| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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This is the 5.10.216 stable release
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# gpg: Signature made Thu 02 May 2024 10:23:53 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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This is the 5.10.215 stable release
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# gpg: Signature made Sat 13 Apr 2024 07:00:40 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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Linux 5.10.214
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# gpg: Signature made Tue 26 Mar 2024 06:40:54 PM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key E27E5D8A3403A2EF66873BBCDEA66FF797772CDC
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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Linux 5.10.213
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# gpg: Signature made Fri 15 Mar 2024 03:02:12 PM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key E27E5D8A3403A2EF66873BBCDEA66FF797772CDC
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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This is the 5.10.212 stable release
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# gpg: Signature made Wed 06 Mar 2024 09:37:55 AM EST
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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This is the 5.10.211 stable release
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# gpg: Signature made Fri 01 Mar 2024 07:16:57 AM EST
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit 2f7ef5bb4a2f3e481ef05fab946edb97c84f67cf upstream.
Syzbot reported the following information leak for in
btrfs_ioctl_logical_to_ino():
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x110 lib/usercopy.c:40
instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
_copy_to_user+0xbc/0x110 lib/usercopy.c:40
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:191 [inline]
btrfs_ioctl_logical_to_ino+0x440/0x750 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3499
btrfs_ioctl+0x714/0x1260
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x261/0x450 fs/ioctl.c:890
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x96/0xe0 fs/ioctl.c:890
x64_sys_call+0x1883/0x3b50 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Uninit was created at:
__kmalloc_large_node+0x231/0x370 mm/slub.c:3921
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3954 [inline]
__kmalloc_node+0xb07/0x1060 mm/slub.c:3973
kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:648 [inline]
kvmalloc_node+0xc0/0x2d0 mm/util.c:634
kvmalloc include/linux/slab.h:766 [inline]
init_data_container+0x49/0x1e0 fs/btrfs/backref.c:2779
btrfs_ioctl_logical_to_ino+0x17c/0x750 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3480
btrfs_ioctl+0x714/0x1260
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x261/0x450 fs/ioctl.c:890
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x96/0xe0 fs/ioctl.c:890
x64_sys_call+0x1883/0x3b50 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Bytes 40-65535 of 65536 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 65536 starts at ffff888045a40000
This happens, because we're copying a 'struct btrfs_data_container' back
to user-space. This btrfs_data_container is allocated in
'init_data_container()' via kvmalloc(), which does not zero-fill the
memory.
Fix this by using kvzalloc() which zeroes out the memory on allocation.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reported-by: <syzbot+510a1abbb8116eeb341d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <Johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c4a7dc9523b59b3e73fd522c73e95e072f876b16 upstream.
The size of the nilfs_type_by_mode array in the fs/nilfs2/dir.c file is
defined as "S_IFMT >> S_SHIFT", but the nilfs_set_de_type() function,
which uses this array, specifies the index to read from the array in the
same way as "(mode & S_IFMT) >> S_SHIFT".
static void nilfs_set_de_type(struct nilfs_dir_entry *de, struct inode
*inode)
{
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
de->file_type = nilfs_type_by_mode[(mode & S_IFMT)>>S_SHIFT]; // oob
}
However, when the index is determined this way, an out-of-bounds (OOB)
error occurs by referring to an index that is 1 larger than the array size
when the condition "mode & S_IFMT == S_IFMT" is satisfied. Therefore, a
patch to resize the nilfs_type_by_mode array should be applied to prevent
OOB errors.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415182048.7144-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+2e22057de05b9f3b30d8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2e22057de05b9f3b30d8
Fixes: 2ba466d74ed7 ("nilfs2: directory entry operations")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a90bca2228c0646fc29a72689d308e5fe03e6d78 upstream.
The sysfs_break_active_protection() routine has an obvious reference
leak in its error path. If the call to kernfs_find_and_get() fails then
kn will be NULL, so the companion sysfs_unbreak_active_protection()
routine won't get called (and would only cause an access violation by
trying to dereference kn->parent if it was called). As a result, the
reference to kobj acquired at the start of the function will never be
released.
Fix the leak by adding an explicit kobject_put() call when kn is NULL.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Fixes: 2afc9166f79b ("scsi: sysfs: Introduce sysfs_{un,}break_active_protection()")
Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8a4d3f0f-c5e3-4b70-a188-0ca433f9e6f9@rowland.harvard.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 71537e35c324ea6fbd68377a4f26bb93a831ae35 ]
When running delayed inode updates, we do not record the inode's root in
the transaction, but we do allocate PREALLOC and thus converted PERTRANS
space for it. To be sure we free that PERTRANS meta rsv, we must ensure
that we record the root in the transaction.
Fixes: 4f5427ccce5d ("btrfs: delayed-inode: Use new qgroup meta rsv for delayed inode and item")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 141fb8cd206ace23c02cd2791c6da52c1d77d42a upstream.
We use add_root_meta_rsv and sub_root_meta_rsv to track prealloc and
pertrans reservations for subvolumes when quotas are enabled. The
convert function does not properly increment pertrans after decrementing
prealloc, so the count is not accurate.
Note: we check that the fs is not read-only to mirror the logic in
qgroup_convert_meta, which checks that before adding to the pertrans rsv.
Fixes: 8287475a2055 ("btrfs: qgroup: Use root::qgroup_meta_rsv_* to record qgroup meta reserved space")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d8b945fa475f13d787df00c26a6dc45a3e2e1d1d ]
There's issue as follows When do IO fault injection test:
Quota error (device dm-3): find_block_dqentry: Quota for id 101 referenced but not present
Quota error (device dm-3): qtree_read_dquot: Can't read quota structure for id 101
Quota error (device dm-3): do_check_range: Getting block 2021161007 out of range 1-186
Quota error (device dm-3): qtree_read_dquot: Can't read quota structure for id 661
Now, ext4_write_dquot()/ext4_acquire_dquot()/ext4_release_dquot() may commit
inconsistent quota data even if process failed. This may lead to filesystem
corruption.
To ensure filesystem consistent when errors=remount-ro there is need to call
ext4_handle_error() to abort journal.
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119062908.3598806-1-yebin10@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 68ee261fb15457ecb17e3683cb4e6a4792ca5b71 ]
If one group is marked as block bitmap corrupted, its free blocks cannot
be used and its free count is also deducted from the global
sbi->s_freeclusters_counter. User might be confused about the absent
free space because we can't query the information about corrupted block
groups except unreliable error messages in syslog. So add a hint to show
block bitmap corrupted groups in mb_groups.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119061154.1525781-1-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4243bf80c79211a8ca2795401add9c4a3b1d37ca ]
I have a CD copy of the original Tom Clancy's Ghost Recon game from
2001. The disc mounts without error on Windows, but on Linux mounting
fails with the message "isofs_fill_super: get root inode failed". The
error originates in isofs_read_inode, which returns -EIO because de_len
is 0. The superblock on this disc appears to be intentionally corrupt as
a form of copy protection.
When the root inode is unusable, instead of giving up immediately, try
to continue with the Joliet file table. This fixes the Ghost Recon CD
and probably other copy-protected CDs too.
Signed-off-by: Alex Henrie <alexhenrie24@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-Id: <20240208022134.451490-1-alexhenrie24@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f123dc86388cb669c3d6322702dc441abc35c31e ]
syzbot is reporting sleep in atomic context in SysV filesystem [1], for
sb_bread() is called with rw_spinlock held.
A "write_lock(&pointers_lock) => read_lock(&pointers_lock) deadlock" bug
and a "sb_bread() with write_lock(&pointers_lock)" bug were introduced by
"Replace BKL for chain locking with sysvfs-private rwlock" in Linux 2.5.12.
Then, "[PATCH] err1-40: sysvfs locking fix" in Linux 2.6.8 fixed the
former bug by moving pointers_lock lock to the callers, but instead
introduced a "sb_bread() with read_lock(&pointers_lock)" bug (which made
this problem easier to hit).
Al Viro suggested that why not to do like get_branch()/get_block()/
find_shared() in Minix filesystem does. And doing like that is almost a
revert of "[PATCH] err1-40: sysvfs locking fix" except that get_branch()
from with find_shared() is called without write_lock(&pointers_lock).
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+69b40dc5fd40f32c199f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=69b40dc5fd40f32c199f
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0d195f93-a22a-49a2-0020-103534d6f7f6@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3c6ee34c6f9cd12802326da26631232a61743501 ]
Change BUG_ON to proper error handling if building the path buffer
fails. The pointers are not printed so we don't accidentally leak kernel
addresses.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 26b66d1d366a375745755ca7365f67110bbf6bd5 ]
The get_parent handler looks up a parent of a given dentry, this can be
either a subvolume or a directory. The search is set up with offset -1
but it's never expected to find such item, as it would break allowed
range of inode number or a root id. This means it's a corruption (ext4
also returns this error code).
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7411055db5ce64f836aaffd422396af0075fdc99 ]
The unhandled case in btrfs_relocate_sys_chunks() loop is a corruption,
as it could be caused only by two impossible conditions:
- at first the search key is set up to look for a chunk tree item, with
offset -1, this is an inexact search and the key->offset will contain
the correct offset upon a successful search, a valid chunk tree item
cannot have an offset -1
- after first successful search, the found_key corresponds to a chunk
item, the offset is decremented by 1 before the next loop, it's
impossible to find a chunk item there due to alignment and size
constraints
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 98bc7e26e14fbb26a6abf97603d59532475e97f8 ]
kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory
which can be NULL upon failure. Ensure the allocation was successful
by checking the pointer validity.
Signed-off-by: Kunwu Chan <chentao@kylinos.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240118100206.213928-1-chentao@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit de3f64b738af57e2732b91a0774facc675b75b54 upstream.
If an load_nls_xxx() function fails a few lines above, the 'sbi->bdi_id' is
still 0.
So, in the error handling path, we will call ida_simple_remove(..., 0)
which is not allocated yet.
In order to prevent a spurious "ida_free called for id=0 which is not
allocated." message, tweak the error handling path and add a new label.
Fixes: 0fd169576648 ("fs: Add VirtualBox guest shared folder (vboxsf) support")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d09eaaa4e2e08206c58a1a27ca9b3e81dc168773.1698835730.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2aea94ac14d1e0a8ae9e34febebe208213ba72f7 upstream.
In NOMMU kernel the value of linux_binprm::p is the offset inside the
temporary program arguments array maintained in separate pages in the
linux_binprm::page. linux_binprm::exec being a copy of linux_binprm::p
thus must be adjusted when that array is copied to the user stack.
Without that adjustment the value passed by the NOMMU kernel to the ELF
program in the AT_EXECFN entry of the aux array doesn't make any sense
and it may break programs that try to access memory pointed to by that
entry.
Adjust linux_binprm::exec before the successful return from the
transfer_args_to_stack().
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: b6a2fea39318 ("mm: variable length argument support")
Fixes: 5edc2a5123a7 ("binfmt_elf_fdpic: wire up AT_EXECFD, AT_EXECFN, AT_SECURE")
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240320182607.1472887-1-jcmvbkbc@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c853a5783ebe123847886d432354931874367292 upstream.
Instead of using kmalloc() to allocate btrfs_ioctl_defrag_range_args,
allocate btrfs_ioctl_defrag_range_args on stack, the size is reasonably
small and ioctls are called in process context.
sizeof(btrfs_ioctl_defrag_range_args) = 48
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ This patch is needed to fix a memory leak of "range" that was
introduced when commit 173431b274a9 ("btrfs: defrag: reject unknown
flags of btrfs_ioctl_defrag_range_args") was backported to kernels
lacking this patch. Now with these two patches applied in reverse order,
range->flags needed to change back to range.flags.
This bug was discovered and resolved using Coverity Static Analysis
Security Testing (SAST) by Synopsys, Inc.]
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 961ebd120565cb60cebe21cb634fbc456022db4a upstream.
The first kiocb_set_cancel_fn() argument may point at a struct kiocb
that is not embedded inside struct aio_kiocb. With the current code,
depending on the compiler, the req->ki_ctx read happens either before
the IOCB_AIO_RW test or after that test. Move the req->ki_ctx read such
that it is guaranteed that the IOCB_AIO_RW test happens first.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <ben@communityfibre.ca>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@scylladb.com>
Cc: Sandeep Dhavale <dhavale@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b820de741ae4 ("fs/aio: Restrict kiocb_set_cancel_fn() to I/O submitted via libaio")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240304235715.3790858-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 269cdf353b5bdd15f1a079671b0f889113865f20 ]
Fix a bug where nilfs_get_block() returns a successful status when
searching and inserting the specified block both fail inconsistently. If
this inconsistent behavior is not due to a previously fixed bug, then an
unexpected race is occurring, so return a temporary error -EAGAIN instead.
This prevents callers such as __block_write_begin_int() from requesting a
read into a buffer that is not mapped, which would cause the BUG_ON check
for the BH_Mapped flag in submit_bh_wbc() to fail.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240313105827.5296-3-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Fixes: 1f5abe7e7dbc ("nilfs2: replace BUG_ON and BUG calls triggerable from ioctl")
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f2f26b4a84a0ef41791bd2d70861c8eac748f4ba ]
Patch series "nilfs2: fix kernel bug at submit_bh_wbc()".
This resolves a kernel BUG reported by syzbot. Since there are two
flaws involved, I've made each one a separate patch.
The first patch alone resolves the syzbot-reported bug, but I think
both fixes should be sent to stable, so I've tagged them as such.
This patch (of 2):
Syzbot has reported a kernel bug in submit_bh_wbc() when writing file data
to a nilfs2 file system whose metadata is corrupted.
There are two flaws involved in this issue.
The first flaw is that when nilfs_get_block() locates a data block using
btree or direct mapping, if the disk address translation routine
nilfs_dat_translate() fails with internal code -ENOENT due to DAT metadata
corruption, it can be passed back to nilfs_get_block(). This causes
nilfs_get_block() to misidentify an existing block as non-existent,
causing both data block lookup and insertion to fail inconsistently.
The second flaw is that nilfs_get_block() returns a successful status in
this inconsistent state. This causes the caller __block_write_begin_int()
or others to request a read even though the buffer is not mapped,
resulting in a BUG_ON check for the BH_Mapped flag in submit_bh_wbc()
failing.
This fixes the first issue by changing the return value to code -EINVAL
when a conversion using DAT fails with code -ENOENT, avoiding the
conflicting condition that leads to the kernel bug described above. Here,
code -EINVAL indicates that metadata corruption was detected during the
block lookup, which will be properly handled as a file system error and
converted to -EIO when passing through the nilfs2 bmap layer.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240313105827.5296-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240313105827.5296-2-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Fixes: c3a7abf06ce7 ("nilfs2: support contiguous lookup of blocks")
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+cfed5b56649bddf80d6e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=cfed5b56649bddf80d6e
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 17f46b803d4f23c66cacce81db35fef3adb8f2af ]
In production we have been hitting the following warning consistently
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 17 PID: 1800359 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x9c/0xe0
Workqueue: nfsiod nfs_direct_write_schedule_work [nfs]
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x9c/0xe0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x9f/0x130
? refcount_warn_saturate+0x9c/0xe0
? report_bug+0xcc/0x150
? handle_bug+0x3d/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x40
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? refcount_warn_saturate+0x9c/0xe0
nfs_direct_write_schedule_work+0x237/0x250 [nfs]
process_one_work+0x12f/0x4a0
worker_thread+0x14e/0x3b0
? ZSTD_getCParams_internal+0x220/0x220
kthread+0xdc/0x120
? __btf_name_valid+0xa0/0xa0
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
This is because we're completing the nfs_direct_request twice in a row.
The source of this is when we have our commit requests to submit, we
process them and send them off, and then in the completion path for the
commit requests we have
if (nfs_commit_end(cinfo.mds))
nfs_direct_write_complete(dreq);
However since we're submitting asynchronous requests we sometimes have
one that completes before we submit the next one, so we end up calling
complete on the nfs_direct_request twice.
The only other place we use nfs_generic_commit_list() is in
__nfs_commit_inode, which wraps this call in a
nfs_commit_begin();
nfs_commit_end();
Which is a common pattern for this style of completion handling, one
that is also repeated in the direct code with get_dreq()/put_dreq()
calls around where we process events as well as in the completion paths.
Fix this by using the same pattern for the commit requests.
Before with my 200 node rocksdb stress running this warning would pop
every 10ish minutes. With my patch the stress test has been running for
several hours without popping.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a6b3bfe176e8a5b05ec4447404e412c2a3fc92cc ]
We observed a corruption during on-line resize of a file system that is
larger than 16 TiB with 4k block size. With having more then 2^32 blocks
resize_inode is turned off by default by mke2fs. The issue can be
reproduced on a smaller file system for convenience by explicitly
turning off resize_inode. An on-line resize across an 8 GiB boundary (the
size of a meta block group in this setup) then leads to a corruption:
dev=/dev/<some_dev> # should be >= 16 GiB
mkdir -p /corruption
/sbin/mke2fs -t ext4 -b 4096 -O ^resize_inode $dev $((2 * 2**21 - 2**15))
mount -t ext4 $dev /corruption
dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 of=/corruption/test count=$((2*2**21 - 4*2**15))
sha1sum /corruption/test
# 79d2658b39dcfd77274e435b0934028adafaab11 /corruption/test
/sbin/resize2fs $dev $((2*2**21))
# drop page cache to force reload the block from disk
echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
sha1sum /corruption/test
# 3c2abc63cbf1a94c9e6977e0fbd72cd832c4d5c3 /corruption/test
2^21 = 2^15*2^6 equals 8 GiB whereof 2^15 is the number of blocks per
block group and 2^6 are the number of block groups that make a meta
block group.
The last checksum might be different depending on how the file is laid
out across the physical blocks. The actual corruption occurs at physical
block 63*2^15 = 2064384 which would be the location of the backup of the
meta block group's block descriptor. During the on-line resize the file
system will be converted to meta_bg starting at s_first_meta_bg which is
2 in the example - meaning all block groups after 16 GiB. However, in
ext4_flex_group_add we might add block groups that are not part of the
first meta block group yet. In the reproducer we achieved this by
substracting the size of a whole block group from the point where the
meta block group would start. This must be considered when updating the
backup block group descriptors to follow the non-meta_bg layout. The fix
is to add a test whether the group to add is already part of the meta
block group or not.
Fixes: 01f795f9e0d67 ("ext4: add online resizing support for meta_bg and 64-bit file systems")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de>
Tested-by: Srivathsa Dara <srivathsa.d.dara@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Srivathsa Dara <srivathsa.d.dara@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240215155009.94493-1-mheyne@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ae6bd7f9b46a29af52ebfac25d395757e2031d0d ]
At contains_pending_extent() the value of the end offset of a chunk we
found in the device's allocation state io tree is inclusive, so when
we calculate the length we pass to the in_range() macro, we must sum
1 to the expression "physical_end - physical_offset".
In practice the wrong calculation should be harmless as chunks sizes
are never 1 byte and we should never have 1 byte ranges of unallocated
space. Nevertheless fix the wrong calculation.
Reported-by: Alex Lyakas <alex.lyakas@zadara.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAOcd+r30e-f4R-5x-S7sV22RJPe7+pgwherA6xqN2_qe7o4XTg@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 1c11b63eff2a ("btrfs: replace pending/pinned chunks lists with io tree")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b1fe686a765e6c0d71811d825b5a1585a202b777 ]
The root inode is assumed to be always hashed. Do not unhash the root
inode even if it is marked BAD.
Fixes: 5d069dbe8aaf ("fuse: fix bad inode")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.11
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 68ca1b49e430f6534d0774a94147a823e3b8b26e ]
The root inode has a fixed nodeid and generation (1, 0).
Prior to the commit 15db16837a35 ("fuse: fix illegal access to inode with
reused nodeid") generation number on lookup was ignored. After this commit
lookup with the wrong generation number resulted in the inode being
unhashed. This is correct for non-root inodes, but replacing the root
inode is wrong and results in weird behavior.
Fix by reverting to the old behavior if ignoring the generation for the
root inode, but issuing a warning in dmesg.
Reported-by: Antonio SJ Musumeci <trapexit@spawn.link>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAOQ4uxhek5ytdN8Yz2tNEOg5ea4NkBb4nk0FGPjPk_9nz-VG3g@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 15db16837a35 ("fuse: fix illegal access to inode with reused nodeid")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.14
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 723012cab779eee8228376754e22c6594229bf8f ]
Page cache reads are lockless, so setting the freshly allocated page
uptodate before we've overwritten it with the data it's supposed to have
in it will allow a simultaneous reader to see old data. Move the call
to SetPageUptodate into ubifs_write_end(), which is after we copied the
new data into the page.
Fixes: 1e51764a3c2a ("UBIFS: add new flash file system")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit fde2497d2bc3a063d8af88b258dbadc86bd7b57c ]
When fat_encode_fh_nostale() encodes file handle without a parent it
stores only first 10 bytes of the file handle. However the length of the
file handle must be a multiple of 4 so the file handle is actually 12
bytes long and the last two bytes remain uninitialized. This is not
great at we potentially leak uninitialized information with the handle
to userspace. Properly initialize the full handle length.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240205122626.13701-1-jack@suse.cz
Reported-by: syzbot+3ce5dea5b1539ff36769@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: ea3983ace6b7 ("fat: restructure export_operations")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4fbf8bc733d14bceb16dda46a3f5e19c6a9621c5 ]
When yangerkun review commit 93cdf49f6eca ("ext4: Fix best extent lstart
adjustment logic in ext4_mb_new_inode_pa()"), it was found that the best
extent did not completely cover the original request after adjusting the
best extent lstart in ext4_mb_new_inode_pa() as follows:
original request: 2/10(8)
normalized request: 0/64(64)
best extent: 0/9(9)
When we check if best ex can be kept at start of goal, ac_o_ex.fe_logical
is 2 less than the adjusted best extent logical end 9, so we think the
adjustment is done. But obviously 0/9(9) doesn't cover 2/10(8), so we
should determine here if the original request logical end is less than or
equal to the adjusted best extent logical end.
In addition, add a comment stating when adjusted best_ex will not cover
the original request, and remove the duplicate assertion because adjusting
lstart makes no change to b_ex.fe_len.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3630fa7f-b432-7afd-5f79-781bc3b2c5ea@huawei.com
Fixes: 93cdf49f6eca ("ext4: Fix best extent lstart adjustment logic in ext4_mb_new_inode_pa()")
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240201141845.1879253-1-libaokun1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0aec3847d044273733285dcff90afda89ad461d2 ]
This reverts commit 57e9d49c54528c49b8bffe6d99d782ea051ea534.
This undoes the hiding of .__afsXXXX silly-rename files. The problem with
hiding them is that rm can't then manually delete them.
This also reverts commit 5f7a07646655fb4108da527565dcdc80124b14c4 ("afs: Fix
endless loop in directory parsing") as that's a bugfix for the above.
Fixes: 57e9d49c5452 ("afs: Hide silly-rename files from userspace")
Reported-by: Markus Suvanto <markus.suvanto@gmail.com>
Link: https://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-afs/2024-February/008102.html
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3085695.1710328121@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey E Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 698ad1a538da0b6bf969cfee630b4e3a026afb87 ]
The intent is to check if 'dest' is truncated or not. So, >= should be
used instead of >, because strlcat() returns the length of 'dest' and 'src'
excluding the trailing NULL.
Fixes: 56463e50d1fc ("NFS: Use super.c for NFSROOT mount option parsing")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit bcac8bff90a6ee1629f90669cdb9d28fb86049b0 ]
Switch order of operations to avoid creating a short XDR buffer:
e.g., buflen = 12, old xdrlen = 12, new xdrlen = 20.
Having a short XDR buffer leads to lxa_maxcount be a few bytes
less than what is needed to retrieve the whole list when using
a buflen as returned by a call with size = 0:
buflen = listxattr(path, NULL, 0);
buf = malloc(buflen);
buflen = listxattr(path, buf, buflen);
For a file with one attribute (name = '123456'), the first call
with size = 0 will return buflen = 12 ('user.123456\x00').
The second call with size = 12, sends LISTXATTRS with
lxa_maxcount = 12 + 8 (cookie) + 4 (array count) = 24. The
XDR buffer needs 8 (cookie) + 4 (array count) + 4 (name count)
+ 6 (name len) + 2 (padding) + 4 (eof) = 28 which is 4 bytes
shorter than the lxa_maxcount provided in the call.
Fixes: 04a5da690e8f ("NFSv4.2: define limits and sizes for user xattr handling")
Signed-off-by: Jorge Mora <mora@netapp.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 251a658bbfceafb4d58c76b77682c8bf7bcfad65 ]
A call to listxattr() with a buffer size = 0 returns the actual
size of the buffer needed for a subsequent call. When size > 0,
nfs4_listxattr() does not return an error because either
generic_listxattr() or nfs4_listxattr_nfs4_label() consumes
exactly all the bytes then size is 0 when calling
nfs4_listxattr_nfs4_user() which then triggers the following
kernel BUG:
[ 99.403778] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
[ 99.404063] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
[ 99.408463] CPU: 0 PID: 3310 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.6.0-61.fc40.aarch64 #1
[ 99.415827] Call trace:
[ 99.415985] usercopy_abort+0x70/0xa0
[ 99.416227] __check_heap_object+0x134/0x158
[ 99.416505] check_heap_object+0x150/0x188
[ 99.416696] __check_object_size.part.0+0x78/0x168
[ 99.416886] __check_object_size+0x28/0x40
[ 99.417078] listxattr+0x8c/0x120
[ 99.417252] path_listxattr+0x78/0xe0
[ 99.417476] __arm64_sys_listxattr+0x28/0x40
[ 99.417723] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x100
[ 99.417929] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0
[ 99.418186] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
[ 99.418376] el0_svc+0x3c/0x110
[ 99.418554] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130
[ 99.418788] el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198
[ 99.418994] Code: aa0003e3 d000a3e0 91310000 97f49bdb (d4210000)
Issue is reproduced when generic_listxattr() returns 'system.nfs4_acl',
thus calling lisxattr() with size = 16 will trigger the bug.
Add check on nfs4_listxattr() to return ERANGE error when it is
called with size > 0 and the return value is greater than size.
Fixes: 012a211abd5d ("NFSv4.2: hook in the user extended attribute handlers")
Signed-off-by: Jorge Mora <mora@netapp.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit eb8fbaa53374e0a2d4381190abfe708481517bbb ]
Compressed cluster may not be released due to we can fail in
release_compress_blocks(), fix to handle reserved compressed
cluster correctly in reserve_compress_blocks().
Fixes: 4c8ff7095bef ("f2fs: support data compression")
Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <shengyong@oppo.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 179b8c97ebf63429589f5afeba59a181fe70603e ]
Dquot pointers in i_dquot array in the inode are protected by
dquot_srcu. Annotate the array pointers with __rcu, perform the locked
dereferences with srcu_dereference_check() instead of plain reads, and
set the array elements with rcu_assign_pointer().
Fixes: b9ba6f94b238 ("quota: remove dqptr_sem")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202402061900.rTuYDlo6-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit d0aa72604fbd80c8aabb46eda00535ed35570f1f ]
Below race may cause NULL pointer dereference
P1 P2
dquot_free_inode quota_off
drop_dquot_ref
remove_dquot_ref
dquots = i_dquot(inode)
dquots = i_dquot(inode)
srcu_read_lock
dquots[cnt]) != NULL (1)
dquots[type] = NULL (2)
spin_lock(&dquots[cnt]->dq_dqb_lock) (3)
....
If dquot_free_inode(or other routines) checks inode's quota pointers (1)
before quota_off sets it to NULL(2) and use it (3) after that, NULL pointer
dereference will be triggered.
So let's fix it by using a temporary pointer to avoid this issue.
Signed-off-by: Wang Jianjian <wangjianjian3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-Id: <20240202081852.2514092-1-wangjianjian3@huawei.com>
Stable-dep-of: 179b8c97ebf6 ("quota: Fix rcu annotations of inode dquot pointers")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 7bce48f0fec602b3b6c335963b26d9eefa417788 ]
As Honza said, remove_inode_dquot_ref() currently does not release the
last dquot reference but instead adds the dquot to tofree_head list. This
is because dqput() can sleep while dropping of the last dquot reference
(writing back the dquot and calling ->release_dquot()) and that must not
happen under dq_list_lock. Now that dqput() queues the final dquot cleanup
into a workqueue, remove_inode_dquot_ref() can call dqput() unconditionally
and we can significantly simplify it.
Here we open code the simplified code of remove_inode_dquot_ref() into
remove_dquot_ref() and remove the function put_dquot_list() which is no
longer used.
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-Id: <20230630110822.3881712-6-libaokun1@huawei.com>
Stable-dep-of: 179b8c97ebf6 ("quota: Fix rcu annotations of inode dquot pointers")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ddb9fd7a544088ed70eccbb9f85e9cc9952131c1 ]
A while ago, we changed the way that select() and poll() preallocate
a temporary buffer just under the size of the static warning limit of
1024 bytes, as clang was frequently going slightly above that limit.
The warnings have recently returned and I took another look. As it turns
out, clang is not actually inherently worse at reserving stack space,
it just happens to inline do_select() into core_sys_select(), while gcc
never inlines it.
Annotate do_select() to never be inlined and in turn remove the special
case for the allocation size. This should give the same behavior for
both clang and gcc all the time and once more avoids those warnings.
Fixes: ad312f95d41c ("fs/select: avoid clang stack usage warning")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240216202352.2492798-1-arnd@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3948abaa4e2be938ccdfc289385a27342fb13d43 ]
syzbot identified a kernel information leak vulnerability in
do_sys_name_to_handle() and issued the following report [1].
[1]
"BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:40
instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
_copy_to_user+0xbc/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:40
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:191 [inline]
do_sys_name_to_handle fs/fhandle.c:73 [inline]
__do_sys_name_to_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:112 [inline]
__se_sys_name_to_handle_at+0x949/0xb10 fs/fhandle.c:94
__x64_sys_name_to_handle_at+0xe4/0x140 fs/fhandle.c:94
...
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]
__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5c9/0x970 mm/slub.c:3517
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:1006 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x121/0x3c0 mm/slab_common.c:1020
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline]
do_sys_name_to_handle fs/fhandle.c:39 [inline]
__do_sys_name_to_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:112 [inline]
__se_sys_name_to_handle_at+0x441/0xb10 fs/fhandle.c:94
__x64_sys_name_to_handle_at+0xe4/0x140 fs/fhandle.c:94
...
Bytes 18-19 of 20 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 20 starts at ffff888128a46380
Data copied to user address 0000000020000240"
Per Chuck Lever's suggestion, use kzalloc() instead of kmalloc() to
solve the problem.
Fixes: 990d6c2d7aee ("vfs: Add name to file handle conversion support")
Suggested-by: Chuck Lever III <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: <syzbot+09b349b3066c2e0b1e96@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119153906.4367-1-n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e656c7a9e59607d1672d85ffa9a89031876ffe67 ]
For shared memory of type SHM_HUGETLB, hugetlb pages are reserved in
shmget() call. If SHM_NORESERVE flags is specified then the hugetlb pages
are not reserved. However when the shared memory is attached with the
shmat() call the hugetlb pages are getting reserved incorrectly for
SHM_HUGETLB shared memory created with SHM_NORESERVE which is a bug.
-------------------------------
Following test shows the issue.
$cat shmhtb.c
int main()
{
int shmflags = 0660 | IPC_CREAT | SHM_HUGETLB | SHM_NORESERVE;
int shmid;
shmid = shmget(SKEY, SHMSZ, shmflags);
if (shmid < 0)
{
printf("shmat: shmget() failed, %d\n", errno);
return 1;
}
printf("After shmget()\n");
system("cat /proc/meminfo | grep -i hugepages_");
shmat(shmid, NULL, 0);
printf("\nAfter shmat()\n");
system("cat /proc/meminfo | grep -i hugepages_");
shmctl(shmid, IPC_RMID, NULL);
return 0;
}
#sysctl -w vm.nr_hugepages=20
#./shmhtb
After shmget()
HugePages_Total: 20
HugePages_Free: 20
HugePages_Rsvd: 0
HugePages_Surp: 0
After shmat()
HugePages_Total: 20
HugePages_Free: 20
HugePages_Rsvd: 5 <--
HugePages_Surp: 0
--------------------------------
Fix is to ensure that hugetlb pages are not reserved for SHM_HUGETLB shared
memory in the shmat() call.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1706040282-12388-1-git-send-email-prakash.sangappa@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Prakash Sangappa <prakash.sangappa@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 33b8f84a4ee78491a8f4f9e4c5520c9da4a10983 ]
While reviewing a bug in hugetlb_reserve_pages, it was noticed that all
callers ignore the return value. Any failure is considered an ENOMEM
error by the callers.
Change the function to be of type bool. The function will return true if
the reservation was successful, false otherwise. Callers currently assume
a zero return code indicates success. Change the callers to look for true
to indicate success. No functional change, only code cleanup.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201221192542.15732-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: e656c7a9e596 ("mm: hugetlb pages should not be reserved by shmat() if SHM_NORESERVE")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit acf795dc161f3cf481db20f05db4250714e375e5 ]
ext4_da_map_blocks() only hold i_data_sem in shared mode and i_rwsem
when inserting delalloc extents, it could be raced by another querying
path of ext4_map_blocks() without i_rwsem, .e.g buffered read path.
Suppose we buffered read a file containing just a hole, and without any
cached extents tree, then it is raced by another delayed buffered write
to the same area or the near area belongs to the same hole, and the new
delalloc extent could be overwritten to a hole extent.
pread() pwrite()
filemap_read_folio()
ext4_mpage_readpages()
ext4_map_blocks()
down_read(i_data_sem)
ext4_ext_determine_hole()
//find hole
ext4_ext_put_gap_in_cache()
ext4_es_find_extent_range()
//no delalloc extent
ext4_da_map_blocks()
down_read(i_data_sem)
ext4_insert_delayed_block()
//insert delalloc extent
ext4_es_insert_extent()
//overwrite delalloc extent to hole
This race could lead to inconsistent delalloc extents tree and
incorrect reserved space counter. Fix this by converting to hold
i_data_sem in exclusive mode when adding a new delalloc extent in
ext4_da_map_blocks().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240127015825.1608160-3-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3fcc2b887a1ba4c1f45319cd8c54daa263ecbc36 ]
Refactor and cleanup ext4_da_map_blocks(), reduce some unnecessary
parameters and branches, no logic changes.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240127015825.1608160-2-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: acf795dc161f ("ext4: convert to exclusive lock while inserting delalloc extents")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6c120399cde6b1b5cf65ce403765c579fb3d3e50 ]
Now ext4_es_insert_extent() never return error, so make it return void.
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230424033846.4732-12-libaokun1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: acf795dc161f ("ext4: convert to exclusive lock while inserting delalloc extents")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 79d72c68c58784a3e1cd2378669d51bfd0cb7498 upstream.
When configuring a hugetlb filesystem via the fsconfig() syscall, there is
a possible NULL dereference in hugetlbfs_fill_super() caused by assigning
NULL to ctx->hstate in hugetlbfs_parse_param() when the requested pagesize
is non valid.
E.g: Taking the following steps:
fd = fsopen("hugetlbfs", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC);
fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "pagesize", "1024", 0);
fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0);
Given that the requested "pagesize" is invalid, ctxt->hstate will be replaced
with NULL, losing its previous value, and we will print an error:
...
...
case Opt_pagesize:
ps = memparse(param->string, &rest);
ctx->hstate = h;
if (!ctx->hstate) {
pr_err("Unsupported page size %lu MB\n", ps / SZ_1M);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
...
...
This is a problem because later on, we will dereference ctxt->hstate in
hugetlbfs_fill_super()
...
...
sb->s_blocksize = huge_page_size(ctx->hstate);
...
...
Causing below Oops.
Fix this by replacing cxt->hstate value only when then pagesize is known
to be valid.
kernel: hugetlbfs: Unsupported page size 0 MB
kernel: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
kernel: #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
kernel: #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
kernel: PGD 800000010f66c067 P4D 800000010f66c067 PUD 1b22f8067 PMD 0
kernel: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
kernel: CPU: 4 PID: 5659 Comm: syscall Tainted: G E 6.8.0-rc2-default+ #22 5a47c3fef76212addcc6eb71344aabc35190ae8f
kernel: Hardware name: Intel Corp. GROVEPORT/GROVEPORT, BIOS GVPRCRB1.86B.0016.D04.1705030402 05/03/2017
kernel: RIP: 0010:hugetlbfs_fill_super+0xb4/0x1a0
kernel: Code: 48 8b 3b e8 3e c6 ed ff 48 85 c0 48 89 45 20 0f 84 d6 00 00 00 48 b8 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 7f 4c 89 e7 49 89 44 24 20 48 8b 03 <8b> 48 28 b8 00 10 00 00 48 d3 e0 49 89 44 24 18 48 8b 03 8b 40 28
kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffbe9960fcbd48 EFLAGS: 00010246
kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9af5272ae780 RCX: 0000000000372004
kernel: RDX: ffffffffffffffff RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: ffff9af555e9b000
kernel: RBP: ffff9af52ee66b00 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 0000000000370004
kernel: R10: ffffbe9960fcbd48 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff9af555e9b000
kernel: R13: ffffffffa66b86c0 R14: ffff9af507d2f400 R15: ffff9af507d2f400
kernel: FS: 00007ffbc0ba4740(0000) GS:ffff9b0bd7000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
kernel: CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 00000001b1ee0000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: <TASK>
kernel: ? __die_body+0x1a/0x60
kernel: ? page_fault_oops+0x16f/0x4a0
kernel: ? search_bpf_extables+0x65/0x70
kernel: ? fixup_exception+0x22/0x310
kernel: ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x150
kernel: ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
kernel: ? __pfx_hugetlbfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10
kernel: ? hugetlbfs_fill_super+0xb4/0x1a0
kernel: ? hugetlbfs_fill_super+0x28/0x1a0
kernel: ? __pfx_hugetlbfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10
kernel: vfs_get_super+0x40/0xa0
kernel: ? __pfx_bpf_lsm_capable+0x10/0x10
kernel: vfs_get_tree+0x25/0xd0
kernel: vfs_cmd_create+0x64/0xe0
kernel: __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x395/0x410
kernel: do_syscall_64+0x80/0x160
kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x82/0x240
kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x160
kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x82/0x240
kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x160
kernel: ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x150
kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7ffbc0cb87c9
kernel: Code: 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 97 96 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
kernel: RSP: 002b:00007ffc29d2f388 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001af
kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ffbc0cb87c9
kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000003
kernel: RBP: 00007ffc29d2f3b0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
kernel: R13: 00007ffc29d2f4c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
kernel: </TASK>
kernel: Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5(E) auth_rpcgss(E) nfsv4(E) dns_resolver(E) nfs(E) lockd(E) grace(E) sunrpc(E) netfs(E) af_packet(E) bridge(E) stp(E) llc(E) iscsi_ibft(E) iscsi_boot_sysfs(E) intel_rapl_msr(E) intel_rapl_common(E) iTCO_wdt(E) intel_pmc_bxt(E) sb_edac(E) iTCO_vendor_support(E) x86_pkg_temp_thermal(E) intel_powerclamp(E) coretemp(E) kvm_intel(E) rfkill(E) ipmi_ssif(E) kvm(E) acpi_ipmi(E) irqbypass(E) pcspkr(E) igb(E) ipmi_si(E) mei_me(E) i2c_i801(E) joydev(E) intel_pch_thermal(E) i2c_smbus(E) dca(E) lpc_ich(E) mei(E) ipmi_devintf(E) ipmi_msghandler(E) acpi_pad(E) tiny_power_button(E) button(E) fuse(E) efi_pstore(E) configfs(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) ext4(E) mbcache(E) jbd2(E) hid_generic(E) usbhid(E) sd_mod(E) t10_pi(E) crct10dif_pclmul(E) crc32_pclmul(E) crc32c_intel(E) polyval_clmulni(E) ahci(E) xhci_pci(E) polyval_generic(E) gf128mul(E) ghash_clmulni_intel(E) sha512_ssse3(E) sha256_ssse3(E) xhci_pci_renesas(E) libahci(E) ehci_pci(E) sha1_ssse3(E) xhci_hcd(E) ehci_hcd(E) libata(E)
kernel: mgag200(E) i2c_algo_bit(E) usbcore(E) wmi(E) sg(E) dm_multipath(E) dm_mod(E) scsi_dh_rdac(E) scsi_dh_emc(E) scsi_dh_alua(E) scsi_mod(E) scsi_common(E) aesni_intel(E) crypto_simd(E) cryptd(E)
kernel: Unloaded tainted modules: acpi_cpufreq(E):1 fjes(E):1
kernel: CR2: 0000000000000028
kernel: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
kernel: RIP: 0010:hugetlbfs_fill_super+0xb4/0x1a0
kernel: Code: 48 8b 3b e8 3e c6 ed ff 48 85 c0 48 89 45 20 0f 84 d6 00 00 00 48 b8 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 7f 4c 89 e7 49 89 44 24 20 48 8b 03 <8b> 48 28 b8 00 10 00 00 48 d3 e0 49 89 44 24 18 48 8b 03 8b 40 28
kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffbe9960fcbd48 EFLAGS: 00010246
kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9af5272ae780 RCX: 0000000000372004
kernel: RDX: ffffffffffffffff RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: ffff9af555e9b000
kernel: RBP: ffff9af52ee66b00 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 0000000000370004
kernel: R10: ffffbe9960fcbd48 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff9af555e9b000
kernel: R13: ffffffffa66b86c0 R14: ffff9af507d2f400 R15: ffff9af507d2f400
kernel: FS: 00007ffbc0ba4740(0000) GS:ffff9b0bd7000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
kernel: CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 00000001b1ee0000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240130210418.3771-1-osalvador@suse.de
Fixes: 32021982a324 ("hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context")
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Vamsi Krishna Brahmajosyula <vamsi-krishna.brahmajosyula@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e21a2f17566cbd64926fb8f16323972f7a064444 upstream.
The following memory leak was reported after unbinding /dev/cachefiles:
==================================================================
unreferenced object 0xffff9b674176e3c0 (size 192):
comm "cachefilesd2", pid 680, jiffies 4294881224
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace (crc ea38a44b):
[<ffffffff8eb8a1a5>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x2d5/0x370
[<ffffffff8e917f86>] prepare_creds+0x26/0x2e0
[<ffffffffc002eeef>] cachefiles_determine_cache_security+0x1f/0x120
[<ffffffffc00243ec>] cachefiles_add_cache+0x13c/0x3a0
[<ffffffffc0025216>] cachefiles_daemon_write+0x146/0x1c0
[<ffffffff8ebc4a3b>] vfs_write+0xcb/0x520
[<ffffffff8ebc5069>] ksys_write+0x69/0xf0
[<ffffffff8f6d4662>] do_syscall_64+0x72/0x140
[<ffffffff8f8000aa>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
==================================================================
Put the reference count of cache_cred in cachefiles_daemon_unbind() to
fix the problem. And also put cache_cred in cachefiles_add_cache() error
branch to avoid memory leaks.
Fixes: 9ae326a69004 ("CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240217081431.796809-1-libaokun1@huawei.com
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jingbo Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Bruce Ashfield
Johannes Thumshirn
Jeongjun Park
Alan Stern
Boris Burkov
Ye Bin
Zhang Yi
Alex Henrie
Tetsuo Handa
David Sterba
Kunwu Chan
Christophe JAILLET
Max Filippov
Goldwyn Rodrigues
Bart Van Assche
Ryusuke Konishi
Josef Bacik
Maximilian Heyne
Filipe Manana
Miklos Szeredi
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
Jan Kara
Baokun Li
David Howells
Jorge Mora
Sheng Yong
Wang Jianjian
Arnd Bergmann
Nikita Zhandarovich
Prakash Sangappa
Mike Kravetz
Oscar Salvador