db8:10::1 metric 1024 pref medium
Conversion of FIB entries to work with external nexthop objects
missed an important difference between IPv4 and IPv6 - how dst
entries are invalidated when the FIB changes. IPv4 has a per-network
namespace generation id (rt_genid) that is bumped on changes to the FIB.
Checking if a dst_entry is still valid means comparing rt_genid in the
rtable to the current value of rt_genid for the namespace.
IPv6 also has a per network namespace counter, fib6_sernum, but the
count is saved per fib6_node. With the per-node counter only dst_entries
based on fib entries under the node are invalidated when changes are
made to the routes - limiting the scope of invalidations. IPv6 uses a
reference in the rt6_info, 'from', to track the corresponding fib entry
used to create the dst_entry. When validating a dst_entry, the 'from'
is used to backtrack to the fib6_node and check the sernum of it to the
cookie passed to the dst_check operation.
With the inline format (nexthop definition inline with the fib6_info),
dst_entries cached in the fib6_nh have a 1:1 correlation between fib
entries, nexthop data and dst_entries. With external nexthops, IPv6
looks more like IPv4 which means multiple fib entries across disparate
fib6_nodes can all reference the same fib6_nh. That means validation
of dst_entries based on external nexthops needs to use the IPv4 format
- the per-network namespace counter.
Add sernum to rt6_info and set it when creating a pcpu dst entry. Update
rt6_get_cookie to return sernum if it is set and update dst_check for
IPv6 to look for sernum set and based the check on it if so. Finally,
rt6_get_pcpu_route needs to validate the cached entry before returning
a pcpu entry (similar to the rt_cache_valid calls in __mkroute_input and
__mkroute_output for IPv4).
This problem only affects routes using the new, external nexthops.
Thanks to the kbuild test robot for catching the IS_ENABLED needed
around rt_genid_ipv6 before I sent this out.
Fixes: 5b98324ebe29 ("ipv6: Allow routes to use nexthop objects")
Reported-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Tested-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
This is the 5.4.40 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Sun 10 May 2020 04:31:34 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
|
|
This is the 5.4.39 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Wed 06 May 2020 02:15:17 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
|
|
commit d0208bf4da97f76237300afb83c097de25645de6 upstream.
Commit 6cd021a58c18a ("udp: segment looped gso packets correctly")
fixes an issue with rare udp gso multicast packets looped onto the
receive path.
The stable backport makes the narrowest change to target only these
packets, when needed. As opposed to, say, expanding __udp_gso_segment,
which is harder to reason to be free from unintended side-effects.
But the resulting code is hardly self-describing.
Document its purpose and rationale.
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 30b2f0be23fb40e58d0ad2caf8702c2a44cda2e1 upstream.
commit 08a5bdde3812 ("mac80211: consider QoS Null frames for STA_NULLFUNC_ACKED")
Fixed a bug where we failed to take into account a
nullfunc frame can be either non-QoS or QoS. It turns out
there is at least one more bug in
ieee80211_sta_tx_notify(), introduced in
commit 7b6ddeaf27ec ("mac80211: use QoS NDP for AP probing"),
where we forgot to check for the QoS variant and so
assumed the QoS nullfunc frame never went out
Fix this by adding a helper ieee80211_is_any_nullfunc()
which consolidates the check for non-QoS and QoS nullfunc
frames. Replace existing compound conditionals and add a
couple more missing checks for QoS variant.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Pedersen <thomas@adapt-ip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200114055940.18502-3-thomas@adapt-ip.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e537654b7039aacfe8ae629d49655c0e5692ad44 ]
Implement a resource managed strongly uncachable ioremap function.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+
Tested-by: AceLan Kao <acelan.kao@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tuowen Zhao <ztuowen@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 83a196773b8bc6702f49df1eddc848180e350340 ]
Analogix_dp driver acquires all its resources in the ->bind() callback,
what is a bit against the component driver based approach, where the
driver initialization is split into a probe(), where all resources are
gathered, and a bind(), where all objects are created and a compound
driver is initialized.
Extract all the resource related operations to analogix_dp_probe() and
analogix_dp_remove(), then call them before/after registration of the
device components from the main Exynos DP and Rockchip DP drivers. Also
move the plat_data initialization to the probe() to make it available for
the analogix_dp_probe() function.
This fixes the multiple calls to the bind() of the DRM compound driver
when the DP PHY driver is not yet loaded/probed:
[drm] Exynos DRM: using 14400000.fimd device for DMA mapping operations
exynos-drm exynos-drm: bound 14400000.fimd (ops fimd_component_ops [exynosdrm])
exynos-drm exynos-drm: bound 14450000.mixer (ops mixer_component_ops [exynosdrm])
exynos-dp 145b0000.dp-controller: no DP phy configured
exynos-drm exynos-drm: failed to bind 145b0000.dp-controller (ops exynos_dp_ops [exynosdrm]): -517
exynos-drm exynos-drm: master bind failed: -517
...
[drm] Exynos DRM: using 14400000.fimd device for DMA mapping operations
exynos-drm exynos-drm: bound 14400000.fimd (ops hdmi_enable [exynosdrm])
exynos-drm exynos-drm: bound 14450000.mixer (ops hdmi_enable [exynosdrm])
exynos-drm exynos-drm: bound 145b0000.dp-controller (ops hdmi_enable [exynosdrm])
exynos-drm exynos-drm: bound 14530000.hdmi (ops hdmi_enable [exynosdrm])
[drm] Supports vblank timestamp caching Rev 2 (21.10.2013).
Console: switching to colour frame buffer device 170x48
exynos-drm exynos-drm: fb0: exynosdrmfb frame buffer device
[drm] Initialized exynos 1.1.0 20180330 for exynos-drm on minor 1
...
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Andy Yan <andy.yan@rock-chips.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200310103427.26048-1-m.szyprowski@samsung.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit dff58530c4ca8ce7ee5a74db431c6e35362cf682 upstream.
Currently, if the client sends BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION with
NFS4_CDFC4_FORE_OR_BOTH but only gets NFS4_CDFS4_FORE back it ignores
that it wasn't able to enable a backchannel.
To make sure, the client sends BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION as the first
operation on the connections (ie., no other session compounds haven't
been sent before), and if the client's request to bind the backchannel
is not satisfied, then reset the connection and retry.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a5bff92eaac45bdf6221badf9505c26792fdf99e upstream.
The uapi is the same on 32 and 64 bit, but the number isn't. Everyone
who botched this please re-read:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.4-preprc-cpu/ioctl/botching-up-ioctls.html
Also, the type argument for the ioctl macros is for the type the void
__user *arg pointer points at, which in this case would be the
variable-sized char[] of a 0 terminated string. So this was botched in
more than just the usual ways.
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Cc: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Cc: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linaro-mm-sig@lists.linaro.org
Cc: minchan@kernel.org
Cc: surenb@google.com
Cc: jenhaochen@google.com
Cc: Martin Liu <liumartin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Tested-by: Martin Liu <liumartin@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Liu <liumartin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
[sumits: updated some checkpatch fixes, corrected author email]
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200407133002.3486387-1-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is the 5.4.37 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Sat 02 May 2020 02:49:34 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
|
|
This is the 5.4.36 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Wed 29 Apr 2020 10:33:25 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
|
|
This is the 5.4.35 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Thu 23 Apr 2020 04:36:46 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
|
|
commit a22ae72b86a4f754e8d25fbf9ea5a8f77365e531 upstream.
v5.4 changes in soc-core tightened the checks on soc_dapm_add_routes,
which results in the ASoC card probe failing.
Introduce a flag to be set in machine drivers to prevent the probe
from stopping in case of incomplete topologies or missing routes. This
flag is for backwards compatibility only and shall not be used for
newer machine drivers.
Example with an HDaudio card with a bad topology:
[ 236.177898] skl_hda_dsp_generic skl_hda_dsp_generic: ASoC: Failed to
add route iDisp1_out -> direct -> iDisp1 Tx
[ 236.177902] skl_hda_dsp_generic skl_hda_dsp_generic:
snd_soc_bind_card: snd_soc_dapm_add_routes failed: -19
with the disable_route_checks set:
[ 64.031657] skl_hda_dsp_generic skl_hda_dsp_generic: ASoC: Failed to
add route iDisp1_out -> direct -> iDisp1 Tx
[ 64.031661] skl_hda_dsp_generic skl_hda_dsp_generic:
snd_soc_bind_card: disable_route_checks set, ignoring errors on
add_routes
Fixes: daa480bde6b3a9 ("ASoC: soc-core: tidyup for snd_soc_dapm_add_routes()")
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200309192744.18380-2-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8063f761cd7c17fc1d0018728936e0c33a25388a upstream.
The qed_chain data structure was modified in
commit 1a4a69751f4d ("qed: Chain support for external PBL") to support
receiving an external pbl (due to iWARP FW requirements).
The pages pointed to by the pbl are allocated in qed_chain_alloc
and their virtual address are stored in an virtual addresses array to
enable accessing and freeing the data. The physical addresses however
weren't stored and were accessed directly from the external-pbl
during free.
Destroy-qp flow, leads to freeing the external pbl before the chain is
freed, when the chain is freed it tries accessing the already freed
external pbl, leading to a use-after-free. Therefore we need to store
the physical addresses in additional to the virtual addresses in a
new data structure.
Fixes: 1a4a69751f4d ("qed: Chain support for external PBL")
Signed-off-by: Michal Kalderon <mkalderon@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuval Bason <ybason@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 673040c3a82a7564423e09c791e242a846591e30 upstream.
BIT() macro definition is internal to the Linux kernel and is not
to be used in UAPI headers; replace its usage with the _BITUL() macro
that is already used elsewhere in the header.
Fixes: 9c66d1564676 ("taprio: Add support for hardware offloading")
Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d6c8e949a35d6906d6c03a50e9a9cdf4e494528a upstream.
Systemtap 4.2 is unable to correctly interpret the "u32 (*missed_ppm)[2]"
argument of the iocost_ioc_vrate_adj trace entry defined in
include/trace/events/iocost.h leading to the following error:
/tmp/stapAcz0G0/stap_c89c58b83cea1724e26395efa9ed4939_6321_aux_6.c:78:8:
error: expected ‘;’, ‘,’ or ‘)’ before ‘*’ token
, u32[]* __tracepoint_arg_missed_ppm
That argument type is indeed rather complex and hard to read. Looking
at block/blk-iocost.c. It is just a 2-entry u32 array. By simplifying
the argument to a simple "u32 *missed_ppm" and adjusting the trace
entry accordingly, the compilation error was gone.
Fixes: 7caa47151ab2 ("blkcg: implement blk-iocost")
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3375590623e4a132b19a8740512f4deb95728933 upstream.
Add Zhaoxin Vendor ID to pci_ids.h
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200327091148.5190-2-RaymondPang-oc@zhaoxin.com
Signed-off-by: Raymond Pang <RaymondPang-oc@zhaoxin.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 23cf1ee1f1869966b75518c59b5cbda4c6c92450 upstream.
Utilize the xpo_release_rqst transport method to ensure that each
rqstp's svc_rdma_recv_ctxt object is released even when the server
cannot return a Reply for that rqstp.
Without this fix, each RPC whose Reply cannot be sent leaks one
svc_rdma_recv_ctxt. This is a 2.5KB structure, a 4KB DMA-mapped
Receive buffer, and any pages that might be part of the Reply
message.
The leak is infrequent unless the network fabric is unreliable or
Kerberos is in use, as GSS sequence window overruns, which result
in connection loss, are more common on fast transports.
Fixes: 3a88092ee319 ("svcrdma: Preserve Receive buffer until svc_rdma_sendto")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e28b4fc652c1830796a4d3e09565f30c20f9a2cf upstream.
I hit this while testing nfsd-5.7 with kernel memory debugging
enabled on my server:
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8887e6c279a8
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: PGD 3601067 P4D 3601067 PUD 87c519067 PMD 87c3e2067 PTE 800ffff8193d8060
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: CPU: 2 PID: 1933 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 5.6.0-rc6-00040-g881e87a3c6f9 #1591
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X10SRL-F, BIOS 1.0c 09/09/2015
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: RIP: 0010:svc_rdma_post_chunk_ctxt+0xab/0x284 [rpcrdma]
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: Code: c1 83 34 02 00 00 29 d0 85 c0 7e 72 48 8b bb a0 02 00 00 48 8d 54 24 08 4c 89 e6 48 8b 07 48 8b 40 20 e8 5a 5c 2b e1 41 89 c6 <8b> 45 20 89 44 24 04 8b 05 02 e9 01 00 85 c0 7e 33 e9 5e 01 00 00
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffc90000dfbdd8 EFLAGS: 00010286
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8887db8db400 RCX: 0000000000000030
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000246
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: RBP: ffff8887e6c27988 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000004
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: R10: ffffc90000dfbdd8 R11: 00c068ef00000000 R12: ffff8887eb4e4a80
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: R13: ffff8887db8db634 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8887fc931000
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88885bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: CR2: ffff8887e6c279a8 CR3: 000000081b72e002 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: Call Trace:
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: ? svc_rdma_vec_to_sg+0x7f/0x7f [rpcrdma]
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: svc_rdma_send_write_chunk+0x59/0xce [rpcrdma]
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: svc_rdma_sendto+0xf9/0x3ae [rpcrdma]
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: ? nfsd_destroy+0x51/0x51 [nfsd]
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: svc_send+0x105/0x1e3 [sunrpc]
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: nfsd+0xf2/0x149 [nfsd]
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: kthread+0xf6/0xfb
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: ? kthread_queue_delayed_work+0x74/0x74
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: Modules linked in: ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue ib_umad ib_ipoib mlx4_ib sb_edac x86_pkg_temp_thermal iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel glue_helper crypto_simd cryptd pcspkr rpcrdma i2c_i801 rdma_ucm lpc_ich mfd_core ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm mei_me raid0 libiscsi mei sg scsi_transport_iscsi ioatdma wmi ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter nfsd nfs_acl lockd auth_rpcgss grace sunrpc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c mlx4_en sd_mod sr_mod cdrom mlx4_core crc32c_intel igb nvme i2c_algo_bit ahci i2c_core libahci nvme_core dca libata t10_pi qedr dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod dax qede qed crc8 ib_uverbs ib_core
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: CR2: ffff8887e6c279a8
Mar 30 13:21:45 klimt kernel: ---[ end trace 87971d2ad3429424 ]---
It's absolutely not safe to use resources pointed to by the @send_wr
argument of ib_post_send() _after_ that function returns. Those
resources are typically freed by the Send completion handler, which
can run before ib_post_send() returns.
Thus the trace points currently around ib_post_send() in the
server's RPC/RDMA transport are a hazard, even when they are
disabled. Rearrange them so that they touch the Work Request only
_before_ ib_post_send() is invoked.
Fixes: bd2abef33394 ("svcrdma: Trace key RDMA API events")
Fixes: 4201c7464753 ("svcrdma: Introduce svc_rdma_send_ctxt")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ab6f762f0f53162d41497708b33c9a3236d3609e upstream.
printk_deferred(), similarly to printk_safe/printk_nmi, does not
immediately attempt to print a new message on the consoles, avoiding
calls into non-reentrant kernel paths, e.g. scheduler or timekeeping,
which potentially can deadlock the system.
Those printk() flavors, instead, rely on per-CPU flush irq_work to print
messages from safer contexts. For same reasons (recursive scheduler or
timekeeping calls) printk() uses per-CPU irq_work in order to wake up
user space syslog/kmsg readers.
However, only printk_safe/printk_nmi do make sure that per-CPU areas
have been initialised and that it's safe to modify per-CPU irq_work.
This means that, for instance, should printk_deferred() be invoked "too
early", that is before per-CPU areas are initialised, printk_deferred()
will perform illegal per-CPU access.
Lech Perczak [0] reports that after commit 1b710b1b10ef ("char/random:
silence a lockdep splat with printk()") user-space syslog/kmsg readers
are not able to read new kernel messages.
The reason is printk_deferred() being called too early (as was pointed
out by Petr and John).
Fix printk_deferred() and do not queue per-CPU irq_work before per-CPU
areas are initialized.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/aa0732c6-5c4e-8a8b-a1c1-75ebe3dca05b@camlintechnologies.com/
Reported-by: Lech Perczak <l.perczak@camlintechnologies.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6cb5f3ea4654faf8c28b901266e960b1a4787b26 upstream.
When fixing the initialization race, we neglected to account for
the fact that debugfs is initialized in wiphy_register(), and
some debugfs things went missing (or rather were rerooted to the
global debugfs root).
Fix this by adding debugfs entries only after wiphy_register().
This requires some changes in the rate control code since it
currently adds debugfs at alloc time, which can no longer be
done after the reordering.
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Reported-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Reported-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 52e04b4ce5d0 ("mac80211: fix race in ieee80211_register_hw()")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200423111344.0e00d3346f12.Iadc76a03a55093d94391fc672e996a458702875d@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b6467ab142b708dd076f6186ca274f14af379c72 upstream.
Check that the resolved slot (somewhat confusingly named 'start') is a
valid/allocated slot before doing the final comparison to see if the
specified gfn resides in the associated slot. The resolved slot can be
invalid if the binary search loop terminated because the search index
was incremented beyond the number of used slots.
This bug has existed since the binary search algorithm was introduced,
but went unnoticed because KVM statically allocated memory for the max
number of slots, i.e. the access would only be truly out-of-bounds if
all possible slots were allocated and the specified gfn was less than
the base of the lowest memslot. Commit 36947254e5f98 ("KVM: Dynamically
size memslot array based on number of used slots") eliminated the "all
possible slots allocated" condition and made the bug embarrasingly easy
to hit.
Fixes: 9c1a5d38780e6 ("kvm: optimize GFN to memslot lookup with large slots amount")
Reported-by: syzbot+d889b59b2bb87d4047a2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200408064059.8957-2-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit bdebd6a2831b6fab69eb85cee74a8ba77f1a1cc2 upstream.
remap_vmalloc_range() has had various issues with the bounds checks it
promises to perform ("This function checks that addr is a valid
vmalloc'ed area, and that it is big enough to cover the vma") over time,
e.g.:
- not detecting pgoff<<PAGE_SHIFT overflow
- not detecting (pgoff<<PAGE_SHIFT)+usize overflow
- not checking whether addr and addr+(pgoff<<PAGE_SHIFT) are the same
vmalloc allocation
- comparing a potentially wildly out-of-bounds pointer with the end of
the vmalloc region
In particular, since commit fc9702273e2e ("bpf: Add mmap() support for
BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY"), unprivileged users can cause kernel null pointer
dereferences by calling mmap() on a BPF map with a size that is bigger
than the distance from the start of the BPF map to the end of the
address space.
This could theoretically be used as a kernel ASLR bypass, by using
whether mmap() with a given offset oopses or returns an error code to
perform a binary search over the possible address range.
To allow remap_vmalloc_range_partial() to verify that addr and
addr+(pgoff<<PAGE_SHIFT) are in the same vmalloc region, pass the offset
to remap_vmalloc_range_partial() instead of adding it to the pointer in
remap_vmalloc_range().
In remap_vmalloc_range_partial(), fix the check against
get_vm_area_size() by using size comparisons instead of pointer
comparisons, and add checks for pgoff.
Fixes: 833423143c3a ("[PATCH] mm: introduce remap_vmalloc_range()")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200415222312.236431-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit a07479147be03d2450376ebaff9ea1a0682f25d6 upstream.
This change removes the semi-colon from the devm_iio_device_register()
macro which seems to have been added by accident.
Fixes: 63b19547cc3d9 ("iio: Use macro magic to avoid manual assign of driver_module")
Signed-off-by: Lars Engebretsen <lars@engebretsen.ch>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Ardelean <alexandru.ardelean@analog.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 9bacd256f1354883d3c1402655153367982bba49 ]
TCP stack is dumb in how it cooks its output packets.
Depending on MAX_HEADER value, we might chose a bad ending point
for the headers.
If we align the end of TCP headers to cache line boundary, we
make sure to always use the smallest number of cache lines,
which always help.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit d3ec10aa95819bff18a0d936b18884c7816d0914 upstream.
A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a
keyutils test:
[12537.027242] ======================================================
[12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE --------- - -
[12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------
[12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock:
[12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12537.208365]
[12537.208365] but task is already holding lock:
[12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
[12537.270476]
[12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[12537.270476]
[12537.307209]
[12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[12537.340754]
[12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}:
[12537.367434] down_write+0x4d/0x110
[12537.385202] __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280
[12537.405232] request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70
[12537.427221] request_key+0x3c/0x80
[12537.444839] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
[12537.468445] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
[12537.496731] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
[12537.519418] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
[12537.546263] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
[12537.573551] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
[12537.601045] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
[12537.617906] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[12537.636225]
[12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}:
[12537.664525] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
[12537.683734] request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70
[12537.705640] request_key+0x3c/0x80
[12537.723304] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
[12537.746773] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
[12537.775607] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
[12537.798322] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
[12537.823369] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
[12537.847262] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
[12537.873477] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
[12537.890281] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[12537.908649]
[12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}:
[12537.935225] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
[12537.954450] cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs]
[12537.977250] smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs]
[12538.000659] cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs]
[12538.023920] read_pages+0xf5/0x560
[12538.041583] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0
[12538.067047] ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10
[12538.092069] filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830
[12538.111637] __do_fault+0x82/0x260
[12538.129216] do_fault+0x419/0xfb0
[12538.146390] __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0
[12538.167408] handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550
[12538.187401] __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60
[12538.207395] do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0
[12538.225777] page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[12538.243010]
[12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}:
[12538.267875] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
[12538.286848] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
[12538.306006] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
[12538.327936] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
[12538.352154] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
[12538.370558] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
[12538.391470] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
[12538.410511] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf
[12538.435535]
[12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this:
[12538.435535]
[12538.472829] Chain exists of:
[12538.472829] &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class
[12538.472829]
[12538.524820] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[12538.524820]
[12538.551431] CPU0 CPU1
[12538.572654] ---- ----
[12538.595865] lock(&type->lock_class);
[12538.613737] lock(root_key_user.cons_lock);
[12538.644234] lock(&type->lock_class);
[12538.672410] lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
[12538.687758]
[12538.687758] *** DEADLOCK ***
[12538.687758]
[12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598:
[12538.732097] #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
[12538.770573]
[12538.770573] stack backtrace:
[12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
[12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015
[12538.881963] Call Trace:
[12538.892897] dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0
[12538.907908] print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279
[12538.932891] ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250
[12538.948979] check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0
[12538.971643] ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190
[12538.992738] ? check_usage+0x550/0x550
[12539.009845] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
[12539.025484] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0
[12539.043555] __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0
[12539.061551] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10
[12539.080554] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
[12539.100330] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12539.119079] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
[12539.135869] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12539.153234] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
[12539.172787] ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110
[12539.190059] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
[12539.211526] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
[12539.227561] ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0
[12539.249076] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
[12539.266660] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
[12539.283091] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf
One way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not
allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead,
an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the
read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding
the lock.
That requires taking out the __user modifier from all the relevant
read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace
write helpers. That is,
1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy.
2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy().
3) All the fault handling code is removed.
Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is
reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch.
Fixes: ^1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 696ac2e3bf267f5a2b2ed7d34e64131f2287d0ad ]
Similar to commit 0266d81e9bf5 ("acpi/processor: Prevent cpu hotplug
deadlock") except this is for acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe():
"The problem is that the work is scheduled on the current CPU from the
hotplug thread associated with that CPU.
It's not required to invoke these functions via the workqueue because
the hotplug thread runs on the target CPU already.
Check whether current is a per cpu thread pinned on the target CPU and
invoke the function directly to avoid the workqueue."
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
------------------------------------------------------
cpuhp/1/15 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffc90003447a28 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x4c6/0x630
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffffafa1c0e8 (cpuidle_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cpuidle_pause_and_lock+0x17/0x20
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
cpus_read_lock+0x3e/0xc0
irq_calc_affinity_vectors+0x5f/0x91
__pci_enable_msix_range+0x10f/0x9a0
pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0x13e/0x1f0
pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity at drivers/pci/msi.c:1208
pqi_ctrl_init+0x72f/0x1618 [smartpqi]
pqi_pci_probe.cold.63+0x882/0x892 [smartpqi]
local_pci_probe+0x7a/0xc0
work_for_cpu_fn+0x2e/0x50
process_one_work+0x57e/0xb90
worker_thread+0x363/0x5b0
kthread+0x1f4/0x220
ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50
-> #0 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x2244/0x32a0
lock_acquire+0x1a2/0x680
__flush_work+0x4e6/0x630
work_on_cpu+0x114/0x160
acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe+0x129/0x250
acpi_processor_evaluate_cst+0x4c8/0x580
acpi_processor_get_power_info+0x86/0x740
acpi_processor_hotplug+0xc3/0x140
acpi_soft_cpu_online+0x102/0x1d0
cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x197/0x1120
cpuhp_thread_fun+0x252/0x2f0
smpboot_thread_fn+0x255/0x440
kthread+0x1f4/0x220
ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
(work_completion)(&wfc.work) --> cpuhp_state-up --> cpuidle_lock
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(cpuidle_lock);
lock(cpuhp_state-up);
lock(cpuidle_lock);
lock((work_completion)(&wfc.work));
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by cpuhp/1/15:
#0: ffffffffaf51ab10 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x69/0x2f0
#1: ffffffffaf51ad40 (cpuhp_state-up){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x69/0x2f0
#2: ffffffffafa1c0e8 (cpuidle_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cpuidle_pause_and_lock+0x17/0x20
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xa0/0xea
print_circular_bug.cold.52+0x147/0x14c
check_noncircular+0x295/0x2d0
__lock_acquire+0x2244/0x32a0
lock_acquire+0x1a2/0x680
__flush_work+0x4e6/0x630
work_on_cpu+0x114/0x160
acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe+0x129/0x250
acpi_processor_evaluate_cst+0x4c8/0x580
acpi_processor_get_power_info+0x86/0x740
acpi_processor_hotplug+0xc3/0x140
acpi_soft_cpu_online+0x102/0x1d0
cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x197/0x1120
cpuhp_thread_fun+0x252/0x2f0
smpboot_thread_fn+0x255/0x440
kthread+0x1f4/0x220
ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[ rjw: Subject ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit af9c5d2e3b355854ff0e4acfbfbfadcd5198a349 ]
compiletime_assert() uses __LINE__ to create a unique function name. This
means that if you have more than one BUILD_BUG_ON() in the same source
line (which can happen if they appear e.g. in a macro), then the error
message from the compiler might output the wrong condition.
For this source file:
#include <linux/build_bug.h>
#define macro() \
BUILD_BUG_ON(1); \
BUILD_BUG_ON(0);
void foo()
{
macro();
}
gcc would output:
./include/linux/compiler.h:350:38: error: call to `__compiletime_assert_9' declared with attribute error: BUILD_BUG_ON failed: 0
_compiletime_assert(condition, msg, __compiletime_assert_, __LINE__)
However, it was not the BUILD_BUG_ON(0) that failed, so it should say 1
instead of 0. With this patch, we use __COUNTER__ instead of __LINE__, so
each BUILD_BUG_ON() gets a different function name and the correct
condition is printed:
./include/linux/compiler.h:350:38: error: call to `__compiletime_assert_0' declared with attribute error: BUILD_BUG_ON failed: 1
_compiletime_assert(condition, msg, __compiletime_assert_, __COUNTER__)
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Santos <daniel.santos@pobox.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200331112637.25047-1-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 7e2345200262e4a6056580f0231cccdaffc825f3 ]
"vm_committed_as.count" could be accessed concurrently as reported by
KCSAN,
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __vm_enough_memory / percpu_counter_add_batch
write to 0xffffffff9451c538 of 8 bytes by task 65879 on cpu 35:
percpu_counter_add_batch+0x83/0xd0
percpu_counter_add_batch at lib/percpu_counter.c:91
__vm_enough_memory+0xb9/0x260
dup_mm+0x3a4/0x8f0
copy_process+0x2458/0x3240
_do_fork+0xaa/0x9f0
__do_sys_clone+0x125/0x160
__x64_sys_clone+0x70/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb05
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
read to 0xffffffff9451c538 of 8 bytes by task 66773 on cpu 19:
__vm_enough_memory+0x199/0x260
percpu_counter_read_positive at include/linux/percpu_counter.h:81
(inlined by) __vm_enough_memory at mm/util.c:839
mmap_region+0x1b2/0xa10
do_mmap+0x45c/0x700
vm_mmap_pgoff+0xc0/0x130
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x6e/0x300
__x64_sys_mmap+0x33/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb05
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The read is outside percpu_counter::lock critical section which results in
a data race. Fix it by adding a READ_ONCE() in
percpu_counter_read_positive() which could also service as the existing
compiler memory barrier.
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1582302724-2804-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit 3f3673d7d324d872d9d8ddb73b3e5e47fbf12e0d ]
If CONFIG_DEVICE_PRIVATE is defined, but neither CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE nor
CONFIG_MIGRATION, then non_swap_entry() will return 0, meaning that the
condition (non_swap_entry(entry) && is_device_private_entry(entry)) in
zap_pte_range() will never be true even if the entry is a device private
one.
Equally any other code depending on non_swap_entry() will not function as
expected.
I originally spotted this just by looking at the code, I haven't actually
observed any problems.
Looking a bit more closely it appears that actually this situation
(currently at least) cannot occur:
DEVICE_PRIVATE depends on ZONE_DEVICE
ZONE_DEVICE depends on MEMORY_HOTREMOVE
MEMORY_HOTREMOVE depends on MIGRATION
Fixes: 5042db43cc26 ("mm/ZONE_DEVICE: new type of ZONE_DEVICE for unaddressable memory")
Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305130550.22693-1-steven.price@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit bb297bb2de517e41199185021f043bbc5d75b377 ]
When CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE is set but not CONFIG_HUGETLBFS, the following
build failure is encoutered:
In file included from arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c:33:0:
include/linux/hugetlb.h: In function 'hstate_inode':
include/linux/hugetlb.h:477:9: error: implicit declaration of function 'HUGETLBFS_SB' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
return HUGETLBFS_SB(i->i_sb)->hstate;
^
include/linux/hugetlb.h:477:30: error: invalid type argument of '->' (have 'int')
return HUGETLBFS_SB(i->i_sb)->hstate;
^
Gate hstate_inode() with CONFIG_HUGETLBFS instead of CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE.
Fixes: a137e1cc6d6e ("hugetlbfs: per mount huge page sizes")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Nishanth Aravamudan <nacc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Adam Litke <agl@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7e8c3a3c9a587b9cd8a2f146df32a421b961f3a2.1584432148.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
Link: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1255548/#2386036
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Bruce Ashfield
Chuck Lever
Borislav Petkov
Takashi Iwai
Linus Torvalds
Jason Gunthorpe
Yafang Shao
Arnd Bergmann
John Fastabend
Eric Dumazet
Cong Wang
Amir Goldstein
Christoph Hellwig
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
Willem de Bruijn
David Ahern
Thomas Pedersen
Tuowen Zhao
Marek Szyprowski
Olga Kornievskaia
Daniel Vetter
Pierre-Louis Bossart
Yuval Basson
Eugene Syromiatnikov
Waiman Long
Raymond Pang
Sergey Senozhatsky
Johannes Berg
Sean Christopherson
Jann Horn
Lars Engebretsen
Qian Cai
Vegard Nossum
Steven Price
Christophe Leroy