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commit e163fdb3f7f8c62dccf194f3f37a7bcb3c333aa8 upstream.
In my attempt to fix a memory leak, I introduced a double-free in the
pstore error path. Instead of trying to manage the allocation lifetime
between persistent_ram_new() and its callers, adjust the logic so
persistent_ram_new() always takes a kstrdup() copy, and leaves the
caller's allocation lifetime up to the caller. Therefore callers are
_always_ responsible for freeing their label. Before, it only needed
freeing when the prz itself failed to allocate, and not in any of the
other prz failure cases, which callers would have no visibility into,
which is the root design problem that lead to both the leak and now
double-free bugs.
Reported-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz@kernel.wtf>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/d4ec59002ede4aaf9928c7f7526da87c@kernel.wtf
Fixes: 8df955a32a73 ("pstore/ram: Fix error-path memory leak in persistent_ram_new() callers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 6d390e4b5d48ec03bb87e63cf0a2bff5f4e116da upstream.
'16306a61d3b7 ("fs/locks: always delete_block after waiting.")' add the
logic to check waiter->fl_blocker without blocked_lock_lock. And it will
trigger a UAF when we try to wakeup some waiter:
Thread 1 has create a write flock a on file, and now thread 2 try to
unlock and delete flock a, thread 3 try to add flock b on the same file.
Thread2 Thread3
flock syscall(create flock b)
...flock_lock_inode_wait
flock_lock_inode(will insert
our fl_blocked_member list
to flock a's fl_blocked_requests)
sleep
flock syscall(unlock)
...flock_lock_inode_wait
locks_delete_lock_ctx
...__locks_wake_up_blocks
__locks_delete_blocks(
b->fl_blocker = NULL)
...
break by a signal
locks_delete_block
b->fl_blocker == NULL &&
list_empty(&b->fl_blocked_requests)
success, return directly
locks_free_lock b
wake_up(&b->fl_waiter)
trigger UAF
Fix it by remove this logic, and this patch may also fix CVE-2019-19769.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 16306a61d3b7 ("fs/locks: always delete_block after waiting.")
Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 83c9c547168e8b914ea6398430473a4de68c52cc upstream.
Commit 85a8ce62c2ea ("block: add bio_truncate to fix guard_bio_eod")
adds bio_truncate() for handling bio EOD. However, bio_truncate()
doesn't use the passed 'op' parameter from guard_bio_eod's callers.
So bio_trunacate() may retrieve wrong 'op', and zering pages may
not be done for READ bio.
Fixes this issue by moving guard_bio_eod() after bio_set_op_attrs()
in submit_bh_wbc() so that bio_truncate() can always retrieve correct
op info.
Meantime remove the 'op' parameter from guard_bio_eod() because it isn't
used any more.
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 85a8ce62c2ea ("block: add bio_truncate to fix guard_bio_eod")
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Fold in kerneldoc and bio_op() change.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 1edc8eb2e93130e36ac74ac9c80913815a57d413 upstream.
When a filesystem is unmounted, we currently call fsnotify_sb_delete()
before evict_inodes(), which means that fsnotify_unmount_inodes()
must iterate over all inodes on the superblock looking for any inodes
with watches. This is inefficient and can lead to livelocks as it
iterates over many unwatched inodes.
At this point, SB_ACTIVE is gone and dropping refcount to zero kicks
the inode out out immediately, so anything processed by
fsnotify_sb_delete / fsnotify_unmount_inodes gets evicted in that loop.
After that, the call to evict_inodes will evict everything else with a
zero refcount.
This should speed things up overall, and avoid livelocks in
fsnotify_unmount_inodes().
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 04646aebd30b99f2cfa0182435a2ec252fcb16d0 upstream.
Anything that walks all inodes on sb->s_inodes list without rescheduling
risks softlockups.
Previous efforts were made in 2 functions, see:
c27d82f fs/drop_caches.c: avoid softlockups in drop_pagecache_sb()
ac05fbb inode: don't softlockup when evicting inodes
but there hasn't been an audit of all walkers, so do that now. This
also consistently moves the cond_resched() calls to the bottom of each
loop in cases where it already exists.
One loop remains: remove_dquot_ref(), because I'm not quite sure how
to deal with that one w/o taking the i_lock.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit db8fe64f9ce61d1d89d3c3c34d111a43afb9f053 upstream.
We have a BUG_ON(ret < 0) in find_free_extent from
btrfs_cache_block_group. If we fail to allocate our ctl we'll just
panic, which is not good. Instead just go on to another block group.
If we fail to find a block group we don't want to return ENOSPC, because
really we got a ENOMEM and that's the root of the problem. Save our
return from btrfs_cache_block_group(), and then if we still fail to make
our allocation return that ret so we get the right error back.
Tested with inject-error.py from bcc.
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 37d02592f11bb76e4ab1dcaa5b8a2a0715403207 upstream.
The branch of qgroup_rescan_init which is executed from the mount
path prints wrong errors messages. The textual print out in case
BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN/BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_ON are not
set are transposed. Fix it by exchanging their place.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 1d53c9e6723022b12e4a5ed4b141f67c834b7f6f upstream.
The btrfs writepages function collects a large range of pages flagged
for delayed allocation, and then sends them down through the COW code
for processing. When compression is on, we allocate one async_chunk
structure for every 512K, and then run those pages through the
compression code for IO submission.
writepages starts all of this off with a single page, locked by the
original call to extent_write_cache_pages(), and it's important to keep
track of this page because it has already been through
clear_page_dirty_for_io().
The btrfs async_chunk struct has a pointer to the locked_page, and when
we're redirtying the page because compression had to fallback to
uncompressed IO, we use page->index to decide if a given async_chunk
struct really owns that page.
But, this is racey. If a given delalloc range is broken up into two
async_chunks (chunkA and chunkB), we can end up with something like
this:
compress_file_range(chunkA)
submit_compress_extents(chunkA)
submit compressed bios(chunkA)
put_page(locked_page)
compress_file_range(chunkB)
...
Or:
async_cow_submit
submit_compressed_extents <--- falls back to buffered writeout
cow_file_range
extent_clear_unlock_delalloc
__process_pages_contig
put_page(locked_pages)
async_cow_submit
The end result is that chunkA is completed and cleaned up before chunkB
even starts processing. This means we can free locked_page() and reuse
it elsewhere. If we get really lucky, it'll have the same page->index
in its new home as it did before.
While we're processing chunkB, we might decide we need to fall back to
uncompressed IO, and so compress_file_range() will call
__set_page_dirty_nobufers() on chunkB->locked_page.
Without cgroups in use, this creates as a phantom dirty page, which
isn't great but isn't the end of the world. What can happen, it can go
through the fixup worker and the whole COW machinery again:
in submit_compressed_extents():
while (async extents) {
...
cow_file_range
if (!page_started ...)
extent_write_locked_range
else if (...)
unlock_page
continue;
This hasn't been observed in practice but is still possible.
With cgroups in use, we might crash in the accounting code because
page->mapping->i_wb isn't set.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000d0
IP: percpu_counter_add_batch+0x11/0x70
PGD 66534e067 P4D 66534e067 PUD 66534f067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
CPU: 16 PID: 2172 Comm: rm Not tainted
RIP: 0010:percpu_counter_add_batch+0x11/0x70
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a97bbe0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: 0000000000000090 RCX: 0000000000026115
RDX: 0000000000000030 RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: 0000000000000090
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: fffffffffffffff5 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000260c0 R11: ffff881037fc26c0 R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff880fe4111548 R14: ffffc9000a97bc90 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f5503ced480(0000) GS:ffff880ff7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000d0 CR3: 00000001e0459005 CR4: 0000000000360ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
account_page_cleaned+0x15b/0x1f0
__cancel_dirty_page+0x146/0x200
truncate_cleanup_page+0x92/0xb0
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x202/0x7d0
btrfs_evict_inode+0x92/0x5a0
evict+0xc1/0x190
do_unlinkat+0x176/0x280
do_syscall_64+0x63/0x1a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
The fix here is to make asyc_chunk->locked_page NULL everywhere but the
one async_chunk struct that's allowed to do things to the locked page.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/c2419d01-5c84-3fb4-189e-4db519d08796@suse.com/
Fixes: 771ed689d2cd ("Btrfs: Optimize compressed writeback and reads")
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
[ update changelog from mail thread discussion ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit a0cac0ec961f0d42828eeef196ac2246a2f07659 upstream.
Commit 9e0af2376434 ("Btrfs: fix task hang under heavy compressed
write") worked around the issue that a recycled work item could get a
false dependency on the original work item due to how the workqueue code
guarantees non-reentrancy. It did so by giving different work functions
to different types of work.
However, the fixes in the previous few patches are more complete, as
they prevent a work item from being recycled at all (except for a tiny
window that the kernel workqueue code handles for us). This obsoletes
the previous fix, so we don't need the unique helpers for correctness.
The only other reason to keep them would be so they show up in stack
traces, but they always seem to be optimized to a tail call, so they
don't show up anyways. So, let's just get rid of the extra indirection.
While we're here, rename normal_work_helper() to the more informative
btrfs_work_helper().
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[PG: block-group.c ---> extent-tree.c for older v5.2 code base.]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 6abf57262166b4f4294667fb5206ae7ba1ba96f5 upstream.
Running stress-test test_2 in mtd-utils on ubi device, sometimes we can
get following oops message:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff00000140
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 280a067 P4D 280a067 PUD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 60 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.2.0 #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0
-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-ubifs_0_0)
RIP: 0010:rb_next_postorder+0x2e/0xb0
Code: 80 db 03 01 48 85 ff 0f 84 97 00 00 00 48 8b 17 48 83 05 bc 80 db
03 01 48 83 e2 fc 0f 84 82 00 00 00 48 83 05 b2 80 db 03 01 <48> 3b 7a
10 48 89 d0 74 02 f3 c3 48 8b 52 08 48 83 05 a3 80 db 03
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000887758 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffff888129ae4700 RBX: ffff888138b08400 RCX: 0000000080800001
RDX: ffffffff00000130 RSI: 0000000080800024 RDI: ffff888138b08400
RBP: ffff888138b08400 R08: ffffea0004a6b920 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffc90000887740 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888128d48000
R13: 0000000000000800 R14: 000000000000011e R15: 00000000000007c8
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813ba00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffff00000140 CR3: 000000013789d000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
destroy_old_idx+0x5d/0xa0 [ubifs]
ubifs_tnc_start_commit+0x4fe/0x1380 [ubifs]
do_commit+0x3eb/0x830 [ubifs]
ubifs_run_commit+0xdc/0x1c0 [ubifs]
Above Oops are due to the slab-out-of-bounds happened in do-while of
function layout_in_gaps indirectly called by ubifs_tnc_start_commit. In
function layout_in_gaps, there is a do-while loop placing index nodes
into the gaps created by obsolete index nodes in non-empty index LEBs
until rest index nodes can totally be placed into pre-allocated empty
LEBs. @c->gap_lebs points to a memory area(integer array) which records
LEB numbers used by 'in-the-gaps' method. Whenever a fitable index LEB
is found, corresponding lnum will be incrementally written into the
memory area pointed by @c->gap_lebs. The size
((@c->lst.idx_lebs + 1) * sizeof(int)) of memory area is allocated before
do-while loop and can not be changed in the loop. But @c->lst.idx_lebs
could be increased by function ubifs_change_lp (called by
layout_leb_in_gaps->ubifs_find_dirty_idx_leb->get_idx_gc_leb) during the
loop. So, sometimes oob happens when number of cycles in do-while loop
exceeds the original value of @c->lst.idx_lebs. See detail in
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204229.
This patch fixes oob in layout_in_gaps.
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 5d1116d4c6af3e580f1ed0382ca5a94bd65a34cf upstream.
Christoph Hellwig complained about the following soft lockup warning
when running scrub after generic/175 when preemption is disabled and
slub debugging is enabled:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 22s! [xfs_scrub:161]
Modules linked in:
irq event stamp: 41692326
hardirqs last enabled at (41692325): [<ffffffff8232c3b7>] _raw_0
hardirqs last disabled at (41692326): [<ffffffff81001c5a>] trace0
softirqs last enabled at (41684994): [<ffffffff8260031f>] __do_e
softirqs last disabled at (41684987): [<ffffffff81127d8c>] irq_e0
CPU: 3 PID: 16189 Comm: xfs_scrub Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #30
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.124
RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x39/0x40
Code: 89 f3 be 01 00 00 00 e8 d5 3a e5 fe 48 89 ef e8 ed 87 e5 f2
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000233f970 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffff3
RAX: ffff88813b398040 RBX: 0000000000000286 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff88813b3988c0 RDI: ffff88813b398040
RBP: ffff888137958640 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffea00042b0c00
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88810ac32308 R15: ffff8881376fc040
FS: 00007f6113dea700(0000) GS:ffff88813bb80000(0000) knlGS:00000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6113de8ff8 CR3: 000000012f290000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
free_debug_processing+0x1dd/0x240
__slab_free+0x231/0x410
kmem_cache_free+0x30e/0x360
xchk_ag_btcur_free+0x76/0xb0
xchk_ag_free+0x10/0x80
xchk_bmap_iextent_xref.isra.14+0xd9/0x120
xchk_bmap_iextent+0x187/0x210
xchk_bmap+0x2e0/0x3b0
xfs_scrub_metadata+0x2e7/0x500
xfs_ioc_scrub_metadata+0x4a/0xa0
xfs_file_ioctl+0x58a/0xcd0
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa0/0x6f0
ksys_ioctl+0x5b/0x90
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x11/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x1a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
If preemption is disabled, all metadata buffers needed to perform the
scrub are already in memory, and there are a lot of records to check,
it's possible that the scrub thread will run for an extended period of
time without sleeping for IO or any other reason. Then the watchdog
timer or the RCU stall timeout can trigger, producing the backtrace
above.
To fix this problem, call cond_resched() from the scrub thread so that
we back out to the scheduler whenever necessary.
Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 6b2daec19094a90435abe67d16fb43b1a5527254 upstream.
Unlike FICLONE, all of those take a pointer argument; they do need
compat_ptr() applied to arg.
Fixes: d79bdd52d8be ("vfs: wire up compat ioctl for CLONE/CLONE_RANGE")
Fixes: 54dbc1517237 ("vfs: hoist the btrfs deduplication ioctl to the vfs")
Fixes: ceac204e1da9 ("fs: make fiemap work from compat_ioctl")
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 69738cfdfa7032f45d9e7462d24490e61cf163dd upstream.
According to the comment in the code and commit log, some apps
expect atime >= mtime; but the introduced code results in
atime==mtime. Fix the comparison to guard against atime<mtime.
Fixes: 9b9c5bea0b96 ("cifs: do not return atime less than mtime")
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: stfrench@microsoft.com
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit df3df923b31d298c3d3653a0380202b9f2df9864 upstream.
We don't care about module aliasing validation in
cifs_compose_mount_options(..., is_smb3) when finding the root SMB
session of an DFS namespace in order to refresh DFS referral cache.
The following issue has been observed when mounting with '-t smb3' and
then specifying 'vers=2.0':
...
Nov 08 15:27:08 tw kernel: address conversion returned 0 for FS0.WIN.LOCAL
Nov 08 15:27:08 tw kernel: [kworke] ==> dns_query((null),FS0.WIN.LOCAL,13,(null))
Nov 08 15:27:08 tw kernel: [kworke] call request_key(,FS0.WIN.LOCAL,)
Nov 08 15:27:08 tw kernel: [kworke] ==> dns_resolver_cmp(FS0.WIN.LOCAL,FS0.WIN.LOCAL)
Nov 08 15:27:08 tw kernel: [kworke] <== dns_resolver_cmp() = 1
Nov 08 15:27:08 tw kernel: [kworke] <== dns_query() = 13
Nov 08 15:27:08 tw kernel: fs/cifs/dns_resolve.c: dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip: resolved: FS0.WIN.LOCAL to 192.168.30.26
===> Nov 08 15:27:08 tw kernel: CIFS VFS: vers=2.0 not permitted when mounting with smb3
Nov 08 15:27:08 tw kernel: fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c: CIFS VFS: leaving refresh_tcon (xid = 26) rc = -22
...
Fixes: 5072010ccf05 ("cifs: Fix DFS cache refresher for DFS links")
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 69ffe5960df16938bccfe1b65382af0b3de51265 upstream.
Commit 5b094d6dac04 ("xfs: fix multi-AG deadlock in xfs_bunmapi") added
a check in __xfs_bunmapi() to stop early if we would touch multiple AGs
in the wrong order. However, this check isn't applicable for realtime
files. In most cases, it just makes us do unnecessary commits. However,
without the fix from the previous commit ("xfs: fix realtime file data
space leak"), if the last and second-to-last extents also happen to have
different "AG numbers", then the break actually causes __xfs_bunmapi()
to return without making any progress, which sends
xfs_itruncate_extents_flags() into an infinite loop.
Fixes: 5b094d6dac04 ("xfs: fix multi-AG deadlock in xfs_bunmapi")
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 84a1f5b1cc6fd7f6cd99fc5630c36f631b19fa60 upstream.
We used to skip reconnects on all SMB2_IOCTL commands due to SMB3+
FSCTL_VALIDATE_NEGOTIATE_INFO - which made sense since we're still
establishing a SMB session.
However, when refresh_cache_worker() calls smb2_get_dfs_refer() and
we're under reconnect, SMB2_ioctl() will not be able to get a proper
status error (e.g. -EHOSTDOWN in case we failed to reconnect) but an
-EAGAIN from cifs_send_recv() thus looping forever in
refresh_cache_worker().
Fixes: e99c63e4d86d ("SMB3: Fix deadlock in validate negotiate hits reconnect")
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Suggested-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 6e73e92b155c868ff7fce9d108839668caf1d9be upstream.
When running an nfs stress test, I see quite a few cached replies that
don't match up with the actual request. The first comment in
replay_matches_cache() makes sense, but the code doesn't seem to
match... fix it.
This isn't exactly a bugfix, as the server isn't required to catch every
case of a false retry. So, we may as well do this, but if this is
fixing a problem then that suggests there's a client bug.
Fixes: 53da6a53e1d4 ("nfsd4: catch some false session retries")
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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|
commit de7999afedff02c6631feab3ea726a0e8f8c3d40 upstream.
When starting writeback for a range that covers part of a preallocated
extent, due to a race with writeback for another range that also covers
another part of the same preallocated extent, we can end up in an infinite
loop.
Consider the following example where for inode 280 we have two dirty
ranges:
range A, from 294912 to 303103, 8192 bytes
range B, from 348160 to 438271, 90112 bytes
and we have the following file extent item layout for our inode:
leaf 38895616 gen 24544 total ptrs 29 free space 13820 owner 5
(...)
item 27 key (280 108 200704) itemoff 14598 itemsize 53
extent data disk bytenr 0 nr 0 type 1 (regular)
extent data offset 0 nr 94208 ram 94208
item 28 key (280 108 294912) itemoff 14545 itemsize 53
extent data disk bytenr 10433052672 nr 81920 type 2 (prealloc)
extent data offset 0 nr 81920 ram 81920
Then the following happens:
1) Writeback starts for range B (from 348160 to 438271), execution of
run_delalloc_nocow() starts;
2) The first iteration of run_delalloc_nocow()'s whil loop leaves us at
the extent item at slot 28, pointing to the prealloc extent item
covering the range from 294912 to 376831. This extent covers part of
our range;
3) An ordered extent is created against that extent, covering the file
range from 348160 to 376831 (28672 bytes);
4) We adjust 'cur_offset' to 376832 and move on to the next iteration of
the while loop;
5) The call to btrfs_lookup_file_extent() leaves us at the same leaf,
pointing to slot 29, 1 slot after the last item (the extent item
we processed in the previous iteration);
6) Because we are a slot beyond the last item, we call btrfs_next_leaf(),
which releases the search path before doing a another search for the
last key of the leaf (280 108 294912);
7) Right after btrfs_next_leaf() released the path, and before it did
another search for the last key of the leaf, writeback for the range
A (from 294912 to 303103) completes (it was previously started at
some point);
8) Upon completion of the ordered extent for range A, the prealloc extent
we previously found got split into two extent items, one covering the
range from 294912 to 303103 (8192 bytes), with a type of regular extent
(and no longer prealloc) and another covering the range from 303104 to
376831 (73728 bytes), with a type of prealloc and an offset of 8192
bytes. So our leaf now has the following layout:
leaf 38895616 gen 24544 total ptrs 31 free space 13664 owner 5
(...)
item 27 key (280 108 200704) itemoff 14598 itemsize 53
extent data disk bytenr 0 nr 0 type 1
extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 94208
item 28 key (280 108 208896) itemoff 14545 itemsize 53
extent data disk bytenr 10433142784 nr 86016 type 1
extent data offset 0 nr 86016 ram 86016
item 29 key (280 108 294912) itemoff 14492 itemsize 53
extent data disk bytenr 10433052672 nr 81920 type 1
extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 81920
item 30 key (280 108 303104) itemoff 14439 itemsize 53
extent data disk bytenr 10433052672 nr 81920 type 2
extent data offset 8192 nr 73728 ram 81920
9) After btrfs_next_leaf() returns, we have our path pointing to that same
leaf and at slot 30, since it has a key we didn't have before and it's
the first key greater then the key that was previously the last key of
the leaf (key (280 108 294912));
10) The extent item at slot 30 covers the range from 303104 to 376831
which is in our target range, so we process it, despite having already
created an ordered extent against this extent for the file range from
348160 to 376831. This is because we skip to the next extent item only
if its end is less than or equals to the start of our delalloc range,
and not less than or equals to the current offset ('cur_offset');
11) As a result we compute 'num_bytes' as:
num_bytes = min(end + 1, extent_end) - cur_offset;
= min(438271 + 1, 376832) - 376832 = 0
12) We then call create_io_em() for a 0 bytes range starting at offset
376832;
13) Then create_io_em() enters an infinite loop because its calls to
btrfs_drop_extent_cache() do nothing due to the 0 length range
passed to it. So no existing extent maps that cover the offset
376832 get removed, and therefore calls to add_extent_mapping()
return -EEXIST, resulting in an infinite loop. This loop from
create_io_em() is the following:
do {
btrfs_drop_extent_cache(BTRFS_I(inode), em->start,
em->start + em->len - 1, 0);
write_lock(&em_tree->lock);
ret = add_extent_mapping(em_tree, em, 1);
write_unlock(&em_tree->lock);
/*
* The caller has taken lock_extent(), who could race with us
* to add em?
*/
} while (ret == -EEXIST);
Also, each call to btrfs_drop_extent_cache() triggers a warning because
the start offset passed to it (376832) is smaller then the end offset
(376832 - 1) passed to it by -1, due to the 0 length:
[258532.052621] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[258532.052643] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9987 at fs/btrfs/file.c:602 btrfs_drop_extent_cache+0x3f4/0x590 [btrfs]
(...)
[258532.052672] CPU: 0 PID: 9987 Comm: fsx Tainted: G W 5.4.0-rc7-btrfs-next-64 #1
[258532.052673] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[258532.052691] RIP: 0010:btrfs_drop_extent_cache+0x3f4/0x590 [btrfs]
(...)
[258532.052695] RSP: 0018:ffffb4be0153f860 EFLAGS: 00010287
[258532.052700] RAX: ffff975b445ee360 RBX: ffff975b44eb3e08 RCX: 0000000000000000
[258532.052700] RDX: 0000000000038fff RSI: 0000000000039000 RDI: ffff975b445ee308
[258532.052700] RBP: 0000000000038fff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[258532.052701] R10: ffff975b513c5c10 R11: 00000000e3c0cfa9 R12: 0000000000039000
[258532.052703] R13: ffff975b445ee360 R14: 00000000ffffffef R15: ffff975b445ee308
[258532.052705] FS: 00007f86a821de80(0000) GS:ffff975b76a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[258532.052707] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[258532.052708] CR2: 00007fdacf0f3ab4 CR3: 00000001f9d26002 CR4: 00000000003606f0
[258532.052712] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[258532.052717] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[258532.052717] Call Trace:
[258532.052718] ? preempt_schedule_common+0x32/0x70
[258532.052722] ? ___preempt_schedule+0x16/0x20
[258532.052741] create_io_em+0xff/0x180 [btrfs]
[258532.052767] run_delalloc_nocow+0x942/0xb10 [btrfs]
[258532.052791] btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x30b/0x520 [btrfs]
[258532.052812] ? find_lock_delalloc_range+0x221/0x250 [btrfs]
[258532.052834] writepage_delalloc+0xe4/0x140 [btrfs]
[258532.052855] __extent_writepage+0x110/0x4e0 [btrfs]
[258532.052876] extent_write_cache_pages+0x21c/0x480 [btrfs]
[258532.052906] extent_writepages+0x52/0xb0 [btrfs]
[258532.052911] do_writepages+0x23/0x80
[258532.052915] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xd2/0x110
[258532.052938] btrfs_fdatawrite_range+0x1b/0x50 [btrfs]
[258532.052954] start_ordered_ops+0x57/0xa0 [btrfs]
[258532.052973] ? btrfs_sync_file+0x225/0x490 [btrfs]
[258532.052988] btrfs_sync_file+0x225/0x490 [btrfs]
[258532.052997] __x64_sys_msync+0x199/0x200
[258532.053004] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x250
[258532.053007] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[258532.053010] RIP: 0033:0x7f86a7dfd760
(...)
[258532.053014] RSP: 002b:00007ffd99af0368 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000001a
[258532.053016] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000ec9 RCX: 00007f86a7dfd760
[258532.053017] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000000000000836c RDI: 00007f86a8221000
[258532.053019] RBP: 0000000000021ec9 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 00007f86a812037c
[258532.053020] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000074a3
[258532.053021] R13: 00007f86a8221000 R14: 000000000000836c R15: 0000000000000001
[258532.053032] irq event stamp: 1653450494
[258532.053035] hardirqs last enabled at (1653450493): [<ffffffff9dec69f9>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x50
[258532.053037] hardirqs last disabled at (1653450494): [<ffffffff9d4048ea>] trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x20
[258532.053039] softirqs last enabled at (1653449852): [<ffffffff9e200466>] __do_softirq+0x466/0x6bd
[258532.053042] softirqs last disabled at (1653449845): [<ffffffff9d4c8a0c>] irq_exit+0xec/0x120
[258532.053043] ---[ end trace 8476fce13d9ce20a ]---
Which results in flooding dmesg/syslog since btrfs_drop_extent_cache()
uses WARN_ON() and not WARN_ON_ONCE().
So fix this issue by changing run_delalloc_nocow()'s loop to move to the
next extent item when the current extent item ends at at offset less than
or equals to the current offset instead of the start offset.
Fixes: 80ff385665b7fc ("Btrfs: update nodatacow code v2")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[PG: drop update to comment not present in v5.2.x]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
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commit 98ca480a8f22fdbd768e3dad07024c8d4856576c upstream.
An ino is unsigned, so display it as such in /proc/locks.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 8df955a32a73315055e0cd187cbb1cea5820394b upstream.
For callers that allocated a label for persistent_ram_new(), if the call
fails, they must clean up the allocation.
Suggested-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Fixes: 1227daa43bce ("pstore/ram: Clarify resource reservation labels")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191211191353.14385-1-navid.emamdoost@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 9e5f1c19800b808a37fb9815a26d382132c26c3d upstream.
The ram_core.c routines treat przs as circular buffers. When writing a
new crash dump, the old buffer needs to be cleared so that the new dump
doesn't end up in the wrong place (i.e. at the end).
The solution to this problem is to reset the circular buffer state before
writing a new Oops dump.
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Yashkin <a.yashkin@inango-systems.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Merinov <n.merinov@inango-systems.com>
Signed-off-by: Ariel Gilman <a.gilman@inango-systems.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191223133816.28155-1-n.merinov@inango-systems.com
Fixes: 896fc1f0c4c6 ("pstore/ram: Switch to persistent_ram routines")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 85a8ce62c2eabe28b9d76ca4eecf37922402df93 upstream.
Some filesystem, such as vfat, may send bio which crosses device boundary,
and the worse thing is that the IO request starting within device boundaries
can contain more than one segment past EOD.
Commit dce30ca9e3b6 ("fs: fix guard_bio_eod to check for real EOD errors")
tries to fix this issue by returning -EIO for this situation. However,
this way lets fs user code lose chance to handle -EIO, then sync_inodes_sb()
may hang for ever.
Also the current truncating on last segment is dangerous by updating the
last bvec, given bvec table becomes not immutable any more, and fs bio
users may not retrieve the truncated pages via bio_for_each_segment_all() in
its .end_io callback.
Fixes this issue by supporting multi-segment truncating. And the
approach is simpler:
- just update bio size since block layer can make correct bvec with
the updated bio size. Then bvec table becomes really immutable.
- zero all truncated segments for read bio
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Fixed-by: dce30ca9e3b6 ("fs: fix guard_bio_eod to check for real EOD errors")
Reported-by: syzbot+2b9e54155c8c25d8d165@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 1da4bd9f9d187f53618890d7b66b9628bbec3c70 upstream.
Fix the lookup method on the dynamic root directory such that creation
calls, such as mkdir, open(O_CREAT), symlink, etc. fail with EOPNOTSUPP
rather than failing with some odd error (such as EEXIST).
lookup() itself tries to create automount directories when it is invoked.
These are cached locally in RAM and not committed to storage.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Tested-by: Jonathan Billings <jsbillings@jsbillings.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 158d58335393af3956a9c06f0816ee75ed1f1447 upstream.
Each AFS mountpoint has strings that define the target to be mounted. This
is required to end in a dot that is supposed to be stripped off. The
string can include suffixes of ".readonly" or ".backup" - which are
supposed to come before the terminal dot. To add to the confusion, the "fs
lsmount" afs utility does not show the terminal dot when displaying the
string.
The kernel mount source string parser, however, assumes that the terminal
dot marks the suffix and that the suffix is always "" and is thus ignored.
In most cases, there is no suffix and this is not a problem - but if there
is a suffix, it is lost and this affects the ability to mount the correct
volume.
The command line mount command, on the other hand, is expected not to
include a terminal dot - so the problem doesn't arise there.
Fix this by making sure that the dot exists and then stripping it when
passing the string to the mount configuration.
Fixes: bec5eb614130 ("AFS: Implement an autocell mount capability [ver #2]")
Reported-by: Jonathan Billings <jsbillings@jsbillings.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Tested-by: Jonathan Billings <jsbillings@jsbillings.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit bcbccaf2edcf1b76f73f890e968babef446151a4 upstream.
Make the AFS dynamic root superblock R/W so that SELinux can set the
security label on it. Without this, upgrades to, say, the Fedora
filesystem-afs RPM fail if afs is mounted on it because the SELinux label
can't be (re-)applied.
It might be better to make it possible to bypass the R/O check for LSM
label application through setxattr.
Fixes: 4d673da14533 ("afs: Support the AFS dynamic root")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 9bd0160d12370a076e44f8d1320cde9c83f2c647 upstream.
afs_find_server tries to find a server that has an address that
matches the transport address of an rxrpc peer. The code assumes
that the transport address is always ipv6, with ipv4 represented
as ipv4 mapped addresses, but that's not the case. If the transport
family is AF_INET, srx->transport.sin6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[] will
be beyond the actual ipv4 address and will always be 0, and all
ipv4 addresses will be seen as matching.
As a result, the first ipv4 address seen on any server will be
considered a match, and the server returned may be the wrong one.
One of the consequences is that callbacks received over ipv4 will
only be correctly applied for the server that happens to have the
first ipv4 address on the fs_addresses4 list. Callbacks over ipv4
from all other servers are dropped, causing the client to serve stale
data.
This is fixed by looking at the transport family, and comparing ipv4
addresses based on a sockaddr_in structure rather than a sockaddr_in6.
Fixes: d2ddc776a458 ("afs: Overhaul volume and server record caching and fileserver rotation")
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 5.2.34 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Sat 07 Mar 2020 07:25:00 PM EST
# gpg: using RSA key EBCE84042C07D1D6
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit 15f0ec941f4f908fefa23a30ded8358977cc1cc0 upstream.
LTP memfd_create04 started failing for some huge page sizes
after v5.4-10135-gc3bfc5dd73c6.
The problem is the check introduced to for_each_hstate() loop that
should skip default_hstate_idx. Since it doesn't update 'i' counter,
all subsequent huge page sizes are skipped as well.
Fixes: 8fc312b32b25 ("mm/hugetlbfs: fix error handling when setting up mounts")
Signed-off-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 798a9cada4694ca8d970259f216cec47e675bfd5 upstream.
syzbot (via KASAN) reports a use-after-free in the error path of
xlog_alloc_log(). Specifically, the iclog freeing loop doesn't
handle the case of a fully initialized ->l_iclog linked list.
Instead, it assumes that the list is partially constructed and NULL
terminated.
This bug manifested because there was no possible error scenario
after iclog list setup when the original code was added. Subsequent
code and associated error conditions were added some time later,
while the original error handling code was never updated. Fix up the
error loop to terminate either on a NULL iclog or reaching the end
of the list.
Reported-by: syzbot+c732f8644185de340492@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 3c1c24d91ffd536de0a64688a9df7f49e58fadbc upstream.
A while ago Andy noticed
(http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrWY+5ynDct7eU_nDUqx=okQvjm=Y5wJvA4ahBja=CQXGw@mail.gmail.com)
that UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK used by an unprivileged user may have
security implications.
As the first step of the solution the following patch limits the availably
of UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK only for those having CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
The usage of CAP_SYS_PTRACE ensures compatibility with CRIU.
Yet, if there are other users of non-cooperative userfaultfd that run
without CAP_SYS_PTRACE, they would be broken :(
Current implementation of UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK modifies the file
descriptor table from the read() implementation of uffd, which may have
security implications for unprivileged use of the userfaultfd.
Limit availability of UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK only for callers that have
CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1572967777-8812-2-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Nosh Minwalla <nosh@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <ovzxemul@gmail.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 8fc312b32b25c6b0a8b46fab4df8c68df5af1223 upstream.
It is assumed that the hugetlbfs_vfsmount[] array will contain either a
valid vfsmount pointer or NULL for each hstate after initialization.
Changes made while converting to use fs_context broke this assumption.
While fixing the hugetlbfs_vfsmount issue, it was discovered that
init_hugetlbfs_fs never did correctly clean up when encountering a vfs
mount error.
It was found during code inspection. A small memory allocation failure
would be the most likely cause of taking a error path with the bug.
This is unlikely to happen as this is early init code.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/94b6244d-2c24-e269-b12c-e3ba694b242d@oracle.com
Reported-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net>
Fixes: 32021982a324 ("hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context")
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 188c523e1c271d537f3c9f55b6b65bf4476de32f upstream.
Fix a static code checker warning:
fs/ocfs2/acl.c:331
ocfs2_acl_chmod() warn: passing zero to 'PTR_ERR'
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1dee278b-6c96-eec2-ce76-fe6e07c6e20f@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: 5ee0fbd50fd ("ocfs2: revert using ocfs2_acl_chmod to avoid inode cluster lock hang")
Signed-off-by: Ding Xiang <dingxiang@cmss.chinamobile.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 8354d88efdab72b4da32fc4f032448fcef22dab4 upstream.
Ensure we grab an active reference in cifs superblock while doing
failover to prevent automounts (DFS links) of expiring and then
destroying the superblock pointer.
This patch fixes the following KASAN report:
[ 464.301462] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in
cifs_reconnect+0x6ab/0x1350
[ 464.303052] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888155e580d0 by task
cifsd/1107
[ 464.304682] CPU: 3 PID: 1107 Comm: cifsd Not tainted 5.4.0-rc4+ #13
[ 464.305552] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009),
BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
[ 464.307146] Call Trace:
[ 464.307875] dump_stack+0x5b/0x90
[ 464.308631] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x16/0x200
[ 464.309478] ? cifs_reconnect+0x6ab/0x1350
[ 464.310253] ? cifs_reconnect+0x6ab/0x1350
[ 464.311040] __kasan_report.cold+0x1a/0x41
[ 464.311811] ? cifs_reconnect+0x6ab/0x1350
[ 464.312563] kasan_report+0xe/0x20
[ 464.313300] cifs_reconnect+0x6ab/0x1350
[ 464.314062] ? extract_hostname.part.0+0x90/0x90
[ 464.314829] ? printk+0xad/0xde
[ 464.315525] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x7c/0xd0
[ 464.316252] ? _raw_read_lock_irq+0x40/0x40
[ 464.316961] ? ___ratelimit+0xed/0x182
[ 464.317655] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x289/0x3b0
[ 464.318386] cifs_read_from_socket+0x98/0xd0
[ 464.319078] ? cifs_readv_from_socket+0x3b0/0x3b0
[ 464.319782] ? try_to_wake_up+0x43c/0xa90
[ 464.320463] ? cifs_small_buf_get+0x4b/0x60
[ 464.321173] ? allocate_buffers+0x98/0x1a0
[ 464.321856] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x218/0x14a0
[ 464.322558] ? cifs_handle_standard+0x270/0x270
[ 464.323237] ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
[ 464.323893] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
[ 464.324554] ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
[ 464.325226] ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
[ 464.325863] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
[ 464.326505] ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
[ 464.327161] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
[ 464.327784] ? finish_task_switch+0xa1/0x330
[ 464.328414] ? __switch_to+0x363/0x640
[ 464.329044] ? __schedule+0x575/0xaf0
[ 464.329655] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x82/0xe0
[ 464.330301] kthread+0x1a3/0x1f0
[ 464.330884] ? cifs_handle_standard+0x270/0x270
[ 464.331624] ? kthread_create_on_node+0xd0/0xd0
[ 464.332347] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 464.333577] Allocated by task 1110:
[ 464.334381] save_stack+0x1b/0x80
[ 464.335123] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0
[ 464.335848] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0xd4/0xb00
[ 464.336619] legacy_get_tree+0x6b/0xa0
[ 464.337235] vfs_get_tree+0x41/0x110
[ 464.337975] fc_mount+0xa/0x40
[ 464.338557] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x6c/0x80
[ 464.339227] cifs_dfs_d_automount+0x336/0xd29
[ 464.339846] follow_managed+0x1b1/0x450
[ 464.340449] lookup_fast+0x231/0x4a0
[ 464.341039] path_openat+0x240/0x1fd0
[ 464.341634] do_filp_open+0x126/0x1c0
[ 464.342277] do_sys_open+0x1eb/0x2c0
[ 464.342957] do_syscall_64+0x5e/0x190
[ 464.343555] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 464.344772] Freed by task 0:
[ 464.345347] save_stack+0x1b/0x80
[ 464.345966] __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x170
[ 464.346576] kfree+0xa6/0x270
[ 464.347211] rcu_core+0x39c/0xc80
[ 464.347800] __do_softirq+0x10d/0x3da
[ 464.348919] The buggy address belongs to the object at
ffff888155e58000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
[ 464.350222] The buggy address is located 208 bytes inside of
256-byte region [ffff888155e58000, ffff888155e58100)
[ 464.351575] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 464.352333] page:ffffea0005579600 refcount:1 mapcount:0
mapping:ffff88815a803400 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 464.353583] flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head)
[ 464.354209] raw: 0200000000010200 ffffea0005576200 0000000400000004
ffff88815a803400
[ 464.355353] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff
0000000000000000
[ 464.356458] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 464.367005] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 464.367787] ffff888155e57f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
fc fc fc fc
[ 464.368877] ffff888155e58000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
fb fb fb fb
[ 464.369967] >ffff888155e58080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
fb fb fb fb
[ 464.371111] ^
[ 464.371775] ffff888155e58100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
fc fc fc fc
[ 464.372893] ffff888155e58180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
fc fc fc fc
[ 464.373983] ==================================================================
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit e9f930ac88a8936ccc2d021110c98810cf5aa810 upstream.
Naresh reported LTP diotest4 failing for 32bit x86 and arm -next
kernels on ext4. Same problem exists in 5.4-rc7 on xfs.
The failure comes down to:
openat(AT_FDCWD, "testdata-4.5918", O_RDWR|O_DIRECT) = 4
mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7f7b000
read(4, 0xb7f7b000, 4096) = 0 // expects -EFAULT
Problem is conversion at iomap_dio_bio_actor() return. Ternary
operator has a return type and an attempt is made to convert each
of operands to the type of the other. In this case "ret" (int)
is converted to type of "copied" (unsigned long). Both have size
of 4 bytes:
size_t copied = 0;
int ret = -14;
long long actor_ret = copied ? copied : ret;
On x86_64: actor_ret == -14;
On x86 : actor_ret == 4294967282
Replace ternary operator with 2 return statements to avoid this
unwanted conversion.
Fixes: 4721a6010990 ("iomap: dio data corruption and spurious errors when pipes fill")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 6fcbcec9cfc7b3c6a2c1f1a23ebacedff7073e0a upstream.
Quota statistics counted as 64-bit per-cpu counter. Reading sums per-cpu
fractions as signed 64-bit int, filters negative values and then reports
lower half as signed 32-bit int.
Result may looks like:
fs.quota.allocated_dquots = 22327
fs.quota.cache_hits = -489852115
fs.quota.drops = -487288718
fs.quota.free_dquots = 22083
fs.quota.lookups = -486883485
fs.quota.reads = 22327
fs.quota.syncs = 335064
fs.quota.writes = 3088689
Values bigger than 2^31-1 reported as negative.
All counters except "allocated_dquots" and "free_dquots" are monotonic,
thus they should be reported as is without filtering negative values.
Kernel doesn't have generic helper for 64-bit sysctl yet,
let's use at least unsigned long.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/157337934693.2078.9842146413181153727.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 2a60637f06ac94869b2e630eaf837110d39bf291 upstream.
As Eric reported:
RENAME_EXCHANGE support was just added to fsstress in xfstests:
commit 65dfd40a97b6bbbd2a22538977bab355c5bc0f06
Author: kaixuxia <xiakaixu1987@gmail.com>
Date: Thu Oct 31 14:41:48 2019 +0800
fsstress: add EXCHANGE renameat2 support
This is causing xfstest generic/579 to fail due to fsck.f2fs reporting errors.
I'm not sure what the problem is, but it still happens even with all the
fs-verity stuff in the test commented out, so that the test just runs fsstress.
generic/579 23s ... [10:02:25]
[ 7.745370] run fstests generic/579 at 2019-11-04 10:02:25
_check_generic_filesystem: filesystem on /dev/vdc is inconsistent
(see /results/f2fs/results-default/generic/579.full for details)
[10:02:47]
Ran: generic/579
Failures: generic/579
Failed 1 of 1 tests
Xunit report: /results/f2fs/results-default/result.xml
Here's the contents of 579.full:
_check_generic_filesystem: filesystem on /dev/vdc is inconsistent
*** fsck.f2fs output ***
[ASSERT] (__chk_dots_dentries:1378) --> Bad inode number[0x24] for '..', parent parent ino is [0xd10]
The root cause is that we forgot to update directory's i_pino during
cross_rename, fix it.
Fixes: 32f9bc25cbda0 ("f2fs: support ->rename2()")
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 015c6033068208d6227612c878877919f3fcf6b6 upstream.
jbd2 statistics counting number of blocks logged in a transaction was
wrong. It didn't count the commit block and more importantly it didn't
count revoke descriptor blocks. Make sure these get properly counted.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191105164437.32602-13-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 2e9b51d78229d5145725a481bb5464ebc0a3f9b2 upstream.
This patch addresses what Dave Chinner had discovered and fixed within
commit: 7684e2c4384d. This changes does not have any user visible
impact for ext4 as none of the current users of ext4_iomap_begin()
that extend files depend on IOMAP_F_DIRTY.
When doing a direct IO that spans the current EOF, and there are
written blocks beyond EOF that extend beyond the current write, the
only metadata update that needs to be done is a file size extension.
However, we don't mark such iomaps as IOMAP_F_DIRTY to indicate that
there is IO completion metadata updates required, and hence we may
fail to correctly sync file size extensions made in IO completion when
O_DSYNC writes are being used and the hardware supports FUA.
Hence when setting IOMAP_F_DIRTY, we need to also take into account
whether the iomap spans the current EOF. If it does, then we need to
mark it dirty so that IO completion will call generic_write_sync() to
flush the inode size update to stable storage correctly.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Bobrowski <mbobrowski@mbobrowski.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8b43ee9ee94bee5328da56ba0909b7d2229ef150.1572949325.git.mbobrowski@mbobrowski.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 548feebec7e93e58b647dba70b3303dcb569c914 upstream.
This patch updates the lock pattern in ext4_direct_IO_read() to not
block on inode lock in cases of IOCB_NOWAIT direct I/O reads. The
locking condition implemented here is similar to that of 942491c9e6d6
("xfs: fix AIM7 regression").
Fixes: 16c54688592c ("ext4: Allow parallel DIO reads")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Bobrowski <mbobrowski@mbobrowski.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c5d5e759f91747359fbd2c6f9a36240cf75ad79f.1572949325.git.mbobrowski@mbobrowski.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit fe1897eaa6646f5a64a4cee0e6473ed9887d324b upstream.
generic/018 reports an inconsistent status of atime, the
testcase is as below:
- open file with O_SYNC
- write file to construct fraged space
- calc md5 of file
- record {a,c,m}time
- defrag file --- do nothing
- umount & mount
- check {a,c,m}time
The root cause is, as f2fs enables lazytime by default, atime
update will dirty vfs inode, rather than dirtying f2fs inode (by set
with FI_DIRTY_INODE), so later f2fs_write_inode() called from VFS will
fail to update inode page due to our skip:
f2fs_write_inode()
if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE))
return 0;
So eventually, after evict(), we lose last atime for ever.
To fix this issue, we need to check whether {a,c,m,cr}time is
consistent in between inode cache and inode page, and only skip
f2fs_update_inode() if f2fs inode is not dirty and time is
consistent as well.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 6404674acd596de41fd3ad5f267b4525494a891a upstream.
Brown paperbag time: fetching ->i_uid/->i_mode really should've been
done from nd->inode. I even suggested that, but the reason for that has
slipped through the cracks and I went for dir->d_inode instead - made
for more "obvious" patch.
Analysis:
- at the entry into do_last() and all the way to step_into(): dir (aka
nd->path.dentry) is known not to have been freed; so's nd->inode and
it's equal to dir->d_inode unless we are already doomed to -ECHILD.
inode of the file to get opened is not known.
- after step_into(): inode of the file to get opened is known; dir
might be pointing to freed memory/be negative/etc.
- at the call of may_create_in_sticky(): guaranteed to be out of RCU
mode; inode of the file to get opened is known and pinned; dir might
be garbage.
The last was the reason for the original patch. Except that at the
do_last() entry we can be in RCU mode and it is possible that
nd->path.dentry->d_inode has already changed under us.
In that case we are going to fail with -ECHILD, but we need to be
careful; nd->inode is pointing to valid struct inode and it's the same
as nd->path.dentry->d_inode in "won't fail with -ECHILD" case, so we
should use that.
Reported-by: "Rantala, Tommi T. (Nokia - FI/Espoo)" <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+190005201ced78a74ad6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Wearing-brown-paperbag: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: d0cb50185ae9 ("do_last(): fetch directory ->i_mode and ->i_uid before it's too late")
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit d0cb50185ae942b03c4327be322055d622dc79f6 upstream.
may_create_in_sticky() call is done when we already have dropped the
reference to dir.
Fixes: 30aba6656f61e (namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit af133ade9a40794a37104ecbcc2827c0ea373a3c upstream.
When journal size is set too big by "mkfs.ext4 -J size=", or when
we mount a crafted image to make journal inode->i_size too big,
the loop, "while (i < num)", holds cpu too long. This could cause
soft lockup.
[ 529.357541] Call trace:
[ 529.357551] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x198
[ 529.357555] show_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 529.357562] dump_stack+0xa4/0xcc
[ 529.357568] watchdog_timer_fn+0x300/0x3e8
[ 529.357574] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x114/0x358
[ 529.357576] hrtimer_interrupt+0x104/0x2d8
[ 529.357580] arch_timer_handler_virt+0x38/0x58
[ 529.357584] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x90/0x248
[ 529.357588] generic_handle_irq+0x34/0x50
[ 529.357590] __handle_domain_irq+0x68/0xc0
[ 529.357593] gic_handle_irq+0x6c/0x150
[ 529.357595] el1_irq+0xb8/0x140
[ 529.357599] __ll_sc_atomic_add_return_acquire+0x14/0x20
[ 529.357668] ext4_map_blocks+0x64/0x5c0 [ext4]
[ 529.357693] ext4_setup_system_zone+0x330/0x458 [ext4]
[ 529.357717] ext4_fill_super+0x2170/0x2ba8 [ext4]
[ 529.357722] mount_bdev+0x1a8/0x1e8
[ 529.357746] ext4_mount+0x44/0x58 [ext4]
[ 529.357748] mount_fs+0x50/0x170
[ 529.357752] vfs_kern_mount.part.9+0x54/0x188
[ 529.357755] do_mount+0x5ac/0xd78
[ 529.357758] ksys_mount+0x9c/0x118
[ 529.357760] __arm64_sys_mount+0x28/0x38
[ 529.357764] el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130
[ 529.357766] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
[ 529.357769] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 541.356516] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 23s! [mount:18674]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200211011752.29242-1-luoshijie1@huawei.com
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Shijie Luo <luoshijie1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 5.2.33 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Tue 25 Feb 2020 12:02:41 AM EST
# gpg: using RSA key EBCE84042C07D1D6
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit 4f97a68192bd33b9963b400759cef0ca5963af00 upstream.
A recent commit, 9803387c55f7 ("ext4: validate the
debug_want_extra_isize mount option at parse time"), moved mount-time
checks around. One of those changes moved the inode size check before
the blocksize variable was set to the blocksize of the file system.
After 9803387c55f7 was set to the minimum allowable blocksize, which
in practice on most systems would be 1024 bytes. This cuased file
systems with inode sizes larger than 1024 bytes to be rejected with a
message:
EXT4-fs (sdXX): unsupported inode size: 4096
Fixes: 9803387c55f7 ("ext4: validate the debug_want_extra_isize mount option at parse time")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200206225252.GA3673@mit.edu
Reported-by: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 9803387c55f7d2ce69aa64340c5fdc6b3027dbc8 upstream.
Instead of setting s_want_extra_size and then making sure that it is a
valid value afterwards, validate the field before we set it. This
avoids races and other problems when remounting the file system.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191215063020.GA11512@mit.edu
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+4a39a025912b265cacef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[PG: use 4.19.102-stable version of backport.]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 7f420d64a08c1dcd65b27be82a27cf2bdb2e7847 upstream.
We need to unlock the xattr before returning on this error path.
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.13
Fixes: c03b45b853f5 ("ext4, project: expand inode extra size if possible")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191213185010.6k7yl2tck3wlsdkt@kili.mountain
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 109ba779d6cca2d519c5dd624a3276d03e21948e upstream.
ext4_check_dir_entry() currently does not catch a case when a directory
entry ends so close to the block end that the header of the next
directory entry would not fit in the remaining space. This can lead to
directory iteration code trying to access address beyond end of current
buffer head leading to oops.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191202170213.4761-3-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 64d4ce892383b2ad6d782e080d25502f91bf2a38 upstream.
Function ext4_empty_dir() doesn't correctly handle directories with
holes and crashes on bh->b_data dereference when bh is NULL. Reorganize
the loop to use 'offset' variable all the times instead of comparing
pointers to current direntry with bh->b_data pointer. Also add more
strict checking of '.' and '..' directory entries to avoid entering loop
in possibly invalid state on corrupted filesystems.
References: CVE-2019-19037
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4e19d6b65fb4 ("ext4: allow directory holes")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191202170213.4761-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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