| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
# Conflicts:
# kernel/printk/printk.c
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This is the 5.4.275 stable release
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# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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This is the 5.4.274 stable release
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# gpg: Signature made Sat 13 Apr 2024 06:55:15 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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[ Upstream commit 9543f6e26634537997b6e909c20911b7bf4876de ]
Fix cpuid_deps[] to list the correct dependencies for GFNI, VAES, and
VPCLMULQDQ. These features don't depend on AVX512, and there exist CPUs
that support these features but not AVX512. GFNI actually doesn't even
depend on AVX.
This prevents GFNI from being unnecessarily disabled if AVX is disabled
to mitigate the GDS vulnerability.
This also prevents all three features from being unnecessarily disabled
if AVX512VL (or its dependency AVX512F) were to be disabled, but it
looks like there isn't any case where this happens anyway.
Fixes: c128dbfa0f87 ("x86/cpufeatures: Enable new SSE/AVX/AVX512 CPU features")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240417060434.47101-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 3ddf944b32f88741c303f0b21459dbb3872b8bc5 upstream.
Modifying a MCA bank's MCA_CTL bits which control which error types to
be reported is done over
/sys/devices/system/machinecheck/
├── machinecheck0
│ ├── bank0
│ ├── bank1
│ ├── bank10
│ ├── bank11
...
sysfs nodes by writing the new bit mask of events to enable.
When the write is accepted, the kernel deletes all current timers and
reinits all banks.
Doing that in parallel can lead to initializing a timer which is already
armed and in the timer wheel, i.e., in use already:
ODEBUG: init active (active state 0) object: ffff888063a28000 object
type: timer_list hint: mce_timer_fn+0x0/0x240 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c:2642
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8120 at lib/debugobjects.c:514
debug_print_object+0x1a0/0x2a0 lib/debugobjects.c:514
Fix that by grabbing the sysfs mutex as the rest of the MCA sysfs code
does.
Reported by: Yue Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Reported by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAEkJfYNiENwQY8yV1LYJ9LjJs%2Bx_-PqMv98gKig55=2vbzffRw@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fd470a8beed88440b160d690344fbae05a0b9b1b upstream.
Unlike Intel's Enhanced IBRS feature, AMD's Automatic IBRS does not
provide protection to processes running at CPL3/user mode, see section
"Extended Feature Enable Register (EFER)" in the APM v2 at
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=304652
Explicitly enable STIBP to protect against cross-thread CPL3
branch target injections on systems with Automatic IBRS enabled.
Also update the relevant documentation.
Fixes: e7862eda309e ("x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS")
Reported-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230720194727.67022-1-kim.phillips@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5c84b051bd4e777cf37aaff983277e58c99618d5 ]
Update them to the correct revision numbers.
Fixes: 522b1d69219d ("x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 1d30800c0c0ae1d086ffad2bdf0ba4403370f132 upstream.
Those mitigations are very talkative; use the printing helper which pays
attention to the buffer size.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220809153419.10182-1-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e7862eda309ecfccc36bb5558d937ed3ace07f3f upstream.
The AMD Zen4 core supports a new feature called Automatic IBRS.
It is a "set-and-forget" feature that means that, like Intel's Enhanced IBRS,
h/w manages its IBRS mitigation resources automatically across CPL transitions.
The feature is advertised by CPUID_Fn80000021_EAX bit 8 and is enabled by
setting MSR C000_0080 (EFER) bit 21.
Enable Automatic IBRS by default if the CPU feature is present. It typically
provides greater performance over the incumbent generic retpolines mitigation.
Reuse the SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS spectre_v2_mitigation enum. AMD Automatic IBRS and
Intel Enhanced IBRS have similar enablement. Add NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to
cpu_vuln_whitelist, since AMD Automatic IBRS isn't affected by PBRSB-eIBRS.
The kernel command line option spectre_v2=eibrs is used to select AMD Automatic
IBRS, if available.
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124163319.2277355-8-kim.phillips@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is the 5.4.271 stable release
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# gpg: Signature made Wed 06 Mar 2024 09:36:14 AM EST
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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This is the 5.4.270 stable release
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# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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This is the 5.4.269 stable release
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# gpg: Signature made Fri 23 Feb 2024 02:25:44 AM EST
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit 6890cb1ace350b4386c8aee1343dc3b3ddd214da upstream.
MKTME repurposes the high bit of physical address to key id for encryption
key and, even though MAXPHYADDR in CPUID[0x80000008] remains the same,
the valid bits in the MTRR mask register are based on the reduced number
of physical address bits.
detect_tme() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c detects TME and subtracts
it from the total usable physical bits, but it is called too late.
Move the call to early_init_intel() so that it is called in setup_arch(),
before MTRRs are setup.
This fixes boot on TDX-enabled systems, which until now only worked with
"disable_mtrr_cleanup". Without the patch, the values written to the
MTRRs mask registers were 52-bit wide (e.g. 0x000fffff_80000800) and
the writes failed; with the patch, the values are 46-bit wide, which
matches the reduced MAXPHYADDR that is shown in /proc/cpuinfo.
Reported-by: Zixi Chen <zixchen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240131230902.1867092-3-pbonzini%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d35652a5fc9944784f6f50a5c979518ff8dacf61 ]
Fei has reported that KASAN triggers during apply_alternatives() on
a 5-level paging machine:
BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in rcu_is_watching()
Read of size 4 at addr ff110003ee6419a0 by task swapper/0/0
...
__asan_load4()
rcu_is_watching()
trace_hardirqs_on()
text_poke_early()
apply_alternatives()
...
On machines with 5-level paging, cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LA57)
gets patched. It includes KASAN code, where KASAN_SHADOW_START depends on
__VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT, which is defined with cpu_feature_enabled().
KASAN gets confused when apply_alternatives() patches the
KASAN_SHADOW_START users. A test patch that makes KASAN_SHADOW_START
static, by replacing __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT with 56, works around the issue.
Fix it for real by disabling KASAN while the kernel is patching alternatives.
[ mingo: updated the changelog ]
Fixes: 6657fca06e3f ("x86/mm: Allow to boot without LA57 if CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y")
Reported-by: Fei Yang <fei.yang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231012100424.1456-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9f3b130048bfa2e44a8cfb1b616f826d9d5d8188 ]
Memory errors don't happen very often, especially fatal ones. However,
in large-scale scenarios such as data centers, that probability
increases with the amount of machines present.
When a fatal machine check happens, mce_panic() is called based on the
severity grading of that error. The page containing the error is not
marked as poison.
However, when kexec is enabled, tools like makedumpfile understand when
pages are marked as poison and do not touch them so as not to cause
a fatal machine check exception again while dumping the previous
kernel's memory.
Therefore, mark the page containing the error as poisoned so that the
kexec'ed kernel can avoid accessing the page.
[ bp: Rewrite commit message and comment. ]
Co-developed-by: Youquan Song <youquan.song@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Youquan Song <youquan.song@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhiquan Li <zhiquan1.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231014051754.3759099-1-zhiquan1.li@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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The stable kernel version backport of the patch disabling XSAVES on AMD
Zen family 0x17 applied this change to the wrong function (init_amd_k6()),
one which isn't called for Zen CPUs.
Move the erratum to the init_amd_zn() function instead.
Add an explicit family 0x17 check to the erratum so nothing will break if
someone naively makes this kernel version call init_amd_zn() also for
family 0x19 in the future (as the current upstream code does).
Fixes: e40c1e9da1ec ("x86/CPU/AMD: Disable XSAVES on AMD family 0x17")
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is the 5.4.268 stable release
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# gpg: Signature made Thu 25 Jan 2024 05:35:02 PM EST
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
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commit 1c6d984f523f67ecfad1083bb04c55d91977bb15 upstream.
kvm_guest_cpu_offline() tries to disable kvmclock regardless if it is
present in the VM. It leads to write to a MSR that doesn't exist on some
configurations, namely in TDX guest:
unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x12 (tried to write 0x0000000000000000)
at rIP: 0xffffffff8110687c (kvmclock_disable+0x1c/0x30)
kvmclock enabling is gated by CLOCKSOURCE and CLOCKSOURCE2 KVM paravirt
features.
Do not disable kvmclock if it was not enabled.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Fixes: c02027b5742b ("x86/kvm: Disable kvmclock on all CPUs on shutdown")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Message-Id: <20231205004510.27164-6-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is the 5.4.266 stable release
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# gpg: Signature made Mon 08 Jan 2024 05:29:51 AM EST
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit 3ea1704a92967834bf0e64ca1205db4680d04048 upstream.
text_poke_early() does:
local_irq_save(flags);
memcpy(addr, opcode, len);
local_irq_restore(flags);
sync_core();
That's not really correct because the synchronization should happen before
interrupts are re-enabled to ensure that a pending interrupt observes the
complete update of the opcodes.
It's not entirely clear whether the interrupt entry provides enough
serialization already, but moving the sync_core() invocation into interrupt
disabled region does no harm and is obviously correct.
Fixes: 6fffacb30349 ("x86/alternatives, jumplabel: Use text_poke_early() before mm_init()")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZT6narvE%2BLxX%2B7Be@windriver.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is the 5.4.264 stable release
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# gpg: Signature made Wed 13 Dec 2023 12:18:39 PM EST
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit 9b8493dc43044376716d789d07699f17d538a7c4 upstream.
Commit in Fixes added an AMD-specific microcode callback. However, it
didn't check the CPU vendor the kernel runs on explicitly.
The only reason the Zenbleed check in it didn't run on other x86 vendors
hardware was pure coincidental luck:
if (!cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_zenbleed))
return;
gives true on other vendors because they don't have those families and
models.
However, with the removal of the cpu_has_amd_erratum() in
05f5f73936fa ("x86/CPU/AMD: Drop now unused CPU erratum checking function")
that coincidental condition is gone, leading to the zenbleed check
getting executed on other vendors too.
Add the explicit vendor check for the whole callback as it should've
been done in the first place.
Fixes: 522b1d69219d ("x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix")
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231201184226.16749-1-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is the 5.4.262 stable release
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# gpg: Signature made Tue 28 Nov 2023 11:50:45 AM EST
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit ee545b94d39a00c93dc98b1dbcbcf731d2eadeb4 upstream.
Hygon processors with a model ID > 3 have CPUID leaf 0xB correctly
populated and don't need the fixed package ID shift workaround. The fixup
is also incorrect when running in a guest.
Fixes: e0ceeae708ce ("x86/CPU/hygon: Fix phys_proc_id calculation logic for multi-die processors")
Signed-off-by: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/tencent_594804A808BD93A4EBF50A994F228E3A7F07@qq.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814085112.089607918@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is the 5.4.260 stable release
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# gpg: Signature made Wed 08 Nov 2023 05:23:50 AM EST
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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This is the 5.4.259 stable release
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# gpg: Signature made Wed 25 Oct 2023 05:53:34 AM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit 7e09ac27f43b382f5fe9bb7c7f4c465ece1f8a23 upstream.
Commit in Fixes added the "NOLOAD" attribute to the .brk section as a
"failsafe" measure.
Unfortunately, this leads to the linker no longer covering the .brk
section in a program header, resulting in the kernel loader not knowing
that the memory for the .brk section must be reserved.
This has led to crashes when loading the kernel as PV dom0 under Xen,
but other scenarios could be hit by the same problem (e.g. in case an
uncompressed kernel is used and the initrd is placed directly behind
it).
So drop the "NOLOAD" attribute. This has been verified to correctly
cover the .brk section by a program header of the resulting ELF file.
Fixes: e32683c6f7d2 ("x86/mm: Fix RESERVE_BRK() for older binutils")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630071441.28576-4-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e32683c6f7d22ba624e0bfc58b02cf3348bdca63 upstream.
With binutils 2.26, RESERVE_BRK() causes a build failure:
/tmp/ccnGOKZ5.s: Assembler messages:
/tmp/ccnGOKZ5.s:98: Error: missing ')'
/tmp/ccnGOKZ5.s:98: Error: missing ')'
/tmp/ccnGOKZ5.s:98: Error: missing ')'
/tmp/ccnGOKZ5.s:98: Error: junk at end of line, first unrecognized
character is `U'
The problem is this line:
RESERVE_BRK(early_pgt_alloc, INIT_PGT_BUF_SIZE)
Specifically, the INIT_PGT_BUF_SIZE macro which (via PAGE_SIZE's use
_AC()) has a "1UL", which makes older versions of the assembler unhappy.
Unfortunately the _AC() macro doesn't work for inline asm.
Inline asm was only needed here to convince the toolchain to add the
STT_NOBITS flag. However, if a C variable is placed in a section whose
name is prefixed with ".bss", GCC and Clang automatically set
STT_NOBITS. In fact, ".bss..page_aligned" already relies on this trick.
So fix the build failure (and simplify the macro) by allocating the
variable in C.
Also, add NOLOAD to the ".brk" output section clause in the linker
script. This is a failsafe in case the ".bss" prefix magic trick ever
stops working somehow. If there's a section type mismatch, the GNU
linker will force the ".brk" output section to be STT_NOBITS. The LLVM
linker will fail with a "section type mismatch" error.
Note this also changes the name of the variable from .brk.##name to
__brk_##name. The variable names aren't actually used anywhere, so it's
harmless.
Fixes: a1e2c031ec39 ("x86/mm: Simplify RESERVE_BRK()")
Reported-by: Joe Damato <jdamato@fastly.com>
Reported-by: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Joe Damato <jdamato@fastly.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/22d07a44c80d8e8e1e82b9a806ddc8c6bbb2606e.1654759036.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
[nathan: Fix conflict due to lack of 360db4ace311 and resolve silent
conflict with 360db4ace3117]
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 128b0c9781c9f2651bea163cb85e52a6c7be0f9e upstream.
David and a few others reported that on certain newer systems some legacy
interrupts fail to work correctly.
Debugging revealed that the BIOS of these systems leaves the legacy PIC in
uninitialized state which makes the PIC detection fail and the kernel
switches to a dummy implementation.
Unfortunately this fallback causes quite some code to fail as it depends on
checks for the number of legacy PIC interrupts or the availability of the
real PIC.
In theory there is no reason to use the PIC on any modern system when
IO/APIC is available, but the dependencies on the related checks cannot be
resolved trivially and on short notice. This needs lots of analysis and
rework.
The PIC detection has been added to avoid quirky checks and force selection
of the dummy implementation all over the place, especially in VM guest
scenarios. So it's not an option to revert the relevant commit as that
would break a lot of other scenarios.
One solution would be to try to initialize the PIC on detection fail and
retry the detection, but that puts the burden on everything which does not
have a PIC.
Fortunately the ACPI/MADT table header has a flag field, which advertises
in bit 0 that the system is PCAT compatible, which means it has a legacy
8259 PIC.
Evaluate that bit and if set avoid the detection routine and keep the real
PIC installed, which then gets initialized (for nothing) and makes the rest
of the code with all the dependencies work again.
Fixes: e179f6914152 ("x86, irq, pic: Probe for legacy PIC and set legacy_pic appropriately")
Reported-by: David Lazar <dlazar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: David Lazar <dlazar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218003
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/875y2u5s8g.ffs@tglx
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f454b18e07f518bcd0c05af17a2239138bff52de upstream.
Fix erratum #1485 on Zen4 parts where running with STIBP disabled can
cause an #UD exception. The performance impact of the fix is negligible.
Reported-by: René Rebe <rene@exactcode.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: René Rebe <rene@exactcode.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/D99589F4-BC5D-430B-87B2-72C20370CF57@exactcode.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is the 5.4.257 stable release
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# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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[ Upstream commit c9f4c45c8ec3f07f4f083f9750032a1ec3eab6b2 ]
The Gather Data Sampling (GDS) vulnerability is common to all Skylake
processors. However, the "client" Skylakes* are now in this list:
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/support/articles/000022396/processors.html
which means they are no longer included for new vulnerabilities here:
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html
or in other GDS documentation. Thus, they were not included in the
original GDS mitigation patches.
Mark SKYLAKE and SKYLAKE_L as vulnerable to GDS to match all the
other Skylake CPUs (which include Kaby Lake). Also group the CPUs
so that the ones that share the exact same vulnerabilities are next
to each other.
Last, move SRBDS to the end of each line. This makes it clear at a
glance that SKYLAKE_X is unique. Of the five Skylakes, it is the
only "server" CPU and has a different implementation from the
clients of the "special register" hardware, making it immune to SRBDS.
This makes the diff much harder to read, but the resulting table is
worth it.
I very much appreciate the report from Michael Zhivich about this
issue. Despite what level of support a hardware vendor is providing,
the kernel very much needs an accurate and up-to-date list of
vulnerable CPUs. More reports like this are very welcome.
* Client Skylakes are CPUID 406E3/506E3 which is family 6, models
0x4E and 0x5E, aka INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE and INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L.
Reported-by: Michael Zhivich <mzhivich@akamai.com>
Fixes: 8974eb588283 ("x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4ba2909638a29630a346d6c4907a3105409bee7d ]
This source file already includes <linux/miscdevice.h>, which contains
the same macro. It doesn't need to be defined here again.
Fixes: 874bcd00f520 ("apm-emulation: move APM_MINOR_DEV to include/linux/miscdevice.h")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Cc: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230728011120.759-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
# Conflicts:
# include/linux/wait.h
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This is the 5.4.255 stable release
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# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
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commit 2c66ca3949dc701da7f4c9407f2140ae425683a5 upstream.
0-Day found a 34.6% regression in stress-ng's 'af-alg' test case, and
bisected it to commit b81fac906a8f ("x86/fpu: Move FPU initialization into
arch_cpu_finalize_init()"), which optimizes the FPU init order, and moves
the CR4_OSXSAVE enabling into a later place:
arch_cpu_finalize_init
identify_boot_cpu
identify_cpu
generic_identify
get_cpu_cap --> setup cpu capability
...
fpu__init_cpu
fpu__init_cpu_xstate
cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE);
As the FPU is not yet initialized the CPU capability setup fails to set
X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE. Many security module like 'camellia_aesni_avx_x86_64'
depend on this feature and therefore fail to load, causing the regression.
Cure this by setting X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE feature right after OSXSAVE
enabling.
[ tglx: Moved it into the actual BSP FPU initialization code and added a comment ]
Fixes: b81fac906a8f ("x86/fpu: Move FPU initialization into arch_cpu_finalize_init()")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202307192135.203ac24e-oliver.sang@intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230823065747.92257-1-feng.tang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is the 5.4.254 stable release
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# gpg: Signature made Wed 16 Aug 2023 12:19:32 PM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit 6dbef74aeb090d6bee7d64ef3fa82ae6fa53f271 upstream.
Commit
522b1d69219d ("x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix")
provided a fix for the Zen2 VZEROUPPER data corruption bug affecting
a range of CPU models, but the AMD Custom APU 0405 found on SteamDeck
was not listed, although it is clearly affected by the vulnerability.
Add this CPU variant to the Zenbleed erratum list, in order to
unconditionally enable the fallback fix until a proper microcode update
is available.
Fixes: 522b1d69219d ("x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix")
Signed-off-by: Cristian Ciocaltea <cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230811203705.1699914-1-cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b3607269ff57fd3c9690cb25962c5e4b91a0fd3b upstream.
This cannot work and it's unclear how that ever made a difference.
init_fpstate.xsave.header.xfeatures is always 0 so get_xsave_addr() will
always return a NULL pointer, which will prevent storing the default PKRU
value in init_fpstate.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210623121451.451391598@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is the 5.4.252 stable release
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# gpg: Signature made Tue 08 Aug 2023 01:56:44 PM EDT
# gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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Stable-tree-only change.
Due to the way the GDS and SRSO patches flowed into the stable tree, it
was a 50% chance that the merge of the which value GDS and SRSO should
be. Of course, I lost that bet, and chose the opposite of what Linus
chose in commit 64094e7e3118 ("Merge tag 'gds-for-linus-2023-08-01' of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip")
Fix this up by switching the values to match what is now in Linus's tree
as that is the correct value to mirror.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Bruce Ashfield
Eric Biggers
Borislav Petkov (AMD)
Kim Phillips
Borislav Petkov
Paolo Bonzini
Kirill A. Shutemov
Zhiquan Li
Maciej S. Szmigiero
Thomas Gleixner
Pu Wen
Juergen Gross
Josh Poimboeuf
Dave Hansen
Randy Dunlap
Feng Tang
Cristian Ciocaltea
Greg Kroah-Hartman